



DANA SMILLIE FOR THE WORLD BANK

FINAL REPORT

YEMEN YOUTH DEVELOPMENT STUDY

November 2021

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YEMEN YOUTH DEVELOPMENT STUDY

FINAL REPORT

USAID/YEMEN, USAID/MIDDLE EAST BUREAU

IDIQ: AID-OAA-I-14-00075

Task Order: AID-OAA-TO-17-00022 (Middle East Education Research, Training, and Support)

Submitted to:

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USAID/Middle East Bureau

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ACRONYMS

BCC	Behavioral Change Communication
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CLS	Child Labor Survey
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HBS	Household Budget Survey
HC	Health Cluster
IBTCI	International Business and Technical Consultants Inc
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
IRB	Institutional Review Board
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KII	Key Informant Interview
MEERS	Middle East Education, Research, and Training Support
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PYD	Positive Youth Development
ROYG	Republic of Yemen Government
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SI	Social Impact
SMEPS	Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Services
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

YPA	Youth Programming Approach
YPC	Yemen Polling Center

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

STUDY OBJECTIVES

The Youth Development Study (YDS) was designed to support the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) update to the Yemen country strategy (i.e., the Yemen Programming Approach [YPA]).¹ USAID contracted Social Impact (SI) to conduct a study exploring the challenges, priorities, and opportunities faced by Yemeni youth in relation to the five YPA sectors: (1) health; (2) education; (3) water, sanitation, and hygiene; (4) economic recovery, livelihoods, and agriculture; and (5) governance, peace, and stability. The findings from this study are intended to inform integration of youth programming principles into the YPA extension, and possibly, into future activity design. The study was designed to answer five study questions (and one sub-question):

1. What data exist about the condition of youth in Yemen, and what do these data tell us about their needs and how best to serve them?
2. What are the primary challenges, opportunities, and priorities of Yemeni youth?
3. What are the (YPA-relevant) programmatic gaps, cross-sector connections, and potential synergies with other development partners in the youth development sector in Yemen?
4. In what ways can youth development policies and approaches be integrated into USAID activity design to assist in the goal of enabling Yemeni youth to contribute to the rebuilding and development of Yemen?
5. Who are the development partners, implementing partners (IPs), government bodies, and local organizations that serve youth today in Yemen, what models or approaches do they use, and why?
 - i. What evidence exists about the effectiveness of these models and how do they compare to the international literature on best practices for youth development in conflict and crisis affected contexts?

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team interviewed 135 persons across two study phases. Phase 1 included (i) a structured literature review that used documented search criteria and an analytic frame to code 28 documents, (ii) telephone interviews conducted in Arabic and English with 22 youth and 11 non-youth key informants, and (iii) a brief web-based survey administered to 17 individuals. Phase 2 greatly expanded the scale of youth participation, with SI contracting Yemen Polling Center (YPC) to conduct in-person listing and remote interviews with 97 youth across eight governorates. Findings from these interviews were further enriched through five additional key informant interviews. Given the sensitivity of the subject matter covered by the study, the country context, and the demographic of youth respondents, all data collection instruments and protocols were reviewed and approved by SI's Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to commencing data collection to ensure the study met the highest standards of protection for the research subjects.

LIMITATIONS

Even with the expansion of Phase 2 that brought the total number of youth respondents to 119, the study sample is still small in absolute terms and is insufficient to make robust inferences about the population of youth in the eight targeted governorates. It is important to note that the objective of this study was to solicit youth voices and preferences. The documentation of a broad range of these voices, rather than statistical representativeness, should be kept in mind when reading this report. Additionally, results of the literature review uncovered a lack of recent quantitative data available for Yemen, particularly regarding youth.

¹ The YPA 2017-2020 objective was, "to strengthen the foundation for a durable peace in Yemen." A new YPA was approved during the study period. The YPA 2020-2022 objective was revised to, "a strong foundation for durable peace, conflict prevention, and addressing humanitarian needs." As the study was structured in response to the 2017-2020 YPA, the strategic outcomes under review are not reflective of the current country strategy.

COUNTRY LANDSCAPE

The people of Yemen are grappling with a severe, complex, and prolonged humanitarian crisis. At the time of writing, Yemen is in its seventh year of a civil war, a macroeconomic crisis, a famine, a cholera outbreak, and a rapidly expanding outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). The human toll is stark and growing. It is estimated that there have been 130,000 direct casualties from the civil war,² that 70 percent of the population is facing food insecurity, and that almost 50 percent require urgent humanitarian assistance.³ The economic implications of this crisis have been equally serious. It is estimated that gross domestic product (GDP) contracted 39 percent since the outbreak of the war.⁴ The public debt is four-fifths of the GDP and increasing.⁵ Eighty percent of the population is living below the poverty line and prices of key commodities have more than doubled since the outbreak of hostilities.⁶

Since the outbreak of the civil war primarily between the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the Al Houthi insurgency, the country has been territorially divided. The capacity and reach of the ROYG has atrophied significantly at all levels, and citizen trust in the government to deliver key services is at an all-time low.

These compounding crises have fundamentally upended the lives of Yemeni citizenry and made planning for the future secondary to securing more immediate basic needs. Among the youth demographic (10-29 years old), the instability has inhibited opportunities and cast a years-long shadow of insecurity, unpredictability, and want. The current situation for youth in Yemen is further exacerbated by the sheer size of the youth population: 69 percent of Yemen's population is under the age of 30, compared to 49 percent of the world's population.⁷ This "youth bulge" combined with the lack of opportunities for youth engendered by the conflict and resulting economic stagnation presents a significant risk to peacebuilding efforts in Yemen, thus underscoring the critical importance of engaging youth in development programming at this time. In the sections below, we provide a brief overview of findings across the six previous YPA outcomes that serve to inform sectoral priorities for

YOUTH AT A GLANCE



The number of Yemenis under age 15 increased by **17 percent** over the last decade



Among youth ages 15-24, the **unemployment rate (23 percent)** was almost twice that of the general population in 2019



More than **6,700 children** have been verified as killed or maimed since the start of the conflict. More than half of Yemenis aged 15 to 25 are severely affected by the indirect consequences of the war



An estimated **1.8 million children** are acutely malnourished, with malnourishment projected to affect nearly 80 percent of Yemeni children by 2030



Forty-two percent of 15-29-year-olds were enrolled in education in 2017; by 2019, approximately 1,600 schools had been completely or partially destroyed



More than 422,000 refugees and migrants live in Yemen in precarious conditions. **30 percent of the 150,000** new arrivals in 2018 were unaccompanied minors

² ACLED (2020) ACLED Resources: War in Yemen. Retrieved from: <https://acleddata.com/2020/03/25/acled-resources-war-in-yemen/>

³ UNHCR (2019). Yemen 2019 end of year results. Retrieved from: <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2647>

⁴ World Bank. (2021). Yemen's economic update – April 2021. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-april-2021>

⁵ Trading Economics (2021). Yemen Government Debt to GDP. Retrieved from: <https://tradingeconomics.com/yemen/government-debt-to-gdp>

⁶ World Food Programme (2019). Yemen Market Watch Report. Retrieved from: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000104941/download/>

⁷ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.

youth and methods for their engagement.⁸ A detailed overview of each thematic context and study findings can be found in the body of the report.

FINDINGS

OUTCOME 1.1 IMPROVED ACCESS TO HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WATER

Public health, education, and water systems did not meet citizenry demand before the outbreak of the civil war. All three have significantly deteriorated over the last five-year period due to direct and indirect consequences of the war, including the destruction of an estimated 2,500 schools⁹ and damage to or destruction of 278 health facilities.¹⁰

Quality of healthcare and educational service delivery is extremely poor, particularly in rural areas. Key drivers of this deterioration include emigration of highly qualified professionals, poor training and underpayment of healthcare and educational workers, and insufficiency of supplies.

Inadequacy of the health system has contributed to multiple large outbreaks of communicable diseases. Public health challenges have been compounded by large-scale malnutrition.

Youth have no faith in the public health system, reporting age-based discrimination in access and poor quality of care. The private health system functions better but access is limited, and services are cost prohibitive to most of the nation's youth.

Psychological problems stemming from the conflict are pervasive but access to treatment is inhibited by insufficient supply of mental health services, dismissive social perceptions of mental illness, and financial constraints; however, some youth-led civil society organizations (CSOs) have received international funding to implement psychosocial support projects to date.

Major constraints to quality education include insufficient access to schools, high cost of schooling, teacher underperformance, insufficient access to teaching and learning materials, large teacher-to-pupil ratios, and outdated curricula. This poor quality of education in conjunction with the unemployment crisis has led to **large numbers of youth dropouts, as households see lower return on educational investments and higher opportunity costs to keeping youth out of the labor market.**

Youth are unhappy with the state of the nation's water system. They note inadequacy of water networks, the high cost of water, the low quality of water from piped and private water sources, and significant time investment involved with acquisition and transport of private water sources.

OUTCOME 1.2 INCREASED HOUSEHOLD INCOME & OUTCOME 1.3 MACROECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND FUNCTIONS STRENGTHENED

The Yemeni economy has been in a years-long crisis characterized by increasing prices, large-scale unemployment, and a growing debt burden. Forty percent of the country lives in extreme poverty, reporting poor or borderline consumption, and a significant majority lives in pervasive economic instability.¹¹

Yemeni economic institutions are under-resourced and lack capacity to deal with the significance and number of national challenges. The regulatory framework inhibits entrepreneurial activity, particularly regarding trade, electricity, construction permits, and access to credit.

⁸ USAID and SI agreed to combine Outcomes 1.2 and 1.3 because investments under Outcome 1.3 provide benefits at the population (rather than youth) level, and youth respondents prioritized more direct economic phenomena in KIs.

⁹ Moyer, J., Bohl, D., Hanna, T., Mapes, B., and Rafa, M. (2019). Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen. University of Denver for UNDP. pg. 26

¹⁰ Moyer et al. (2019), pg. 38

¹¹ World Bank (2021). Yemen Country Overview. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview>.

Unemployment has disproportionately affected youth, with national estimates between 23-50 percent.^{12, 13} All youth respondents spoke about a pervasive shortage of quality jobs, a phenomenon that transected geographic, age, sex, educational, and socio-economic lines.

The economic crisis has led to a **significant increase in female labor force participation**. Females are economically active in greater numbers and across a wider variety of activities than before the war, with many entering previously male-dominated fields.

While **social constraints to employment** in the form of inequitable gender norms (e.g., mobility constraints through the practice of ‘mahram’), certain jobs being considered dishonorable (‘ayb’), and nepotism (‘wasta’) have waned in recent years, their practice remains common in certain parts of the country.

Youth have increasingly turned to entrepreneurship, but they lack business skills and capital.

OUTCOME 2.1 MECHANISMS THAT ALLOW CITIZENS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS GRIEVANCES STRENGTHENED

The war has caused a severe weakening of central government structures and the ability of the government to manage conflict. This has necessitated increased reliance on local and informal community structures for dispute resolution.

The personalized nature of some of these mechanisms and inter-generational conflicts likely inhibit the identification and resolution of youth grievances, with respondents reporting that **community leaders do not understand or try to address youth needs**.

The fragmentation of centralized dispute management structures has increased the importance of advocacy as a means for successful conflict resolution. However, youth cite **varied and pervasive constraints and prohibitions on youth activism**.

OUTCOME 2.2 SOCIAL COHESION OF COMMUNITIES STRENGTHENED

The war has exacerbated pre-existing social fragmentation around age, ethnicity, education, political affiliation, displacement status, income, and geographic location. Youth report a greater degree of polarization following the start of the conflict, especially along ideological and regional lines.

Breakdown of social cohesion has disproportionately affected women, who have been the victims of various forms of direct and indirect violence since the start of the war.

Youth may be instrumental to improving community cohesion and peacebuilding efforts. Youth groups and initiatives are engaged in various facets of community strengthening, including service provision, behavior change communication, and monitoring of wellbeing.

Youth cite high levels of community support and cohesion, with many saying there is a greater degree of support among youth than among the general population. This cohesion is founded on socio-cultural norms and the necessity of mutual aid. Strong community cohesion can, however, exacerbate conflict, with small disputes escalating into inter-community disputes.

OUTCOME 2.3 INCLUSIVE PEACE AND TRANSITION PROCESSES STRENGTHENED

The UN has been at the forefront of peacebuilding efforts in Yemen, but **progress has been slow due to an over-reliance on dysfunctional state institutions and a lack of inclusivity of marginalized voices** that reflect the situation on the ground.

¹² Plecher, H. (2020). Yemen: Youth unemployment rate from 1999 to 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/813178/youth-unemployment-rate-in-yemen/>

¹³ United Nations Development Program (n.d.) Helping young Yemenis fight unemployment. Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/ourstories/helping-young-yemenis-to-fight-unemployment.html>

Youth are both victims and perpetrators of violence. They have been recruited into frontline combat roles by both sides in the conflict and are incentivized by securing income, food, resources, and a sense of personal purpose.

Yemeni youth are creative and think differently about peacebuilding efforts than older generations. However, **youth face significant constraints to making their voice heard in peacebuilding efforts**, including the inflexibility of older generations, security/travel concerns, and lack of permissions for peacebuilding projects in Houthi-held areas.

Despite the challenges, **youth are hopeful for a future where their voices can be heard and have insights into ways in which they may contribute to the peacebuilding effort** including youth representation in decision-making positions, changing the collective youth mindset, and leveraging the power of influence between youth.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The SI team synthesized programmatic recommendations provided by key informants, survey respondents, and the literature review with sectoral best practices. We present abridged, outcome-specific recommendations for USAID below. The codes in brackets link these recommendations to YPA illustrative activities as detailed in the recommendations section in the report body. Before elaborating sector-specific recommendations, however, we provide key considerations that cut across many YPA areas:

- Irrespective of all outcome areas, USAID should strive to incorporate a youth lens so that youth voices should be included at all stages of the program cycle stages, including activity design, implementation, and M&E. While this is important in any USAID context, the opportunities and threats presented by Yemen's significant youth population make this a key beneficiary population that should be explicitly considered. Depending on the extent of youth involvement with a given activity, this could take the form of strategy/document review from a youth perspective, solicitation of feedback from expert(s) in relevant Yemeni youth issues, or the direct involvement of Yemeni youth as stakeholders.
- Activity targeting should be conducted in a way that strives to provide services to those youth most in need and/or most likely to benefit from investments. However, this desire should be weighed against possible inter-family or community-level consequences levied at participants, their families, and/or local implementers. In instances where conflicts may be exacerbated through specific targeting strategies (i.e., focusing exclusively on female beneficiaries), it is incumbent on USAID and its implementing partners to revise targeting strategies (possibly reducing delivery efficiency) and/or to better understand possible grievances and work with community members to ameliorate issues before commencement of programming.
- Finally, given the paucity of age-disaggregated data and the high degree of heterogeneity across Yemen, we recommend that USAID incorporate high-quality data collection in support of activity design and/or inclusion of rigorous activity baselines to assist adaptive management and measure performance.

HEALTH

- Rebuild damaged infrastructure and incentivize the creation of new health facilities in rural areas to better meet youth held needs, including through public/private partnerships. [1.1]
- Provide improved pre-service and in-service training to health care workers, targeting youth providers. [1.7]
- Work with government counterparts to support retention of healthcare professionals through identification and operationalization of incentive-based systems. [1.2, 1.7, 1.6]
- Implement behavior change communication (BCC) interventions around hygiene practices, mental health, and reproductive health. In addition to targeting youth audiences, USAID should engage youth in the design and distribution of BCC messages. [1.8]

- Provide key medical equipment/supplies based on a cost-benefit analysis with a focus on youth reproductive health services and the prevention of communicable diseases. [1.2]
- Partner with other development partners working in humanitarian assistance to support meeting the basic needs of at-risk populations (e.g., internally displaced persons (IDPs)) through provision of food baskets and shelter. [1.6]

EDUCATION

Technical and Vocational Education and Training

- Support the development and delivery of youth-focused entrepreneurship and workforce development trainings in partnership with public and private TVET providers, and possibly universities. Trainings should be informed by local market assessments that assess both labor needs as well as social constraints. Trainings should include life/soft skills and financial literacy components, as well as follow-on services such as coaching/mentoring and provision of seed capital for entrepreneurs.
- Provide technical assistance to TVET providers serving youth populations.
- Explore partnering with youth as training extension agents in locations where there is an absence of qualified TVET institutions.

Formal Education [1.3, 1.5]

- Support modernization of school curricula with a focus on foundational skills (literacy/numeracy) and better preparing students for integration with the modern economy.
- Support modernization of pre-service teacher training curricula and provision of in-service teacher training and mentoring support, especially among youth educators.
- Develop and provide scripted lesson plans, particularly for teachers without formal training.
- Recruit youth to serve as teachers and teacher's aides, particularly women.
- Support retention of educational professionals through identification and operationalization of incentive-based systems.
- Support student retention, particularly with female pupils, through early identification and household-based engagement activities.
- Develop and provide remedial education services for out of school youth, focusing on foundational and life/soft skills, as well as re-entry into the formal education system.
- Promote teacher accountability through improved school-based management and parent involvement in the education system.

WATER

- Support expansion of water infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, involving youth in the building, maintenance, and monitoring of these investments. [1.9]
- Support sterilization of wells and water tankers and distribute chlorine tablets (particularly to IDPs) to inhibit the spread of communicable diseases.
- Support water user associations through technical assistance and harmonization of water rights claims.
- Distribute BCC on safe water storage and efficient water management.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME

- Promote job creation through the provision of entrepreneurship and workforce development training (detailed in the education section above). [2.1, 2.3, 2.4]
- Expand access to microfinance for youth entrepreneurs, particularly among females and rural youth. [2.1]
- Value-chain support to key labor-intensive sectors including agriculture and fisheries. [2.1, 2.2]
- Support to emergent industries exhibiting growth since the civil war, particularly those with high expected employment of youth workers (e.g., solar power, motorcycle transport). [2.4]

- Targeted cash-for work projects aligning strategic priorities (e.g., supporting other YPA sectors) with beneficiary targeting (e.g., youth that might leverage experience into related careers).

GRIEVANCE IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION

- Develop and provide trainings for youth on legal rights and processes by which they can be exercised, with particular focus on youth activists and groups. [3.2]
- Support local conflict resolution entities through capacity building and technical assistance. [3.2]
- Partner with youth to act as field monitors on functioning of grievance resolution mechanisms. [3.3]
- Facilitate dialogue between youth networks and government representatives at the local, provincial, and national levels. [3.4]

COMMUNITY SOCIAL COHESION

- Create safe spaces for youth from different backgrounds to socialize (e.g., sport facilities, competitions, workshops, festivals). [1.4, 4.1]
- Create spaces for dialogue between youth and non-youth from different backgrounds. Not marketing activities as social cohesion strengthening will promote engagement and efficacy. [4.1]
- Capacitate and promote youth community and thought leaders. [1.2, 4.1]
- Capacitate and support youth-led community initiatives, particularly those with an explicit goal of serving individuals from different backgrounds or engaging in community dialogue/advocacy. [4.3]
- Support beneficial youth online activities, particularly the production of content focusing on cross-cultural dialogue and combatting online discrimination. [4.1, 4.3]

PEACE AND TRANSITION

- Counteract recruitment of youth into the war by working with government partners to create recruitment-free zones in areas where youth congregate (e.g., schools), assessing strategies for combatting online recruiting, promoting job opportunities (see Education and Income sections), and engaging youth in programming to provide an alternate sense of personal purpose. [5.4]
- Promote dialogue within the youth population and between youth and adults (see Social Cohesion section above). [YPA 5.1, YPA 4.1]
- Support youth engagement with the Transitional Education Plan and Track 2 and 3 programs. [5.5]
- Support youth representation in government positions and advisory groups in partnership with local government partners and other adult powerbrokers. These interventions would necessitate intergenerational approaches noted above. [5.1, 5.4]

BACKGROUND

In March 2020, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) commissioned Social Impact (SI) to conduct the Yemen Desk Study. At the time, USAID's Yemen Programming Approach (YPA) 2017-2020 was in the process of being updated and revalidated. This process concluded during the study period with the publishing of the YPA 2020-2022.¹⁴ The study was intended to facilitate the integration of youth issues in the five YPA sectors: (I) health; (II) education; (III) water, sanitation, and hygiene; (IV) economic development; and (V) governance, peace, and stability (see Figure 1). Following the approval of the report in July 2020, USAID requested an expansion of the Yemen Desk Study (henceforth referred to as Phase 1) to increase the youth sample and strengthen the representativeness of findings. At this time, the study was renamed as Youth Development Study (YDS) (henceforth referred to as Phase 2). The primary audiences for the study include staff from USAID/Yemen and USAID/Middle East Bureau. The study will also be useful for other development partners and practitioners working on youth development.

STUDY PURPOSE & QUESTIONS

The original purpose of this study was to strengthen the evidence base regarding the challenges, priorities, and opportunities of youth programming in Yemen. This purpose was expanded in Phase 2 into three objectives: (i) Clarify priority sectoral areas for programming as defined by Yemeni youth, drawing on both findings from Phase 1 and new information gathered in Phase 2, (ii) expand the geographic and demographic representation of youth in the study sample to represent the youth population in areas where USAID is currently implementing or may potentially implement activities, and (iii) collect additional information on the set of sectoral areas identified by youth as priorities.

The Desk Study was designed to answer five research questions (RQs), and one sub-question:

1. What data exist about the condition of youth in Yemen, and what do these data tell us about their needs and how best to serve them?
2. What are the primary challenges, opportunities, and priorities of Yemeni youth?
3. What are the [YPA-relevant] programmatic gaps, cross-sector connections, and potential synergies with other development partners in the youth development sector in Yemen?
4. In what ways can youth development policies and approaches be integrated into USAID activity design to assist in the goal of enabling Yemeni youth to contribute to the rebuilding and development of Yemen?
5. Who are the development partners, implementing partners, government bodies, and local organizations that serve youth today in Yemen, what models or approaches do they use, and why?


¹⁴ The YPA 2017-2020 objective was, "to strengthen the foundation for a durable peace in Yemen". The YPA 2020-2022 objective was revised to, "a strong foundation for durable peace, conflict prevention, and addressing humanitarian needs." As the YPA was structured in response to the 2017-2020 YPC, the specific outcomes under review in this study are not reflective of the current country strategy.

The 2017-2020 YPA included six outcomes 1.1 "Improved Access to Health, Education, and Water" 1.2 "Increased Household Income" 1.3 "Macroeconomic Institutions and Functions Strengthened to Boost the Economy" 2.1 "Mechanisms that Allow Citizens to Identify and Address Grievances Strengthened" 2.2 "Social Cohesion of Communities Strengthened" and 2.3 "Inclusive Peace and Transition Processes Strengthened". USAID and SI agreed to (i) separate Outcome 1.1 into three themes, discussing health, education, and water separately, and (ii) combine Outcomes 1.2 and 1.3 under the rubric of "household income." This latter decision was influenced by the fact that investments under Outcome 1.3 will provide benefits at the population (rather than youth) level and that youth respondents identify and prioritize more direct economic phenomena,

- a. What evidence exists about the effectiveness of these models and how do they compare to the international literature on best practices for youth development in conflict and crisis affected contexts?

The research was grounded in a positive youth development (PYD) approach that sought to facilitate the enablement of Yemeni youth contributions to the rebuilding and development of Yemen.

Figure 1: Yemen Programming Approach Results Web



METHODOLOGY

The Yemen Youth Development study was conducted in two distinct phases. Phase I was intended as a fully remote desk review with limited scope and budget. In this phase, SI used a mixed-methods approach comprising of a targeted literature review, phone-based youth and key informant interviews (KIIs), and a web-survey. The study was subsequently expanded, with the SI team building on the Phase I evidence base by: (i) updating and expanding the literature review, (ii) contracting the Yemen Polling Center (YPC), a Yemeni data collection partner, to conduct in-person household listing and conduct phone-based interviews with youth, and (iii) conducting phone-based key informant interviews (KIIs). Across both Phases, the SI team interviewed 135 respondents (119 youth and 16 non-youth). In the sections below we describe each data collection approach, the analytical approach, the application of research ethics, and study limitations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review was designed to document key aspects of the current Yemeni context and important historical trends within each of the YPA areas. To start the literature review process, the team first reviewed the YPA and other documentation provided by USAID. Drawing on this review, the team used targeted searches using Google and Google Scholar, the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse website, implementing partner (IP) and development partners websites, and additional documents referred by KII and web survey respondents. Documentation included peer-reviewed articles, development partners and IP research, evaluation reports, news articles, relevant datasets, and grey literature. Documentation was sourced in both English and Arabic. The team prioritized literature for coding based on the relevance to the YPA objectives and youth issues, and using an analytic frame conducted structure coding and analysis. In all, SI sourced 77 documents and coded 28. This process was updated in Phase 2.

YOUTH INTERVIEWS

SI conducted 22 in-depth, semi-structured KIIs with Yemeni youth in Phase I. These interviews focused on youth perceptions of life in Yemen; challenges, assets, and opportunities for youth in Yemen; and recommendations for youth engagement in the YPA outcome areas. The KIIs lasted an average of 60 minutes, were completed via phone using Microsoft Teams or Skype, and were conducted by the Team Lead in English or by an Arabic speaking SI team member. The SI team was challenged by the remote, telephonic approach. To mitigate selection bias, the team conducted outreach to Yemeni youth groups, student unions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) through Facebook, as well as using snowball sampling. These efforts, notwithstanding the Phase I sample, were skewed toward older, more educated, more urban, and more affluent respondents.

With additional resources allocated under Phase 2, the SI team broadened and expanded the qualitative youth sample. Based on input from USAID and consultations with YPC, SI selected 8 governorates for data collection: Abyan, Aden, Al-Dhale, Hadramawt, Lahj, Ma'rib, Shabwah, and Ta'izz.¹⁵ Selection prioritized areas that USAID would be likely to program in the future (i.e., all governorates were outside Houthi control at the time of the research) and did not present considerable security risks to field teams or respondents. Within each governorate, SI and YPC worked together to select one urban district (the governorate's capital) and at least one rural district. Selection of rural districts was facilitated through analysis of seven indicators constructed based on previous YPC surveys: (i) availability and access to education; (ii) availability and access to health

¹⁵ SI initially proposed covering 12 governorates, but due to budget limitations agreed with USAID to reduce to eight governorates. Among these eight, SI and USAID initially agreed on including Sana'a. However, this governorate was replaced after consultations with YPC evidenced security risks to both recruitment teams and respondents. USAID preferred to replace Sana'a with Al-Baydha, but YPC suggested replacing it with Ma'rib instead considering that Al-Baydha is controlled by the Houthi group which would make it difficult and unsafe for the field team to move between different districts and conduct data inside the governorate. Ma'rib is recommended both because of its accessibility for data collection activities in terms of security, as well as representation of different low-income groups in the community.

services; (iii) availability and access to water; (iv) availability and access to public services; (v) poverty level; (vi) security situation; and (vii) perceptions of the current situation. An index of these seven indicators was constructed to identify the districts with the most acute need. To prioritize locations with more secure conditions the security score was doubled in the weighting. This sampling approach helped identify sub-governorate locations that are low-income, have poor access to services, and are relatively safe.

Following a training led by YPC and attended by representatives of SI, YPC deployed two-person field teams to each sampled community. These teams conducted door-to-door listing and generated a sample frame of 120 youth. The screening form used during the listening identified eligible households and facilitated quota-based sampling of youth to achieve a balanced sample on three key characteristics: age, sex, and educational attainment. Particular attention was given to ensure adequate participation by difficult to reach populations, especially inclusion of rural, low socio-economic, and younger (i.e., 15-20 years old) youth respondents. Stratification of communities within governorates supported balance on urbanity and socio-economic status across the full youth sample. Each listing interview lasted for 10 to 15 minutes and solicited contact information, respondent demographics, and information about youth-led community initiatives.

Using the listing data, SI selected the youth sample and YPC utilized a team of interviewers (two men and two women) and note takers (two men and two women) to complete remote interviews with 97 youth using the contact numbers collected in the listing data. The Phase 2 youth interview instrument carried over several Phase 1 questions to promote comparability, but also significantly increased the focus on youth priorities and opportunities for youth engagement in YPA sectors. Youth interviews lasted an average of 75 minutes and were conducted in Arabic from YPC's call center in Ta'izz.

Annex V itemizes the selected districts and sub-districts within each governorate, the number of interviews targeted and completed in each during the listing exercise and phone interviews. Table 1 and Table 2 below document the final Phase 2 sample, disaggregated by key respondent characteristics.

Table 1: Phase 2 Youth Interviews, disaggregated by Gender, Age, and Education

		Sex		Age			Education				Total
		Male	Female	15-19	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelors	
Phase 1	n	9	13	2	9	11	0	0	4	18	22
	%	41%	59%	9%	41%	50%	0%	0%	18%	82%	100%
Phase 2	n	51	46	26	39	32	26	39	19	13	97
	%	53%	47%	27%	40%	33%	27%	40%	20%	13%	100%

Table 2: Youth Interviews, disaggregated by Governorate

Governorate	Phase 1		Phase 2		Total
	Urban		Urban	Rural	
Sana'a	17		0	0	17

Governorate	Phase 1	Phase 2		Total
	Urban	Urban	Rural	
Abyan	0	5	7	12
Ta'izz	2	6	6	14
Hadramawt	0	8	4	12
Ma'rib	0	6	6	12
Lahj	0	6	7	13
Shabwah	0	6	6	12
Al-Dhale	0	7	5	12
Aden	2	12	0	14
Amran	1	0	0	1
Total	22	56	41	119

QUALITATIVE KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

In Phase 1, SI used three complementary approaches to sample KIIs with non-youth participants: (i) USAID referrals, (ii) identifying organizations and individuals from YPA sectors, and (iii) snowball sampling through KII and web survey respondents. In this study phase, SI conducted 11 in-depth, semi-structured KIIs with individuals representing four stakeholder groups: USAID, Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), other development partners, and IPs. By asking similar questions to different groups, SI gathered a variety of perspectives to assist with data analysis and triangulation across various data sources and types of respondents. In Phase 2, SI used findings from youth interviews to sample KII respondents. These respondents were selected based on youth priorities and issues noted by youth that needed elaboration. This sample of respondents included USAID implementers, researchers, and non-governmental organizations. Table 3 details KII respondents across both phases.

Table 3: Key Informant Interviews, disaggregated by Respondent Type

USAID/Development Partner	ROYG	Researchers	Non-Profit	IPs	Total
2	3	3	1	7	16

WEB SURVEY

To gather inputs from a broader range of stakeholders than was possible through KIIs, SI administered a brief web-based survey to individuals representing three stakeholder groups: USAID, other development partners, and IPs. SI's sampling strategy for the web survey included: (i) USAID referrals,

and (ii) snowball sampling via recipients of the survey link forwarding the survey among other colleagues. The survey included a limited number of quantitative and open-ended responses and was designed to solicit information on organizations' youth programming, respondent views on the youth landscape in Yemen, and recommendations for engaging youth in achieving USAID's strategic objectives for Yemen. The survey had 17 complete responses, a 31 percent response rate (see Table 4).

Table 4: Web Surveys, disaggregated by Respondent Type

USAID/Development Partner	IPs	Total
8	9	17

ANALYSIS

SI developed codebooks for youth and non-youth interviews in Phase 1. Members of the team conducted structured coding of all qualitative data (including inter-rater reliability measures) and synthesized results with literature review and survey data in the Phase 1 report. For Phase 2, SI updated the youth codebook to better align with revised instruments, conducted structured coding (including inter-rater reliability measures) and compared emergent themes to data from the previous phase. As noted above, these findings were used to inform the sampling and subsequent analysis of Phase 2 non-youth KIIs. Given the robustness of the Phase 2 youth sample, we gave more weight to these data in the development of this report. We note the existence of divergent findings between the phases in the body of each YPA outcome area.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

All data collection instruments and protocols were reviewed by SI's Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to commencing data collection to ensure that data collection met the highest standards of protection for the research subjects. IRB reviews ensured that the team had protocols in place to read informed consents to all participants (and their parents in case of participants below 18 years of age) and that activities did not put participants at any additional risks from exposure to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) or security concerns.

LIMITATIONS

Representativeness of sample for primary data collection. As noted above, the Phase 1 youth sample was biased due to the limited resources afforded to the initial research. This limitation was significantly reduced in Phase 2 through the expansion in the sample size, but more importantly the community-based quota sampling methodology. While the final Phase 2 sample closely mirrored the quota sampling design, the ability of a study of 97 respondents to generalize to the population of these governorates has significant limitations. However, the Phase 2 sample is still small in absolute terms and is insufficient to make robust inferences about the population of youth in the eight targeted governorates. We feel the respondents capture important segments of the youth population and are as devoid of selection bias as is possible with a study of this nature. However, it is important to note that the objective of this study was to solicit youth voices and preferences. The documentation of a broad range of these voices, rather than statistical representativeness, should be kept in mind when reading this report.

Limited in-person interviewing to prevent COVID-19 transfer. Remote interviewing imposed a range of challenges but was necessary to minimize risk of COVID-19 transfer and to accomplish objectives within budget. We expected non-response rates to be higher, connectivity issues to affect the completion of some interviews, and higher degree of response bias (especially under-elaborating) due to lower degree of relationship building between enumerators and respondents. To mitigate this,

YPC conducted training sessions for recruiters and interviewers, attended by the SI team. The interview training sessions included practice on conducting phone interviews. Instruments included probes for the interviewer to ensure they can capture the participants' response fully for the questions asked. Interviewers had a clear protocol to the number and timing of attempts to make on a contact number before it was replaced with an alternative respondent. In cases where connectivity was a problem, interviewers called at a later convenient time for the respondent to complete the interview.

Lack of recent and age-disaggregated data. Results of the literature review uncovered a clear lack of recent quantitative data available for Yemen. This gap in the literature is especially apparent with youth, and there are no reliable data sources available with quantitative or qualitative data disaggregated by USAID-defined age brackets (10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29), or geographic location. To mitigate this limitation, SI relied on existing peer-reviewed articles and grey literature rather than secondary datasets. However, this lack of disaggregated data particularly for youth represents a large gap in the existing literature.

STUDY CONTEXT

The people of Yemen are grappling with a severe, complex, and prolonged humanitarian crisis. At the time of writing, Yemen is in its seventh year of a civil war, a macroeconomic crisis, a famine, a cholera outbreak, and a fast-growing outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). The human toll is stark and growing. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project estimates 130,000 direct casualties from the conflict.¹⁶ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 80 percent of the Yemeni population requires some form of assistance, with 20 million individuals facing food insecurity and 14 million requiring urgent humanitarian assistance.¹⁷ An estimated four million people were internally displaced at the end of 2019.¹⁸ The economic implications of this crisis have been equally serious. The World Bank estimates that gross domestic product (GDP) has contracted by 39 percent since the outbreak of the war and economic and social prospects in 2021 and beyond are highly uncertain.^{19 20} The public debt is four-fifths of the GDP and increasing.²¹ Eighty percent of the population is living below the poverty line²² and prices of key commodities have increased significantly since the outbreak of hostilities (e.g., the price of the Minimum Food Basket has increased 103 percent).²³

INSTITUTIONS

Since the outbreak of the civil war between the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the Al Houthi insurgency, the country has been territorially divided (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). The ROYG governs out of Ataq and controls the South, East, and North of the country. The Houthis, ruling out of Sana'a and having formed a government under the title Supreme Political Council, control Sana'a and much of Western Yemen. Beyond these two primary actors, a range of smaller combatants claims territorial control as well: most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Yemen Province, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Most important international parties to the conflict are Iran (supporting Houthi), Saudi Arabia (supporting ROYG), and UAE (supporting the STC). Given the geographic focus of USAID programming, this report focuses on the institutional and legal framework under ROYG control.

The capacity and reach of the ROYG has atrophied significantly since its formation, with citizens citing reduced trust in the ability of the government to deliver key services. According to a 2015 paper, “People have lost faith in the ability of the police to solve their problems, which has in turn produced significant chaos and mistrust.”²⁴ Yemen’s governance system consists of appointed executive units at the governorate and district levels. The former reports to the central-level executive office and is led by a governor, whereas the latter reports to the governorate-level executive office and is led by a district director and an elected local council. According to Gleixner-Hayat and Al Ayoub (2017), citizens seek support most frequently from the district executive offices (e.g., office of the district director, functional offices such as education, water, etc.), which perform their functions to varying degrees. Even in instances where services are provided by these authorities, however, people are unsatisfied

¹⁶ ACLED (2020). ACLED Resources: War in Yemen. Retrieved from: <https://acleddata.com/2020/03/25/acled-resources-war-in-yemen/>

¹⁷ UNHCR (2019). <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2647>

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ World Bank (2019). Yemen’s Economic Update – April 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-april-2019>

²⁰ World Bank (2019). Yemen’s Economic Update – April 2021. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-april-2021>

²¹ Trading Economics (2021). Yemen Government Debt to GDP. Retrieved from: <https://tradingeconomics.com/yemen/government-debt-to-gdp>


²² USD 3.2 purchasing power parity

²³ World Food Programme (2019). Yemen Market Watch Report. Retrieved from: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000104941/download/>

²⁴ Al-Shami, M. (2015). Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, pg. 1

with performance, citing corruption and lack of transparency, accountability, and competence.²⁵

Figure 2: Map of Yemen and Zones of Control: December 2019










²⁵ Gleixner-Hayat, B. and Al Ayoub, B. (2017). Yemen Country Study: A sociopolitical analysis of current conditions in Yemen. Development Transformations for USAID, pg. 13

Figure 3: Lines of Control in Yemen: October 2020



As of October 26, 2020, based on map from Risk Intelligence.
Areas are approximate and subject to change.

	Areas of influence	City Control
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)	  <i>Sparsely populated</i>	
Houthi Forces		
UAE-backed Southern Transition Council (STC)		
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)		

The civil war has been particularly damaging to local councils who have been severely impeded in their ability to carry out the basic tasks.²⁶ While local councils should theoretically be effective due to their proximity to citizens, “their lack of authority and resources means that, for the most part, they are not functioning.”²⁷ Akels (“elders”), are neighborhood-level authorities who prove a local coordinating function, oversight of water and humanitarian aid distribution, and in some instances security checkpoints. This office has grown in importance due to state weakness and the extension of humanitarian and basic service distribution. Importantly, “the legality and appropriateness of this practice is debated” and some Yemeni people view Akels with distrust citing beliefs that they are “spies working for the Political Security Organization.”²⁸ While it may be tempting for the USAID to devolve programming to local levels to forestall further consolidation of power by non-state actors, unless structural barriers to functioning legitimacy, authority, and access to resources are resolved, working through these local entities may prove problematic.

²⁶ al-Awlaqi, W. and al-Madhaji, M. (2018). Local Governance in Yemen amid Conflict and Instability. Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, pg. 7

²⁷ Gleixner-Hayat, B. and Al Ayou, B. (2017), pg. 12

²⁸ Gleixner-Hayat, B. and Al Ayou, B. (2017), pg. 12

The erosion of government authority at all levels has opened greater political space to domestic and international actors with greater access to resources. In several governorates, “the widening political and security vacuum has been filled by armed groups.... cementing a new status quo moving Yemen farther from a centralized, unified state” ²⁹

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

According to UNICEF, most Yemeni laws “contain provisions that discriminate against women, including the personal status law, the penal code, the citizenship law and the evidence law.” ³⁰ For example, females lack equal rights in many domains of family life, including divorce, inheritance, child custody, and legal protection. These inequities, in turn, disproportionately expose women and girls to domestic and sexual violence. While females have the legal right to make stipulations in marriage contracts, girls are often unaware of or coerced from exercising this right. More specifically, the ability to exercise pre-marriage rights is inhibited by the fact that females must have the permission and signature of a male guardian or a court and by the high prevalence of early marriage (there is no minimum age for marriage in Yemen). Without these contractual stipulations, “the law requires a wife’s obedience to her husband and his consent to leave the home or travel abroad.” ³¹

The prevalence of child marriage is not expected to substantively decline in the near term. In fact, experts agree that “legal action on child marriage issues is unlikely for the foreseeable future” ³² due to political instability and humanitarian crisis.

YOUTH LANDSCAPE

Yemen has a young and rapidly growing population. Currently, 69 percent of Yemen’s population is under the age of 30, compared to 49 percent of the world’s population. As displayed in Figure 4 and Figure 5 below, the proportion of Yemenis between the ages of 10-29 has grown from 37 percent of the population in 1980 to 42 percent in 2020; for comparison, the comparable proportion of youth over this period globally has decreased from 38 percent to 31 percent. ³³ Various studies and white papers have explored the effects of so-called “youth bulges” on political stability and conflict, suggesting that a youth bulge in combination with economic stagnation may increase the risk of domestic armed conflict. ³⁴ One theory argues that “societies are particularly war prone when the number of young people aged 15-25 reaches a ‘critical level’ of 20 percent of the overall population in a country.” In 2020, exactly 20 percent of Yemen’s population is between the ages of 15-24. ³⁵ Conversely, a young population also presents an opportunity for an increased supply of labor and entrepreneurial energy that can boost economic growth. This research underscores the critical importance of leveraging the youth population to achieve increased economic productivity rather than increased conflict.

²⁹ al-Awlaqi, W. and al-Madhaji, M. (2018), pg. 7

³⁰ UNICEF (2017). Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa – Yemen Country Brief. UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office in collaboration with the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), pg. 11

³¹ UNICEF (2017), pg. 11

³² UNICEF (2017), pg. 12

³³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.

³⁴ Urdal, H. (2004). The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000. Social Development Papers, Paper No. 14. The World Bank.

³⁵ Huntington, S.P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

Figure 4: Yemen Population Growth 1950-2020 by Age Group





Figure 5: World Population Growth 1950-2020 by Age Group



Alongside other governments in the region, Yemen focused significant attention on youth issues in the decade preceding the civil war. This was primarily in response to the large youth population and its persistently high levels of unemployment. A ten-year National Youth Strategy was published in 2006 and resources were allocated to youth workforce development. However, these efforts proved insufficient as the 2011 Arab Spring protests reflected frustration with social and political exclusion as well as economic grievances. The government responded to this groundswell by adopting a National Action Plan (2014-2016)³⁶ that focused specifically on youth employment and increasing youth engagement in the political process. A National Dialogue Conference process was initiated with a 20 percent quota for youth, a 30 percent quota for women, and strong representation from CSOs, as well as commitments from the central government for new youth-focused technical/vocational training programs.³⁷

The experiences with the 2011 protests galvanized youth and female engagement. Women and youth were instrumental in precipitating the uprisings. They were some of the first groups to publicly call for

³⁶ Yemen was the only country in the region that had an explicit plan for youth employment following the Arab Spring - <https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/>

³⁷ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019). "The situation needs us to be active": Youth contributions to peacebuilding in Yemen. European Commission and Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pg. 3

political and social reform.³⁸ They organized a series of ‘change squares’ and protest camps around the country that provided a public venue for young people to meet, debate and learn from each other. Youth led the formation of “numerous youth-led coordinating councils and advocacy, media and monitoring groups, including groups led by young women” and the creation of new coalitions and networks to work on addressing various humanitarian needs.³⁹

This post revolution optimism, however, quickly faded as the civil war and associated crises drew the attention of policy makers. The youth movement was largely “excluded from the negotiations between members of the politically relevant elite and external mediators to resolve the country’s crises, and their demands for accountability, inclusion, and regime change were mostly ignored.”⁴⁰ Ten years after the revolution and seven years into the civil war, youth engagement in community activities and political advocacy has waned significantly. Many youths withdrew from this space because “their work was no longer relevant to the new context, it was too dangerous or traumatic to continue, or they were busy ‘looking for their next meal.’”⁴¹ According to Nevens, Baabbad, and Padda (2019), “Young women and men who are perceived to present any political dissent to local power-holders – including but not limited to civil society activists, human rights advocates and young journalists – are also at increasing risk of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and even assassination at the hands of a number of violent and repressive armed groups.”⁴² It is not unusual for activists to have their social media and email accounts hacked and for gatherings of young activists to be subjected to harassment or being shut down. However, despite these risks to themselves, their families, and their friends, a significant number of young Yemeni women and men continue to play an active community role.

The crisis has affected Yemeni youth in many ways. Most directly, more than 6,700 children have been verified as killed or maimed since the start of the conflict and many more remain under “extreme risk of death or injury from unexploded ordinances, landmines and explosive remnants of war.”⁴³ The indirect effects of the conflict are pervasive among this population. According to a representative national survey conducted in 2017, “More than half of the Yemeni population between the ages of 15 and 25 are severely affected by the indirect consequences of the war, particularly the increase of prices and availability of food, fuel and water.”⁴⁴

Unemployment among youth has continued to be problematic. Among youth ages 15-24, the unemployment rate in 2019 was almost twice that of the general population, at 23.4 percent.⁴⁵ In a context where prices have significantly increased in tandem with reduced earning power of many families, many youths have had to forego pursuit of education to support family incomes. For males this has tended to manifest in early entry into the workforce, particularly construction in urban areas and agriculture in rural areas. More concerning is the recruiting of youth into militias, where the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting estimates that “more than 2,700 boys have been recruited into armed forces and groups.”⁴⁶ Females, on the other hand, have increased their participation in a variety of labor markets but are also getting married at an earlier age, partially as a way of securing dowry for their families.

Despite this turbulent and dangerous context, migrant flows, primarily from the Horn of Africa, continue. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that more than 422,000 refugees and migrants live in Yemen in precarious conditions and

³⁸ Al-Shami, M. (2015). Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, pg. 1

³⁹ Al-Shami, M. (2015), pg. 1

⁴⁰ Dixon, T.L. and Seeger, L. (2016). Yemen Monitoring and Evaluation Program, Phase II: Task 2 Youth Programming in Yemen Gap Analysis. IBTCI for USAID, pg. 4

⁴¹ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 4

⁴² Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 8

⁴³ Humanitarian Action for Children UNICEF, revised April 2019

⁴⁴ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 9

⁴⁵ Statista.com, (2019). Youth Unemployment Rate in Yemen. Retrieved from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/813178/youth-unemployment-rate-in-yemen/>

⁴⁶ Humanitarian Action for Children UNICEF, revised April 2019

that “thirty percent of the 150,000 new arrivals in 2018 were unaccompanied minors... The majority face discrimination, nearly a third have no income, some are arbitrarily detained, and others trafficked.”⁴⁷

PROGRAMMATIC LANDSCAPE

Humanitarian organizations have become critical to the people of Yemen because of the ongoing conflict. The pervasiveness of these organizations is substantiated by an estimate from a representative survey in 2017 which found that “40 percent of the families of the youth questioned have received aid from humanitarian organizations at least once since the beginning of 2017.”⁴⁸

According to Al-Shami (2015), CSOs in Yemen “have a higher status and greater capability” than their peers in many other countries in the Middle East. This partly stems from the fact that “Yemen’s governments have rarely suspended CSOs in the past because they welcome the role of international aid in CSO capacity development.”⁴⁹ However, according to Gleixner-Hayat and Al Ayoub (2017), people view the “role of local CSOs as limited to relief distribution and emergency assistance, often as implementers for international organizations (IOs), who cannot reach the target populations themselves due to security concerns... Respondents commonly referred to lack of funding and capacity to implement as the main challenges for CSOs while some believed a lack of neutrality, accountability, and transparency were also challenges.”⁵⁰

Republic of Yemen Government:⁵¹ Four government ministries have key mandates vis-à-vis youth development: Ministry of Youth and Sport, Ministry of Technical and Vocational Training, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and Ministry of Education. Though these organizations all support youth in some way, none have an explicit and publicly available youth strategy. These government institutions support a variety of YPA outcome areas. However, these institutions do not support activities related to outcomes four (addressing grievances), or six (peacebuilding).

Development Partners: Excepting USAID, the following development partners contribute to youth development in Yemen: European Union (EU) Delegation to Yemen, Department for International Development, GIZ, World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Social Fund for Development, UNICEF, UN Special Envoy Office, and British Foreign Office. These development partners support a variety of YPA outcome areas across all six YPA outcomes.

Implementers and Local NGOs: The following IPs and local NGOs contribute to youth development in Yemen: Youth Leadership Development Foundation, Nadha Makers, Education for Employment, Wojoood Foundation, the Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Service (SMEPS), Save the Children, International Rescue Committee (IRC), International Business and Technical Consultants Inc (IBTCI), Global Communities, CARE International, Relief International, and Pragma Corporation. These organizations support a variety of YPA outcomes, also across all six YPA areas. The most common type of work reported by KII and survey respondents from these organizations were related to income, health, education, water, and social cohesion. Most respondents did not report their organization having a youth strategy or using a specific youth model. The number of organizations supporting macroeconomic functions, governance processes, and peacebuilding efforts was very low. Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 below display more information about the locations, target age groups and cohorts, and positive youth development (PYD) concepts applied among activities of the web survey respondents.

⁴⁷ UNOCHA (2019). Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. Retrieved from: <https://yemen.un.org/en/11650-yemen-humanitarian-response-plan-january-december-2019>

⁴⁸ Transfeld, M. (2017) Coming of Age in a Fragmented State: Everyday Struggles and Perspectives of Yemeni Youth. Yemen Polling Center, pg. 9

⁴⁹ Al-Shami, M. (2015), pg. 1

⁵⁰ Gleixner-Hayat, B. and Al Ayoub, B. (2017), pg. 21

⁵¹ In addition to literature review, some names of development partners, implementing partners, government bodies, and local organizations that serve in Yemen, were identified during KIIs.

Figure 6: Programming Locations Among Web Survey Respondents





Figure 7: Targeted Groups Among Web Survey Respondents



The most common locations of programming were in Sana'a (five) and Aden (five). The dispersion of targeted age groups among activities was reasonably even. Young women (seven) and young men (six) in general were the most common cohorts targeted among activities of web survey respondents, followed by internally displaced persons (IDPs) (five). Individuals injured in military clashes (one) and ethnic or religious minorities (one) were the least targeted cohorts. The most common PYD concept incorporated by web survey respondents was technical or vocational training (seven), followed by soft skills or life skills building (five) and improving norms and behaviors (five). The least incorporated PYD concepts were youth belonging, strengthening laws and policies, and leadership in decision-making, with two responses each.

Figure 8: Positive Youth Development Principles Applied by Programs of Web Survey Respondents



OBJECTIVE 1: KEY CITIZEN NEEDS MET THROUGH LOCAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS

OUTCOME 1.1: IMPROVED ACCESS TO HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WATER

HEALTH

Yemeni public health and nutrition are in a state of crisis and expected to worsen. The United Nations (UN) estimates that 24 million people, or over 80 percent of the country, are in need of humanitarian assistance.⁵² Not only is this figure stark, but the severity of need is rapidly increasing. While the factors explaining this phenomenon are complex, the literature and study respondents focus primarily on insufficient access to quality healthcare and food as primary determinants.

It is estimated that 16.4 million Yemenis, or almost 60 percent of the country, lack adequate healthcare.⁵³ The determinants of this problem are historical. Pre-war health infrastructure was insufficient to meet the needs of Yemeni citizenry, where “half of the population (two-thirds in rural areas) lacked access to healthcare services.”⁵⁴ This supply-side problem was compounded by the war, during which “at least 278 health facilities (were) damaged or destroyed.” An example of this destruction was the August 2018 airstrike on the Al Thawra Hospital in Hodeidah, which served as an epicenter for cholera treatment. After the severe damage of the attack, “estimated cholera cases in the city rose by a third.”⁵⁵ In total, less than half of Yemen’s health facilities are thought to be fully functional and even those “struggle with shortages of essential medicines, supplies and healthcare workers, as well as a lack of resources, safe water, fuel and power.”⁵⁶ While there are some private facilities that provide higher quality care compared to public health centers, they are expensive and beyond the means of the vast majority of Yemenis.

The Yemeni health system was already on the verge of collapse before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time of writing, the virus was causing significant increases in healthcare demand. The response of many hospitals was to refuse admittance due to inadequate capacity, insufficient supplies, and high rates of infected doctors.

Yemen is highly dependent on food imports.⁵⁷ The civil war has constrained the food supply in several important ways. First, armed conflict has led to reduced food imports from blockades of both traded goods and humanitarian aid. Second, domestic food production and distribution have been adversely affected by below average rainfall, higher prices for farming inputs, and reduced access to agricultural land and fishing locations.⁵⁸ The decreased food supply has contributed to increasing food costs at the same time as consumer purchasing power devolved from increased unemployment, salary reductions, and currency inflation. The product of these phenomena has been pervasive, national food insecurity, and malnutrition. Statistics paint a grim picture. An estimated 17.8 million individuals, or more than 60 percent of the country are food insecure.⁵⁹ An estimated 1.8 million children are acutely malnourished, with malnourishment projected to affect nearly 80 percent of Yemeni children by 2030.⁶⁰ Lastly, an

⁵² OCHA (n.d.). About OCHA Yemen. Retrieved from: <https://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-ocha-yemen>

⁵³ OCHA. Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Sana’a, Yemen: 2018.

⁵⁴ Moyer et al. (2019), pg. 37

⁵⁵ Sutter, M. (2018). An update on Yemen’s water crisis and the weaponization of water. Atlantic Council, pg. 7

⁵⁶ Moyer et al. (2019), pg. 38

⁵⁷ UNICEF (2018). Yemen Food Imports: A focus on critical challenges and priority interventions. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/securing-imports-of-essential-food-commodities-to-yemen>

⁵⁸ WFP (2019). Yemen: This is the world’s largest food crisis. Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-worlds-largest-food-crisis>

⁵⁹ OCHA (2018). Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Sana’a, Yemen.

⁶⁰ Moyer, J., Bohl, D., Hanna, T., Mapes, B., and Rafa, M. (2019). Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen. University of Denver for UNDP, pg. 53

estimated 462,000 children suffer from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM),⁶¹ a condition estimated to have caused the death of over 84,000 children between April 2015 and October 2018.⁶²

The people of Yemen have faced multiple large outbreaks of communicable diseases, many of which are vaccine preventable. In 2019 alone, cholera, measles, dengue, and diphtheria were estimated to have sickened millions of Yemenis.⁶³ Contaminated water, poor living conditions, and insufficient sanitation practices have contributed to “the largest cholera outbreak in epidemiologically recorded history with more than 1.3 million suspected cases and over 2,600 associated deaths since the April 2017 outbreak.”⁶⁴

Less observable and harder to quantify, mental health problems stemming from the war and its socio-economic consequences are pervasive. The resources for addressing these needs are in even shorter supply than with physical health; WHO reports that as of 2016, Yemen had only 0.2 psychiatrists working in the mental health sector, 0.3 nurses working in mental health, 0.05 social workers in mental health, and 0.4 psychologists working in mental health per 100,000 population. For comparison, in 2014 Yemen had 53 medical doctors per 100,000 population.⁶⁵ Public awareness of mental health issues is also low and social stigma around mental illness inhibits access to diagnosis and treatment for those that might otherwise have the resources to seek help. The Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies found that Yemenis suffering from mental health conditions are often “detained in family homes or abandoned and left homeless.”⁶⁶ The Health Cluster (HC), a WHO-led coordination mechanism for the health response in Yemen, has done some mental health work in recent years through an established technical working group within the HC called Mental Health & Psychosocial Support Service (MHPSS). Though there is limited public documentation on these efforts, previous HC bulletins available online indicate that the MHPSS has been involved in trauma management, referrals, and mental health/psychosocial support in health facilities.⁶⁷

YOUTH PERSPECTIVE

Youth in Phase 2 were asked whether they have access to quality healthcare when needed. Respondents were twice as likely to disagree than agree with this statement, with only four percent strongly agreeing. The largest disparity was regarding age: 77 percent of youth in the 15-29 age group strongly disagreed or disagreed with this statement. Table 5 below displays responses to this question disaggregated by sex, age, and urbanity. In the qualitative responses, youth respondents in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 raised major challenges with the access, quality, and cost of healthcare.

Table 5: Youth responses to “I have access to quality healthcare when needed” in Phase 2

	Total	Sex		Age			Urbanity	
		Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	13%	11%	14%	4%	18%	13%	25%	4%
Disagree	49%	43%	54%	73%	28%	55%	45%	52%

⁶¹ OCHA (2018).

⁶² Moyer, J., Bohl, D., Hanna, T., Mapes, B., and Rafa, M. (2019). Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen. University of Denver for UNDP, pg. 14

⁶³ WHO (2019). WHO and Kuwait: Protecting Yemen’s “Right to Health.” Retrieved from: <http://www.emro.who.int/yem/yemen-news/who-and-kuwait-protecting-yemens-right-to-health.html>

⁶⁴ Moyer et al. (2019), pg. 54

⁶⁵ WHO (2019). Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Retrieved from: <https://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.MHHR?lang=en>

⁶⁶ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 10

⁶⁷ WHO (2017). Health Cluster Bulletin Yemen. Retrieved from: <https://www.who.int/health-cluster/countries/yemen/Yemen-Health-Cluster-Bulletin-September2017.pdf>

	Total	Sex		Age			Urbanity	
		Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Rural	Urban
Neutral	4%	4%	4%	0%	5%	6%	5%	4%
Agree	30%	39%	22%	19%	44%	23%	25%	34%
Strongly agree	4%	2%	6%	4%	5%	3%	0%	7%

Forty-nine of the 97 respondents discussed issues of access to healthcare. Mentions of access were largely consistent across age group and gender but differed across urbanity and governorate, where rural respondents were almost three times more likely to discuss issues of access. Rural respondents cited lack of hospitals or health centers as well as specific challenges with obtaining quality health services: difficulty transporting patients due to distance or rough roads (eight), high prices of transportation (five), health centers often closed or only open for specific hours (two), and health centers having closed due to land disputes (one). One rural respondent in Al-Dhale summarized the challenges with obtaining health services in rural areas: “The most important challenge is that there is no health center in our village. There is a health center in our neighboring village and yet it lacks the most basic services.... Walking on foot and even pregnant women go to the health center on foot due to the bumpy road. If there is a woman in childbirth, she usually cannot find any services in the center, and the families are forced to take those women to the city. And because of the harsh road conditions, those women are subjected to severe suffering.” Another rural respondent in Lahj explained that “when somebody gets sick, they have to book a private car to transport them to the Al-Turbah area to get treatment. The treatment is often very expensive.”

Regarding quality, 53 of 97 youth spoke about a lack of supplies in government hospitals and facilities, including medicines. Another 19 youth mentioned issues with low quality or poorly trained healthcare staff. Related to both lack of supplies and staff quality, one urban respondent in Abyan said, “There are no educated doctors. Educated people often have private clinics, which are expensive. Also, patients do not receive enough care.... They [doctors] do not provide the patients with clear information about their illnesses, nor inform them where they have to go or what they have to do.... Medical supplies and medicines are not available.” One respondent in Ma’rib went further to explain that “government-run hospitals take medicines from donor organizations and sell them out in the market.” Perceptions of low quality in both supplies and healthcare staff were largely consistent across age group, gender, and urbanity but differed slightly across governorates. Respondents in Al-Dhale, Ta’izz and Lahj had the most mentions of insufficient supplies, while Ma’rib and Shabwah had the least. Quality of healthcare staff was discussed more consistently across governorates.

Aside from quality and access, 53 respondents discussed the challenge of high costs in obtaining quality health services. Though responses were largely consistent across gender, urbanity and governorate, mentions of high cost as a challenge were highest in the 15-19 age group and decreased with age. One 15–19-year-old respondent in Ma’rib explained the challenge of high costs as it relates to public versus private healthcare: “There is no good medical care, no concern for patients, and a shortage of staff and capacity in the government hospital. Once, my nephew fell and suffered internal bleeding. We brought him to the government hospital and they refused to admit him. They said there are no specialist doctors, so we took him to a private hospital and we paid a very large sum of money for his treatment.”

Two additional themes related to healthcare arose during Phase I interviews: lack of access to mental health services and lack of health insurance. During Phase I, respondents spoke about psychological problems precipitated by the conflict and its aftermath. While trauma, depression, and other psychological issues are certainly widespread, there are significant social and economic impediments

for youth to seek diagnosis and treatment. One youth from Sana'a stated that "Youth are embarrassed, due to community reasons, by the topic of mental health so they don't go see psychologists." Another from Ta'izz responded to a question about mental illness by saying, "people don't believe in it... It is taboo to mention you need mental health help or to access this kind of assistance. The challenge is how to convince families or individuals of the importance of mental health. Awareness is important here." Regarding lack of health insurance, one Phase I respondent estimated that "maybe 99%" of the Sana'a population does not have health insurance. Another respondent explained the implications: "[The challenge is] the very high cost of being part of the systems. [Insurance is] not available for all of us, for all populations. Just available for a very small portion of the population. If you do have insurance you can go to private hospitals easily, if you don't have it you have to go to public hospitals where your situation might be worse."

Finally, khat consumption was raised as a major issue by multiple youth. Multiple respondents spoke about the health, moral, and motivational problems associated with khat consumption. According to youth respondents and the literature, khat usage is pervasive in Yemen.^{68, 69, 70} Furthermore, there is a strong economic dependence on khat cultivation in certain parts of the country (see Household Income section). According to one youth respondent, "More than 90 percent of the male population in Yemen goes out every afternoon to buy some khat leaves that... makes one stay in the house. Takes them about eight hours a day. They do nothing but look at phones. Khat adds up, expenses over time. This is the biggest thing they need to be distracted from with education, job opportunities, etc."

OTHER STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

Non-youth KII respondents echoed many of the sentiments expressed by youth. However, they also spoke about the state of the management of the health system, highlighting the weak capacity and insufficient resourcing of the Ministry of Health, as well as the poor management of the health care system. While youth focused primarily on the availability and capacity of doctors and nurses, a respondent from an implementing partner cited the need for a diversified set of health care professionals including technicians, community health specialists, and immunization specialists. Given the fact that most Yemenis live in rural areas and that those areas are more subject to epidemic diseases, the need for these types of professionals is particularly acute in non-urban settings. Finally, a respondent from an implementing partner noted that "some health centers don't have the capacity to deliver reproductive health" and that youth may be the "main users" of these services. Uptake of existing, and potentially expanded, reproductive health services is, however, inhibited by cultural factors. A respondent spoke about the hesitancy of youth and non-youth alike to take advantage of these services.

Recommendations from non-youth study respondents included focusing on capacity building at all levels of the health system, investment in infrastructure rehabilitation and/or expansion, and the expansion of reproductive health services. While USAID prioritizes support to the public health system, multiple respondents spoke about opportunities to improve public health through partnerships with the private sector. One idea involved the integration of entrepreneurial training into medical school curricula to increase the supply of health clinics in rural areas. The theory is that if you "encourage youth medical students to construct business plans and establish their community-based health centers, or midwifery clinics" then the availability of health services to under-resource communities will increase. Survey respondents cited the need for strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Health to enable improved service delivery, increase access to mental health services, and improve hygiene practices in hospitals.

⁶⁸Alshakka, Mohammed, Wafa FS Badulla, Nazeh Al-Abd, and Mohamed Izham Mohamed Ibrahim. "Knowledge and attitudes on Khat use among Yemeni health sciences students." *Substance use & misuse* 55, no. 4 (2020): 557-563. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10826084.2019.1688350>

⁶⁹Basunaid, Suhail, Martien van Dongen, and Ton J. Cleophas. "Khat abuse in Yemen: a population-based survey." *Clinical Research and Regulatory Affairs* 25, no. 2 (2008): 87-92.

⁷⁰Small Wars Journal (2019). The Role of Khat in Yemen's Humanitarian Crisis. Retrieved from: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/role-khat-yemens-humanitarian-crisis>.

EDUCATION

The civil war has caused prolonged and significant disruptions to Yemen's educational system. Definitive figures are hard to come by but estimates of the primary out-of-school population range from 650,000 to 2,000,000. Another source estimates that one third of the school-aged population has not been attending school since the outset of the conflict. The World Bank estimates only a 52 percent secondary school enrollment rate.

Education is a gendered issue in Yemen as well; the World Economic Forum ranked Yemen as 150th out of 153 countries in terms of gender disparity in educational attainment in the 2020 Global Gender Gap Report.⁷¹ Table 6 below displays key education statistics disaggregated by gender that were included in the global gender gap index for educational attainment in Yemen. The largest disparity between men and women is in literacy rate, with a 38.2 percentage point difference in literacy rates between males (73.2 percent) and females (35 percent).⁷²

Table 6: Global Gender Gap Report, Yemen Educational Attainment Country Scorecard

Indicator	Rank	Score	All-Country Average	Female	Male	Gender Parity
Literacy rate, %	153	0.478	0.897	35.0	73.2	0.48
Enrollment in primary education, %	141	0.880	0.755	78.7	89.4	0.88
Enrollment in secondary education, %	148	0.735	0.950	40.2	54.7	0.73
Enrollment in tertiary education, %	144	0.440	0.927	6.2	14.0	0.44

According to UNDP, female children of school entrance age can expect to receive an average of 2.7 fewer years of schooling than male children over the course of the child's life.⁷³ Female students are likely be held back from school because of insecurity and inability to walk alone,⁷⁴ lack of resources, the need to stay home and help with household duties,⁷⁵ or because of early marriages.⁷⁶ Youth respondents from another study said it was most often "girls who were pulled out of school first when parents could not afford to educate all of their children."⁷⁷ One study published in 2018 used data from three previous Yemeni national official surveys (Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2005-2006, Child Labor Survey 2010 and HBS 2014) to explore reasons for school dropouts in Yemen. The study used logistic regression modeling to assess the effects of a variety of demographic and situational variables on enrollment status. The authors used the results of the analysis to suggest the model shown in Figure 9.⁷⁸

⁷¹ World Economic Forum (2021). Global Gender Gap Report 2021. Retrieved from: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ UNDP. Yemen Human Development Indicators. Retrieved from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/YEM>

⁷⁴ Human Rights Council (2019), pg. 174


⁷⁵ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 31

⁷⁶ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 49

⁷⁷ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 45

⁷⁸ Al-Mansoor, Muhammed. (2018). An Attempt to Model Factors Affecting the School's Dropout Phenomenon in Yemen. International Journal of Education, Culture and Society. 3. 78. 10.11648/j.ijecs.20180305.11.

Figure 9: Dropout Model for Yemen (2006-2014)



While Yemen underperformed on educational indicators prior to the war, the crisis in the education sector has adversely affected a generation of youth already. In a context where the adult literacy rate is only 54 percent on average, further educational backsliding will have profound effects on economic, social, and political domains.

As with hospitals, schools have been targeted by both sides in the civil war. The UN estimates that approximately 1,600 schools had been completely or partially destroyed from the war at the end of 2019.⁷⁹ Moyer et al. (2019) claim that more than 2,500 schools across 20 governorates have been destroyed, damaged, or occupied by armed groups of IDPs.⁸⁰ Beyond damage to physical infrastructure, the war has adversely affected the safety, availability, and quality of education. These include the intentional targeting of students (e.g., students being hit by sniper fire on the way to school),⁸¹ the arrest or harassment of teachers for refusal to teach politically motivated curricula or participate in the recruitment and conscription of minors,⁸² and the “frequent delays in examinations as well as the postponement of the school year, temporary school closures due to fighting.”⁸³

Even among students with continued access to schools, many have been forced to drop out for economic and/or security reasons. In a context of increasing cost of living and a generalized depression of household income, many families are not able to absorb the costs of sending their children to school. These include real costs associated with learning materials, transportation, and school fees (some government schools have started charging monthly fees in recent years), as well as opportunity costs of withholding youth from the workforce and supplementing household income. Lastly, the indirect effects of the war are felt on the student population. Malnutrition and psychological trauma among students are both widespread and inhibit learning.

Issues of education access are compounded by poor quality of instruction in schools. Literature cites insufficient teaching and learning materials, high student to teacher ratios, and poor quality of teaching.

⁷⁹ Transfeld, M. (2017), pg. 37

⁸⁰ Moyer et al. (2019), pg. 26

⁸¹ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 44

⁸² Human Rights Council (2019). Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014. OHCHR, pg. 174

⁸³ Transfeld, M. (2017), pg. 37

The latter point is clearly influenced by the fact that teachers' salaries have been paid very irregularly, including a 2-year period during which salaries were not paid. Teaching salaries have resumed in some areas, but the real value of these wages has substantially depreciated due to inflation. This remunerative factor has caused hardship and decreased motivation on the part of teachers, while "some teachers stopped going to school because they could not afford the transportation costs.... while many were forced to seek other work."⁸⁴ Schools have tried to supplement teacher shortages using substitutes and volunteers, but it is unambiguous that quality of instruction has suffered. Strains on teaching and school management capacity have, in turn, precipitated a "crisis" of cheating in exams, nepotism, and lack of discipline as well as overall corruption in the education system".⁸⁵

YOUTH PERSPECTIVE

Youth KII respondents spoke about the importance of education for improving individual economic prospects, promoting socially beneficial outcomes, and achieving self-actualization. Corroborating findings from the literature review, respondents cited poor educational outcomes at the population level (e.g., low literacy rates) precipitated by insufficient availability of educational institutions, low quality of educational services, and high cost of education.

Youth spoke about challenges in education access across the entirety of the system, from North to South and from primary to tertiary. As demonstrated in Table 7 below, 63 percent of Phase 2 respondents disagreed with the statement "I have access to quality education when needed." When asked about the main challenges that young people face in obtaining a quality education, the most frequently cited challenge was the high cost of education (Table 8). The most common cost constraints were the price of university fees (32 references), the price of school materials (32 references) and transportation costs (21 references). The second most cited educational challenge was insufficient access to schools. While access to universities was most frequently referenced, respondents spoke about insufficient access to all levels of education. Thirteen respondents spoke about the direct effect of the war on education, with eight citing either the destruction of schools or the closing of schools due to the war:

"There are students studying in tents as a result of the destruction of the school due to the war. Education in these tents is inconvenient, especially in times of rain and winds, which spreads fear among students. Moreover, students sit on the ground inside the tents, and there are no chairs or tables available." (Male, Ta'izz)

The third most frequently cited challenge was the poor quality of teachers. Youth mentioned poor training, chronic absenteeism, insufficient/irregular pay, generalized neglect, and emigration (particularly among professors), as the primary reasons for the poor state of instruction. Importantly, 12 respondents also cited teacher violence and/or aggression toward students as a major challenge. Among those that reported this phenomenon, violence was frequently cited as a primary cause of school dropout.

"Teachers deal violently with students; they insult and curse them, which pushes students to stop attending classes and eventually just drop out of school." (Female, Abyan)

"Some teachers use alienating methods with students, such as physical punishments (caning) and verbal and psychological punishments. Therefore, many students drop out of school and cease their education." (Male, Ad-hale)

⁸⁴ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 43

⁸⁵ Gleixner-Hayat, B. and Al Ayou, B. (2017), pg. 19

Table 7: Youth response to “I have access to quality education when needed” in Phase 2

	Total	Sex		Age			Urbanity	
		Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	14%	9%	20%	15%	21%	6%	17%	13%
Disagree	49%	50%	49%	54%	38%	59%	54%	46%
Neutral	5%	4%	6%	12%	3%	3%	2%	7%
Agree	26%	30%	22%	12%	33%	28%	24%	27%
Strongly agree	5%	7%	4%	8%	5%	3%	2%	7%

Table 8: Challenges Youth Experience in Accessing Education

Challenge	# of Youth	Proportion of Youth
High cost	64	66%
Lack of access to schools	50	52%
Poor quality teachers	37	38%
Insufficient teaching and learning materials in schools	31	32%
Need to work to support family	26	27%
Teacher shortages	22	23%
Lack of incentives/motivation	19	20%
Teachers/professors not getting paid	15	15%
High student-teacher ratios/overcrowding	13	13%

Gender issues in accessing quality education were cited by seven respondents (mostly younger respondents and those from Hadramawt and Shabwah) and included societal/family prohibitions on female education and early marriage:

“Social customs and traditions do not allow girls to pursue education.” (Female, Hadramawt)

“My husband did not allow me to complete my university education.” (Female, Hadramawt)

“My family may disallow me to enroll in university. Because my family is influenced by conservative traditions that forbid a girl to continue education at a specific age of her life.” (Female, Shabwah)

“My family did not enroll me in school in the past. Now, my husband does not allow me to go to school. This is the obstacle.” (Female, Shabwah)

“Early marriage deprives girls from completing education. I got married at the age of 13 and after that I could not go back to school.” (Female, Shabwah)

“In our region, customs and traditions do not allow women to go to the city to receive an education.” (Female, Al-Dhale)

Youth from both phases spoke about the poor quality of educational curricula, with multiple youth citing the fact that their grandparents studied from the same curricula used in classrooms today. This phenomenon is not only important because instructional design has made significant advancements in the past three decades, but the relevance of these materials has long become outdated in response to a vastly changed world. This point was emphasized explicitly by multiple youth, with one saying, “we are stuck in the past while the world is changing and improving” (Youth, Aden). Phase I Youth respondents also spoke about other effects of the war on the education system. In the North, many respondents spoke of the introduction of politically motivated subject matters into the core curriculum, referring in some cases to these classes as “propaganda.” More directly, one youth corroborated literature review findings that schools are sometimes used as recruiting centers, saying that “they get soldiers from schools. They make fake certificates and take them to the front lines. A classmate of mine’s brother went to the front lines without his parent’s permission with a fake certificate” (Youth, Sana’a).

Faced with a fundamentally underperforming education system that is not preparing graduates for economic realities and combined with the lack of clear employment prospects for graduates and the increased demand for youth to supplement household income, it is no surprise many families have chosen to withdraw youth from education entirely. Respondents cited diminishing support for education among parents and youth alike. “Education is not a priority” said one respondent from Aden, while another said, “there are youth who have given up on education because they see those before them that can’t find work even with a degree” (Youth, Ta’izz). With objectively diminishing returns to education investments, it has become economically rational to instead send youth into the workforce. One youth from Sana’a summarized the situation by saying, “We go back to customs and traditions – a lot of people have their beliefs that education is not something beneficial. Work is more beneficial. This motivates some families to have their children work instead of studying” (Youth, Sana’a).

The emergence of the internet as an educational resource has supplemented and/or replaced the formal education system for some youth. Respondents cited the concrete, skills-based opportunities that can be accessed online. However, most Yemeni youth do not have the means to take advantage of these resources.

EMPLOYMENT SKILLS

Moving beyond the formal education system, respondents were asked about the most important skills that can help them acquire a good job or start up a business. As demonstrated in Table 9 below, by far the most common response was sewing and/or other crafting skills (knitting, Naksh, making incense, embroidering, tailoring). Females were much more likely to report a desire for these skills, with more than half of all female respondents expressing this demand. Disaggregating by urbanity, shows that demand is much higher among rural females (75 percent) than among urban females (38 percent). The second most common skill in demand among female respondents was in beauty services (hairdressing, henna, makeup). Finally, female respondents were much more likely to report interest in health skills (nursing, first aid). Among males the most common skills in demand were mechanical skills (electrical work, mobile phone maintenance, and automobile repair), computer skills, English, and construction/carpentry. Demand in agriculture, while a prevalent employment source in rural communities was low. Interest in educational professions was almost nonexistent.

Table 9: Most Important Employment Skills

Skill	# of References	Total	Urban	Rural	Male	Female
Sewing/other crafts	28	29%	21%	39%	6%	54%
Other	14	14%	14%	15%	22%	7%
Mechanics/repairs/plumbing	13	13%	13%	15%	22%	4%
Computer skills	12	12%	18%	5%	16%	9%
English language	12	12%	14%	10%	16%	9%
Hairdressing/henna/makeup	11	11%	13%	10%	2%	22%
Construction/carpentry	8	8%	5%	12%	14%	2%
Business/accounting	7	7%	9%	5%	12%	2%
Agriculture/livestock/fisheries	5	5%	5%	5%	8%	2%
Healthcare	5	7%	5%	8%	0%	15%
Driving	5	5%	5%	5%	10%	0%
Non-job specific	2	2%	0%	5%	0%	4%
Self-confidence/life skills	2	2%	4%	0%	4%	0%
Teaching	1	1%	0%	2%	0%	2%
Employability/job seeking skills	1	1%	2%	0%	2%	0%

Finally, youth were asked what barriers prevented them from acquiring these skills. By far the most common response was financial barriers (57 percent), while the second most common was the lack of training opportunities (19 percent). Four respondents spoke about cultural/gender constraints:

“There are no training and rehabilitation centers in the region, nor are there training courses sponsored by civil society organizations, and the city is far from our area. We cannot go there, due to customs and traditions that prevent women from going without a Mahram.” (Female, Al-Dhale)

“Customs and traditions in my family prevent me from attaining this skill.” (Female, Hadramawt)

“Being preoccupied with raising the children. Also, my husband prevents me from learning these skills.” (Female, Hadramawt)

“Fear of society’s judgment, due to its myopic view of women who engage in some jobs such as journalism” (Male, Ta’izz)

OTHER STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

Non-youth KII respondents echoed many of the sentiments expressed by youth. The highest frequency of feedback on educational challenges focused on school access, where respondents cited the destruction of schools, long-term school closures, postponement of exams, and interruptions in schooling. While quality of education was not as emphasized by these respondents to the same degree as youth, it was mentioned by multiple individuals particularly regarding curricula. The combination of constrained access, low quality of instruction, and inability to find jobs even among educated youth were cited as contributing factors for large-scale disenrollment and a “perception among youth that it is not worth it to study.” Disengagement from the education system was described as “a big waste of human capital in Yemen” as well as contributing to the continuation of the civil war - “(youth) will be uneducated men and women in the near future. This will make them easy targets for armed groups and extremists. Enhancing education is really important to engage and bring youth into the civil life.” While everyone agrees that the education system needs reform, resourcing, and support, one implementer cited challenges of working with host government institutions. They described working on education programming in the South but being stopped by authorities seeking bribes.

WATER

Yemen has long been considered water insecure, though this situation rapidly deteriorated in both urban and rural areas in response to climate change, population growth, and poor water management. According to the World Bank, Yemen has the lowest per capita water availability in the world. In 2015, experts estimated that thirteen million Yemenis, or 50 percent of the population, struggled daily to have enough clean water for basic necessities. Corresponding to this dire situation is a continuous and severe diminishment of scarce water resources. Annual demand for domestic, industrial, and agricultural uses exceeds renewable groundwater and surface water resources by 56 percent.⁸⁶ The balance is largely drawn from non-renewable groundwater sources, leading to a “lowering of water tables in most aquifers, ranging between 2-6 meters a year.”⁸⁷

Before the civil war, “the government enacted policies that actively encouraged the depletion of the existing water supply, including subsidizing cheap diesel pricing and funding surface or spate irrigation for water-heavy cash crops such as qat.”⁸⁸ The result of these policies was inexpensive groundwater and irrigation water, which led to increased demand, inefficient usage, and depletion of water resources. Compounding these policies was a “general neglect of infrastructure, from porous pipes to poorly constructed and maintained dams” which exacerbated water loss and contaminated many groundwater sources with sewage run-off.”⁸⁹ The combination of poor policy priorities and underinvestment led to a national water infrastructure that was extremely limited in reach, or poor quality, and provided sporadic supply even before the outbreak of hostilities.

Given its centrality to agriculture, public health, and economic activity, control over water resources has been at the center of the civil war since its inception. Both sides in the conflict have used access to water for strategic purposes, blocking shipments of humanitarian aid (including water), confiscating water from civilians, and targeting sources of drinking water.⁹⁰ Multiple combatants have been accused of inadvertently destroying, and sometimes explicitly targeting, water infrastructure. One such example was the bombing of a major desalination plant in Mokha by the Saudi coalition on January 8, 2016.⁹¹ Compounding this damage to water infrastructure, fuel shortages have contributed to

⁸⁶ FAO (2019). Yemen Famine Prevention Plan. January-June 2019. Retrieved from: https://water.fanack.com/yemen/water-resources-yemen/#_ftn3

⁸⁷ FAO (2019). Yemen Famine Prevention Plan. January-June 2019. Retrieved from: https://water.fanack.com/yemen/water-resources-yemen/#_ftn3

⁸⁸ Sutter, M. (2018), pg. 7

⁸⁹ Sutter, M. (2018), pg. 7

⁹⁰ Sutter, M. (2018), pg. 3

⁹¹ Clifford, B. and Triebert, C. (2016). Yemen's Bombed Water Infrastructure: An OSINT Investigation. Bellingcat. Retrieved from: <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/02/05/yemens-bombed-water-infrastructure/>

significant increases in the price of water from private sources and diminished ability of wastewater treatment plants to adequately treat sewerage.

The undersupply of water has precipitated several health, economic, and social problems. Regarding health, the lack of access to enough fresh water has been cited as the biggest cause of malnutrition, morbidity, and mortality in rural areas.⁹² Furthermore, the undertreatment of sewerage, in conjunction with the reduced ability of people to practice sanitary behaviors, have led to a range of adverse health effects described in the health section above.⁹³ Regarding the economy, water scarcity is the most important factor limiting agricultural production. In conjunction with fuel shortages, this has made irrigation significantly costlier than in pre-war times. In 2016, cultivated area decreased by 38 percent, on average. In the heavily agricultural Tihama region, all groundwater-related agriculture was suspended, cultivated areas fell to 39 percent of prewar levels and yields were reduced to 42 percent pre-war levels.⁹⁴ Lastly, regarding social cohesion, insufficient water access has precipitated conflicts between rural and urban areas (e.g. escalating violence over the control and routing of water in areas such as Ta'izz and Abyan) as well as between rural areas where tribal conflicts have been exacerbated.⁹⁵ According to Whitehead (2015), "A report in Al-Thawra, Yemen's pro-government newspaper, estimated that 70-80 percent of conflicts in rural areas are about water, and the Yemeni ministry of the interior says that 4,000 die each year in violent disputes over land and water – although this is an old figure and likely an underestimate."⁹⁶

While not on the scale of the problems noted above, the insufficiency of rural and urban water systems placed acute time demands on women and youth for transportation of household water. It is estimated that women in rural areas spend four to five hours a day collecting water.⁹⁷

YOUTH PERSPECTIVE

When asked about the sufficiency of access to clean and sufficient water, 45 percent of Phase 2 youth disagreed. Most youth feedback about water systems was around the poor state of water infrastructure, particularly regarding the lack of government water projects, worsened by poor water availability and frequent interruptions. One respondent from rural Lahj explained, "we are dependent on rainwater in our area. There is no running government water supply project in the area. We just collect rainwater in tanks, which are exposed and often lead to diseases." Respondents spoke about the limited reach of piped networks centered among affluent households. One youth respondent from Ta'izz stated "There are no water programs here in Ta'izz. We don't have water. This is not an issue as a result of the war, it's always been like this."

Due to these supply challenges, households procure water from private vendors especially in urban areas, ferrying bottles, and paying high costs—according to one respondent from Sana'a "ten times the amount of five years ago." While the quality of the tanker water is not well documented, three youth stated that the water is "not clean" and contributes to water-borne disease burden. One of these youth stated, "We know that the water we use is dirty, but we don't have any other choice" (Youth, Sana'a). One youth theorized the problem to be one of contaminated well-water being pumped and distributed through the tankers. However, contaminants could be introduced at many points in the distribution and use cycle (e.g., within the tanker, in transmission from tanker to bottles, in the bottles themselves). Multiple respondents spoke about broader water quality issues, citing sewage contamination of ground water sources and people drinking saline water (especially among IDPs).

Phase 2, youth were asked about the availability of water for sanitation and of the 60 respondents who mentioned sanitation, 30 said that there were no sanitation services available in their areas. Many

⁹² Whitehead, F. (2015), pg. 2

⁹³ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 16

⁹⁴ Moyer et al. (2019), pg. 24

⁹⁵ Sutter, M. (2018), pg. 3

⁹⁶ Whitehead, F. (2015), pg. 2

⁹⁷ Whitehead, F. (2015), pg. 2

houses have separate cesspits, deep holes in the ground to collect sewage and wastewater, which are sometimes connected to nearby streams through pipes. Several households do not have cesspits at all and relieve themselves in the open. Even for households with cesspits, most respondents are concerned that the cesspits are not covered, resulting in the congregation of mosquitoes and the prevalence of diseases and severe lack of hygiene.

OTHER STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

Respondents spoke of poor pre-war infrastructure and its further deterioration over the past five-year period, how population growth and internal migration have become contributing factors for general water scarcity, and how poor awareness of hygiene practices in conjunction with polluted water sources has exacerbated public health crises.⁹⁸ A key informant in Phase 2 explained how the scarcity of water was a chronic issue, making it a key source of conflict within communities. While youth themselves are not actively engaged in being a victim or driver of conflicts pertaining to water, they are used as ‘fuel’ as they are appointed to protect water points and sources from members outside those communities.

CONCLUSIONS

The table below summarizes the assets, challenges, priorities, and opportunities as gathered from all data sources.

Assets
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existing youth engagement in the provision of health, education, and water programming through youth groups and initiatives. Desire of youth to engage with all three sectoral areas, particularly education. Recognition of mental health as a priority issue by some youth. Youth communication capabilities (e.g., social media, graphic design) to educate communities on public health and safety issues Existence of underexploited renewable water resources (e.g., rainwater)
Challenges
Health <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deterioration of the health system: damaged infrastructure, poor quality of doctors (emigration, pay, motivation), insufficient availability of equipment/medicine/supplies. High cost (private hospitals, insurance, supplies/medicines) Famine/undernutrition, disease (e.g., cholera outbreaks, COVID, etc.) Poor public health education (lack of awareness around drivers of disease and how to protect yourself) Khat consumption is endemic, especially among youth Trauma/psychological effect of war, especially among youth Youth feel discriminated against and underprioritized when seeking health care

⁹⁸ Respondents generally self-identified an area of sectoral interest or expertise during the interview; the KII sample was not disaggregated by experts.

Education

- Poor access to education driven by the high cost of education (materials and transportation) and insufficient availability of schools (due to generalized supply side shortage as well as civil war-mediated destruction/occupation).
- Poor quality of instruction, primarily driven by low levels of teacher capacity and engagement, chronic teacher absenteeism, poor/outdated quality of curricula quality, insufficient school resources, and classroom overcrowding.
- Evidence of social gender norms inhibiting female participation in education relative to males, particularly regarding tertiary education.
- Trauma/psychological effects of the civil war inhibit learning. This is exacerbated by violent and aggressive behavior of teachers.
- These factors paired with low and diminishing family/community support for education have led to high dropout rates.

Water

- Poor Availability: inadequate/neglected/damaged infrastructure, intermittent electricity for pumping, consumption of saline water (e.g., IDPs),
- High cost of private water
- Water resources inequitably distributed (e.g., agricultural uses)
- Water-borne illnesses (sewage, wells/tanker water, household storage)
- High time demands of water transport, especially for youth

Priorities

Health

- Better access to health services for youth, including mental health care
- Higher quality service (especially health care worker capacity)
- Lower prices for health services

Education

- Better access to educational services (at all levels),
- Better quality of education: curriculum modernization, teacher training, provision of teaching/learning materials.

Water

- Expanded/rehabilitated water capture and conveyance infrastructure
- Improved water safety through sterilization of public water sources
- Water sanitation behavior change communication

Opportunities

Health

- Behavior change communication (e.g., hygiene)
- Entry point for youth engagement: designing, validating, and communicating messages (especially if youth target beneficiaries)
- Rebuilding infrastructure (youth engagement entry point)
- Healthcare worker training, including targeting of youth

Education

- Entrepreneurship training (inclusive of seed capital and market linkages)
- Workforce development training (tailored to local market demands and social constraints)
- Entry point for youth engagement – using youth as training extension agents (training of trainers)
- Partnering with state and non-state technical and vocational education and training (TVET) providers/training centers
- School Support, including, curriculum modernization, creation/provision of scripted lesson plans, provision of teaching/learning materials, teacher/professor training (pre-service/in-service), school management support, parent engagement with school administration and/or teachers, distance learning/technology support.
- Emergence of informal online educational opportunities.

Water

- Youth engagement entry point: using youth/youth groups in construction/maintenance of infrastructure investments
- Rainwater harvesting
- Well/tanker sterilization
- Household water storage/management
- Sewage mediation
- Improving distributional governance (equity in water allocation)

OUTCOME 1.2: INCREASED HOUSEHOLD INCOME & OUTCOME 1.3: MACROECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND FUNCTIONS STRENGTHENED TO BOOST THE ECONOMY

LITERATURE REVIEW

Mirroring the context outlined in the health, education, and water sections above, an underperforming economy prior to the civil war has been pushed into severe crisis by the civil war. UNDP estimates that as of 2019, 11.7 million people, or over 40 percent of the population, have been pushed into extreme poverty.⁹⁹ If the war were to extend through 2030, “Yemen will be the poorest country in the world, with 88 per cent of the population living on less than US \$3.10 per day and 78 per cent on less than US \$1.90.”¹⁰⁰

There are multiple drivers of the current economic situation at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, stemming first from the regulatory environment. Though the Yemen YPA focuses on the macroeconomic drivers of trade and Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) functions, the literature does not support the conclusion that current trade or CBY policies affect youth differentially from the broader population. Annex II contains a detailed analysis of the regulatory environment in Yemen including indicators around trade, electricity, access to credit, and other essential business functions; however, since youth are not differentially affected by the policies around these functions, the remainder of the literature review in this report section focuses on two drivers of poor macroeconomic performance that do acutely affect youth, as well as the microeconomic dynamics around household income.

The two macroeconomic factors that most directly affect youth in Yemen are cost of living increases and raising unemployment. Regarding the former, the Yemeni Riyal has steadily and significantly lost value against the United States dollar (USD) since the outbreak of the civil war. At the time of writing, the Riyal had lost almost 70 percent of its pre-war value relative to the USD.¹⁰¹ This depreciation has created inflationary pressures that have increased the cost of living, eroded savings, and exacerbated the multiple humanitarian crises. Price increases have also been precipitated by other factors such as fuel shortages, pricing of risk into imported goods, shortages of commodities, and increased taxation.¹⁰²

The second significant macroeconomic problem is the high rate of unemployment, estimated at 12.9 percent (2019), with female unemployment more than twice as high as male unemployment (24.9 and 11.9 percent, respectively).¹⁰³ The economic effects of the war and resulting coping strategies have differed significantly by gender. According to the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies (2019) “working women were initially hit harder by the conflict than working men in most areas. In 2015, female employment fell by 28 percent, compared to an 11 percent drop among men, although there was strong national variation; almost half of female job losses occurred in Sana’a, where the private sector was severely damaged by the war, while in Aden female employment increased by 11 percent. Likewise, female-owned businesses were more likely to close than male-owned businesses at the start of the war.”¹⁰⁴ Though women were more affected by the early days of the crisis, there is evidence that they “navigated the country’s new economic reality more effectively than men.” Some sources speculate about a greater degree of entrepreneurialism and adaptability among females, but the increasing

⁹⁹ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 15

¹⁰⁰ Moyer et al. (2019).

¹⁰¹ ACAPS (2020). Volatility of the Yemeni Riyal. Retrieved from: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200129_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_drivers_and_impact_of_yer_volatility_0.pdf

¹⁰² ACAPS (2020). Volatility of the Yemeni Riyal. Retrieved from: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200129_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_drivers_and_impact_of_yer_volatility_0.pdf

¹⁰³ World Bank Databank

¹⁰⁴ Al-Amman, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 23

economic activity among women could also be explained by a lower baseline economic participation rate. In a context where household earning is more often being prioritized over social conventions regarding the traditional economic role of the sexes, women have been entering into nontraditional sectors and professions after the disruptions of the war. This includes working in jobs traditionally performed by men (e.g., construction, lumber, digging/painting, shop keeping, waitressing, street vending, and hotel receptionists).¹⁰⁵

Depending on the source, the youth unemployment rate ranges from 23.4 percent¹⁰⁶ to over 50 percent.¹⁰⁷ Regardless of the true figure, unemployment among this population is endemic. Having long suffered high levels of systemic unemployment, the economic prospects of Yemeni youth have been further undermined by the civil war. In addition to fewer job opportunities and lower salaries for wage earners, “youth and women-run SMEs appear to have been particularly vulnerable to closure due to the effects of the war.”¹⁰⁸ Many youth see little to no work opportunities for themselves in their communities; the opportunities that they do see are in construction, agriculture, transportation, or other small projects.¹⁰⁹

According to the UNDP, Yemeni business-owners cite the following major constraints to private sector economic activity: “Physical damage to infrastructure, loss of capital, lack of equipment, inflation, and insecurity.”¹¹⁰

YOUTH PERSPECTIVE

When asked about the state of household income, youth spoke about pervasive poverty, raising prices for commodities (driven by currency devaluation, taxation policy, and constraints on trade), insufficiency of jobs, the poor quality of jobs that are available, and the increased pressures for youth (and women in particular) to engage in the labor market to supplement depressed household incomes. Youth see the core role of the economy, primarily mediated by the availability of quality jobs, as a prerequisite for individual and household welfare as much as they see it as a predictor of all other social outcomes (e.g., health, education). Of all the YPA programmatic areas, youth respondents spoke most emphatically about economic issues, with the primary economic concern being the lack of employment opportunities. Irrespective of geography, age, sex, or education level, youth respondents spoke about the pervasive insufficiency of quality jobs.

In this section we highlight youth perspectives and experiences as they relate to four phenomena: (i) the intersection of economic issues and youth’s mid-term goals, (ii) the primary economic challenges faced by youth, (iii) the most important income generating activities for youth, and (iv) the skills that can most help youth acquire a good job or start a business. We begin by outlining employment trends across the sample to contextualize findings across these four domains.

RESPONDENT ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION

Of the 97 youth interviewed in Phase 2, 27 (28 percent) reported participating in an income generating activity at the time of the interview. With only four of the 46 female respondents employed at the time of the study,¹¹¹ males were 5.6 times more likely to be employed than females (49 percent vs. nine percent) and urban youth were more than twice as likely to be employed than rural youth (39 percent vs. 17 percent). The intersection of these two variables evidenced a large gulf between employment rates among rural and urban females. None of the 20 rural female respondents were employed compared to 15 percent of the urban female respondents. Among males, the most common

¹⁰⁵ Al-Amman, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 25

¹⁰⁶ Statista.com. Retrieved from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/813178/youth-unemployment-rate-in-yemen/>

¹⁰⁷ UNDP (n.d.) Helping young Yemenis fight unemployment. Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/ourstories/helping-young-yemenis-to-fight-unemployment.html>

¹⁰⁸ Dixon, T.L. and Seeger, L. (2016), pg. 6

¹⁰⁹ Transfeld, M. (2017), pg. 9

¹¹⁰ Dixon, T.L. and Seeger, L. (2016), pg. 6

¹¹¹ two were nurses, one was a private school teacher and a domestic worker

jobs were working as daily wage laborers (loading, packing), driving motorcycle taxis and/or minibuses, and working in shops. As demonstrated in Table 10 below, only 17 percent of employed youth felt that they earned an adequate source of income.

Table 10: Youth response to “My job provides me with an adequate source of income for my/family's needs (if working currently)” in Phase 2

	Total	Sex		Education				Urbanity	
		Female	Male	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	23%	0%	28%	11%	43%	13%	33%	57%	13%
Disagree	60%	60%	60%	78%	43%	63%	50%	29%	70%
Neutral	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Agree	17%	40%	12%	11%	14%	25%	17%	14%	17%
Strongly agree	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Youth unemployed at the time of the study were asked if they had access to a job opportunity if they needed it. As demonstrated in Table 11 below, one-quarter of these youth responded in the affirmative. Notably, there was no significant difference in responses between males and females. Non-working rural respondents were more likely to report not having access to a job opportunity if they needed it, as compared to urban youth (77 percent vs. 58 percent). This finding held irrespective of educational level.

Table 11: Youth response to “I have access to a job opportunity when needed (if not working currently)” in Phase 2

	Total	Sex		Education				Urbanity	
		Female	Male	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	15%	17%	12%	18%	19%	0%	14%	12%	18%
Disagree	52%	51%	54%	47%	47%	82%	43%	65%	39%
Neutral	7%	5%	12%	0%	9%	18%	0%	3%	12%
Agree	21%	22%	19%	29%	19%	0%	43%	18%	24%
Strongly agree	4%	5%	4%	6%	6%	0%	0%	3%	6%

When asked what they most want to accomplish in the next five years, by far the most common response among youth centered around income generation, either wanting to find a good job, wanting to start a business, or desiring education as a means for employment. Of the 97 respondents, only eight did not make an explicit mention of income generation as one of their top ambitions. Of these,

four were in the 15-19 age range and six were females.¹¹² It is important to note that youth frequently cited psychological benefits of employment, with 11 youth providing this as one of the primary reasons for desiring employment.

Among those with concrete plans and/or aspirations for income generation, entrepreneurship was by far the most popular. One in five youth reported wanting to start a business (21 percent), with males, urban respondents, and higher educated individuals were more likely to cite entrepreneurial aspirations. While there was a pronounced desire for entrepreneurship, respondents expressed having insufficient seed capital to start a business. For example: “The poverty that I suffer from, even with my father's retirement salary, our income is not sufficient to provide the most basic necessities of living. Therefore, I cannot establish the business that I am planning” (Male, Al-Dhale).

With 16 direct citations, the most popular desired profession was sewing. While sewing was much more popular among rural than urban respondents (45 percent rural, 22 percent urban), more than one in five urban female respondents stated a desire to sew as a means of income generation. Furthermore, sewing was strongly correlated with educational status, with illiterate respondents most likely to express a desire for this means of income.¹¹³ Medical jobs were noted by 10 percent of respondents and were much more popular among females than males (16 percent vs two percent). Notably teaching and education were only mentioned by two youth (both urban), substantiating findings about the erosion of faith in the profession as well as the poor salaries of teachers: “teachers receive a salary of sixty thousand Yemeni riyals, but if they worked in a fishing company, their salary would be one hundred thousand Yemeni riyals, which is why teachers leave their jobs and go to work in the fishing company” (Male, Hadramawt). Finally, beauty services were noted by six percent of the sample (80 percent of which were female).

BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT

When asked about the primary barriers in searching for a job in their community, the most common responses were lack of job availability, lack of access to job opportunities, and lack of good quality jobs. Scarcity of employment was cited by respondents from all demographic backgrounds. In fact, while many respondents cited educational barriers (e.g., literacy), high rates of unemployment among the college educated points substantiate the pervasive shortage of jobs. This imbalance has led many employers to expand credential requirements of job seekers, crowding out youth that may have previously been qualified for certain positions.

Youth respondents corroborated the literature and non-youth respondents in conveying increased female participation in the labor market, both in the absolute sense (i.e., new entrants that may not have worked under previous circumstances) as well as into less traditional employment sectors. However, many respondents spoke about social impediments to labor force participation. We present the three most frequently cited challenges below:

- **Inequitable Gender Norms:** Many youth spoke about community and family prohibitions to female employment. For example, “The social convention here is that women only do housework, which includes raising the children, cooking and cleaning the house” (Female, Al-Dhale). A similar sentiment was expressed by a female respondent from Ma’rib, “Here, we are ruled by the prevailing social customs and traditions that do not allow us, as women, to work. There are opportunities, but society restricts women and does not allow them to work” (Female, Ma’rib). While an outright prohibition on employment was the starkest example of inequitable gender norms, youth cited other important restrictions on female employment. In addition to general mobility restrictions, certain respondents faced through the cultural practice of Mahram, where a male relative acts as a guardian in accompanying a female when outside the house. For example,

¹¹² Of these two males, one had a congenital leg deformity that inhibited labor.

¹¹³ 57% illiterate, 31% primary, 13% secondary, 0% bachelors.

“Unlike independent girls, I cannot travel without one of my family members. My family does not allow that. There are no other obstacles” (Female, Hadramawt).

- **Nepotism (Wasta):** Strong family connections and increased security concerns stemming from the civil war and criminality have exacerbated the practice of *Wasta*. Twenty-five youth cited the necessity of connections and/or *Wasta* as necessary for employment. In the words of one male from Aden, “When they go to look for job opportunities, they cannot get hired without *Wasta* as employers only accept people who they know personally and rarely hire people they do not know.” Notably, youth cited this challenge for jobs at all levels of qualification. For example, “Even in the simplest of works such as manual labor (loading/unloading, carrying, and moving materials), *Wasta* is practiced” (Male, Hadramawt).
- **Dishonorable Jobs (Ayb):** Cultural prohibition to employment through the concept of *Ayb*, or something being dishonorable, were noted by respondents of both sexes. However, female respondents were most acutely affected: “Society stands in my way as a female because working women are looked upon with suspicion and doubt. Society considers it dishonorable and a shame for women to work” (Female, Lahj). Some youth cited specific professions as being *Ayb*, for example: “In our area, people look down at certain jobs and professions, and the society considers them as *Ayb*. Most of the professions: haircutting, butchery, even working as taxi drivers is *Ayb* in my community” (Female, Ma’rib). Other youth made broader statements like, “Tribalism stands in the way of any young person that wants to work, because working is considered *Ayb* and against the tribal customs and norms” (Male, Ma’rib).

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Respondents were asked about the most important types of work and income-generating activities carried out by young people in their community. As demonstrated in Table 12 below, by far the most common response was in working in shops/markets/groceries (71 percent). This profession was particularly common in urban areas, where it was cited by 80 percent of respondents. Other professions more commonly cited in urban areas included handicrafts (sewing/other crafts), entertainment (Clubs/restaurants/cafeterias), selling khat, and beauty services (hairdressing/henna/makeup). Conversely, rural respondents were much more likely to cite agricultural employment (agriculture/livestock/fisheries) as well as, to a lesser degree, military (army/militia/armed forces). While employment among armed groups was limited across the full sample, 12 of the 97 youth spoke about the pervasiveness of this phenomenon within their communities.¹¹⁴ A representative quote from this group from a male respondent from Lahj reads, “There are no job opportunities, except joining the army, and the salaries of the soldiers are rarely paid anyways.”

Table 12: Most Important Type of Employment by Youth

Profession	# of references	Total	Urban	Rural	Male	Female
Working in shops/markets/grocery	69	71%	80%	59%	73%	70%
Construction/carpentry	42	43%	43%	44%	43%	43%

¹¹⁴ Al-Dhale (4), Lahj (3), Ma’rib (3), Abyan (1) and Shabwah (1).

Profession	# of references	Total	Urban	Rural	Male	Female
Motorbike taxi drivers/other transport	32	33%	34%	32%	31%	35%
Agriculture/livestock/fisheries	31	32%	20%	49%	41%	22%
Army/militia/armed forces	15	15%	13%	20%	16%	15%
Sewing/other crafts	14	14%	18%	10%	8%	22%
Clubs/restaurants/caferterias	14	14%	18%	10%	12%	17%
Hairdressing/henna/makeup	12	12%	18%	5%	10%	15%
Selling khat	12	12%	16%	7%	12%	13%
NGOs/organizations/aid	11	11%	13%	10%	8%	15%
Other daily labor	10	11%	16%	5%	10%	13%
Healthcare	9	9%	7%	12%	10%	9%
Teaching	8	8%	11%	5%	6%	11%
Mechanics/repair technicians/plumbing	5	5%	7%	2%	6%	4%
Security guards	5	5%	5%	5%	4%	7%
Other salaried labor	4	4%	7%	0%	2%	7%
Other entrepreneurship	4	4%	4%	5%	6%	2%
Government	1	1%	0%	2%	0%	2%

While most respondents had less to say about macroeconomic institutions, multiple youth (particularly in Phase I) did speak about difficulties importing goods and its effect on pricing and feasibility of business creation, the difficulty in accessing credit (particularly when lacking collateral), and a general lack of trust in government institutions, a sentiment that was shared by respondents from the North as well as the South. In the words of one youth from Sana'a, "Many people have lost faith. We have to restore this trust and people need transparency. Once we do this, the rest is just details. The relationship between the central bank and the people is the main key point." Taken together, youth detail a situation of pervasive household economic instability. Apart from a small number of affluent individuals, Yemeni families cannot build savings to weather future crises. "Whenever you work, you will not be able to buy a house for your family. The cost of everything, including living, is high in Yemen. Whatever your salary is, you will use it this month and you can't save" (Youth, Sana'a).

OTHER STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

Like youth, non-youth KII respondents had less to say about macroeconomic institutions than about employment and household incomes. Individuals spoke about the general instability of the Central Bank of Yemen, about the difficulties in having competing banks in Sana'a and Aden, about varying Riyal-to-USD exchange rates within the country (and its associated real and transaction costs), and about the increasing fees of sending money.

High-level recommendations related to macroeconomic institutions from KIIs included working with the government to improve trade, particularly through increasing the efficiency of customs, public-private partnerships, support to the banking system, expansion of and capacity building for microfinance institutions, and support to the Social Development Fund for youth loan guarantee institutions. Web survey respondents recommended working with macroeconomic institutions to improve transparency, to build the capacity of the Central Bank of Yemen and other economic institutions, and rationalization of interest rates.

More frequently, non-youth KII respondents cited the lack of jobs as the primary constraint to improving household income, focusing specifically on the youth unemployment rate. Respondents spoke about an insufficient supply of jobs and the corresponding high levels of competition for jobs, the inflation of job requirements (e.g., degrees, foreign languages) in response to the oversupply of labor, and the inability to gain experience for many Yemeni youth (even in internships). Not only does unemployment have direct effects on household income, but the lack of opportunity perpetuates a sense of purposelessness that can affect psychological health, self-actualization, and vulnerability for youth exploitation by armed ideological and criminal groups. The effect of unemployment and its corresponding lack of youth purpose on the war cannot be understated. Respondents spoke about the importance of both economic problems and desires for status as recruiting tools. An expansion of the labor market would not only improve economic performance but inhibit the continuation of the civil war.

Regarding gender, multiple respondents corroborated the expanded role of women in labor markets. However, there was strong divergence in the extent to which cultural practices continue to play an inhibiting role in the economic freedoms of Yemeni women, or even the current trajectory of cultural practices. Some respondents said that the liberalization of female mobility and labor participation continues to improve. Others contend that there have been countervailing trends, particularly in the Houthi controlled parts of the country, with restrictions on female participation in employment, schooling, and social life. As with many phenomena in Yemen, the truth is certainly localized and varies substantially across the country. Additionally, whereas youth spoke about the expanded role of women in the workforce, one non-youth respondent said that males' economic behavior has also challenged social barriers, with men "accepting any job opportunity so they can feed their kids, their mothers, their families.

CONCLUSIONS

The table below summarizes the assets, challenges, priorities, and opportunities gathered from all data sources.

Assets
<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Resilience and entrepreneurial spirit of youth● Increased female participation in the workforce, particularly among youth, including in traditionally male sectors (e.g., restaurants)● Growth of microbusinesses, particularly among youth● Remittance systems as an alternative to Yemeni banking system

Challenges

- Impacts of war on basic services (water, electricity) and trade contributing to closure of private sector enterprises and high cost of living (driven by currency depreciation)
- Pervasive unemployment driven by underperforming macroeconomy, conflict and internal displacement. Reliance on military employment among youth.
- Social constraints to full labor force participation, including inequitable gender norms (female ability to work/study, mobility without accompaniment), social stigma around certain jobs, nepotism.
- Early entry of youth into the labor market and families resorting to child marriage for economic gain.
- Challenge obtaining loans, particularly among youth
- Large proportion of Yemeni population residing in rural areas with high dependence on agriculture.
- Non-payment of employers in the public sector
- Poorly functioning regulatory frameworks governing trade, electricity, and construction permits. Parallel and low-capacity Central Banks in Sana'a and Aden

Priorities

- Job creation
- Access to credit, especially for female and rural entrepreneurs
- Currency stabilization
- Expansion of trade

Opportunities

- Provision of microfinance to entrepreneurs
- Value-chain support focusing on key sectors (e.g., agriculture and fisheries)
- Online and app-based business opportunities
- Emergence of new industries due to conflict (solar power, motorcycle transport, street vendors)

OBJECTIVE 2: YEMEN'S ABILITY TO MANAGE CONFLICTS (LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL) ENHANCED

OUTCOME 2.1: MECHANISMS THAT ALLOW CITIZENS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS GRIEVANCES STRENGTHENED

LITERATURE REVIEW

The impacts of the war in Yemen have resulted in a severe weakening to the point of absence of central government structures and the ability of the government to manage conflict and violence.¹¹⁵ A 2017 sociopolitical analysis in Yemen reported that “state capacity for dispute management is virtually absent,” and the courts are not operating.¹¹⁶ In the absence of an active centralized government, local institutions such as Executive Units, Local Councils, and CSOs have come forward to fill the void in service delivery and managing disputes at the local level. According to Yemeni respondents in the sociopolitical analysis, the current providers of dispute resolution are “akels, the security directorate, resistance forces, local authorities, the Security Belt Forces, the Houthis, social figures, tribal sheikhs, and CSOs.”¹¹⁷

In addition to these local institutions, Yemen has a history of strong individual formal and informal leaders across society; tribal sheikhs, religious leaders, and local governance actors “hold considerable authority and more resonance with peers than actors perceived to be representing an outside entity.”¹¹⁸ Local council members often work closely with local tribesmen as well;¹¹⁹ some sources suggest that these informal leaders and institutions can be leveraged to bridge the current gap in dispute management and grievance resolution services. However, a general feeling among youth of a lack of options for the future combined with a lack of faith in local and state leaders presents a barrier to successful leveraging of these leaders and institutions. A 2017 study on the perspectives of Yemeni youth from the Yemen Polling Center found that 37 percent of polled youth believe community leaders do not understand the youth’s needs and do not try their best to satisfy them, 14 percent do not know if these leaders understand the needs or try to satisfy them, and only 20 percent believe that community leaders at least somewhat understand the youth’s needs and try to satisfy them.¹²⁰

YOUTH PERSPECTIVE

As Phase 2 focused primarily on the Objective 1 sectors, the youth perspectives in this section represent just those from Phase 1 data collection. When broadly discussing the youth landscape in Yemen, eight out of 22 youth KII respondents mentioned constraints or government prohibitions to youth activism. One KII respondent explained, “It has never been an easy thing to be a youth in Yemen, even before the war. But now, it is getting more complicated, and the youth are more vulnerable. They are not heard. Their needs are not very important. Their needs are secondary due to the conflict in general” (Youth, Sana’a). Youth respondents also spoke frequently about the added challenge of making their voice heard amongst older generations who are often opposed to new ideas or harbor judgement against younger generations. Ten out of 22 youth respondents raised this challenge for youth when discussing the youth landscape broadly. One respondent explained, “They [older generations] had a different atmosphere and conditions. We [youth] are facing difficulties and challenges that weren’t there back then. Five years ago, it was totally different; 10 years ago, it was extremely different, there is no comparison. The older generations will have a totally different point of view” (Youth, Sana’a). Many others raised the issue of antiquated customs and traditions upheld by

¹¹⁵ Search for Common Ground (2017). Pathways for Peace and Stability in Yemen. Retrieved from: https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Yemen-Peace-Analysis_FINAL.pdf

¹¹⁶ Gleixner-Hayat, B. and Al Ayoub, B. (2017), pg. 23

¹¹⁷ Gleixner-Hayat, B. and Al Ayoub, B. (2017), pg. 23

¹¹⁸ Search for Common Ground (2017). Pathways for Peace and Stability in Yemen. Retrieved from: https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Yemen-Peace-Analysis_FINAL.pdf

¹¹⁹ al-Awlaqi, W. and al-Madhaji, M. (2018), pg. 35

¹²⁰ 10 – row 132

older generations that disproportionately affect women, especially those surrounding marriage and employment opportunities.

Regarding logistical barriers to participation in local governance, many youth respondents raised the issue of permissions. One female youth KII respondent from Sana'a explained that prior to 2015, youth projects or initiatives required only one permission from the Ministry of Youth and Sport. However, permissions now need to come from three to four parties and youth are often forced to operate self-led initiatives in secret due to fear of retribution from political entities.

Some youth respondents extended the sentiment beyond their communities or even their country. One respondent said, "We don't always have a way to express and reach out to the world to tell them what's going on. When you try to do that, there are forces trying to cover it [your voice]" (Youth, Sana'a). A few respondents mentioned that opportunities to travel outside of Yemen expanded their world view and allowed them to return to Yemen with new ideas.

However, despite these obstacles, the desire of youth to lend their collective voice to improving the situation for youth in Yemen was clear. Nine out of the 22 youth respondents mentioned influence on their community or country as a key marker of success for youth today. One respondent said, "My parents have different priorities than me.... That's why I wanted to participate in this study. Asking youth about their priorities and how they feel is amazing. This is a participatory approach that we wish was implemented everywhere. Hearing from youth voices is different than hearing from elders."

Another respondent explained that although she is aware of her rights and educated enough to know she can ask for them, there are many youths who are not. She went on to say, "I'm quite active on social media and ask [for my rights] on social media. More than that, I'm asking local organizations. I believe I have the right to ask them... to have opportunities, to get trainings. But to be honest, I'm scared for my life. I'm scared to ask the government and get killed."

Regarding accessibility and use of social media applications, one respondent explained that youth are "experts on Facebook posts" and rely heavily on low-bandwidth applications like Facebook and WhatsApp as a source of information and communication in the absence of more formal and higher bandwidth internet options or harder to access print news sources. One study published in 2018 looked at the role of Facebook and other social media channels in the Arab Spring movement among Yemeni Youth. Among the 60 activists interviewed, the study found that all respondents were active Facebook users with high amounts of activity. Almost all accessed Facebook on their mobile phone, and a majority stated that Facebook helped to progress the Arab Spring movement through creating vital connections among activists and keeping them informed about current events related to the movement.¹²¹

Very few youth respondents discussed specific opportunities for youth related to improving systems for identifying and addressing grievances—the conversation with youth was largely focused on the challenges related to this objective. However, one youth respondent raised the prospect of training youth on their rights and avenues for asking for their rights. This female respondent in Aden described a specific example where she was able to interact with a Minister directly in an informal setting and shared specific grievances but saw no follow up after that point.

OTHER STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

While youth respondents touted the potential for youth engagement in addressing grievances, non-youth respondents were less optimistic. Two of nine non-youth KII respondents mentioned the challenge for youth of needing to address their daily needs before engaging in participatory activities; however, one respondent explained that this is not a problem of youth, but of broken institutions and authorities. This respondent explained that programs should target youth engagement but also aim to cover daily needs.

¹²¹ Abdulrahman Naef Farhan, Adnan & Varghese, P.A.. (2018). Facebook Utilization and Arab Spring Movement: A Study among Yemeni Youth. International Journal of Social Sciences and Management. 5. 5. 10.3126/ijssm.v5i1.18971. [file:///C:/Users/asmith/Downloads/Facebook Utilization and Arab Spring Movement A St.pdf](file:///C:/Users/asmith/Downloads/Facebook%20Utilization%20and%20Arab%20Spring%20Movement%20A%20St.pdf)

Other respondents raised the issue of cultural norms preventing young people from taking over as community leaders. One respondent explained that, for example, the title of “sheik” is generally inherited, thereby preventing youth from assuming this position.

Consistently though with youth respondents, respondents from development partners and implementers emphasized the importance of including the youth voice in all stages of development, despite the challenging circumstances. Other than covering basic needs, respondents raised the following ideas for engaging youth in programming specific to identifying and addressing grievances: programs or trainings targeting institutions and authorities, encouraging local initiatives, educating youth on rights, creating youth networks or local councils, and creating opportunities for youth to engage directly with high-level government actors. Outside of these recommendations, there was, however, marked skepticism among both youth and non-youth respondents about the efficacy of interventions involving the government or a reliance on government structures.

CONCLUSIONS

The table below summarizes the assets, challenges, priorities, and opportunities as gathered from all data sources for youth integration in identifying and addressing grievances.

Assets
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of strong formal and informal leaders across society • Attitudes and interest of youth toward activism • Wide-spread youth access and use of low-bandwidth social media sites (Facebook, WhatsApp)
Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feeling of lack of prospects/options for future among youth • Lack of youth trust in state institutions • Threat of retaliation for speaking out • Courts not operating • Need for youth to fulfill basic needs • Cultural norms preventing youth from participating in community leadership roles and having their voices heard by older generations • Logistical barriers to engagement due to war (lack of travel ability, additional permissions)
Priorities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorporating youth voice into all stages of development activity planning and implementation
Opportunities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trainings for youth on rights and processes for asking for rights • Encouraging local initiatives • Creating youth networks or local councils

- Creating opportunities for youth to engage with high-level government actors

OUTCOME 2.2: SOCIAL COHESION OF COMMUNITIES STRENGTHENED

LITERATURE REVIEW

Though Yemen has always had societal tensions, the war has driven further chasms between many of these groups. “Divisions in Yemen are determined by geography (South, middle, or North), clan (Hashemite or not), tribe, religion (Zaidi or Sunni), location (urban or rural),” political affiliation,¹²² and socioeconomic class.¹²³ These conflicts manifest in many ways, including intermittent violence and societal fragmentation. This includes increasing tendencies to refer to people by their religious, political, and geographic affiliations (e.g., southerner/northerner, and “more localized differences such as those between Adenis originating from different governorates such as Abyan and Al-Dhale”).¹²⁴ Sources cite that “Divisions between Sunni and Shi’a Muslim sects in Sana’a, for instance, have grown increasingly prominent and divided Muslim communities. Community gatherings in mosques had previously united individuals from differing social and religious affiliations, but political associations with sects (e.g., Zaidi Shi’a Muslims with the Houthi movement) have made worship exclusive affairs held in separate locations for different sects.”¹²⁵ Growing tension across these lines has impacted the capacity of CSOs. “Yemenis are affiliated with their many identities, yet CSOs are often labeled according to the identities of their leaders. This can affect their ability to work in certain regions or conduct projects on certain topics.”¹²⁶

This social segmentation has transferred to Yemeni youth as well, who have “become increasingly polarized along ideological and regional lines, with these identities hardening as the conflict continues”¹²⁷ and as youth activities that help to sustain community cohesion are put under strain.¹²⁸ A young woman in Sana’a described how “At the level of the community, the culture of war spread negative social norms. People would ask what you’re wearing, what you’re listening to, how you behave...The social fabric has been torn apart.”¹²⁹ However, youth may be the key to community cohesion and peacebuilding as well; one 2019 report stated that youth “are spearheading humanitarian initiatives in spaces others are unable to reach and contribute to social cohesion and wellbeing within their communities. They monitor human rights abuses and spread messages of peace at local, national and international levels.”¹³⁰ In a 2019 report, one youth explained that “young people have...worked to combat increasing levels of hostility and community division by using artistic and new media tools—such as music, painting, social media, photography and videography—to promote peace and coexistence.”¹³¹

As with many of the subjects discussed above, effects of the war on social cohesion in communities are disproportionately affecting women. Women have been subject to various forms of direct and indirect violence since the start of the war. Focus group respondents in Al-Ammar, Patchett, and Shamsan (2019) reported having “perceived a war-time increase in incidences of rape, kidnapping, sexual harassment and domestic violence in their communities. Violence against women and girls has been perpetrated by militias and community members as well as husbands, fathers and brothers.”¹³² Increased incidents of gender-based violence (GBV) since the start of the war have been attributed to a variety of factors including, “economic factors, including loss of livelihoods and price rises; the shifting

¹²² Al-Shami, M. (2015), pg. 1

¹²³ Qaid, K. (2019). Looking at us with Contempt; the tribal culture that limits Yemeni Youth. Raseef 22.

¹²⁴ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 10

¹²⁵ Search for Common Ground (2017). Pathways for Peace and Stability in Yemen. Retrieved from: https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Yemen-Peace-Analysis_FINAL.pdf

¹²⁶ Al-Shami, M. (2015), pg. 1

¹²⁷ Dixon, T.L. and Seeger, L. (2016), pg. 5

¹²⁸ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 14

¹²⁹ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 10

¹³⁰ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 1

¹³¹ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 14

¹³² Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 58

of gender roles as more women enter the labor market; displacement; the breakdown of law and order and the removal of formal and informal protection mechanisms against violence.”¹³³ GBV is a complex phenomenon and those incidents that are precipitated by changing household power dynamics may be partially offset by increased female earning power. While the evidence base is limited, previous studies¹³⁴ have found that women may be at lower risk of violence once they have established economic power but that a short-term rise in male violence against women sometimes occurs during transitional periods as women gain economic power.”¹³⁵

YOUTH PERSPECTIVE

Youth respondents in Phase 1 were asked about the extent to which their community supports one another; in Phase 2, the interview questions focused more specifically on the biggest sources of disagreement and conflict in their community or area.

In concurrence with literature review findings, youth in Phase 1 consistently described a fragmentation of society or marginalization of certain groups; four of 22 youth respondents raised this as a problem when discussing the youth landscape broadly. Respondents described divisions related to the following factors: age, ethnicity, education or “awareness,” political affiliation, displacement status, income, and even level of motivation to succeed among youth. Interestingly, though some respondents mentioned fragmentation based on ethnicity, almost all respondents did not personally identify with any ethnicity.

Phase 2 respondents most frequently cited the following sources of community level conflict: 27 respondents discussed conflict related to water, 20 discussed conflict related to land, 20 discussed inter-familial conflict, and 12 brought up conflicts related to resource distribution. Only three Phase 2 respondents mentioned conflict or disagreement based on ethnicity.

The central issue regarding water-related conflicts is scarcity of the resource. Describing how these conflicts escalate, one Phase 2 respondent in Abyan explained, “A dispute occurs over anything, for example, land or a water source, so a member of a particular tribe kills another person from the other tribe. Then, a brother or relative of the murdered kills the perpetrator or one of his relatives, and so the situation continues. This conflict has been inherited since ancient times.” Respondents gave a variety of examples of the ways communities deal with the scarce water supply and how these different coping strategies can result in conflict. Respondents frequently explained that disputes arise over rainwater that is collected in reservoirs: “When the water in the wells dries up, the people of the village get water from the reservoir [...] and the people of the other village in which the water reservoir is located refuse to allow people from our village to take water, and disputes begin. Armed clashes took place sometimes.” Other respondents described conflicts developing when wells are filled: “Conflicts arise between women during the filling of water from the well. Some women go early to the well to fetch water and extract large quantities of water, and some women come late, and the water pumping has weakened [due to the low levels of water after it drained] and cannot obtain enough, and here the dispute occurs.” One respondent in Ta’izz explained a general source of conflict between those who receive water from the Water Pumping Project and those who do not. The respondent explained that people who do not receive water “damage the pipes to obtain it” which causes conflict. Additionally, one respondent in Aden explained how these conflicts can also occur even between households that are connected to government water. The respondent explained that the water supplied by the government is intermittent, and during the brief periods when it is turned on and enters the “main pipe,” it is common that it is shut off again before the water supply reaches households. To get around this, people who should have access to the government water take plastic water containers to fill up from the source. The respondent said, “...problems arise because each one wants to precede the other in filling their own water containers, so disputes and fights happen.” Another respondent in Aden summarized that conflicts over water occur due to the absence of a mechanism that organizes the distribution of water. Conflicts related to water were most frequently

¹³³ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 58

¹³⁴ McAslan Fraser, E. (2012). “Helpdesk Research Report: Economic Empowerment and Violence Against Women and Girls.” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. Retrieved from <http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq790.pdf>.

¹³⁵ Al-Ammar, F., Patchett, H., and Shamsan, S. (2019), pg. 63

mentioned in Ta'izz (six), followed by Lahj (five), Aden (five), and Al-Dhale (five). Water-related conflicts were mentioned the least in Hadramawt (one), Ma'rib (one), and Shabwah (one).

Of respondents who discussed conflict related to land, a majority described general land disputes between neighboring families. For example, one respondent in Abyan said, "They dispute over a piece of land, and if a person takes a meter or two from another person's land, a dispute occurs that sometimes leads to shootings." Some respondents mentioned within-family conflicts as well, specifically issues between buyers and heirs of the land, "as some of the heirs sell the lands without the approval of the rest of the heirs." Several respondents also discussed property rights disputes as reason for conflict. One respondent gave the following example: "The biggest source of conflict in my area is lands. There are people who take over the lands of others and fight the original owners of the lands. There is a well-known conflict over a land [...] that has five heirs. Each one of them sold the land to a different person. The five people who bought the land fought among themselves, each claiming that the land belonged to him. Some people were killed and a series of blood feuds started because of this land." A few respondents also mentioned issues with land being stolen by armed groups. Conflicts related to land were most frequently mentioned in Ma'rib (five), Ta'izz (four), Shabwah (four) and Abyan (four), and least mentioned in Lahj (zero), Hadramawt (one), Aden (one), and Al-Dhale (one).

Across conflict types, there was little consensus on how these conflicts have changed in the past five years: 35 respondents said it has gotten worse, 27 said it had gotten better, and 14 described no change. Respondents described varying roles of youth in community conflict as well: 37 described youth as perpetrators in the conflict, 31 as victims, and 26 as arbitrators or mediators in local conflict. Trends did emerge, however, when looking at change by conflict type. The data showed that in general, inter-family and interpersonal conflicts improved but conflicts related to water, land and resource distribution have gotten worse due to the scarcity of resources as a result of the war. Related to water, one respondent in Ta'izz said, "Conflicts about water have increased in comparison to last year as a result of the lack or insufficiency of public services such as water provision. It made people more cruel." Related other resources, another said, "The intensity of the conflict over cooking gas has increased due to its monopoly by the providers. Cooking gas is sold on the black market at high prices."

When asked about social cohesion in their own communities, 13 of the 22 Phase I respondents said that their community positively supports one another, and many said there is a high degree of support that is greater even among youth. One respondent said this is because "youth understand each other – each other's needs. They understand each other's ways of thinking, opinions, suggestions. If I understand my friend, I can support him, spiritually or financially, or otherwise" (Youth, Ta'izz). Some of the ways in which youth said they support other youth or their communities are: writing to each other through social media, supporting each other's initiatives, giving money or resources directly to a person in need, assisting a friend in finding a job or training course, and providing training they have received to others. One male respondent in Sana'a gave an example of an instance where a youth community member used social media to gather support: "One time, there was someone going to get married. He didn't have anyone in Sana'a, so he posted on social media that he needed people to do a Zaffeh (when cars drive one after another and honk in celebration of a wedding) ... it was a hashtag. It became one of the longest zaffehs ever done in Sana'a ... and this was during hard times. This thing that happened between youth let other people work in a similar way. People gave gifts, others offered other things."

Considering ways to increase social cohesion in communities, Phase I respondents provided suggestions directed to both community members and development partners like USAID. Related to community members, youth raised the need for community members to put aside political and religious affiliations and unite under a shared goal for the community, then governorate, then country. Related to donor support, respondents suggested joint work on projects with the ROYG, promoting dialogue from different groups, equity across development/humanitarian activities, and targeting thought leaders as well as youth. One youth respondent described a specific need for increased funding for youth-led initiatives at the community level: "There are some youth that took initiatives in Sana'a. They took the lead in volunteering, conducting classes, distributing food and clothes for people in

need, working as community mobilizing for the cholera outbreak. Youth have been finding ways to come into places, but they were not given opportunities to do these things formally on the ground. Most of the funds go to international NGOs that recruit staff and implement on a big level, but funds haven't come to local level. Funds need to reach grassroots efforts or programs—that will be more effective” (Youth, Sana’a/Ta’izz).

OTHER STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

Development partner and implementer respondents of Phase 1 KIs and the web survey echoed youth in acknowledging increased social fragmentation due to the war. One Phase 2 KI respondent working with an international organization verified especially the Phase 2 youth perspectives around community level conflict. The respondent even considered conflicts around land and water as “bigger in Yemen than the national conflict itself because it has been chronic and trying to mitigate it is much more complex.” In line with the youth perspectives above, this respondent explained that the central issues are around scarcity of the resources paired with a lack of law or reference on how to distribute them. Though there are water associations in most governorates, these groups lack a consistent means for resource distribution.

When discussing opportunities related to social cohesion for youth, development partners focused on the need to bring youth voices from different social factions together, supporting cultural activities, and linking youth with opportunities for learning and growth. Related to youth voices, one respondent said, “Hate speech, terrorism speech... needs to be addressed by bringing young people from different areas into one space, but not telling them it’s to fix hate speech and terrorism—not talking about politics.” The respondent explained that youth from the south expect hate from people in the north based on what they see on Facebook and Twitter, but this perception of hate among youth in the north is generally untrue and can be debunked by bringing youth together. “Social media shouldn’t be about hate speech. Focusing on the potential of youth and highlighting talents and achievements of youth, making a contest around this, bringing these talented people on social media platforms, this would be a good idea. [For example,] bring a youth to... speak about his experience with a friend from Sana’a. Bring accomplished young people because they have a lot of followers – have them directly or indirectly share their experiences, how Yemenis can support one another. This would help a lot.” Another respondent linked the concepts of bringing together youth voices with cultural activities, pointing out the opportunity for USAID to support youth initiatives or businesses that create social spaces in the community. Two of nine Phase 1 development partner or implementer KI respondents also linked social cohesion to educational and income-generating opportunities, explaining that social cohesion programs need to be mixed with economic opportunities for youth. “You can’t try to promote social cohesion without fixing the grassroots problem of livelihoods.” Like the sentiment around grievance mechanisms described above, these respondents went on to explain that basic needs like health, water and income need to be addressed in order for social cohesion programs to work.

CONCLUSIONS

The table below summarizes the assets, challenges, priorities, and opportunities gathered from all data sources for youth integration in strengthening social cohesion.

Assets
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth ability to spearhead humanitarian initiatives in spaces others are unable to reach • Women able to maintain connections across divides, and are key influencers in formal and informal education of youth • Wide-spread youth access and use of low-bandwidth social media sites (Facebook, WhatsApp) • Strong existing social cohesion among youth

Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local meeting places destructed (schools, courts, cultural facilities) • Competing factions exercising control over different neighborhoods, fracturing districts • Pre-existing divisions across sectarian lines • Perception of youth that only way to prove themselves is to fight • Disputes over services like water and electricity due to poor governance, scarcity of resources and corruption
Priorities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leveraging existing channels for youth communication to bring together youth with different backgrounds and experiences
Opportunities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint projects with ROYG • Creating spaces (in-person or virtual) for youth with different backgrounds to share experiences • Ensuring equity across development/humanitarian activities • Interventions targeted to thought leaders as well as youth • Funding for youth-led social cohesion initiatives at community level • Supporting cultural activities • Design trainings intentionally to equip youth participants with the knowledge, skills, and materials to effectively train other youth in their communities

OUTCOME 2.3: INCLUSIVE PEACE AND TRANSITION PROCESSES STRENGTHENED

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Yemeni civil war began September 2014 with the seizure of Sana'a by Houthi rebels and groups loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.¹³⁶ Since then the situation in Yemen has rapidly deteriorated, impacting the functionality of the central government and banks, and resulting in a variety of development issues as described in the sections above. The UN has been at the forefront of peacebuilding efforts in Yemen,¹³⁷ but progress has been slow due to what some sources suggest is an over-reliance on currently dysfunctional state institutions, and a lack of inclusivity of marginalized voices that better reflect the situation on the ground.¹³⁸ The conflict has weakened state institutions rendering them unable to perform standard functions, which in turn further deepens the humanitarian

¹³⁶ Salisbury, P. (2018). Building Peace in Yemen from the Ground Up. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-02-28/building-peace-yemen-ground>

¹³⁷ UN (2017). UN Strategic Framework for Yemen 2017-2019. Retrieved from: <https://yemen.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/unct-ye-strategic-framework-2017-2019-doc.pdf>

¹³⁸ Salisbury, P. (2018). Building Peace in Yemen from the Ground Up. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-02-28/building-peace-yemen-ground>

crisis and inhibits peacebuilding efforts. Peacebuilding is hampered by international supporters of both sides and the fact that some major actors in the conflict have profited from the war economy.¹³⁹ This cycle of dysfunction in combination with the complexity of the economy underscores the importance of exploring creative and alternative avenues for peacebuilding.

Yemeni youth are one group that is “putting forward alternative narratives and visions for peace.”¹⁴⁰ A 2019 paper explained that “increasing numbers of young men and women artists across the country – singers, painters, filmmakers and photographers – are tailoring art and cultural activities towards peacebuilding.... Women artists in particular are finding more space to express themselves, with exhibitions like ‘Basma w Rasma’¹⁴¹ organized by the Basement Cultural Foundation.”¹⁴² However, as noted previously youth voices have been marginalized in the peacemaking process and many youth activists “were polarized or their loyalties were bought for money by the conflicted parties and groups, thus their activities turned out to be in favor of these parties and groups. That also meant that their collective role was disrupted, and it lost most of its values and strengths.”¹⁴³

Compounding the dysfunction is an extreme lack of inclusivity in existing political institutions: the Global Gender Gap Report reported that in 2020, 99.7 percent of parliament positions were filled by men compared to 0.3 percent by women; 93.5 percent of ministerial positions were filled by men compared to 6.5 percent by women; and of the last 50 years, a man held the head of state position in all 50.¹⁴⁴ The literature is sparse on youth representation in political institutions, though youth KII respondents expand on this point in the section below.

YOUTH PERSPECTIVE

As Phase 2 focused primarily on the Objective 1 sectors, the youth perspectives in this section represent just those from Phase 1 data collection. Youth respondents of KIIs frequently raised the direct and indirect effects of the war on all aspects of their lives as youth in Yemen. When discussing the youth landscape broadly, four of 22 respondents brought up safety and security issues, three raised issues of state violence or threats, and three discussed the problem of youth joining conflict actors as a means to secure an income, food and resources, or a personal sense of purpose. One respondent said, “Right now, youth are the fuel of the war, sadly” (Youth, Sana’a).

Thinking about the next five years in Yemen, youth respondents expressed a mix of both optimistic and pessimistic opinions. While six respondents expressed an overall pessimistic outlook, nine respondents expressed hope for the next five years. One respondent said, “In terms of the next five years, I see it in a very positive way – hopefully, youth will keep thinking in positive ways, and think about ways to change, increase programs and startups, help the country even without financial support. They can excite and encourage each other” (Youth, Sana’a). Another optimistic respondent raised the importance of education and the economy in peacebuilding, saying “If we take care of two sides – one, education side, and two, economic side... if youth find good education that make [them] able to find jobs and develop [themselves], the economic side will grow. They [youth] wouldn’t be forced to go to other sides (war, violence). So, if we take care of these things, the other problematic things will then disappear” (Youth, Ta’izz).

A common thread among respondents with hopeful views of the future of Yemeni youth was the centrality of the youth themselves to the solutions. As detailed in sections above, youth respondents were highly motivated and interested in contributing to progress in Yemen. One respondent gave an

¹³⁹ Salisbury, P. (2018). Building Peace in Yemen from the Ground Up. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-02-28/building-peace-yemen-ground>

¹⁴⁰ Nevens, K., Baabbad, M., and Padda, J. (2019), pg. 14

¹⁴¹ Forum for Development, Culture, and Dialogue (2016). Retrieved from: <https://www.fgcd.org/events-details.php?id=157#>

¹⁴² Forum for Development, Culture, and Dialogue (2016). ORF: Rasma w Basma Initiative. Retrieved from: <https://www.fgcd.org/events-details.php?id=157#>

¹⁴³ Transfeld, M. (2017), pg. 11

¹⁴⁴ World Economic Forum (2019). Global Gender Gap Report 2020. Retrieved from: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf

example of a specific peacebuilding training via Zoom, and expressed interest in more like it, saying “In the near future, it seems depressing. But there are initiatives of hope... I just finished a Zoom meeting with colleagues about a stage of peacebuilding. This platform is one of the youth initiatives on the ground that helps train youth to build peace because it’s what we need the most. In the last period, international organizations and development partners have focused more on humanitarian works but they began to work completely on the development and youth side... how to build youth... so there are promising things for youth to build themselves by themselves” (Youth, Sana’a/Amran). Another respondent highlighted differences in thinking among youth as an asset: “Involving youth in political matters would really help. We [youth] have a more peaceful, different way of thinking. Youth want life, to build their futures, see opportunities. [This is] the opposite of the decision-makers and officials who only care about their personal interests. If youth get involved with politics, it will help promote peace and mitigate the ongoing conflict. We think in a more peaceful way – ways that would benefit the country more. Youth don’t have personal interests” (Youth, Sana’a).

In discussing ways in which youth can contribute to peace, youth raised ideas about youth as decision-makers, the importance of sharing experiences and changing the youth mindset, and the potential for youth influence. Table 13 below displays these quotes by category.

Table 13: Youth Perspectives on Contributing to Peace in Yemen

Subject	Quote
Including youth in decision making	<i>“Local community initiatives [are needed] where youth have some influence on the community/sides, have ability to lead. We also see UN delegates don’t represent the youth or opinions of youth. There is the resolution... that is about how to integrate youth but it doesn’t make a long-lasting impression. The youth have tried one, two, three paths. Big marginalization, but youth still try, and attempts are increasing, which is optimistic.” – Youth, Sana’a/Amran</i>
	<i>“Decision making itself is not given to youth, only certain people have the power. But if youth are given the chance regarding decision making and the political process, we can be one of the most significant aspects of peacebuilding. Youth participated in the national conference dialogue in 2012 after the revolution. I remember that they were so excited and aware of what’s going to happen in Yemen. Unfortunately, no one had an idea that things were going to get worse. But indeed, youth are important assets regarding peacebuilding. We are keen to learn more, to give more. The only motivation is patriotism. Right now, the men in power... their only motivation is money and power. They don’t care about the country. Youth are noble. If they are given the chance they deserve, we would have a much better country right now.” – Youth, Sana’a</i>
	<i>“Involving youth in political matters would really help. We [youth] have a more peaceful, different way of thinking.... Youth want life, to build their futures, see opportunities, etc.... The opposite of the decision-makers and officials who only care about their personal interests. If youth get involved with politics, it will help promote peace and mitigate the ongoing conflict. We think in a more peaceful way – ways that would benefit the country more. Youth don’t have personal interests.” – Youth, Sana’a</i>
	<i>“They [youth] need to be heard and they need to be making decisions.... People are afraid to voice their concerns.” – Youth, Sana’a</i>

Subject	Quote
	<p><i>"It's not in their hand, to be honest. If it was even one percent in their hands, the situation would be completely different." – Youth, Ta'izz</i></p> <p><i>"In terms of decision-making on international level about Yemeni crisis, youth are left out completely. We've requested many times they involve youth in these discussions to represent different visions and opinions." – Youth, Sana'a</i></p> <p><i>"Youth can play all the parts to help society. The old ideology can be eradicated by youth. The new system, the democracy can be run by youth in company with the old group." – Youth, Sana'a</i></p>
Changing youth mindset/sharing experiences	<p><i>"Right now, youth play the most important role because their tribal and intellectual orientation is that we have to defend a specific issue. [We] can make change by changing how they [youth] think." – Youth, Sana'a</i></p> <p><i>"Youth who are aware, intellectual, want to live, wants a homeland, they are the ones who can limit the conflict. How? Through their intellect, they can help erase what is called tribal aggressiveness or the sectarianism that we suffer from.... For example, when I am intellectual/cultured/aware, and there is a youth from another group or someone from the government's side – who also wants peace – the same thing. When the two parties unite, with progressive thought, open-mind, they will be able to control the conflict.... So long as there is an absence of this unity, the conflict will continue. Youth can stop the conflict with the right way of thinking, by being cultured, by repelling the sectarianism, through their love for life and for learning, and by desiring peace, internal and external peace." – Youth, Ta'izz</i></p> <p><i>"Try to spread peace, coexist, get rid of sectarianism, and find peaceful solutions. We should try to build together and forget about sectarianism and political parties, and build Yemen itself." – Youth, Sana'a</i></p> <p><i>"Peace initiatives.... On social media, publicizing things that let people know the people are okay. We can still do things to save the country... coexisting also. A lot of youth have become more aware (good-minded) and co-exist." – Youth, Sana'a</i></p>
Youth influence	<p><i>"Advocacy. Peacebuilding ... it's an integrated loop. If he advocates, he can be an influencer. If he influences, he will be a success story. If he is a success story, he will have opportunities. If he has opportunity, he will have income. What I mean is it is a system. Youth are in the most sensitive situation in the community. Their choices are clear from the beginning – yes or no (their fate is decided). If you have to take care of your family, you have to go fight in the war – not because you believe in the cause, but because you need to make money. But, all youth can still advocate. They need influential tools too." – Youth, Sana'a</i></p> <p><i>"The only thing youth can do, given the current situation, is try to unite different ideas that exist here – to fix Yemen. Slowly, people can influence the thinking of others. Just uniting everyone to one front." – Youth, Sana'a</i></p>

Subject	Quote
	<i>“[Youth play] a big role. If they are aware youth, they can awaken those that are not aware. Right now, youth are the ones fighting in the war. This means youth are unaware, don’t understand why they are fighting, the politics, etc. Some are fighting their friends for no reason. If they become aware enough, the conflict will stop. If they unite.” – Youth, Aden</i>

While youth expressed a high degree of interest and potential for engagement across all outcome areas, one barrier that is specific to this outcome is the issue of government approvals – one youth respondent explained that permits for peacebuilding activities are not granted in Houthi-held regions. This is a barrier that development partners and implementers raised as well.

OTHER STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

Development partners and implementers generally echoed similar challenges to the youth perspectives described above, raising the challenges of government approval for peacebuilding projects in Houthi areas, youth being recruited to fight, and existing social fragmentation.

In terms of priorities to address related to youth engagement in peacebuilding, donors and implementers gave the following suggestions: uncovering discrimination ideologies in political and social arenas, working directly with communities, supporting the Transitional Education Plan, giving youth a voice in transition processes, youth engagement in track 2 and 3 programs, and ensuring integration of youth into all types of programming. Though there was not much consensus on recommendations specific to this outcome among development partners and implementer respondents, it is clear that programming specific to youth engagement in peacebuilding is both difficult to pinpoint but encompassing effective youth inclusion in all other outcome areas as well.

CONCLUSIONS

The table below summarizes the assets, challenges, priorities, and opportunities gathered from all data sources for youth integration in peace and transition processes.

Assets
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth departing from views of older generations and putting forward new visions for peace • Youth interest in peacebuilding processes and civic engagement • Youth creativity
Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Upsurge in youth recruitment to fight due to limited sources of income, land, fuel, and/or food elsewhere • Lack of reliable and functioning state institutions • Lack of permissions for peacebuilding projects in Houthi-held areas
Priorities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involving youth in decision-making – supporting government involvement

- Involving youth in decision-making – youth inclusion in development planning and implementation

Opportunities

- Training youth and providing them resources for peacebuilding advocacy and influence
- Direct work with communities
- Support to Transitional Education Plan and support to youth engagement in track 2 and 3 programs

YOUTH INITIATIVES

For the education, health, water, and social cohesion sectors respondents were asked for each sector whether young people in their community/area are currently doing anything to contribute to the sector. Additionally, at the end of the interviews respondents were asked more general questions about other ways in which young people are creating positive change in their community/area. Interviewers probed specifically about initiatives that were mentioned during the listing exercise. For each initiative mentioned, respondents were asked if they participated.

The most common youth initiatives respondents were aware of across governorates were health awareness campaigns (41), volunteer teaching (34), garbage cleanup (25), food distribution (15) and cleaning or constructing water tanks (13). Of the 97 total respondents, 32 participated in one or more initiatives; 24 of these 32 respondents were male. The sections below provide detailed summaries of current youth initiatives in each governorate. While many of the initiatives described below are entirely youth-driven, some mentioned the support of organizations such as CARE or UNICEF as specified in the activity description. These initiatives were largely described as successful but in need of additional support to continue.

Abyan: Of the 12 respondents in Abyan, six reported participation in one or more youth initiatives. Most of these respondents were in the 20-24 age group (four), followed by 25-29 (two). Five of the six respondents who participated were male. Of those who did not participate in initiatives, the main reasons cited for lack of participation were not knowing of the initiatives, not knowing how to get involved, and lack of time due to employment. Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were a cash for work initiative around cutting sesbania trees (nine), volunteer teaching (six), a COVID-19 awareness initiative (five), and cleaning water tanks or sewage canals (four). Table 14 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Abyan by YPA category.

Table 14: Current Youth Initiatives in Abyan by YPA category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe spaces initiative/COVID-19 awareness (5) • Mosquito control (1) • Opening/operating a pharmacy (1) • First aid course carried out by an organization (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COVID-19 awareness: “It educates people about Covid-19, its causes and ways of prevention. They also distributed soap and sanitizers; It achieved some of its objectives. Some people committed to the prevention measures, and some did not comply because our homes are open, and bathrooms are located outside houses; When money is available for those in charge of the initiative, they can provide for some of the living needs of young people who are daily wage workers.” • Mosquito control: “Young people in the village launched an initiative to combat mosquitoes in the village, where they collected small financial donations from the people, provided insecticides and sprayed them, and they also educated the people on ways to prevent various diseases and epidemics.”

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching (6) ● Awareness (3) ● Cleaning schools (2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching: “There are some young people who volunteer to teach in schools, but there is no one to support them so they can continue.” ● Awareness: “They carry out awareness raising initiatives for people and encourage youth to get an education. Through seminars, recreational trips, and youth gatherings at events.”
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cleaning water tanks/sewage canals (4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cleaning: “They undertake youth initiatives to clean the water tank in the village from waste in order to be eligible to pump water into it from the government project.”
Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cash for work: cutting trees (9) ● Sewing training (2) ● Cash for work: Building classrooms (1) ● Cash for work: Working in farms (0)² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cutting trees: “As a volunteer, I participated in educating the people, and I also participated in chopping down sesbania trees and removing them from the roads and in front of homes. It chopped down sesbania trees and removed them from the roads and in front of homes to improve the village scenery and extend the roads. Yes, it achieved its goals by 80% because it improved the village scenery and developed cooperation between the people of the area through bringing everyone together to participate in chopping down the sesbania trees. It also created some sense of delight and comfort among people.” ● Sewing: “Girls in the Al-Wade’a’ area were registered to be trained in sewing, Naksh and hairdressing, but I could not go there because it is too far (the training place was far from Al-Sawad area where the respondent lives); Many women have learned these skills (sewing, Naksh, and hairdressing); This initiative ought to expand its work to implement training in our area, provide sewing machines and financial support to women who are learning to sew.” ● Sewing: “I participated with the Yemeni Women Union in the field of sewing.”
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conflict-related awareness raising (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conflict: “When any conflict occurs, young people educate people to warn them of the dangers of conflicts that occurred or may occur. Through meetings with people or the parties facing tension.”

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

² Frequencies appear as zero when an initiative was raised during the listing exercise but no respondents during the KIs had heard of it.

Al-Dhale: Of the 12 respondents in Al-Dhale, three reported participation in one or more youth initiatives. Two of the three were in the 15-19 age group and one was in the 25-29 age group. All three of these respondents were male. Only two respondents who did not participate in initiatives

mentioned specific barriers to entry: one female respondent said she was too young to participate (this respondent fell in the 15-19 age group), and another female respondent said she had heard of initiatives but did not participate because “women do not participate due to some problems that occur during work.” When asked about the type of problems, the respondent explained that problems occur with registration of beneficiary households and distribution when aid is distributed, and women do not participate so they “do not get into any issues or arguments.” Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were flour distribution (eight), paving roads (six), direct provision of volunteer health services (five), and volunteer teaching (five). Table 15 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Al-Dhale by YPA category.

Table 15: Current Youth Initiatives in Al-Dhale by YPA category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Flour distribution (8) ● Providing health services (5) ● Awareness campaigns (4) ● Advocacy (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Flour distribution: “I am aware but I have not participated because I do not have time. They distributed flour to some families, especially the displaced. Flour was not distributed to everyone in the area, as some people did not receive flour. It is possible through the help of young people from the area to survey the area, because they are more aware about those who are in need in their areas. Also, the selection criteria for beneficiaries should be modified to include a larger number of people.” ● Health services: “There are about five young people in the area who have experience and certificates in the health sector who help parents in providing simple services such as giving shots, nutrition and first aid, they work voluntarily. Either people go to them or vice versa. Out of the five, three are females. One of them works as a midwife, and she helps people for free.”
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching (5) ● Fundraising (2) ● Building schools (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching: “Some of the university graduates gave students remedial lessons during the summer vacation, and they also raised some money to do remedial lessons. Money was collected for teachers willing to give remedial lessons.” ● Fundraising: “Some young people tried to establish an association to collect donations from supporters and coordinate with government agencies to provide housing costs for university students attending Aden University, but this association was suspended due to the lack of response from the competent authorities in the governorate.”

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Constructing water tanks (4) Cleaning wells (2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Constructing water tanks: “When the region’s youth found that the people were suffering from the lack of drinking water and water for domestic use, they contacted and followed up with some organizations to provide water tanks for the residents in the area. Indeed, the youth succeeded in providing for every five homes a 3,000-liter tank and filling those tanks with water every ten days. This situation lasted only three months because support was ceased [by the organization].”
Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collecting donations (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collecting donations: “The people of the village collect donations together after every Friday prayer and they hand it over to the poorest and neediest families.”
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Paving roads (6) Garbage cleanup (3) Negotiation with other villages (1) Organizing Ramadan competitions (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Paving roads: “I participat[ed] in loading stones, mixing cement and drilling the ground. [The activity] paved roads linking villages and within villages. [The activity achieved its objectives] because the people have seen improved transportation within the area on the ground.” Garbage cleanup: “One of the youths proposed the idea that the area should be cleaned, and his friends agreed with him and raised money in order to buy tools and supplies for cleaning. After that, the youth and the people were mobilized and the cleaning process began, as well as filling the potholes in the streets for traffic safety and getting rid of the water that collects in the pits on the sides of the roads and in the middle of the streets.” Negotiation: “I see that the village youths communicate with ‘Aqels in the other village in which the water reservoir is located, and then negotiations would take place in order to reach an understanding that would allow us to go fetch water from there, even if in small quantities.”

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

Aden: Of the 12 respondents in Aden, four reported participation in one or more youth initiatives. Three of the four were in the 25-29 age group and one of the four was in the 15-19 group. Two of the four were male and two were female. The most frequently cited barriers to participation among respondents who did not participate in initiatives were not knowing about them (two) and not knowing how to get involved (two). One additional respondent raised the issue of retaliation with the example of healthcare, saying “They [youth] do not do anything; because if someone gets involved and talks with the government hospitals’ officials about the need of providing health services for the people, they might get harassed, get reported to any police station, and interrogated on the grounds of attacking the hospital or doctors; therefore, young people avoid taking any action in this regard.” Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were garbage removal (six), drilling or maintaining wells (three), volunteer teaching or educational awareness (two), and health awareness

campaigns (two). Table 16 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Aden by YPA category.

Table 16: Current Youth Initiatives in Aden by YPA category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness campaigns (2) ● Bina Nanhadh (Together for Development) initiative- al-Amal (Hope) initiative (1) ● Mosquito control (1) ● Direct provision of medication (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Bina Nanhadh: He [my brother] is a member of the initiative. He collects old clothes that are still usable and distributes them to the needy. He also visits the elderly home and provides them with their needs of clothes and medicine. [...] It has achieved its objectives of helping the needy. ● Mosquito control: “Yes, young people came together in the neighborhood, sprayed insecticide to control mosquitoes, and carried out cleaning activities in the neighborhood.... The youth took the initiative, bought cleaning tools at their own expense, and carried out the campaign with the participation of the people of the neighborhood, young and old.”
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching/educational awareness (2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching: “I am following a page on Facebook that is owned by some of the young people who conduct field visits to schools to carry out activities, such as conducting educational competitions and handing over prizes to students, and organizing seminars and activities to raise awareness about the importance of education.”
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Drilling/maintaining wells (3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Drilling/maintaining wells: “They [youth people] have dug a water well in the area with the help of the community. They had tried to repair the government water supply project's pipelines, but they could not, due to the lack of adequate financial budget. Therefore, they resorted to digging the well instead of repairing the project's water pipes because it was cheaper.”
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal (6) ● Cultural activities (0)² ● Psychological support (0) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal: “Young people came together to take initiative to solve the problem of garbage accumulation in the neighborhood., Young people in the area always take the initiative in urging the people to participate in activities that serve the community, whether by collecting donations from well-off people or by providing supplies that young people need, such as; Cleaning tools. For example, young people in the neighborhood came together and cleaned the streets and removed the waste to a certain place and burned it, because it is difficult for the garbage truck to enter the neighborhood due to the narrow alleys.”

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

² Frequencies appear as zero when an initiative was raised during the listing exercise but no respondents during the KIs had heard of it.

Hadramawt: Of the 12 respondents in Hadramout, four reported participation in one or more youth initiatives. Two of the four were in the 20-24 age group and 2 were in the 25-29 age group. Three of the four were male and one female. The most frequently cited barriers to participation among respondents who did not participate in initiatives were gender (two) and lack of time due to employment (one). Both respondents who mentioned a gender barrier were female. One said, “The obstacle is that most families do not allow girls to participate in such events because there is gender mixing.” The other respondent explained that “Customs and traditions in the family prevent me from participating in any initiative.” Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were health awareness campaigns (eight), distributing dates during Ramadan (six), garbage removal (six), and cleaning mosques (four). Table 17 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Hadramout by YPA category.

Table 17: Current Youth Initiatives in Hadramout by YPA category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness campaigns (8) • Distributing dates during Ramadan (6) • Mosquito control (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness campaigns: “In medical emergencies, young people take patients to hospitals, and they do not do more than that. Sometimes, when there is someone who motivates and guides them towards a specific idea. For example, one time they distributed posters about diseases. One of the organizations has provided posters for young people, who in turn distributed them in the area to educate people about a disease....” • Dates: “They distribute dates to people in the community. Some neighborhood Aqels supervise the distribution process, each in his neighborhood. It has achieved great success because it helped people in need. If there were other philanthropists and enough financial support, it could distribute food baskets and Eid clothes to the poor.”
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Volunteer teaching (3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Volunteer teaching: “There are teachers who teach outside the area and when they come to the area on vacations, they organize English language sessions for young people and also carry out learning sessions in mosques.”
Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pottery making (0)² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N/A
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repairing sewage canals/water pipes (3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repair: “In some seasons, the water pipes get damaged, so young people repair them on a regular basis.”

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal (6) ● Cleaning mosques (4) ● Fighting corruption (1) ● Ma'yan Youth Forum (1) ● Youth forums (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal: "We made garbage bins, but we did not find support from the local authority to collect the garbage and it quickly stopped. It did not achieve its objectives because it stopped quickly. If the local authority supports the initiative by providing a truck that comes every week to collect the garbage, that will be good." ● Ma'yan Youth: "There is "Ma'yan Youth Forum", which organizes group wedding ceremonies annually in the area. It has an official representative it selects, who is the oldest and wisest among them. He determines the plan for them and forms a committee of young people to coordinate and implement the work." ● Youth Forums: "Establishing youth forums, organizing football tournaments, and holding cultural and singing sessions. They carry out these activities through the Cultural Unit (a cultural center), where the cultural officer in the unit organizes these events with the help of a group of young people from the area."

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

² Frequencies appear as zero when an initiative was raised during the listing exercise but no respondents during the KIs had heard of it.

Lahj: Of the 13 respondents in Lahj, five reported participation in one or more initiatives. Three of the five were in the 25-29 age group and two in the 20-24 group. Three were males and two were females. Only two respondents who did not participate in initiatives cited specific barriers to participation: one cited a lack of initiatives in the area, and the other cited a lack of time due to family commitments. Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were health awareness campaigns (five), repairing or cleaning irrigation canals or water networks (five), volunteer teaching (four), and garbage removal (four). Table 18 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Lahj by YPA category.

Table 18: Current Youth Initiatives in Lahj by YPA category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness campaigns (5) ● Working in health centers (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness campaigns: "Yes. I have participated with them.... This initiative educates women about the preventive measure against COVID-19, viruses, and bilharziasis. It also raises women's awareness about all health issues. Moreover, we distributed cards to pregnant women through which they receive assistance." ● Health centers: "Save the Children organization has conducted training courses on first aid and midwifery in Aden for male and female youth from our area. These young people are now back to the area and they work in the health unit."

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching (4) ● Advocacy (1) ● Printing school textbooks (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching: “Some young people have volunteered to teach, and in return, we collect money on a monthly basis to pay them as salaries. In addition, a group of young people and I have convinced one of the land owners to donate some land to build a school on it. We have started building the construction foundation, but we could not find a body to finance the construction of the school and complete what we have started. We want to find an organization or a body to undertake the project of building the school that we have already started building its foundation. We also wish the government would build schools close to the people, and build girls-only schools, so that girls are not deprived from education.” ● Advocacy: “Some young people go to the education office and demand good teachers, but no one is responding to their demands.”
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Repairing or cleaning irrigation canals/networks (5) ● Digging wells (2) ● Collecting donations for diesel to operate water pumps (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Repair: “Young people repair water pipes for free. For example, one of the young people bought water pipes, and the others contributed with donations to buy cement then they built a room with a door for the well. However, the problem is with wastewater that still flows over the well.” ● Digging wells: “Young people dig wells and help with carrying water on their shoulders to houses.”
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cleaning/garbage removal (4) ● Paving roads (2) ● Protests/demonstrations (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Paving roads: “They have repaired the road, paved it with stones, and cleaned the streets and residential neighborhoods. An organization has instructed them to do so.” ● Protests: “They seek the concerned official authorities, demand and pressure them to resolve issues. They conduct protests and choose leaders or representatives to meet the governor or official authorities and demand a solution.”

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

² Frequencies appear as zero when an initiative was raised during the listing exercise but no respondents during the KIs had heard of it.

Ma’rib: Of the 12 respondents in Ma’rib, four reported participation in one or more initiatives. One of the four was in the 15-19 age group, one in the 20-24 age group and two in the 25-29 age group. Two were male and two were female. Respondents who did not participate in initiatives cited the

following reasons for lack of participation: lack of time due to family commitments (two), not knowing of initiatives (one), lack of time due to employment (one), lack of time due to studying (one), and being illiterate (one). Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were health awareness campaigns (seven), fundraising or provision of educational materials (three), and village cleanup efforts (three). Table 19 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Ma'rib by YPA category.

Table 19: Current Youth Initiatives in Ma'rib by YPA category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness campaigns (7) • Food distribution (1) • Distributing COVID-19 supplies (1) • Mosquito control (1) • Food distribution to IDPs (0)² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness campaigns: “In the first wave of COVID-19, young people carried out awareness raising campaigns and distributed face masks. There was also a women’s initiative to sew face masks and distribute them, which was carried out by my colleague and a number of girls.” • Food distribution: “I distributed 400 food baskets, and I was one of the main distributors in the initiative. The initiative distributes food baskets to poor families. The baskets come from the organization and we distribute them. It did not fully achieve its objectives, as food baskets were distributed, but they did not cover everyone’s needs and were not sufficient for all poor families. There should be better oversight and regulation.”
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fundraising/provision of educational materials (3) • Advocacy (2) • Blind Education Initiative (2) • Quran lessons (1) • Self-development (0) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocacy: “We demanded the provision of a literacy center, and we informed the school director in the district about it, and he promised to raise our demands to the Education Office.” • Blind Education Initiative: “I was the leader of the initiative. I have contacted a friend of mine in Sana'a to print braille books for the blind at Sana'a University. After I received them, we distributed them to the blind here in the city of Ma'rib.... It also teaches the blind how to read and write in Braille. [We used] modern technology to teach the blind. [We did this] by providing softwares, programs and modern devices designed for the blind, and seeking donations to provide them.”
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building water tanks (2) • Sewage cleanup (1) • Volunteer teaching (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sewage cleanup: “Young people use the vacuum trucks provided by the Cleaning and Improvement Fund to suck the sewage that overflows from the sewers.”

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collecting donations/funds (2) One Body (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collecting donations/funds: “They collect donations from expatriates or philanthropists to implement some service projects. Through writing a proposal, presenting it to development partners, and collecting money enough for implementation.” One Body: “I participated as a primary member and was the chief financial officer of the initiative. It distributed Iftar meals and Eid clothing and sweets to the poor. It has achieved its goals because many poor families benefited from the initiative. If it gets support, it will be able to carry such activities.”
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Village cleanup (3) Conflict resolution (2) Providing electricity to houses (0) Construction to prevent houses from floods (0) Sports leagues (0) Clothing distribution (0) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Village cleanup: “Cleaning and decorating streets, and planting trees in them. They are formal through the Cleaning and Improvement Fund. Young people go to work with the Cleaning and Improvement Fund for payments.” Conflict resolution: “Once, in a killing case, the family of one of the killers was demanding the killing of the killer's brother because he has a better status than his brother and his presence is more important to his family, so the young people intervened and saved him from being killed. The young people met with the elders of the two tribes, both where the killer and the killed are from, and they made a reconciliation between them, so that only the killer is held accountable for his crime, and that his brother is not to be involved or hurt.”

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

² Frequencies appear as zero when an initiative was raised during the listing exercise but no respondents during the KIs had heard of it.

Shabwah: Of the 12 respondents in Shabwah, two reported participation in one or more initiatives. One was in the 15-19 age group and one 25-29. Both respondents were male. Respondents who did not participate in initiatives cited the following reasons for lack of participation: poverty/lack of funds (three), gender-related issues (two), lack of time due to employment (one), not knowing of any initiatives (one), and no initiatives present in their area (one). Both respondents who cited gender-related issues were female and said their family would not allow them to participate. One was in the 15-19 age group and one 25-29. Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were volunteer teaching (five), health awareness campaigns (four), garbage removal (four) and construction of water wells or tanks (three). Table 20 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Shabwah by YPA category.

Table 20: Current Youth Initiatives in Shabwah by YPA Category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness campaigns (4) ● Khawatter Shabab (Youth thoughts) (2) ● Food distribution (1) ● Providing free medication (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness campaigns: “Youth conduct field visits to households to carry out activities and collect data of children in need of nutrition assistance.” ● Khawatter Shabab: “A group of young people organized a mosquito spraying campaign in neighborhoods. The campaign was funded by ‘Youth Thoughts’ Organization.”
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching (5) ● Female Adolescents Nadia (1) ● Providing school supplies/materials (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching: “Yes, there are young volunteers who worked in teaching students in schools for free due to the lack of teachers in public schools.” ● Female Adolescents Nadia: “Yes, I have heard of ‘Female Adolescents Nadia’ Initiative only. I have not participated in it. The initiative has raised awareness of households about early marriage risks. It also trained local girls on sewing skills. The initiative attained 90 percent of its objectives. Thanks to the initiative, some younger girls broke off engagement and their marriage was interrupted. Other girls gained sewing skills.”
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Construction of wells/water tanks (3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Construction: “We contribute to digging wells and constructing tanks voluntarily in order to obtain water for domestic use. Young people in the area take the initiative and exert self-efforts to contribute to whatever services, including digging a well if there is funding for the project. Each household assigns one of its members to contribute to digging, construction or facilitation of the project establishment.”
Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Financial support to poor families (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Financial support: “They contribute to supporting poor households by collecting funds from affluent people.”

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal (4) ● Awareness activities around conflict (1) ● Sport activities (0) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal: “Also, young people of Ataq Forum took part in cleaning neighborhoods and removing garbage from streets and marketplaces. The effort was funded by the organization.” ● Awareness: “They have carried out an awareness activity about early marriage, and training courses for young people in the area. [The training courses were] about awareness and how to resolve and settle conflicts because most of the youth were unable to resolve any problem in the community, even if it was a very minor problem.”

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

² Frequencies appear as zero when an initiative was raised during the listing exercise but no respondents during the KIs had heard of it.

Ta'izz: Of the 12 respondents in Ta'izz, four reported participation in one or more initiatives. Two were in the 20-24 age group and two were 25-29. All four were male. Respondents who did not participate in initiatives cited the following reasons for lack of participation: no initiatives in the area (four), illiteracy (two), not knowing how to get involved (one), lack of time due to family commitments (one), lack of interest (one), gender (one), and insufficient experience and connections (one). Like respondents in other governorates who discussed gender issues, this respondent said, “I have not participated in any initiative due to the mixing of genders that takes place, which goes against the teaching of our religion.” Existing initiatives that youth were most frequently aware of were volunteer teaching (eight), health awareness campaigns (six), garbage removal (two), covering open sewers (two), and direct provision of medical supplies (two). Table 21 below displays a summary of current youth initiatives in Ta'izz by YPA category.

Table 21: Current Youth Initiatives in Ta'izz by YPA Category

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness campaigns (6) ● Direct provision of medical supplies (2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness: “The youth undertook an initiative to educate the people in the village about the preventive measures against diseases and epidemics. [It was done through] personal efforts. They noticed an increase in diseases in the village, so they took this initiative to educate the people.” ● Medical supplies: “There is an initiative supported by organizations that worked to rehabilitate the health center in my area. It was not equipped with a laboratory, so they provided it with a laboratory. Before that, it opened a first aid clinic for school students. The initiative's name is “Elite Youth”; the two supporting organizations are; Youth Without Borders, and NODS Yemen.”
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching (8) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer teaching: “For example, some young people and I thought of starting up a project that aims to combat literacy among young people in different

Category	Activities (Mentions)	Description ¹
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advocacy (1) 	<p>villages. We brought together a group of young people from different villages and taught them how to read and write, then we asked them to return to their villages to pass their knowledge and teach illiterate young people how to read and write. [This] was not supported by any party. All the activities we do are voluntary.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advocacy: “Young people in the village demanded that schools be provided to the area, and that the school that was destroyed by the war be repaired and provided with school supplies, such as chairs. [They voiced their demands] to the local authority in the district. [The outcome was] nothing.”
Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Covering open sewers (2) ● Drilling wells (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Covering sewers: “They build manholes (sewage drainage channels at the neighborhood level), and repair the sewers in the neighborhoods. A few weeks ago, an initiative was made to build manholes in the neighborhood, which did not have any before. The Community Center for... Unfortunately, I do not remember the second part of the name.”
Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Vocational training (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Vocational training: “I have heard of another initiative called, “Resalati” [My Message], which is an initiative that teaches widowed women sewing.”
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal (2) ● Installing traffic lights (1) ● Bydayat Salam - clothing distribution (1) ● Support for marriage ceremonies (1) ● Village cleanup (0) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Garbage removal: “This is a youth initiative supported by UNICEF.... A group of young people gathered and started to remove the garbage and agreed with the people to choose a specific place where the garbage would be placed. Also, young people with their families created some agricultural terraces on their properties. The Social Fund provided them with some financial support as encouragement.” ● Traffic lights: “For example, there is an initiative that installed traffic lights and cameras on the streets. Young people here, through their simple abilities, have drawn attention to the matter and made a minor achievement. The state was supposed to adopt the idea and implement it across the governorate.”

¹ Description quotes included for only most frequently mentioned activities in each category or activities requiring additional explanation.

² Frequencies appear as zero when an initiative was raised during the listing exercise but no respondents during the KIs had heard of it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The SI team synthesized programmatic recommendations provided by key informants, survey respondents and the literature review with sectoral best practices. For each YPA outcome, we present sector-specific recommendations for USAID to implement as well as a mapping of recommendations to illustrative activities detailed in the YPA (in Annex I). Before elaborating sector-specific recommendations, however, we provide key considerations that cut across many YPA areas:

1. Irrespective of outcome area, USAID should strive to incorporate a youth lens into key program cycle stages, including activity design, implementation, and M&E. While this is important in any USAID context, the opportunities and threats presented by Yemen's significant youth population make this a key beneficiary population that should be explicitly considered. Depending on the extent of youth involvement with a given activity, this could take the form of strategy/document review from a youth perspective, solicitation of feedback from expert(s) in relevant Yemeni youth issues, or the direct involvement of Yemeni youth as stakeholders.
2. Activity targeting should be conducted in a way that strives to provide services to those youth most in need and/or most likely to benefit from investments. However, this desire should be weighed against possible inter-family or community-level consequences levied at participants, their families, and/or local implementers. In instances where conflicts may be exacerbated through specific targeting strategies (i.e., focusing exclusively on female beneficiaries), it is incumbent on USAID and its implementing partners to revise targeting strategies (possibly reducing delivery efficiency) and/or to better understand possible grievances and work with community members to ameliorate issues before commencement of programming.
3. Finally, given the paucity of age-disaggregated data and the high degree of heterogeneity across Yemen, we recommend that USAID incorporate high-quality data collection in support of activity design and/or inclusion of rigorous activity baselines to assist adaptive management and measure performance.

OUTCOME 1.1: IMPROVED ACCESS TO HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WATER

HEALTH

4. Rebuild damaged infrastructure and incentivize the creation of new health facilities in rural areas to better meet youth held needs. Given the state of government finances and capacity, investment in the health sector is unlikely, particularly in rural communities. However, it may be possible to leverage the private sector through public/private partnerships and/or the integration of entrepreneurial training into medical school curricula to stimulate the supply of private health facilities in underserved areas (e.g., community-based health centers, midwifery clinics). In addition to increasing the supply of health care, the creation of rural health clinics could provide a localized boost to youth employment. [YPA 1.1]
5. Provide improved pre-service and in-service training to health care workers. Given attrition of qualified and experienced health care providers, these interventions should be targeted at recent entrants and those that lack formal accreditation (who also are more likely to be youth). On a longer time-horizon, this could include technical assistance for improving medical curricula.
6. Work with government counterparts to support retention of healthcare professionals through identification and operationalization of incentive-based systems [YPA 1.2, YPA 1.7]. [YPA 1.6]
7. Create and distribute targeted behavior change communication designed to improve hygiene practices, recognition of mental health issues, promotion of good reproductive health. These

messages should be segmented by key demographics to make them more resonant. For any initiatives targeting youth, the design, piloting, communication strategy, and distribution of messages should be done with the support of youth informants. At minimum, these individuals should validate the appropriateness of the messaging. Given the higher impact of youth-focused messages if communicated by peers, USAID should recruit and pay youth to act as advocates. [YPA 1.8]

8. Create a referral system to link youth with mental and reproductive health providers in areas where such services exist. This could take the form of a media campaign and partnerships with health providers, educational institutions, and other community-based organizations, especially existing youth-led organizations and initiatives. [YPA 1.6]
9. Provide key medical equipment/supplies to health facilities on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Focus could be given to reproductive health services (more likely to benefit youth) and the prevention of communicable diseases. [YPA 1.2]
10. Partner with other development partners doing humanitarian assistance in supporting basic needs of at-risk populations (e.g., IDPs) through provision of food baskets and shelter.

EDUCATION

Technical and Vocational Education and Training

1. Support the development, delivery, and marketing for youth-focused entrepreneurship trainings. A mapping of existing TVET providers (public and private) should be conducted to assess partnership and capacity building options. The design and delivery of marketing should be done through direct engagement with youth, with youth-focused media campaigns (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp). The technical content of the trainings should be informed by local market assessments including community economic need as well as the existence and nature of social constraints to entrepreneurship. Owing to the low educational achievement and relative lack of experience in the formal economy among many youths, inclusion of life/soft skills and financial literacy components could further strengthen the training. Experience implementing these projects has substantiated the value-add of providing follow-on services, including coaching/mentoring (particularly focused on facilitating market access and review of business plans), provision of seed capital, and networking.
2. Support the development, delivery, and marketing for targeted, youth-focused workforce development trainings. As with the entrepreneurial trainings, these should be informed by market assessments and social constraints, delivered through existing TVET institutions, and integrate life/soft skills and financial literacy modules. Special consideration should be provided for supporting female youth. This includes targeting and training strategies but also, given the rapidly changing labor market participation of females, up-to-date and localized market assessments. However, female-only trainings are discouraged due to the possibility of negative externalities.
3. In locations where there is an absence of qualified TVET institutions, USAID could explore partnering with youth as training extension agents. In this model the youth would receive a training of trainer intervention and conduct trainings directly with peers.

Formal Education

4. Support public schools with multi-faceted programming, through partnerships with host government partners, including [YPA 1.3, YPA 1.5]:
 - Support modernization of school curricula with a focus on foundational skills (literacy/numeracy) and better preparing students for integration with the modern economy.
 - Support modernization of pre-service teacher training curricula and provision of in-service teacher training and mentoring support, especially among youth educators.

- Support increased accountability of teachers by strengthening school-based management and facilitating the engagement of parents with school.
 - Develop and provide scripted lesson plans, particularly for teachers without formal training.
 - Recruit youth to serve as teachers and teacher's aides. It is important to note that youth demand for educational employment is low.
 - Support retention of educational professionals through identification and operationalization of incentive-based systems.
 - Support student retention, particularly with female pupils, through early identification and household-based engagement activities.
 - Develop and provide remedial education services for out of school youth, focusing on foundational and life/soft skills, as well as re-entry into the formal education system.
5. Develop and provide remedial education services for out of school youth, focusing on foundational and life/soft skills, as well as re-entry into the formal education system. [YPA 1.3]

WATER

1. Expand water infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, including investment in solar-powered water pumps and the expansion of rain harvesting systems. While youth would be direct beneficiaries of increased water supply, USAID should also partner with youth in the building, maintenance, and monitoring of these investments as well as capacity building on proper use. [YPA 1.9]
2. Sterilize wells and water tankers to inhibit the spread of communicable diseases. Provide chlorine tablets for household use, particularly among IDPs.
3. Distribute behavior change communication on safe water storage and efficient water management, along the lines of the BCC recommendation provided in the Health section above.

OUTCOME 1.2: INCREASED HOUSEHOLD INCOME & OUTCOME 1.3: MACROECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND FUNCTIONS STRENGTHENED TO BOOST THE ECONOMY

1. Promote job creation through the provision of entrepreneurship and workforce development training (detailed in the education section above). [YPA 2.1, YPA 2.3, YPA 2.4]
2. Expand access to microfinance for youth entrepreneurs, with a focus on females and rural youth. Ideally expansion of financing would be supported by a multi-component training and mentoring intervention (see point above). [YPA 2.1]
3. Assess weaknesses in and provide technical assistance and financing in support of value-chains in key, labor-intensive sectors including agriculture and fisheries. These investments should be informed by analysis of weaknesses in the respective value-chains and a cost-benefit analysis of USAID interventions with the primary objectives of fostering economic growth and increased employment. [YPA 2.1, YPA 2.2]
4. Support linking youth to emergent industries exhibiting growth from the civil war, particularly those with high expected employment of youth workers (e.g., solar power, motorcycle transport, street vendors). [YPA 2.4]
5. Develop targeted cash-for work projects aligning strategic priorities (e.g., supporting other YPA sectors) with beneficiary targeting (e.g., youth that might leverage experience into related careers).

OUTCOME 2.1: MECHANISMS THAT ALLOW CITIZENS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS GRIEVANCES STRENGTHENED

1. Develop and provide trainings for youth on legal rights and processes by which they can be exercised/asserted. While this type of training could be useful for all youth, targeting youth groups, particularly those currently engaged in advocacy work would yield the strongest dividends. Participation of non-youth stakeholders in these trainings (e.g., local leaders, government representatives) would promote joint understanding of rights and an opportunity for dialogue. Provide training for youth and non-youth participants separately at first to prepare each group to work together, then proceed with joint training. [YPA 3.2]
2. Support local conflict resolution entities through capacity building and technical assistance. [YPA 3.2]
3. Partner with youth to act as field monitors on the processes and outcomes of local grievance resolution mechanisms. [YPA 3.3]
4. Facilitate dialogue between youth networks and government representatives at the local, provincial, and national levels.

OUTCOME 2.2: SOCIAL COHESION OF COMMUNITIES STRENGTHENED

1. Engage youth in the creation of safe spaces (in-person or virtual) for youth with different backgrounds to socialize and share experiences. This can be achieved through multi-use spaces like community centers, sport facilities, schools, events (e.g., competitions, festivals) and online forums. Youth should be consulted to identify safe spaces, especially with respect to different sub-groups of youth (divisions of gender, age, geographic location etc.). This objective could also be achieved through explicit targeting strategies for other youth-focused activities (e.g., purposeful selection of participants for trainings). [YPA 1.4, YPA 4.1]
2. Create safe spaces for youth and non-youth from different backgrounds to socialize and share experiences. Like the above, exchanges between youth and non-youth could reduce inter-generational misunderstanding and conflict. Given the prevalence of community strengthening workshops, it is recommended that USAID not market the objective of these meetings explicitly as they may inhibit demand and affect receptivity of participants. [YPA 4.1]
3. Promote and capacitate community youth leaders and youth thought leaders. Given the influence of these actors among peers, amplification of these voices could reach large numbers of receptive youth.
4. Provide funding and technical assistance to youth-led community initiatives, particularly those with an explicit goal of serving individuals from different backgrounds and/or engaging explicitly in community dialogue/advocacy. [YPA 4.3]
5. Provide funding and technical assistance to socially beneficial youth online activities. These include the production of content focusing on cross-cultural dialogue between different Yemeni populations and combatting online discrimination. [YPA 4.1, YPA 4.3]

OUTCOME 2.3: INCLUSIVE PEACE AND TRANSITION PROCESSES STRENGTHENED

1. Counteract recruitment of youth into the war by working with government partners to create recruitment-free zones in areas where youth congregate (e.g., schools), assessing strategies for combatting online recruiting, addressing economic determinants of youth entry into combat roles (see Education and Income sections above), and engaging youth in programming to provide an alternate sense of personal purpose. [YPA 5.4]
2. Promote dialogue within the youth population and between youth and adults (see Social Cohesion section above). [YPA 5.1, YPA 4.1]
3. Support youth engagement with the Transitional Education Plan and track 2 and 3 programs. Youth representation has been difficult to achieve since the outbreak of hostilities due to the

fragmentation of formal youth civil society. The ability of youth representatives to engage will be dependent on the identification of youth leaders from key demographics. [YPA 5.5]

4. Support youth representation in government positions and advisory groups in partnership with local government partners. These interventions would necessitate intergenerational approaches noted above. [YPA 5.1, YPA 5.4]

ANNEX I: YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES

- All recommendations detailed in the Recommendations section above are numbered starting with I in each sectoral area. This numbering is used to link these recommendations to existing YPA illustrative activities in the tables below. In these tables, we abbreviate the sectoral areas as follows: Health = H, Education = E, Water = W, Income = INC, Grievances = G, Social Cohesion = SC, Peace and Transition = P. HI, for example, refers to the first recommendation listed in the Health section to the left.
- YPA illustrative activities are also numbered within each table starting with I.I This numbering is used in the sectoral recommendations section to link these recommendations to YPA activities in the tables.
- This mapping is intended to display linkages between recommendations as gathered from respondents in this study and pre-existing YPA plans.

Outcome I.I: Improved Access to Health, Education, and Water

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
I.1 Support rehabilitation of basic service delivery infrastructure at the local level (Scenarios 1-3) [H1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Employ youth/youth groups in the construction and maintenance of basic infrastructure 	●All sectors
I.2 Provide technical assistance to promote more transparent and equitable use of resources (Scenarios 4-5) [H2, H6]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Employ youth/youth groups as monitors 	●All sectors
I.3 Support for accelerated, remedial, distance, and self-learning, as well as back to school campaigns (Scenarios 1-3) [E4, E5]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Seek youth feedback on curricula, targeting/outreach approaches, frequency/duration and other aspects of program design. ●Employ/engage youth to engage as instructors on specific subject matters within the courses as well as in a follow-on training capacity with peers ●Employ/engage youth to raise awareness of training opportunities and solicit applications 	●Education
I.4 Promote schools as a safe space and for community-building initiatives around schools (Scenarios 1-5) [SC1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Engage youth through the provision of sports and other cultural activities ●Employ/engage youth/youth groups to maintain spaces and/or provide community building programming 	●Education

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
I.5 Support improved quality of primary education at the primary level, including through early grade reading initiatives (Scenarios 3-5) [E4]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● If updating of curricula is feasible, engage youth in review of materials before production 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Education
I.6 Support health systems strengthening, including support for referral systems, health system logistics and procurement of key supplies, and health systems data collection (Scenarios 1-3) [H3, H5]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ youth as data collectors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Health
I.7 Support recovery and normalization of health service delivery, including through embedded advisors and comprehensive technical assistance, especially around early warning systems, systematic vaccination campaigns, health worker capacity building, and health systems needs analysis (Scenarios 4-5) [H2]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ/engage youth to support outreach efforts, particularly among youth populations ● Train and employ/engage youth to support vaccination campaigns ● Employ youth as data collectors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Health
I.8 Support WASH behavior change efforts to reduce the spread of disease (Scenarios 1-3) [H4]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ youth to develop, refine, and distribute behavior change messages (e.g., through social media) ● Leverage youth interest to promote/extend messages in families and peer groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● WASH
I.9 Promote more sustainable use of water resources through technical assistance to local and national water service providers, promotion of improved irrigation technologies, and awareness raising initiatives (Scenarios 4-5) [W1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ youth to develop, refine, and distribute awareness raising initiatives (e.g., through social media) ● Leverage youth interest to promote/extend messages in families and peer groups ● Employ youth to act as monitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● WASH
I.10 Cross-activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provision of mental health support embedded in existing programing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● All sectors

Outcome 1.2: Increased household income & Outcome 1.3: Macroeconomic institutions and functions strengthened to boost the economy

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
2.1 Support income generation activities that help rehabilitate key community assets and services (Scenarios 1-3) [INC1, INC2, INC3]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Involve youth in data collection and analysis of labor market assessment to inform training design ● Provide technical/vocational training to youth ● Expansion of microfinance opportunities to youth 	● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture
2.2 Support agricultural livelihoods and Micro, Small, and Medium Sized Enterprises (MSMEs) through inputs, training, and access to finance (Scenarios 1-5) [INC3]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provide entrepreneurial training to youth (inclusive of seed capital and market linkages) ● Expansion of microfinance opportunities to youth 	● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture
2.3 Provide business and entrepreneurship training in key value chains and to increase employment (Scenarios 4-5) [INC1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Involve youth in data collection and analysis of business opportunity assessment to inform design of trainings ● Provide entrepreneurial training to youth (inclusive of seed capital and market linkages) ● Use successful youth entrepreneurs in trainings as role models and resources 	● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture
2.4 Support employability activities to build skills and match jobseekers and employers (Scenarios 4-5) [INC1, INC4]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Engage youth in the design of job and internship fairs 	● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture
2.5 Needs and capacity assessments of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) (Scenarios 1-3)	● N/A	● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
2.6 Technical assistance to the CBY to improve the flow and supply of cash, bank transfer operations, debt management, anti-money laundering compliance, cash management, and the national payments system (Scenarios 4-5, with potential initial support in Scenarios 2-3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture
2.7 Technical assistance to improve and modernize Yemen's customs and transport operations (Scenarios 4-5; potential support to ROYG-controlled ports in Scenario 2-3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ/engage youth in event modernization effort provides employment/internship opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture

Outcome 2.1: Mechanisms that allow citizens to identify and address grievances strengthened

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
3.1 Conduct conflict and mapping of local systems in key target areas (Scenarios 1-3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ youth to complete mapping exercises, allowing for their participation in the design stage of these activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture ● Governance, peace & stability
3.2 Training and capacity building for local organizations to promote conflict mitigation and more effective, inclusive community mechanisms (Scenarios 1-5) [G1, G2]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Incorporate youth voice to the process of selecting existing organizations for capacity building support via social media or SMS voting surveys ● Prioritize youth-led organizations for capacity building activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Governance, peace & stability
3.3 Small grants for micro-projects to address community-identified needs and grievances (Scenarios 1-5) [G3]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Establish and monitor youth quotas for micro-projects within each USAID-defined age range (10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 24-29) ● Train youth recipients of micro-project grants in community needs assessment, and provide technical support to recipients throughout project implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
3.4 Promote linkages between assistance providers and/or official service delivery institutions and participatory community mechanisms (Scenarios 4-5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ youth as community advocates for selected assistance providers/service delivery institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture ● Governance, peace & stability
3.5 Cross-activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Employ youth to conduct outreach for USAID activities and to recruit youth participants ● Use low-bandwidth methods of internet communication like Facebook and WhatsApp to advertise opportunities for youth engagement ● Implement humanitarian activities alongside development approaches to cover basic needs of youth in order to encourage participation in development activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● All sectors

Outcome 2.2: Social Cohesion of communities strengthened

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
4.1 Support local social cohesion through dialogue, socio-cultural events, and small-scale tangibles (Scenarios 1-5) [SC1, SC2, SC5, P2]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Engage youth through employment opportunities to create in-person or virtual spaces for youth to share experiences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Economic recovery, livelihoods & agriculture ● Governance, peace & stability
4.2 Integrate social cohesion considerations into service delivery and livelihoods activities (Scenarios 1-5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ensure humanitarian approaches are distributed equitably across existing factions to avoid causing further social divides – consider the following demographic groups as described by youth: age, ethnicity, education or “awareness,” political affiliation, displacement status, income, and geography 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● All sectors

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
4.3 Support local reconciliation and restorative justice efforts (Scenarios 4-5) [SC4, SC5]	● N/A	

Outcome 2.3: Inclusive peace and transition processes strengthened

YPA ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES	YOUTH INTEGRATION	SECTOR(S)
5.1 Support the engagement of youth, women, and other key populations in peace and transition processes (Scenarios 4-5) [P2]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provide financial and logistical support for youth to attend national and international peacebuilding conferences ● Partner with existing local and youth-led initiatives to deliver trainings in peacebuilding advocacy and influence, involving youth in the design of these trainings ● Create spaces (in-person or virtual) for youth to share experiences 	● Governance, peace & stability
5.2 Support civic education and awareness raising efforts around the peace and transition processes (Scenarios 4-5)		
5.3 Enhance transparency and community engagement in peace and transition processes (Scenarios 4-5)		
5.4 Build linkages between local reconciliation and reintegration efforts and national processes (Scenarios 4-5) [P1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advocate among local and national formal and informal structures/authorities for youth representation in decision making processes ● Educate youth in decision making processes 	● Governance, peace & stability
5.5 Support key transition benchmarks and processes, e.g., transitional justice (Scenarios 4-5) [P3]	● N/A	● Governance, peace & stability
5.6 Cross-activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ensure youth inclusion and engagement in all other aspects of USAID programming, drawing on recommendations in other outcome sections to ultimately contribute to peacebuilding efforts 	● All sectors

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ANNEX III: YEMEN MACROECONOMIC REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

As of 2020, the World Bank Doing Business project ranked Yemen 187 out of 190 world economies.

¹⁴⁵ This framework intends to quantify the regulatory framework encountered by businesses as a means of assessing the efficiency of the private sector. This low score signifies substantial challenges faced by entrepreneurs at a time when the country's need for entrepreneurial activity is increasing (e.g., due to issues with public sector employment).

Across the set of 12 indicators measured by the framework, the most problematic are trading across borders (ranked 188/190), access to electricity (ranked 187/190), acquisition of construction permits (ranked 186/190), and access to credit (ranked 186/190). These areas were all scored 0 ("no practice") signifying either the lack of regulations or lack of application of existing regulations. We elaborate these sectors below.

The Doing Business trade indicator was scored 0 due to the lack of formal, large-scale, private sector cross-border trade taking place as a result of the conflict. An alternate way to assess the strength of macroeconomic trade conditions is measured by the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). This metric is designed to score a "country's policies and institutional arrangements... and key elements that are within the country's control, rather than on outcomes (such as economic growth rates) that are influenced by events beyond the country's control."¹⁴⁶ Yemen's CPIA trade rating has dropped drastically in recent years, moving from 4.5 in 2010 to 2.5 in 2018 (6 point scale).¹⁴⁷ This decline indicates a deterioration in the country's political and institutional framework to support sustainable growth and poverty reduction through trade in goods even if war-mediated trade constraints are alleviated.

The Doing Business electricity indicator measures the time and cost of connecting to the electrical grid, the reliability of the electricity supply, and the transparency of tariffs. Though 79.2 percent of the population had some access to electricity in 2017¹⁴⁸, Yemen was scored 0 since there were no new electricity connections to an electrical grid made in the study year.¹⁴⁹ Similar to electricity, Yemen scored 0 on the dealing with construction permits indicator as well since there were no building permits issued in the study year, or the building legislation in the economy was not being implemented.¹⁵⁰

The Doing Business credit indicator measures "the strength of credit reporting systems and the effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws in facilitating lending."¹⁵¹ Yemen scored 0 on the strength of legal rights index compared to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) average of 3.1 (12 point scale), and 0 on the depth of credit information index compared to the MENA average of 5.3 (8 point scale).¹⁵² Yemen reported only 1.3 percent credit registry coverage among adults compared to the MENA average of 15.8 percent, and 0.0 percent credit bureau coverage compared to the MENA average of 16.3 percent.¹⁵³ Yemen reported only 1.3 percent credit registry coverage

¹⁴⁵ <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/y/yemen/YEM.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.TRAD.XQ?locations=YE&view=chart>

¹⁴⁷ scores range from 1 to 6 where 1 is low and 6 is high

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.TRAD.XQ?locations=YE&view=chart>

¹⁴⁸ World Bank Databank

¹⁴⁹ https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf

¹⁵⁰ https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf

¹⁵¹ <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/y/yemen/YEM.pdf>

¹⁵² <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/y/yemen/YEM.pdf>

¹⁵³ <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/y/yemen/YEM.pdf>

among adults compared to the MENA average of 15.8 percent, and 0 percent credit bureau coverage compared to the MENA average of 16.3 percent.¹⁵⁴

Paying taxes (89/190) and registering property (86/190) ranked the highest among the Doing Business indicators in Yemen. Though Yemen requires a much higher number of tax payments of businesses per year than the average MENA country (44 compared to 16.5), the total tax and contribution rate is lower in Yemen than the MENA average (26.6 percent compared to 32.5 percent).¹⁵⁵ Lastly, regarding registration, while there are six procedures for registering property in Yemen compared to the MENA average of 5.4, the time to complete registration is shorter than in other MENA countries. Relatedly, Yemen scored very high regarding registration costs, which averaged 1.8 percent of property value compared to a MENA average of 5.6 percent.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/y/yemen/YEM.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/y/yemen/YEM.pdf>


¹⁵⁶ <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/y/yemen/YEM.pdf>

ANNEX IV: RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS AND LIMITATIONS

PHASE I


KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW DEMOGRAPHICS

NON-YOUTH



Areas of Programming Represented					
Improved Access to Health, Education & Water	Increased Household Income	Macroeconomic Inst. & Functions Strengthened	Mechanisms to identify & address grievances strengthened	Social cohesion of communities strengthened	Inclusive peace and transition processes strengthened
3	6	0	0	2	1

YOUTH




Age Representation in Phase I				
15-19	20-24	25-29	Undetermined	TOTAL
2	9	10	1	22
Geographic Representation				

Sana'a	Ta'izz	Aden	Amran
17 ¹⁵⁷	3*	2	1
Highest Education Level			
High School		Bachelor's	
4		18	

¹⁵⁷ One respondent self-identified as being from both Sana'a and Ta'izz.

*

WEB SURVEY RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS



Starting with only one youth referral from USAID and few responses to Facebook outreach, SI relied heavily on snowball sampling from initially non-youth and eventually youth respondents. Through these referrals, SI was able to complete interviews with 22 youth respondents; however, as respondents likely referred youth they know through familial or social connections, many of the youth respondents were from the same geographic location and age ranges. Most of the respondents were in the 20-24 age range (41 percent) or the 25-29 age range (45 percent). A majority of youth respondents were from Sana’a (75 percent). However, we note that information gathered from the literature review portion of this phase lends a variety of perspectives that are not represented by our KII sample.

PHASE 2

Age group	15-19					20-24					25-29				
Gender	Male			Female		Male		Female			Male		Female		
Education Level	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Illiterate	Primary	Illiterate	Primary	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Secondary	Illiterate	Bachelor	Secondary

	4	9	1	5	7	7	12	8	11	1	7	10	1	5	7
Total by Gender	14			12		19		20			17			13	
Total by Age	26					39					30				

ANNEX V: DISTRICT AND SUBDISTRICT SELECTION – PHASE II

Indicator (by District)	Scale
Population size by District (Official projections 2020 by Central Statistical Organization CSO ¹⁵⁸)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "most populous" and 1 means "less populous". From the total governorate population, the district population % was added and then was multiplied by 10 for each district.
Access to Water (YPC previous surveys)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "Very poor access" and 1 means "Very good access". On a scale of 5 points, how do you rate each of the following services "Access to water in this area?"
Access to Education (YPC previous surveys)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "Very poor access" and 1 means "Very good access". On a scale of 5 points, how do you rate each of the following services "Access to education in this area?"
Access to Health services (YPC previous surveys)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "Very poor access" and 1 means "Very good access". How long does it take to reach the nearest health facility?
Level of Poverty (YPC previous surveys)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "Very poor" and 1 means "Very good". On a scale of 5 points, how do you rate each of the following services "Access to food in this area?"
Security situation (YPC previous surveys)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "Very good situation" and 1 means "Very poor situation". On a scale of 5 points, how do you rate each of the following services "Security"? (For fieldwork teams safety, YPC gave advantage in selection to locations with less security tension.
Public services (YPC previous surveys)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "Very poor access" and 1 means "Very good access". On a scale of 5 points, how do you rate each of the following "Access to public services?"
Your/Your family current situation in general (YPC previous surveys)	Scale of 5 points where 5 means "Very bad" and 1 means "Very good ". On a scale of 5 points how would you rate "your current situation/ family situation in general"?

¹⁵⁸ CSO is a governmental organization responsible for collecting, preparing and issuing the statistical information and data of Yemen.

Governorate	District	Population (Census 2004)		Population (Projection 2020)		Population size (5 means most populous)	Access to Water (5 means very poor)	Access to Education (5 means very poor)	Access to Health Services (5 means very poor)	Level of Poverty (5 means very poor)	Security situation (10 means very good situation)	Public services (5 means very poor)	Your/Your family current situation in general (5 means very bad)	The overall point	
		حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural	حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural										
		Urban%	Rural %	Urban%	Rural %										
أبين_Abyan	المحفد_Al-Mahfad	12%	88%	12%	88%	0.8	3.1	4.1	2.8	3.8	4.4	4.4	2.9	26.1	
	موديه_Mawdiah	24%	76%	24%	76%	1.0	2.6	4.5	2.1	3.5	4.7	4.3	2.4	24.9	
	لودر_Loudar	15%	85%	15%	85%	2.6	2.4	4.2	1.5	3.2	4.2	4.3	2.5	24.9	
	الوضيع_Al-Wadhee	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.7	4.8	4.7	2.1	3.9	4.2	4.6	3.1	27.9	RURAL
	احور_Ahour	26%	74%	25%	75%	0.7	3.7	4.6	1.5	4.4	4.3	4.8	3.2	27.1	
	زنجبار_Zenjubar	78%	22%	78%	22%	0.9	1.4	4.6	1.2	3.9	3.7	4.6	2.4	22.7	CAPITAL
	خنفر_Khanfar	54%	46%	54%	46%	3.4	1.3	4.6	1.3	3.7	4.8	4.2	2.7	25.9	
تعز-Ta'izz	مقبنه_Maqbanah	1%	99%	1%	99%	1.4	2.4	4.4	2.8	3.7	6.7	3.9	2.8	28.0	
	المخاء_Al-Makha	17%	83%	17%	83%	0.4	4.8	4.8	1.3	4.5	7.0	4.8	3.3	30.7	RURAL
	موزع_Mowza	14%	86%	14%	86%	0.1	2.3	4.4	1.3	3.7	8.0	3.5	2.9	26.2	
	جبل حبشي_Jabal Habashi	2%	98%	2%	98%	0.8	2.9	4.0	2.6	3.3	7.4	3.5	2.8	27.3	

Governorate	District	Population (Census 2004)		Population (Projection 2020)		Population size (5 means most populous)	Access to Water (5 means very poor)	Access to Education (5 means very poor)	Access to Health Services (5 means very poor)	Level of Poverty (5 means very poor)	Security situation (10 means very good situation)	Public services (5 means very poor)	Your/Your family current situation in general (5 means very bad)	The overall point
		حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural	حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural									
		Urban%	Rural %	Urban%	Rural %									
	Mashrah & Hadnan_ مشرعه وحنان	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.0	2.0	4.5	1.0	3.8	9.0	4.0	3.3	27.5
	Saber Al-Mawadem_ صبر الموادم	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.7	2.5	4.6	1.0	3.7	7.2	4.2	2.3	26.2
	Al-Mesrakh_ المسراخ	3%	97%	3%	97%	0.7	3.3	4.6	2.0	3.6	6.9	3.9	3.3	28.2
	Al-Selw_ الصلو	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.3	3.3	5.0	1.5	3.0	9.0	4.0	2.0	28.0
	Al-Shamayatein_ الشمايتين	7%	93%	7%	93%	1.3	3.5	4.3	1.1	3.9	6.8	4.2	3.3	28.2
	Al-Wazeyah_ الوازعيه	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.1	2.6	4.4	1.1	3.8	7.3	4.1	2.4	25.7
	Al-Mudhafar_ المظفر	100%	0%	100%	0%	0.9	2.8	3.7	0.6	3.6	6.2	4.2	3.1	25.1
	Cairo_ القاهرة	100%	0%	100%	0%	0.7	2.9	3.8	0.1	2.6	6.2	3.3	2.5	22.0
	Salah_ صاله	100%	0%	100%	0%	0.4	3.3	4.2	0.4	3.5	5.3	3.9	3.0	24.0
	Al-Ma'afer_ المعافر	1%	99%	1%	99%	0.8	3.0	3.6	1.1	3.6	8.8	3.9	3.3	28.0
	Al-Mawaset_ المواسط	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.9	2.9	4.4	1.7	3.4	9.0	4.0	2.4	28.7
	Samae_ سامع	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.3	3.0	3.9	1.9	3.8	7.3	3.3	2.5	25.8
حضر موت _Hadramawt	Al-Qatn_ القطن	20%	80%	20%	80%	0.7	2.9	4.4	3.0	4.6	2.3	4.1	2.7	25
	Shebam_ شبيام	27%	73%	27%	73%	0.6	3.5	3.8	0.9	4.1	3.5	3.8	2.0	22.1
	Saah_ ساه	24%	76%	24%	76%	0.3	2.4	3.9	0.0	4.6	6.8	4.3	3.0	25.1

CAPITAL

Governorate	District	Population (Census 2004)		Population (Projection 2020)		Population size (5 means most populous)	Access to Water (5 means very poor)	Access to Education (5 means very poor)	Access to Health Services (5 means very poor)	Level of Poverty (5 means very poor)	Security situation (10 means very good situation)	Public services (5 means very poor)	Your/Your family current situation in general (5 means very bad)	The overall point	
		حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural	حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural										
		Urban%	Rural %	Urban%	Rural %										
شبه	Sayoun_سيئون	53%	47%	52%	48%	1.2	2.9	3.9	0.0	4.3	5.4	3.2	2.8	23.6	RURAL
	Tarim_تريم	53%	47%	53%	47%	1.1	2.4	3.8	1.6	4.3	4.9	4.0	2.4	24.5	
	Al-Soum_السوم	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.2	2.3	4.8	2.0	3.8	4.0	3.5	3.3	23.7	
	Al-Raidah & Qusayer_الريده وقصير	28%	72%	28%	72%	0.5	0.5	2.8	0.4	3.8	9.5	2.9	2.5	22.9	
	Al-Dees_الديس	59%	41%	59%	41%	0.3	0.3	2.0	0.7	3.5	9.5	3.7	2.7	22.7	
	Al-Shahr_الشحر	78%	22%	78%	22%	0.8	3.4	3.1	0.0	4.4	8.9	4.3	2.9	27.8	
	Gheil Ben Yameen_غيل بن يمين	7%	93%	6%	94%	0.3	0.5	3.3	0.5	3.8	10.0	3.0	0.5	21.8	
	Gheil Bawazeer_غيل باوزير	72%	28%	72%	28%	0.6	0.8	2.4	0.1	3.9	9.3	3.8	2.9	23.7	
	Dawan_دوعن	4%	96%	4%	96%	0.5	0.4	2.6	0.5	4.0	10.0	3.6	2.1	23.7	
	Wadi Al-Ayn_وادي العين	10%	90%	10%	90%	0.3	3.5	4.0	1.5	4.8	0.5	3.5	2.5	20.6	
	Amd_عمد	10%	90%	10%	90%	0.2	3.3	4.5	1.8	4.8	6.0	4.0	2.5	27.0	
	Broum Maifa_بروم ميفع	15%	85%	15%	85%	0.2	0.9	2.8	0.4	3.5	8.8	3.9	1.6	21.9	
	Hareidah_حريضة	16%	84%	16%	84%	0.2	2.8	4.3	3.0	4.3	3.5	3.8	2.0	23.7	
	Al-Mukala City_مدينة المكلا	99%	1%	99%	1%	2.1	2.7	2.1	0.7	4.0	8.4	4.1	3.3	27.4	CAPITAL
Shabwah_شبه	Dahr_دهر	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.2	2.0	2.3	2.8	3.0	8.5	3.8	3.0	25.5	

Governorate	District	Population (Census 2004)		Population (Projection 2020)		Population size (5 means most populous)	Access to Water (5 means very poor)	Access to Education (5 means very poor)	Access to Health Services (5 means very poor)	Level of Poverty (5 means very poor)	Security situation (10 means very good situation)	Public services (5 means very poor)	Your/Your family current situation in general (5 means very bad)	The overall point
		حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural	حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural									
		Urban%	Rural %	Urban%	Rural %									
	الطلح_ Al-Talh	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.2	2.0	3.8	2.5	3.5	9.0	4.5	3.3	28.7
	جردان_ Jardaana	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.3	3.5	4.9	5.0	3.5	4.3	4.2	3.0	28.7
	عرماء_ Arma'a	11%	89%	11%	89%	0.2	2.5	4.0	0.3	3.0	8.5	4.3	2.3	25.0
	عسيلان_ Aseilaan	10%	90%	10%	90%	0.7	2.7	2.5	2.0	3.6	7.9	2.7	2.8	24.7
	عين_ Ain	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.5	1.5	2.8	1.8	3.6	9.5	1.9	2.4	24.0
	بيحان_ Baihan	27%	73%	27%	73%	1.0	2.2	3.1	1.4	3.8	6.4	3.3	3.0	24.1
	مرخه العليا_ High Markhah	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.7	2.6	3.9	4.1	3.7	7.2	4.5	2.8	29.3
	مرخه السفلى_ Markhah Al-Sufila	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.9	2.1	4.1	1.7	3.7	4.0	4.1	2.9	23.4
	نصاب_ Nesab	23%	77%	23%	77%	0.9	2.7	2.9	1.4	3.1	7.0	2.9	2.9	23.6
	حطيب_ Hateeb	18%	82%	18%	82%	0.3	0.8	2.5	4.5	2.5	9.0	4.0	2.3	25.8
	الصعيد_ Al-Saeed	10%	90%	10%	90%	0.7	1.9	3.2	0.4	3.0	5.0	2.8	2.6	19.6
	عتق_ Ataq	58%	42%	56%	44%	0.8	2.3	3.0	0.3	3.5	7.2	2.5	3.0	22.6
	حيان_ Haban	13%	87%	13%	87%	0.6	1.1	3.3	0.9	3.7	7.1	2.7	2.4	21.7
	الروضه_ Al-Rawdhah	21%	79%	21%	79%	0.6	2.4	3.4	2.4	3.5	8.2	3.0	2.4	25.8
	ميفعه_ Maifah	16%	84%	15%	85%	0.9	2.1	4.0	1.0	4.3	5.3	3.8	3.1	24.4

RURAL

CAPITAL

Governorate	District	Population (Census 2004)		Population (Projection 2020)		Population size (5 means most populous)	Access to Water (5 means very poor)	Access to Education (5 means very poor)	Access to Health Services (5 means very poor)	Level of Poverty (5 means very poor)	Security situation (10 means very good situation)	Public services (5 means very poor)	Your/Your family current situation in general (5 means very bad)	The overall point
		حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural	حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural									
		Urban%	Rural %	Urban%	Rural %									
	Radhoum_ رضوم	14%	86%	14%	86%	0.5	3.0	2.8	1.1	3.1	9.0	3.6	2.1	25.2
Aden عدن	Dar Sa'ad_ دار سعد	100%	0%	100%	0%	1.5	4.4	4.6	0.4	4.3	2.7	4.7	3.2	25.7
	Al-Shaikh Othman_ الشيخ عثمان	100%	0%	100%	0%	1.8	4.4	4.7	0.4	4.4	4.5	4.8	3.0	28.0
	Al-Mansurah_ المنصوره	100%	0%	100%	0%	1.7	4.1	4.8	0.2	4.2	3.7	4.8	3.0	26.4
	Al-Boreiqah_ البريقه	100%	0%	100%	0%	1.3	4.5	4.7	0.5	3.9	5.2	4.8	2.9	27.7
	Al-Towahei_ التواهي	100%	0%	100%	0%	0.9	3.8	4.8	0.4	4.2	4.9	4.4	2.7	26.1
	Al-Muala_ المعلا	100%	0%	100%	0%	0.8	4.3	4.6	0.3	4.3	4.6	4.8	2.2	25.9
	(Seirah (Creitar_ صيره(كريتر)	100%	0%	100%	0%	1.3	4.3	4.8	0.6	4.4	3.8	4.8	2.8	26.8
	Khor Maksar_ خور مكسر	100%	0%	100%	0%	0.8	4.4	4.6	0.2	4.8	4.3	4.9	2.8	26.7
Lahj_ لحج	Habeel Jabr_ حبييل جبر	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.8	4.0	4.8	2.8	3.8	7.0	4.8	2.7	31
	Halmein_ حالمين	9%	91%	9%	91%	0.5	5.0	5.0	3.3	3.8	7.5	4.8	1.5	31
	Radfan_ ردفان	24%	76%	22%	78%	0.8	3.3	4.6	2.2	3.9	7.4	4.3	2.8	29
	Al-Malah_ الملاح	4%	96%	4%	96%	0.5	2.8	4.6	2.4	4.1	6.8	4.4	3.2	29
	Al-Musaimir_ المسيمير	11%	89%	11%	89%	0.5	2.3	4.2	2.4	3.3	5.4	4.1	2.8	25
	Al-Qabeitah_ القبيطه	2%	98%	2%	98%	1.7	3.0	4.7	3.7	4.1	5.0	4.7	3.2	30

Governorate	District	Population (Census 2004)		Population (Projection 2020)		Population size (5 means most populous)	Access to Water (5 means very poor)	Access to Education (5 means very poor)	Access to Health Services (5 means very poor)	Level of Poverty (5 means very poor)	Security situation (10 means very good situation)	Public services (5 means very poor)	Your/Your family current situation in general (5 means very bad)	The overall point	
		حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural	حضر _Urban	ريف _Rural										
		Urban%	Rural %	Urban%	Rural %										
	Tour Al-Bahah_ طور الباحة	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.9	3.7	4.4	2.6	3.7	6.5	4.4	2.8	29	RURAL
	Al-Maqaterah_ المقاطرة	0%	100%	0%	100%	1.1	3.4	4.4	3.4	4.1	7.6	4.9	3.9	33	
	Al-Madharebah & المضاريه و العاره Al-Arah	1%	99%	0%	100%	0.9	3.2	4.7	3.6	3.5	5.9	4.4	3.1	29	
	Al-Houtah_ الحوطه	100%	0%	100%	0%	0.5	3.1	4.3	0.7	4.0	5.5	3.8	2.8	24	CAPITAL
	Tuban_ تبين	12%	88%	11%	89%	1.9	3.3	4.2	1.0	3.7	6.3	4.0	2.3	27	
Al Dhaleالضالع	Qatabah_ قعطبه	11%	89%	11%	89%	3.3	3.2	2.3		2.9	3.5	4.1	2.4	22	CAPITAL
	Al-Shuaib_ الشعيب	12%	88%	12%	88%	1.4	2.5	2.5		3.3	7.5	3.0	2.0	22	
	Al-Haseen_ الحصين	7%	93%	7%	93%	1.4	4.3	2.5		3.0	6.5	2.3	2.5	22	
	Al-Dhale_ الضالع	22%	78%	22%	78%	2.9	4.0	1.5		3.3	6.0	3.3	2.2	23	RURAL
	Jahaf_ جحاف	3%	97%	3%	97%	0.9	4.8	1.5		4.0	5.0	3.3	3.0	22	
Ma'rib_ مارب	Al-Jowbah_ الجوية	12%	88%	12%	88%	0.4	2.4	4.0		3.2	8.4	3.7	2.3	24	RURAL
	Hareeb_ حريب	26%	74%	26%	74%	0.6	1.3	2.1		2.7	7.4	2.7	1.2	18	CAPITAL
	Marib City_ مدينة مارب	46%	54%	44%	56%	7.2	1.8	3.7		2.4	8.6	2.3	1.9	28	
	Marib_ مارب	13%	87%	12%	88%	1.5	2.3	3.6		2.3	8.2	2.4	2.9	23	
	Jabal Mourad_ جبل مراد	0%	100%	0%	100%	0.2	2.0	4.3		3.0	7.3	3.3	2.3	22	

Governorate												
			Urban_حضر		Rural_ريف		Urban_حضر		Rural_ريف			
			Sum	Urban%	Sum	Rural %	Sum	Urban%	Sum	Rural %		
أبين_Abyan	الوضيع Al-Wadhee	الوضيع Al-Wadhee		0%	23,379	100%		0%	32,589	100%	15	6
	زنجلار Zenjubar	زنجلار Zinjubar	19,879	78%	5,453	22%	31957	78%	8,766	22%	15	6
تعز-Ta'izz	المخاء Al-Makha	المشالحة Al-Mashalehah		0%	14,527	100%		0%	19,228	100%	8	3
		الجمعة Al-Jumah		0%	20,423	100%		0%	27,753	100%	7	3
	المظفر Al-Mudhafar	المظفر Al-Mudhafar	167,131	100%		0%	181868	100%		0%	15	6
حضرموت-Hadramawt	الشحر Al-Shaher	الشحر Al-Shaher	56,904	78%	15,975	22%	90772	78%	25,483	22%	15	6
	مدينة المكلا Al-Mukala City	مدينة المكلا Al-Mukala City	176,942	99%	2,157	1%	285888	99%	3,485	1%	15	6
شبوة-Shabwah	مرخه العليا High Markhah	الجفرة Al-Jafrah		0%	2,055	100%		0%	2,824	100%	8	3
		الحيدة Al-Heidah		0%	7,744	100%		0%	10,637	100%	7	3
	عتق Ataq	عتق Ataq	20,435	56%	15,810	44%	30912	56%	23,915	44%	15	6
عدن-Aden	البريقه Al-Boreiqah	البريقه Al-Boreiqah	62,062	100%		0%	132599	100%		0%	15	6
	الشيخ عثمان Al-Shaikh Othman	الشيخ عثمان Al-Shaikh Othman	100,237	100%		0%	183668	100%		0%	15	6
لحج-Lahj	المقاطرة Al-Maqaterah	زريقة الشام Zoraiqat Al-Sham		0%	10,377	100%		0%	16,047	100%	8	3

Governorate	District_YPC	Sub-district_العزلة	Population (Census 2004)				Population (Projection 2020)				Recruited	Interviewed
			Urban_حضر		Rural_ريف		Urban_حضر		Rural_ريف			
			Sum	Urban%	Sum	Rural %	Sum	Urban%	Sum	Rural %		
		Zuraiqat Al-زريقة اليمن Yemen		0%	5,976	100%		0%	9,242	100%	7	3
	Al-Houtah_الحوطه	Al-Hawtah_الحوطه	25,471	100%		0%	36223	100%		0%	15	6
Al-Dhale_الضالع	Jehaf_جحاف	Jehaf_جحاف	647	3%	22,248	97%	1170	3%	40,242	97%	15	6
	Al-Dhale_الضالع	Al-Dhale_الضالع	17,139	22%	61,861	78%	29267	22%	105,634	78%	15	6
Ma'rib_مأرب	Al-Jowbah_الجوبة	Al-Jadidah_الجديدة	2,443	63%	1,414	37%	4406	63%	2550	37%	8	3
		Naja_نجا		0%	7,524	100%		0%	13569	100%	7	3
	Marib City_مدينة مأرب	Al-Ashraf_الأشراف	13,863	44%	17,434	56%	278829	44%	350653	56%	15	6
TOTAL											240	96

ANNEX VI: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS – PHASE 2

Participation in Youth Initiatives												
		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
No	67%	83%	53%	81%	72%	50%	85%	69%	47%	54%	66%	68%
Yes	33%	17%	47%	19%	28%	50%	15%	31%	53%	46%	34%	32%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Participation in Youth Initiatives (Governorates)												
Governorates												
	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			
No	67%	50%	75%	67%	67%	62%	67%	83%	67%			
Yes	33%	50%	25%	33%	33%	38%	33%	17%	33%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
Life in my area is better than it was a year/five years ago												

		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	11%	17%	6%	12%	13%	9%	8%	18%	0%	15%	10%	13%
Disagree	41%	28%	53%	31%	41%	50%	31%	41%	58%	38%	37%	45%
Neutral	5%	4%	6%	8%	5%	3%	4%	5%	11%	0%	2%	7%
Agree	36%	43%	29%	50%	33%	28%	54%	31%	21%	38%	46%	29%
Strongly agree	6%	7%	6%	0%	8%	9%	4%	5%	11%	8%	5%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Life in my area is better than it was a year/five years ago												
Governorates												
	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			
Strongly disagree	11%	33%	17%	0%	25%	0%	0%	8%	8%			
Disagree	41%	25%	42%	58%	33%	54%	42%	25%	50%			
Neutral	5%	0%	8%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%			

Agree	36%	42%	25%	17%	42%	46%	42%	58%	17%			
Strongly agree	6%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	17%	8%	17%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

Life in my area will be better next year/next five years

		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Disagree	12%	7%	18%	12%	15%	9%	27%	5%	11%	8%	7%	16%
Neutral	30%	26%	33%	35%	21%	38%	27%	28%	42%	23%	24%	34%
Agree	47%	54%	41%	38%	54%	47%	38%	51%	42%	62%	63%	36%
Strongly agree	10%	13%	8%	15%	10%	6%	8%	15%	5%	8%	5%	14%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Life in my area will be better next year/next five years (Governorates)

Governorates

	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			
Strongly disagree	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%			
Disagree	12%	8%	8%	17%	8%	8%	25%	8%	17%			
Neutral	30%	33%	58%	75%	8%	8%	17%	25%	17%			
Agree	47%	42%	25%	0%	83%	85%	58%	42%	42%			
Strongly agree	10%	17%	8%	8%	0%	0%	0%	25%	25%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

I have access to quality healthcare when needed

		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	13%	11%	14%	4%	18%	13%	4%	15%	21%	8%	25%	4%
Disagree	49%	43%	54%	73%	28%	55%	50%	46%	53%	50%	45%	52%
Neutral	4%	4%	4%	0%	5%	6%	4%	3%	5%	8%	5%	4%
Agree	30%	39%	22%	19%	44%	23%	38%	31%	16%	33%	25%	34%

Strongly agree	4%	2%	6%	4%	5%	3%	4%	5%	5%	0%	0%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
I have access to quality healthcare when needed (Governorates)												
Governorates												
	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			
Strongly disagree	13%	8%	17%	8%	8%	33%	8%	8%	8%			
Disagree	49%	58%	50%	42%	33%	50%	58%	50%	50%			
Neutral	4%	8%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%			
Agree	30%	25%	0%	42%	50%	17%	33%	33%	42%			
Strongly agree	4%	0%	8%	8%	8%	0%	0%	8%	0%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
I have access to quality education when needed												
		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban

Strongly disagree	14%	9%	20%	15%	21%	6%	15%	21%	5%	8%	17%	13%
Disagree	49%	50%	49%	54%	38%	59%	62%	38%	53%	54%	54%	46%
Neutral	5%	4%	6%	12%	3%	3%	4%	8%	5%	0%	2%	7%
Agree	26%	30%	22%	12%	33%	28%	15%	26%	32%	38%	24%	27%
Strongly agree	5%	7%	4%	8%	5%	3%	4%	8%	5%	0%	2%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

I have access to quality education when needed (Governorates)

Governorates

	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			
Strongly disagree	14%	33%	17%	8%	17%	0%	17%	17%	8%			
Disagree	49%	25%	75%	42%	33%	77%	58%	42%	42%			
Neutral	5%	8%	0%	25%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%			
Agree	26%	25%	8%	25%	42%	15%	25%	33%	33%			
Strongly agree	5%	8%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	8%	17%			

Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
I have access to sufficient and clean water when needed												
		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	7%	7%	8%	4%	3%	16%	8%	3%	5%	23%	10%	5%
Disagree	38%	37%	39%	31%	38%	44%	46%	31%	37%	46%	37%	39%
Neutral	7%	9%	6%	8%	8%	6%	4%	10%	11%	0%	7%	7%
Agree	42%	37%	47%	50%	46%	31%	38%	49%	47%	23%	44%	41%
Strongly agree	5%	11%	0%	8%	5%	3%	4%	8%	0%	8%	2%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
I have access to sufficient and clean water when needed												
Governorates												
	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			

Strongly disagree	7%	8%	25%	0%	0%	15%	0%	8%	0%			
Disagree	38%	58%	58%	50%	0%	38%	25%	25%	50%			
Neutral	7%	8%	8%	25%	0%	8%	0%	8%	0%			
Agree	42%	8%	8%	25%	83%	38%	75%	58%	42%			
Strongly agree	5%	17%	0%	0%	17%	0%	0%	0%	8%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
My job provides me with an adequate source of income for my/family's needs (if working currently)												
		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	23%	0%	28%	14%	25%	27%	11%	43%	13%	33%	57%	13%
Disagree	60%	60%	60%	86%	50%	53%	78%	43%	63%	50%	29%	70%
Neutral	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Agree	17%	40%	12%	0%	25%	20%	11%	14%	25%	17%	14%	17%
Strongly agree	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

My job provides me with an adequate source of income for my/family's needs (if working currently)												
Governorates												
	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			
Strongly disagree	23%		17%	33%	43%	33%	0%	0%	0%			
Disagree	60%		83%	50%	14%	67%	100%	80%	100%			
Neutral	0%		0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%			
Agree	17%		0%	17%	43%	0%	0%	20%	0%			
Strongly agree	0%		0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%			
Total	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
I have access to a job opportunity when needed (if not working currently)												
		Sex		Age			Education				Urbanity	
	Total	Female	Male	15-29	20-24	25-29	Illiterate	Primary	Secondary	Bachelor	Rural	Urban
Strongly disagree	15%	17%	12%	26%	10%	12%	18%	19%	0%	14%	12%	18%

Disagree	52%	51%	54%	42%	55%	59%	47%	47%	82%	43%	65%	39%
Neutral	7%	5%	12%	11%	3%	12%	0%	9%	18%	0%	3%	12%
Agree	21%	22%	19%	11%	29%	18%	29%	19%	0%	43%	18%	24%
Strongly agree	4%	5%	4%	11%	3%	0%	6%	6%	0%	0%	3%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
I have access to a job opportunity when needed (if not working currently)												
Governorates												
	Total	Abyan	Al-Dhale	Aden	Hadramawt	Lahj	Ma'rib	Shabwah	Ta'izz			
Strongly disagree	15%	0%	33%	33%	0%	10%	18%	29%	10%			
Disagree	52%	42%	50%	50%	0%	80%	64%	57%	50%			
Neutral	7%	8%	17%	17%	0%	0%	9%	0%	10%			
Agree	21%	33%	0%	0%	100%	10%	9%	14%	20%			
Strongly agree	4%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%			

Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
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ANNEX VI: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS – PHASE I

WEB SURVEY

INTRODUCTORY EMAIL

Dear _____,

USAID recently hired Social Impact (SI) to conduct a Yemen Youth Development Desk Review. This information is intended to inform an extension of the USAID Yemen Programming Approach, the Agency's multi-year country strategy. Specifically, SI is studying the youth landscape as it relates to challenges, programmatic gaps, and high-value programmatic opportunities.

As part of this research, we are reaching out to organizations knowledgeable about youth issues in Yemen. We would greatly appreciate your participation in this 10-15 minute web survey. Compared to many USAID presence countries, there is a limited pool of respondents for this survey. We sincerely hope you can take the time to answer these questions and help USAID guide its programming to better support Yemeni youth.

We kindly request that you complete this survey by April 30 using this link:
<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/RZWHWC8>.

If you would also like to participate in a short phone interview to discuss these topics in more detail, please let us know by writing Social Impact's Project Manager for this activity, Alison Smith, at asmith@socialimpact.com.

We thank you in advance for your support.

Best regards,

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to complete this online survey. We are contacting you on behalf of Social Impact (SI), a US-based research organization. We received your contact information either directly from USAID, or from others who have participated in this survey.

USAID recently hired SI to conduct research to inform an extension of the USAID Yemen Programming Approach, the Agency's multi-year country strategy. Specifically, SI is studying the youth landscape as it relates to challenges, programmatic gaps, and programmatic opportunities. As part of this research, we are reaching out to organizations knowledgeable about youth issues in Yemen.

Social Impact is a fully independent research firm, not directly associated with USAID or any other implementing partner. There are no direct benefits of participation in this survey, other than contributing to knowledge that may help improve services for Yemeni youth in the future.

This survey will take about 10-15 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary; once you start the survey you may stop at any time by closing the browser window. You may also skip any question that you do not want to answer, and still complete the survey by clicking "Done" at the end.

Your answers will be combined with others' responses and submitted in our report to USAID. A version of this report may be made public. We will not report your name in connection with any specific data or statement in either version of the report, and will remove all indirect identifiers as well as particularly sensitive information from the public version of the report. Due to our small sample and the nature of our sampling approach, we cannot guarantee complete confidentiality

among those who will have access to the internal report at USAID; however your answers will remain confidential to those accessing a public version.

If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Social Impact's Project Manager for this activity, Alison Smith, at asmith@socialimpact.com, or the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com or +1 703 465 1884.

SURVEY QUESTIONS

- I. Please select your affiliation
 - Employee of USAID
 - Employee of non-USAID donor agency
 - Employee/contractor of implementer (of USAID or non-USAID funded activity)

Depending on the selected response, respondents will receive a different survey:

I.1 Respondents who Select Employee/Contractor of Implementer

2. Does your organization currently implement programs in Yemen that directly or indirectly target youth (ages 10-29)? *Multiple choice*
 - Yes, we directly target and work with youth in our programs
 - Yes, we indirectly target youth (e.g., working with health centers to provide more youth-friendly services) and/or some youth participate in our programming
 - No, we do not currently work with youth at all
3. [If no] Has your organization implemented programs in Yemen that directly or indirectly targeted youth (ages 10-29) in the past 3 years? *Multiple choice*
 - Yes, we directly targeted and worked with youth in our programs
 - Yes, we indirectly targeted youth (e.g., working with health centers to provide more youth-friendly services) and/or some youth participated in our programming
 - No, we did not implement programs in the past 3 years that directly or indirectly targeted youth

Depending on the selected response, respondents will receive a different survey:

I.1a Respondents who Select Either "Yes" Options

The following set of questions applies to both direct and indirect youth programs that your organization either currently implements or has implemented in the past 3 years.

4. In which governorates did/does your organization implement youth program(s)? *Select all that apply*

Options: 'Aden, 'Amran, Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Bayda', Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Mahrah, Al Mahwit, Amanat Al Asimah, Dhamar, Hadhramaut, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Ma'rib, Raymah, Sa'dah, Sana'a, Shabwah, Ta'izz
5. In what sectors do/did your youth program(s) operate? *Select all that apply*
 - Health
 - Education
 - Water
 - Conflict Prevention and Stabilization
 - Economic Growth
 - Governance
 - Other (Specify) _____
6. What youth age groups did/do your program(s) target? *Select all that apply*

- 10-14
- 15-19
- 20-24
- 25-29

7. What youth cohorts did/do your program(s) target? *Select all that apply*

- Young women
- Young men
- Ethnic/religious minority youth
- Orphans
- Youth with disabilities
- Injured in military clashes
- Internally displaced
- Out-of-school youth
- Other (Specify) _____

8. Did/does your program(s) support youth in any of the following ways? *Select all that apply*

- Build positive relationships between youth and peers, adults, families, employers and/or communities
- Improve norms, attitudes and healthy behaviors among and/or towards youth
- Increase leadership and decision-making opportunities for youth in safe civic, social and peacebuilding spaces
- Provide soft and/or life skills building
- Provide technical and/or vocational training
- Strengthen laws, policies, services and systems that impact youth
- Increase youth belonging and membership in key social structures
- Increase access to age appropriate and youth friendly integrated services
- Other (Specify) _____

9. In what ways are you engaging youth in your programming? *Write-in response*

10. What is the main challenge that Yemeni youth currently face? *Write-in response*

11. How does this challenge differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized and vulnerable, different age groups)? *Write-in response*

12. The list below contains key outcomes of current USAID strategic objectives for Yemen. For each, please provide any recommendations you have for how USAID could better support youth in achieving the outcome. *Write-in response for each objective*

- Improved access to health, education and water
- Increased household income
- Macroeconomic institutions and functions strengthened to boost the economy
- Mechanisms that allow citizens to identify and address grievances strengthened
- Social cohesion of communities strengthened
- Inclusive peace and transition processes strengthened

13. Which of the recommendations you described in question 11 would you say are the highest priority? *List your top 2-3 recommendations*

14. Are there any existing assets that can be better leveraged to support youth (e.g., support systems, resources, skills/competencies)? *Write-in response*

15. Would you like to participate in a phone interview to elaborate on any of the information you've provided in this survey?

- Yes
- No

Follow-up question if "yes" is selected:

- Please share either your phone number or Skype ID and which method of communication you prefer. *Write-in response*
- Please share 3-4 periods of time when you would be available for a one-hour call between May 4-8 or May 11-15 (note that our interview team is located around Washington, DC, so we would greatly appreciate any flexibility you have to take an interview after about 2:00 pm Yemen time, though can accommodate earlier times if needed). *Write-in response*
- Note: Thank you. A member of our project team at Social Impact will follow up with you to confirm a time.

16. If you are familiar with any other donor or implementing partner individuals who would have valuable insights for this research and would be willing to participate in this survey, would you be willing to connect us to them? *Multiple Choice*

- Yes
- No
- Not applicable

Follow-up question if "yes" is selected:

- Please share email address of suggested respondent(s) below. *Write-in response*

17. If you are familiar with any well-informed Yemeni youth who would be willing to participate in a phone interview for this assessment, would you be willing to connect us to them? We are looking for youth aged 15-29 who either live in Yemen currently, or moved out of Yemen within the last year. *Multiple Choice*

- Yes
- No
- Not applicable

Follow-up question if "yes" is selected:

- Note: for youth respondents, we would prefer for you to make the first contact with your recommended respondent. If you can confirm that the recommended respondent is interested in participating in an interview, please send an email to asmith@socialimpact.com with an email address and/or phone number of the suggested respondent and a member of the project team at Social Impact will follow up with more information.

18. Are you aware of any relevant documents (e.g., studies, reports, program evaluations) on youth in Yemen that you can share with us?

- Yes
- No

*Follow-up question if “yes” is selected: Please share titles of studies and/or web links below.
Write-in response*

I.2 Respondents who Select Employee of USAID or non-USAID Donor Agency

19. Based on your experience in Yemen, what are the main challenges that youth currently face?
Write-in response
20. How do these challenges differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized and vulnerable, different age groups)? *Write-in response*
21. Based on your experience in Yemen, what existing assets/opportunities can be leveraged to better support youth? *Write-in response*
22. What are the major programmatic gaps that, if filled, could better serve the needs of youth?
23. The list below contains key outcomes of current USAID strategic objectives for Yemen. For each, please provide any recommendations you have for how USAID could better support youth in achieving the outcome. *Write-in response for each objective*
- Improved access to health, education and water
 - Increased household income
 - Macroeconomic institutions and functions strengthened to boost the economy
 - Mechanisms that allow citizens to identify and address grievances strengthened
 - Social cohesion of communities strengthened
 - Inclusive peace and transition processes strengthened
24. Which of the recommendations you described in question 22 would you say are the highest priority? *List your top 2-3 recommendations*
25. In what ways are you engaging youth in your programming? *Write-in response*
26. Would you like to participate in a phone interview to elaborate on any of the information you’ve provided in this survey?
- Yes
 - No

Follow-up question if “yes” is selected:

- Please share your phone number. *Write-in response*
 - Please share 3-4 periods of time when you would be available for a one-hour call between May 7-8 or May 11-15 (note that our interview team is located around Washington, DC, so we would greatly appreciate any flexibility you have to take an interview after about 2:00 pm Yemen time, though can accommodate earlier times if needed). *Write-in response*
 - Note: Thank you. A member of our project team at Social Impact will follow up with you to confirm a time.
27. If you are familiar with any other donor or implementing partner individuals who would have valuable insights for this research and would be willing to participate in this survey, would you be willing to connect us to them? *Multiple Choice*

- Yes
- No
- Not applicable

Follow-up question if “yes” is selected:

- Please share email address of suggested respondent(s) below. *Write-in response*

28. If you are familiar with any well-informed Yemeni youth who would be willing to participate in a phone interview for this assessment, would you be willing to connect us to them? We are looking for youth aged 15-29 who either live in Yemen currently, or moved out of Yemen within the last year. *Multiple Choice*

- Yes
- No
- Not applicable

Follow-up question if “yes” is selected:

- Note: for youth respondents, we would prefer for you to make the first contact with your recommended respondent. If you can confirm that the recommended respondent is interested in participating in an interview, please send an email to asmith@socialimpact.com with an email address and/or phone number of the suggested respondent and a member of the project team at Social Impact will follow up with more information.

29. Are you aware of any relevant documents (e.g., studies, reports, program evaluations) on youth in Yemen that you can share with us?

- Yes
- No

Follow-up question if “yes” is selected: Please share titles of studies and/or web links below. Write-in response

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE: YOUTH RESPONDENTS

INTRODUCTORY EMAIL: PARENTS (AND YOUTH OVER 18)

Dear _____,

We are contacting you on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are currently working with USAID to update our understanding of challenges, programmatic priorities, and opportunities for youth in Yemen. The information we gain through this study may help to inform USAID's youth programming in Yemen in the future.

As part of this study, we are reaching out to youth in Yemen to help us understand these topics from the youth perspective. We would like to ask your permission to let your child participate in a 30-60 minute phone interview. Please find attached to this email our full consent script for you as a parent, and for your child. We will also explain this at the beginning of our interview and give you an opportunity to ask questions, but want to share this information now if you would like to review it in advance.

If you are interested in scheduling an interview, please share with us the following information:

- 3-4 periods of time when you and your child would be available for a one-hour call between May 4-8 or May 11-15 (note that our interview team is located around Washington, DC, so we would greatly appreciate any flexibility you have to take an interview after about 2:00 pm Yemen time, though can accommodate earlier times if needed).
- Either a phone number or Skype ID where we can reach you and your child, and which method of communication you prefer.
- Your child's age.
- Lastly, please confirm that your child either 1) currently lives in Yemen, or 2) currently lives outside of Yemen, but moved from Yemen within the last year.

Please be aware that your participation is completely voluntary, and you are welcome to decline the interview at any point even after we schedule a time. We thank you in advance for your support.

Best regards,

PARENTAL CONSENT FOR YOUTH KIIS

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. My name is _____, and also on the phone is my colleague _____. We are calling you on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are currently working with USAID to update our understanding of challenges, programmatic priorities, and opportunities for youth in Yemen. We are asking for your permission to let your child participate in a brief interview to help us understand these topics from the youth perspective.

Social Impact is an independent evaluation firm, not directly associated with USAID or any other implementing partner. Your child has been chosen to participate in this interview based on his/her knowledge of issues that impact youth in Yemen. We received your contact information from ["USAID" or "someone else who participated in our study"].

There are no direct benefits of participation in the study other than contributing to knowledge that may help improve services for Yemeni youth in the future. The risks involved in this study are minimal; we do not consider any information shared in this discussion to be sensitive. Specifically, we will ask about demographic characteristics like your child's sex and age, what it is like to be a youth in Yemen today, the challenges that youth face, and the types of programs or services that would be

helpful in supporting youth in Yemen (either through the government of Yemen or from international donors). Though we do not anticipate that anything we discuss will be sensitive, we recommend that your child take this call from a private place to be able to speak freely. You can choose to be in the room with your child during the call.

The discussion will last between 30 minutes and one hour. Your child's participation is completely voluntary; he/she has no obligation to participate. If your child starts the interview and wishes to stop at any time for any reason or if your child does not want to answer any question, he/she may do so without penalty. Your child can also choose to end the interview or withdraw from the study at any time and without any consequences. Your child's answers will be combined with others' responses to be shared with USAID in a report. This report may be made public. We will include general information in the report like age, sex and governorate, but we will not share your name or your child's name.

To ensure we capture everything your child shares with us, we will take notes. Only the research team at Social Impact will know your and your child's identities – we will not share any identifiable information publicly.

If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Social Impact's Interviewer for this activity, Haneen Malallah, at hmalallah@socialimpact.com, or the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com or +1 703 465 1884.

Do you have any questions?

Do you agree to let your child be interviewed for this study?

INFORMED ASSENT FOR YOUTH KIIS

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. My name is _____, and also on the phone is my colleague _____. We are calling you on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are currently working with USAID to update our understanding of challenges, programmatic priorities, and opportunities for youth in Yemen.

Social Impact is an independent evaluation firm, not directly associated with USAID or any other implementing partner. You have been chosen to participate in this interview based on your knowledge of issues that impact youth in Yemen. We received your contact information from ["USAID" or "someone else who participated in our study"].

There are no direct benefits of participation in the study other than contributing to knowledge that may help improve services for Yemeni youth in the future. The risks involved in this study are minimal; we do not consider any information shared in this discussion to be sensitive. Specifically, we will ask about demographic characteristics like your age, what it is like to be a youth in Yemen today, the challenges that youth face, and the types of programs or services that would be helpful in supporting youth in Yemen (either through the government of Yemen or from international donors). Though we do not anticipate that anything we discuss will be sensitive, we recommend that you take this call from a private place so you can speak freely.

The discussion will last between 30 minutes and one hour. Your participation is completely voluntary; you have no obligation to participate. If you start the interview and wish to stop at any time for any reason, or if you do not want to answer any question, you may do so without penalty. You can also choose to end the interview or withdraw from the study at any time you wish, without any consequence. Your answers will be combined with others' responses to be shared with USAID in a report. This report may be made public. We will include general information in the report like age, sex, and governorate, but we will not share your name.

To ensure we capture everything you share with us, we will take notes. Only the research team at Social Impact will know your identity – we will not share any identifiable information publicly.

If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Social Impact's Interviewer for this activity, Haneen Malallah, at hmalallah@socialimpact.com, or the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com or +1 703 465 1884.

Do you have any questions?

Do you agree to be interviewed for this study?

INSTRUMENT

Introduction

Thank you again for agreeing to talk with us today. Before we proceed with the interview, I want to let you know that _____ and I are fluent in Modern Standard Arabic, but are not familiar with the Yemeni dialect, so we appreciate your patience if we have to ask you to repeat anything or to define a Yemeni term you've used in MSA. First, we have a few quick demographic questions for you.

Demographics

To be filled in by interviewer (do not ask): Sex of respondent (Select one): M / F

To be asked of respondent:

1. Do you currently live in Yemen?
 - a. *If yes: proceed with interview.*
 - b. *If no: did you move out of Yemen within the last year?*
 - i. *If no: thank respondent & end interview.*
2. Which governorate do/did you live in? (Select one):

'Aden, 'Amran, Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Bayda', Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Mahrah, Al Mahwit, Amanat Al Asimah, Dhamar, Hadhramaut, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Ma'rib, Raymah, Sa'dah, Sana'a, Shabwah, Ta'izz
3. How would you describe your living situation? (Select one)
 - a. City
 - b. Village
 - c. Refugee Camp
 - d. Other (Specify) _____
4. Did you/have you relocated as a result of the war?
 - a. Yes
 - i. Relocated within Yemen?
 - ii. Relocated from Yemen to another country?
 - iii. Relocated from another country to Yemen?
 - iv. Other (Specify) _____
 - b. No
5. How would you describe your ethnicity or ethnic group?
6. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
7. Do you consider yourself to be a part of the youth category in Yemen?

Youth Landscape

Ok thank you for that. Now I want to ask you a few broad questions about the situation for youth in Yemen.

Probe 7-10: Conflict, gender

8. How would you describe what it is like be a youth in Yemen today?
9. Do you think older generations would describe youth in the same way? If not, how might they see youth?
10. How has this situation changed over the past five years?
11. How do you expect it to change in the next five years?

Challenges, Opportunities & Assets

Now let's shift toward some more specific challenges and opportunities for youth. First, I want to ask:

12. What does success look like for youth like you in Yemen today?
 - a. *Probe: personal aspirations*
 - b. *Probe: what are you striving for in life?*
13. What do you think are the biggest **challenges** faced by youth in Yemen?
 - a. *Probe: what kinds of barriers currently exist that could prevent you or others from being successful?*
14. What do you think are the biggest **opportunities** for Youth in Yemen today?
 - a. *Probe: what kinds of systems, programs, or other opportunities currently exist that could support you or others in being successful?*
15. What do you think are the most important **assets** that youth in Yemen have today (e.g., support systems, resources, skills/competencies)?
 - a. *Probe: what kinds of positive things are going on in Yemen to support youth in being successful?*

Priorities

Now that we've talked about what it's like to be a youth in Yemen currently and some challenges that youth face, I want to talk about things that would help support youth. Let's think through this by topic – I'm going to ask about health, education, water, and income.

16. What are the biggest challenges in improving youth **access to health services**?
 - a. What kinds of things need to happen in Yemen to improve youth **access to health services**?
 - b. Who should be responsible for providing these things? (For example: Government of Yemen, local NGOs, international donors, other youth organizations.)
 - i. Why?
17. What are the biggest challenges in improving youth **access to education**?
 - a. What kinds of things need to happen in Yemen to improve youth **access to education**?
 - b. Who should be responsible for providing these things? (For example: Government of Yemen, local NGOs, international donors, other youth organizations.)
 - i. Why?
18. What are the biggest challenges in improving youth **access to clean water**?
 - a. What kinds of things need to happen in Yemen to improve youth **access to clean water**?
 - b. Who should be responsible for providing these things? (For example: Government of Yemen, local NGOs, international donors, other youth organizations.)
 - i. Why?
19. What are the biggest challenges in increasing youth **income**?
 - a. What kinds of things need to happen in Yemen to **increase youth income**?
 - b. Who should be responsible for providing these things? (For example: Government of Yemen, local NGOs, international donors, other youth organizations.)
 - i. Why?

Youth Engagement

So far we've talked about what the government and donor organizations can do to support Yemeni youth. Now I want to ask a few questions about what youth can do to contribute to Yemen.

20. In general, how can or should youth contribute to development in Yemen? What role should youth play?
 - a. *Probe: What are the most important things preventing youth from making these contributions?*
21. What role do you think youth in Yemen could play to mitigate the impact of the ongoing conflict?

Community

Before we wrap up, I'm going to ask a few questions about your specific community.

22. To what extent do you feel your community supports one another?
 - a. *Probe: support to/from youth*
23. What needs to be done to help your community support each other better?
 - a. Who should be responsible for this? Why?
 - b. Is there anything the Government of Yemen could do to capacitate this community? Can USAID help in any way?
24. Is there anything that youth can or should be doing to strengthen their communities? What are some examples?

Referrals

Ok thank you again for speaking with us – you've provided us with a lot of valuable information.

25. Do you know of any other well-informed Yemeni youth who would be willing to participate in a phone interview like this? We are looking for youth aged 15-29 who either live in Yemen currently, or moved out of Yemen within the last year. Would you be willing to connect us to them?
 - a. *Interviewer: Explain that we would like for them to make the first contact, ideally via email. Then we will follow up via email with more information. If email is not an option, ask respondent to call or text referral to see if it's ok if we contact them. **Ask respondent to please send us an email to confirm when they have reached out, and it's ok for us to proceed. DO NOT RECORD NAME OR CONTACT INFORMATION HERE.***

Conclusion

26. Is there anything I didn't ask you about that you'd like to discuss?
27. Do you have any questions for me?

Thank respondent and conclude interview.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE: USAID & OTHER DEVELOPMENT PARTNER RESPONDENTS

INTRODUCTORY EMAIL

Dear _____ ,

USAID recently hired Social Impact (SI) to conduct a Yemen Youth Development Desk Review. This information is intended to inform an extension of the USAID Yemen Programming Approach, the Agency's multi-year country strategy. Specifically, SI is studying the youth landscape as it relates to challenges, programmatic gaps, and high-value programmatic opportunities.

As part of this research, we are reaching out to organizations knowledgeable about youth issues in Yemen. We would greatly appreciate your participation in a 30-60 minute phone interview. Compared to many USAID presence countries, there is a limited pool of respondents for this study. We sincerely hope you can take the time to speak with us and help USAID guide its programming to better support Yemeni youth.

Please find attached to this email our full consent script. We will also explain this at the beginning of our interview and give you an opportunity to ask questions, but want to share this information now if you would like to review it in advance. If you are interested in scheduling an interview, please share with us the following information:

- 3-4 periods of time when you would be available for a one-hour call between May 4-8 or May 11-15 (note that our interview team is located around Washington, DC, so we would greatly appreciate any flexibility you have to take an interview after about 2:00 pm Yemen time, though can accommodate earlier times if needed).
- Either your phone number or Skype ID and which method of communication you prefer.

Please be aware that your participation is completely voluntary, and you are welcome to decline the interview at any point even after we schedule a time. We thank you in advance for your support.

Best regards,

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. My name is _____, and also on the phone is my colleague _____. We are calling you on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are currently working with USAID to update our understanding of challenges, programmatic priorities, and opportunities for youth in Yemen.

Social Impact is an independent evaluation firm, not directly associated with USAID or any other implementing partner. We received your contact information from ["USAID" or "someone else who participated in our study"] as someone with knowledge of issues that impact youth in Yemen.

There are no direct benefits of participation in the study other than contributing to knowledge that may help improve services for Yemeni youth in the future. The risks involved in this study are minimal; we do not consider any information shared in this discussion to be sensitive. Specifically, we will ask about challenges and opportunities faced by youth, current programming and gaps in programming, existing models for youth engagement, and recommendations. Though we do not anticipate that anything we discuss will be sensitive, we recommend that you take this call from a place where you can be alone for the duration of the interview.

The discussion will last between 30 minutes and one hour. Your participation is completely voluntary. If you start the interview and wish to stop at any time for any reason you may do so without penalty. You may also choose not to answer any question.

Your answers will be combined with others' responses and submitted in our report to USAID. A version of this report may be made public. We will not report your name in connection with any specific data or statement in either version of the report, and will remove all indirect identifiers as well as particularly sensitive information from the public version of the report. Due to our small sample and the nature of our sampling approach, we cannot guarantee complete confidentiality among those who will have access to the internal report at USAID; however, your answers will remain confidential to those accessing a public version.

To ensure we capture everything shared, we will take notes. If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Social Impact's Project Manager for this activity, Alison Smith, at asmith@socialimpact.com, or the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com or +1 703 465 1884.

Do you have any questions?

Do you agree to be interviewed for this study?

INSTRUMENT: USAID

Youth Landscape

1. How would you describe the youth development landscape in Yemen today?
 1. *Probe: Conflict, gender*
2. Which organizations/entities would you say are the main players/stakeholders in the youth development space in Yemen currently?
3. What do you think are the most important gaps in youth programming (GoY, international donors)?

Challenges, Opportunities, Assets & Priorities

4. What do you think are the biggest **challenges** faced by youth in Yemen?
 1. To what extent do these challenges differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized and vulnerable, different age groups)?
5. What do you think are the biggest **opportunities** for Youth in Yemen today?
 1. To what extent do these opportunities differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized and vulnerable, different age groups)?
6. What do you think are the most important **assets** that youth in Yemen have access to today (e.g. support systems, resources, skills/competencies)?
 1. To what extent do assets differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized, and vulnerable, different age groups)?
7. I will read you the key outcomes of current USAID strategic objectives for Yemen. For each, please let me know if you have any recommendations for how USAID could better support youth in achieving the outcome. This could be through adjustments to current programming or the design of new activities.
 - Improved access to health, education, and water
 - Increased household income
 - Macroeconomic institutions and functions strengthened to boost the economy

- Mechanisms that allow citizens to identify and address grievances strengthened
- Social cohesion of communities strengthened
- Inclusive peace and transition processes strengthened

8. Which (2-3) of these recommendations would you say are the highest priority?

Development Models

9. Are you aware of any effective models that are in use by USAID or other development partners in programming that serve or involve youth?
1. *Probe: Relative effectiveness of models*

Conclusion

10. If you are familiar with Yemeni youth who would be willing to participate in a phone interview for this assessment, would you be willing to connect us to them?
1. *Interviewer: Record names, phone numbers, and/or emails of additional respondents.*
11. If you are familiar with any other individuals who would have valuable insights for this research and would be willing to participate in this survey, would you be willing to connect us to them?
1. *Interviewer: Record names, phone numbers, and/or emails of additional respondents.*
12. Is there anything I didn't ask you about that you'd like to discuss?

Thank respondent and conclude interview.

INSTRUMENT: OTHER DONOR/IMPLEMENTERS

Youth Programming (Organization-Specific)

1. What types of youth-serving programming does your organization support/provide in Yemen?
2. Does your organization have a youth strategy for Yemen?
 1. *Probes: What is it called? Is it publicly available? Can you describe the overarching goal and main objectives?*
3. Does your organization have an explicit model that you use for youth development (central or project-level)?
4. In what ways are you engaging youth in your programming?
 1. *Probes: voice, perspective, etc.*
5. What entities does your organization work with in Yemen?
 1. *For example: Government ministries, local governments, other donors, youth committees, etc.*
6. Which organizations/entities would you say are the main players/stakeholders in the youth development space in Yemen currently?

Youth Landscape

7. How would you describe the youth development landscape in Yemen today?
 1. *Probe: Conflict, gender*
8. What do you think are the most important gaps in youth programming (GoY, international donors)?

Challenges, Opportunities, Assets & Priorities

9. What do you think are the biggest **challenges** faced by youth in Yemen?
 1. To what extent do these challenges differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized and vulnerable, different age groups)?
10. What do you think are the biggest **opportunities** for Youth in Yemen today?
 1. To what extent do these opportunities differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized and vulnerable, different age groups)?
11. What do you think are the most important **assets** that youth in Yemen have access to today (e.g. support systems, resources, skills/competencies)?
 1. To what extent do assets differ between various types of youth (e.g., women/men, urban/rural, marginalized and vulnerable, different age groups)?

Youth Programming (Broad)

12. I will read you the key outcomes of current USAID strategic objectives for Yemen. For each, please let me know if you have any recommendations for how USAID could better support youth in achieving the outcome. This could be through adjustments to current programming or the design of new activities.
 - Improved access to health, education, and water
 - Increased household income
 - Macroeconomic institutions and functions strengthened to boost the economy
 - Mechanisms that allow citizens to identify and address grievances strengthened
 - Social cohesion of communities strengthened
 - Inclusive peace and transition processes strengthened
13. Which (2-3) of these recommendations would you say are the highest priority?

Referrals

14. Are you are familiar with any well-informed Yemeni youth who would be willing to participate in a phone interview for this assessment? We are looking for youth aged 15-29 who either live in Yemen currently, or moved out of Yemen within the last year. Would you be willing to connect us to them?
 1. *Interviewer: Explain that we would like for them to make the first contact, ideally via email. Then we will follow up via email with more information. If email is not an option, ask respondent to call or text referral to see if it's ok if we contact them. **Ask respondent to please send us an email to confirm when they have reached out, and it's ok for us to proceed. DO NOT RECORD NAME OR CONTACT INFORMATION HERE.***
15. If you are familiar with any other donor or implementing partner individuals who would have valuable insights for this research and would be willing to participate in this survey, would you be willing to connect us to them?
 1. *Notetaker: Record names, phone numbers, and/or emails of additional respondents.*

16. Are you aware of any relevant studies on youth in Yemen that you can share with us?
1. *Notetaker: Record titles, sources.*

Conclusion

17. Is there anything I didn't ask you about that you'd like to discuss?

Thank respondent and conclude interview.

ANNEX VII: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS – PHASE 2

LISTING INTERVIEW

INFORMED CONSENT

HOUSEHOLD HEAD

Hello. My name is _____. I work for the Yemen Polling Center (YPC) on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are independent researchers working for USAID to better understanding the perspectives of Yemeni youth. We are in your community to identify 30 youth, aged 15-29, to participate in a voluntary 30-minute telephone interview some time next [insert estimated elapsed time]. We will select X of these youth for phone interviews in a way that ensures participation of youth of different ages, sex, and education status. Youth selected for telephone interviews will be asked about their vision of success, challenges that youth face, current youth-led community initiatives, and ways in which USAID or other donors may support these initiatives.

Are there any youth ages 15-29 currently in your household?

- (IF NO) -> I understand. Thank you for your time. Have a great rest of your day.
- (IF YES) -> CONTINUE

If your household chooses to participate, we will conduct a quick 5-minute conversation today. There will be no direct benefits to you or your community. While this research will help USAID better design their projects in Yemen, they will not necessarily conduct any projects in your community. There are no direct risks to participating in this research. Because we will ask you about challenges you experience in the telephone interview, we may discuss some upsetting things. Your responses will be confidential and we will not share any information you tell us during today's conversation with anyone outside of our research team and we will destroy this information immediately after telephone interviews are complete.

Is your household interested in participating in this study?

- (IF NO) -> I understand. Thank you for your time. Have a great rest of your day.
- (IF YES) -> CONTINUE

Great!

I. What is your name?

I would first like to understand how many youth there are currently in your household?

	Sex	Age	Education
Youth 1			
Youth 2			
Etc.			

Thank you! We are specifically looking for {insert preferred criteria} youth at this moment. I would like to speak with {insert selected youth}. Is {insert selected youth} available to speak now?

YOUTH

Hello. My name is _____. I work for the Yemen Polling Center (YPC) on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are independent researchers working for USAID to better understanding the perspectives of Yemeni youth. We are in your community to identify 30 youth, aged 15-29, to participate in a voluntary 30-minute telephone interview some time next [insert estimated elapsed time]. We will select X of these youth for phone interviews in a way that ensures participation of youth of different ages, sex, and education status. Youth selected for telephone interviews will be asked about their vision of success, challenges that youth face, current youth-led community initiatives, and ways in which USAID or other donors may support these initiatives. Your {insert initial respondent} indicated that you might be interested in participating in this study. Your participation is completely voluntary. If you start the interview and wish to stop at any time for any reason you may do so without penalty. You may also choose not to answer any question.

If you choose to participate, we will conduct a quick 5-minute conversation today. There will be no direct benefits to you or your community. While this research will help USAID better design their projects in Yemen, they will not necessarily conduct any projects in your community. There are no direct risks to participating in this research either. Your responses will be confidential and we will not share any information you tell us during today's conversation with anyone outside of our research team and we will destroy this information immediately after telephone interviews are complete.

INSTRUMENT

{TO BE FILLED IN BY INTERVIEWER}

1. Governorate:
 - a. Hadramawt
 - b. Ta'izz
 - c. Sana'a
 - d. Aden
 - e. Lahj
 - f. Abyan
 - g. Shabwa
 - h. Al-Dhala'
2. District (pre-populate once determined):
3. Sub-District (*Ozla*) (pre-populate once determined):
4. Urbanity
 - a. City
 - b. Village
 - c. Other (specify)
5. Sex of respondent (Select one):
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
6. Dwelling type
 - a. Tent
 - b. Small house built from thatch
 - c. Small house built from mud
 - d. House built from bricks with a wooden roof

- e. House built from stones with wooden roof
- f. House built from bricks with reinforced concrete roof
- g. House built from stones with reinforced concrete roof
- h. Apartment
- i. Other (specify)

I will start by asking you a series of questions about how best to reach you for a future interview.

1. What is your name?
2. How old are you?
3. Do you have regular access to a telephone?
 - a. No (END INTERVIEW)
 - b. Yes - Own
 - c. Yes - Immediate Family (within household)
 - d. Yes - Extended Family (outside of household)
 - e. Yes - Other (describe)
4. May we contact you on this telephone?
5. (IF YES) What is the number associated with this telephone?
6. Do you have regular access to an alternate telephone?
 - a. No
 - b. Yes - Own
 - c. Yes - Immediate Family (within household)
 - d. Yes - Extended Family (outside of household)
 - e. Yes - Other (describe)
7. (IF YES) May we contact you on this telephone?
8. (IF YES) What is the number associated with this telephone?
9. Do you have regular access to a computer?
 - a. No
 - b. Yes
10. (IF YES) Do you use Facebook or other social media platforms?
 - a. Yes (platform names)
 - b. No
11. (IF YES) Can we contact you on (platform name) if we can't reach you by telephone?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
12. (IF YES) What is your (platform name) account name/address?

13. What is the best time to reach you for a 30-minute telephone interview?
- FILL IN TIME ROSTER
14. Are there any days you know you will be unavailable in the period? (INSERT EXPECTED TIME PERIOD FOR CALLS)
- FILL IN DAY ROSTER

DEMOGRAPHICS

I will now ask you a couple questions about your background.

15. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- No education/Illiterate
 - Traditional education (can read and write)
 - Some primary
 - Completed primary
 - Some secondary
 - Completed secondary
 - Some vocational/institute education after primary
 - Completed vocational/institute education after primary
 - Some vocational/institute education after secondary
 - Completed vocational/institute education after secondary
 - Some university
 - Bachelor's degree
 - High education (Master's, Doctorate. Etc.)
16. Are you currently employed? (SELECT MULTIPLE)
- No
 - No – student
 - No - housewife
 - Yes – full time
 - Yes – part time
 - Yes – self-employed
 - Other (specify)
17. (IF YES) What sector are you employed in?
- Agriculture
 - Fishing
 - Services
 - Manufacturing
 - Other (specify)

YOUTH ENGAGEMENT

- Are you aware of any youth initiatives in your community (elaborate youth groups/organizations, youth-led efforts)? (PROBE FOR NAMES)
- (IF YES) What is this initiative doing?

Do you have any questions for me?

Thank you for your time! My colleagues may be in touch to schedule a phone interview in the next {insert expected time}.

YOUTH TELEPHONE INTERVIEW

INFORMED CONSENT

Parental Consent (AGES 15-17)

Ask for household head respondent {name captured in listing instrument}.

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. My name is _____, and also on the phone is my colleague _____. We are calling you from the Yemen Polling Center (YPC) on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are independent researchers working for USAID to better understanding the perspectives of Yemeni youth. We are asking for your permission to let your child participate in a brief interview to help us understand these topics from the youth perspective.

You may remember us visiting your house recently to collect some basic information about youth members of your household. Your child has been selected from the list of youth we collected in your community. We selected youth for interviews to ensure inclusion of individuals of different ages, sex, and education status. Your child is one of 96 youth that will be included in our study.

There are no direct benefits of participation in the study other than contributing to knowledge that may help improve services for Yemeni youth in the future. The risks involved in this study are minimal; we do not consider any information shared in this discussion to be sensitive. Specifically, we will ask about your child's vision of success, the challenges that youth face, current youth-led community initiatives, and in ways these initiatives could function even better. While this research will help USAID better design their projects in Yemen, they will not necessarily conduct any projects in your community. Discussing life challenges may bring up some upsetting topics. Though we do not anticipate that anything we discuss will be sensitive, we recommend that your child take this call from a private place to be able to speak freely. You may choose to be in the room with your child during the call.

The discussion will last about 30 minutes. Your child's participation is completely voluntary. You have no obligation to participate. Even if you agree, your child can also choose not to participate. If your child starts the interview and wishes to stop at any time for any reason or if your child does not want to answer any question, he/she may do so without penalty. Your child can also choose to end the interview or withdraw from the study at any time and without any consequences. Your child's answers will be combined with those of other youth and shared with USAID in a report. This report may be made public. However, we will only include general information in the report like age, sex and governorate, but we will not share your name, your child's name or any other identifying information.

We will not record the conversation but to ensure we capture everything your child shares with us, we will take notes. Only the research teams at YPC and Social Impact will know your and your child's identities – we will not share any identifiable information publicly.

If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Yemen Polling Center or the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com or +1 703 465 1884.

Do you have any questions?

Do you agree to let your child be interviewed for this study?

- (IF NO) -> I understand. Thank you for your time. Have a great rest of your day.
- (IF YES) -> CONTINUE

Informed Assent for Youth (AGES 15-17) & Informed Consent for Youth (AGES 18-29)

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. My name is _____, and also on the phone is my colleague _____. We are calling you from the Yemen Polling Center (YPC) on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are independent researchers working for USAID to better understanding the perspectives of Yemeni youth.

You may remember us visiting your house recently to collect some basic information about you and other members of your household. We selected youth for interviews to ensure inclusion of individuals of different ages, sex, and education status. There are 96 total youth who will be included in our study.

There are no direct benefits of participation in the study other than contributing to knowledge that may help improve services for Yemeni youth in the future. The risks involved in this study are minimal; we do not consider any information shared in this discussion to be sensitive. Specifically, we will ask about your vision of success, the challenges that youth face, current youth-led community initiatives, and ways in which USAID or other donors may support these initiatives. We know things have been difficult for many of us in Yemen. Even though it's not our intention, this interview may bring up unhappy memories. If you feel uncomfortable talking about any topics, remember you can feel free to just not answer, with no problem

Though we do not anticipate that anything we discuss will be sensitive, we recommend that you take this call from a private place so you can speak freely. This discussion will last about 30 minutes. Your participation is completely voluntary; you have no obligation to participate. If you start the interview and wish to stop at any time for any reason, or if you do not want to answer any question, you may do so without penalty. You can also choose to end the interview or withdraw from the study at any time you wish, without any consequence.

Your answers will be combined with those of other youth and shared with USAID in a report. This report may be made public. However, we will only include general information in the report like age, sex, and governorate. We will not share your name or any other identifying information.

To ensure we capture everything you share with us, we will take notes. Only the research teams at YPC and Social Impact will know your identity – we will not share any identifiable information publicly.

If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Yemen Polling Center or the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com or +1 703 465 1884.

Do you have any questions?

Do you agree to be interviewed for this study?

1. Yes
2. No (Thank you – END INTERVIEW)

RESPONDENT CONFIRMATION

- I. Is this (READ NAME)?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
2. (IF NO) Is (READ NAME) available?

- a. Yes (Is it possible to speak with (READ NAME))
 - b. No
- 3. (IF NO) When would be a good time to call back to speak with (READ NAME)?
- 4. Is this a good time to speak?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
- 5. (IF NO) When would be a good time to speak?

PRIORITIES

I will start by asking you some questions about your goals and some things that might stand in the way of you achieving them.

- 6. When you think about the next five years... what would you most like to accomplish or change about your life?
 - a. (PROBE) In what ways would this improve your life?
- 7. What are the most important barriers that stand between you and (REFERENCE ACCOMPLISHMENT/CHANGE)?
- 8. Can you think of any changes that would remove or lower this barrier?
 - a. (PROBE) What needs to change?

CHALLENGES (ONLY ASK ITEMS NOT DISCUSSED ABOVE)

I will now ask you about some specific types of challenges youth in your community might face.

- 9. What are the biggest challenges youth in your community face in **finding employment**?
 - a. What are the most common types of jobs or income generating activities youth are doing in your community?
 - b. Are there specific skills that could help you gain a quality job or start a business?
 - i. (IF YES) What are the most important things preventing you from acquiring these skills?
- 10. What are the biggest challenges youth in your community face in **accessing quality education**?
 - a. Are youth in your community currently doing anything to improve education in your community?
 - b. Can you think of any ways that youth like you could contribute to improving education in your community?
- 11. What are the biggest challenges youth in your community face in **accessing quality health services**?
 - a. Are youth in your community currently doing anything to improve health services in your community?
 - b. Can you think of any ways that youth like you could contribute to improving health services in your community?

12. What are the biggest challenges youth in your community face in **accessing clean water and sanitation**?
- Are youth in your community currently doing anything to improve access to clean water?
 - Can you think of any ways that youth like you could contribute to improving access to clean water in your community?

We are also interested in sources of disagreement and conflict. This could take the form of disagreement between neighbors, between different groups of people that live in your community, or between your community and people from other communities.

13. What are the **biggest sources of conflict** within your community (Who is disagreeing with whom and what about)?
- In what ways has this conflict changed over the last X years?
 - In what ways does this conflict affect youth specifically?
 - (PROBE) Youth participation as participants and victims
 - Can you think of any ways that youth like you could contribute to conflict prevention or resolution in your community?

YOUTH ENGAGEMENT

14. What are some of the most important ways youth are making positive changes in your community? *These could be formal youth groups, youth in adult-led groups, informal groups of youth, or individuals who are making a positive difference.*
- PROBE (HOW)
15. We heard about some youth initiatives in your community.
- Have you heard of (INSERT INITIATIVE NAME)?
 - (IF YES) Have you personally been involved with (INSERT INITIATIVE NAME)?
 - (IF YES) Probe how, to what extent.
 - (IF YES) Could you tell us what (INSERT INITIATIVE NAME) does in your community?
 - (IF YES) How well do you think (INSERT INITIATIVE NAME) is doing in achieving this objective?
 - (IF YES) Do you have any ideas on how (INSERT INITIATIVE NAME) could do better in achieving this objective?
16. (IF NO TO ALL) Are you involved in any other youth initiatives?
- (IF YES) What type of initiative are you involved in?
 - (IF NO) Are there specific barriers that prevent you from engaging in youth initiatives?

PERCEPTION QUESTIONS

This is the last section of the interview. I will ask you some questions about your community and your access to basic services. Unlike in the previous sections, I will read you a set of 5 statements one at a time. For each statement, I will ask whether you agree or disagree with what I have said. You will have 5 choices of answers:

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither Agree/Disagree

- *Disagree*
- *Strongly Agree*

17. Life in my community is better than it was X year(s) ago.
18. Life in my community will be better in X year(s) than it is today.
19. I have access to quality **health services** if I need them.
20. I have access to quality **education** if I need it.
21. I have access to **enough safe water** when I need it.
22. (IF EMPLOYED) My job provides me with income that's sufficient for my household's needs.
23. (IF NOT EMPLOYED) I have access to a **job** if I need it.

IDP

24. Have you relocated as a result of the war?
 - a. No
 - b. Relocated across Governorates
 - c. Relocated within Governorate

CLOSEOUT

25. Is there anything I didn't ask you about that you'd like to discuss?
26. Do you have any questions for me?

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. My name is _____, and also on the phone is my colleague _____. We are calling you on behalf of Social Impact, a US-based research organization. We are currently working with USAID to update our understanding of challenges, programmatic priorities, and opportunities for youth in Yemen.

Social Impact is an independent evaluation firm, not directly associated with USAID or any other implementing partner. We received your contact information from [“USAID” or “someone else who participated in our study”] as someone with knowledge of issues that impact youth in Yemen.

There are no direct benefits of participation in the study other than contributing to knowledge that may help improve services for Yemeni youth in the future. The risks involved in this study are minimal; we do not consider any information shared in this discussion to be sensitive. Specifically, we will ask about challenges and opportunities faced by youth, current programming and gaps in programming, existing models for youth engagement, and recommendations. Though we do not anticipate that anything we discuss will be sensitive, we recommend that you take this call from a place where you can be alone for the duration of the interview.

The discussion will last between 30 minutes and one hour. Your participation is completely voluntary. If you start the interview and wish to stop at any time for any reason you may do so without penalty. You may also choose not to answer any question.

Your answers will be combined with others’ responses and submitted in our report to USAID. A version of this report may be made public. We will not report your name in connection with any specific data or statement in either version of the report, and will remove all indirect identifiers as well as particularly sensitive information from the public version of the report. Due to our small sample and the nature of our sampling approach, we cannot guarantee complete confidentiality among those who will have access to the internal report at USAID; however, your answers will remain confidential to those accessing a public version.

To ensure we capture everything shared, we will take notes. If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Social Impact’s Project Manager for this activity, Alison Smith, at asmith@socialimpact.com, or the Social Impact Institutional Review Board at irb@socialimpact.com or +1 703 465 1884.

Do you have any questions?

Do you agree to be interviewed for this study?

U.S. Agency for International Development