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# USAID/Addressing Education in Northeast Nigeria (AENN)

## Rapid Education Risk Analysis (RERA) and Gender Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) Analysis Report

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## Acronyms

AENN	Addressing Education in Northeast Nigeria
AOG	Armed Opposition Group
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
DNH	Do No Harm
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECCN	Education in Conflict and Crisis Network
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EMIS	Education Management Information System
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GESI	Gender Equity and Social Inclusion
IDP	Internally Displace Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JSS	Junior Secondary School
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGEA	Local Government Education Authority
MJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MMC	Maiduguri Metropolitan Council
NFE	Non-Formal Education
NFLC	Non-Formal Learning Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSAG	Non-State Armed Group
OOSC	Out-of-School Children
PSS	Psycho-Social Support
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
RERA	Rapid Education Risk Analysis
SAME	State Agency for Mass Education
SBMC	School-Based Management Committee
SEL	Social-Emotional Learning
SLE	Safer Learning Environment
SRGBV	School-Related Gender-Based Violence
SSS	Senior Secondary School
SUBEB	Statue Universal Basic Education Board
UBEC	Universal Basic Education Commission
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## Executive Summary

USAID’s Addressing Education in Northeast Nigeria (AENN) activity is a \$14,876,124 cooperative agreement that aims to address the immediate education needs of 302,500 children and youth in 225 communities, in Borno and Yobe, through new non-formal and safer formal education, while laying a foundation for sustainable, conflict-sensitive improvement of education systems at the community and government levels.

Conflict-sensitive and inclusive education programming depends on a nuanced understanding of the two-way relationship between the activity and conflict dynamics. The Rapid Education and Risk Analysis (RERA) and Gender Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) analysis were conducted together at AENN start-up in order to provide conflict, gender, and socially-inclusive recommendations for AENN operations and programming.

## Key Findings and Recommendations

Below, key findings (“headline conclusions”) and associated recommendations for AENN are summarized, including Community Dividers, Community Connectors, Barriers to Enrollment/Retention, External Risks, Internal Risks, Gender-Based Violence Inside and Outside of Schools, and Cross-cutting Issues.

### Community Dividers

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Fear and trauma cause tension in both IDP and host communities, even when there is no active conflict.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education programming should work to enroll children and youth in both IDP and host communities equally to address lost time and build a sense of normalcy, stability and long-term investment.</li> <li>• Selection criteria for Return to Learning and NFLC facilitators should be clear.</li> <li>• AENN should monitor fluctuating tensions and fears in these communities.</li> <li>• SEL should be provided to children, youth, and teachers (leveled by age group) to build coping skills to deal with trauma and build resilience.</li> </ul>
<b>The idleness and/or hostility of male youth is sometimes blamed for community tensions.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Out-of-school boys, especially older boys, may need specific strategies to enroll and keep them in school or in NFLCs and prevent dropout.</li> <li>• This issue should be cross-cutting, including materials development, teacher professional development, community level interventions, etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Distribution of relief items to IDPs can cause tensions between IDPs and host communities.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict Sensitive Education guiding principles and strategies should be complied with when providing education support to IDPs and host communities.</li> <li>• Education programming should be available for all who need it without a focus on either IDPs or host communities.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interventions for formal schools and NFLCs should not be, or appear to be, inequitable.</li> </ul>
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### Community Connectors

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>There is significant goodwill towards IDPs among host communities.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should work with local leaders to bring IDP and host communities together through educational programming at the community level.</li> <li>• Community mapping that is participatory and inclusive of both IDPs and host communities should identify key institutions, locations, actors, and events that bring the community together, and ways in which communities would be willing to show their support for AENN.</li> </ul>
<b>There is a strengthened belief and increased trust in education for all children (girls, the displaced, the disabled), possibly as a direct result of the conflict.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should seek respected community leaders who can be identified, trained and recruited as local champions for inclusive education in their communities.</li> <li>• AENN should strive to provide enough educational opportunities for all who need it and want it, not only for a select few, and make sure that NFLC classes meet the needs of the population (groupings, timings, etc.), with attention to marginalized communities and overcrowding (consider pupil-teacher ratios).</li> <li>• AENN must work with institutions via Data Hubs to acknowledge the growing demand and improve planning processes to accommodate these changes.</li> <li>• School safety and teacher preparation must be well-addressed within schools and NFLCs so that parents do not lose their new faith in education.</li> <li>• In policy discussions, increase advocacy for, and maintain a strong focus on, the transition from NFE into FE, which is not currently standardized.</li> </ul>

### Barriers to Access and Retention

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Hunger is a major challenge for targeted children and youth.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN must find ways to creatively address school feeding.</li> <li>• Community-led school feeding approach is realistic and sustainable when the communities have means for food production locally.</li> </ul>
<b>Direct costs of schooling are a barrier for many families.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should consider community and school-level interventions to address the costs of uniforms, school supplies, school fees, and more.</li> <li>• Consider how the lack of learning materials will be managed going forward.</li> </ul>
<b>Some parents do</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respected community leaders should be identified, trained and</li> </ul>

<b>not value formal education, for various reasons.</b>	<p>recruited as champions for inclusive education in their respective communities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community mapping should assess the reasons why some parents do not value formal education, to inform advocacy efforts to promote the importance of education, especially for girls.</li> </ul>
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### Risks External to Schools

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Fences are considered important for keeping traffic and unauthorized adults out of school.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should consider community-level solutions for building and maintaining fences around schools.</li> </ul>
<b>The route to school can be dangerous, especially if children have a long way to walk.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should organize community-level solutions such as escorts on the way to/from school, mine clearance, “community buses” where children meet in one location and walk to school together.</li> <li>• AENN should keep NFLCs within the communities where children live whenever possible to reduce distance traveled and choose sites removed from hazards to children (busy highways, construction sites, socially acceptable, etc.).</li> </ul>

### Risks Internal to Schools

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Many schools face extreme overcrowding.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN can relieve some of the burden on formal schools by providing the option of NFLCs, especially for overage youth. However, the implications of drawing children away from formal schools for non-formal learning must be considered.</li> <li>• Work with education authorities to develop strategies to increase the supply of both formal and non-formal educational opportunities.</li> </ul>
<b>The lack of sufficient toilets and WASH facilities in schools is a huge problem and in many schools, there is open defecation, and lack of sex-separate toilets.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sufficient and gender-appropriate and -segregated toilets, latrines and other WASH facilities in NFLCs and formal schools is a real priority. The AENN Activity should liaise and collaborate with agencies involved in WASH to address it.</li> <li>• AENN should work with SUBEBs and others through the Data Hubs to understand the need for toilets and improve planning processes to address the gaps.</li> <li>• AENN should look for community-level solutions and work with other programs to address problems with WASH.</li> </ul>
<b>Corporal punishment is</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide training and develop codes of conduct for the whole school on expectations for behavior; teachers, parents, students (especially</li> </ul>

<p><b>widely practiced, accepted and even desired by teachers, families and some pupils, and is often abused by prefects.</b></p>	<p>prefects), community leaders and community members should be trained in positive discipline strategies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate communities about the links between corporal punishment and reduced educational outcomes for their children.</li> <li>• The prefect system should be addressed to prevent prefects using their powers to bully and beat other children (consider retraining prefects)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Bullying mainly affects children who are already marginalized, is exacerbated by extreme overcrowding, and is a source of frustration for teachers who struggle to manage it.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should provide training and develop codes of conduct for the whole school on positive school climate and expectations for behavior: head teachers, teachers, parents, students (especially prefects).</li> <li>• AENN should consider training and sensitizing parents, community leaders and community members in positive discipline strategies and the links between corporal punishment and reduced educational outcomes for children</li> <li>• Prefects should be retrained in less violent methods with new strategies enforced.</li> <li>• AENN might consider a set of school and student-level initiatives to address bullying in schools (reporting and response mechanisms, student clubs, social-emotional learning activities, complaint box, etc.).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Teachers suffer from lack of respect, low pay, challenging life conditions, and a burden of responsibility to care for huge numbers of children, many of whom have dealt with trauma and conflict.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should provide training and support to teachers and facilitators to address issues related to: teacher-teacher relations; teacher-head teacher relations; teacher-pupil/student relations; teacher-parent relations; pupil/student-pupil/student relations; general classroom management; and teaching large class sizes.</li> <li>• Teachers need to be supported in multiple ways by AENN, with a focus on their own well-being (training, mentoring, teacher learning circles, teacher recognition)</li> <li>• AENN community interventions should aim to improve community appreciation of and support for teachers and build respect for teachers.</li> <li>• AENN could provide recognition to high-performing teachers each year.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Teachers are inadequately prepared for the challenges they face in the classroom.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should provide training to teachers on classroom practices, including large class sizes and multi-grade teaching</li> <li>• AENN should provide training to teachers on core topics as well as conflict-sensitive education, SEL, teaching children with disabilities</li> <li>• Ongoing mentoring and coaching will be critical.</li> </ul>

**Gender-Based Violence Internal and External to Schools**

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
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<p><b>GBV in the community and school does happen and sometimes the victims (often girls) are blamed for it</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide gender trainings to AENN staff and all AENN beneficiaries in gender issues and gender-based violence.</li> <li>• Liaise and collaborate with organizations or programs working in GBV to help address GBV matters more holistically at home, school and community levels.</li> <li>• Look at options for a response mechanism and referral pathways for victims and their families at the local level</li> <li>• Teachers and head teachers need to receive training and coaching on how to spot signs of GBV, provide support to students, and referral pathways</li> <li>• Social-emotional learning activities should support children to gain coping skills to deal with trauma and should include differentiated strategies for boys and girls.</li> </ul>
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### Cross-Cutting Issues

<p><b>Headline Conclusions</b></p>	<p><b>Recommendations</b></p>
<p><b>Little to no data to understand school contexts exists or is shared, particularly around education quality, GBV, etc.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should work closely with governmental agencies, UNICEF, other organizations/programs, education sector groups (ex. EiEWG), universities and colleges to address education data needs.</li> <li>• AENN’s data hubs should consider the gaps in data and key issues that SUBEBs and partners need information about to facilitate planning processes</li> <li>• Improve communication with NGOs and government entities collecting data on population, security, child protection</li> </ul>



## **Activity Background**

USAID's Addressing Education in Northeast Nigeria (AENN) activity is a \$14,876,124 cooperative agreement that aims to address the immediate education needs of 302,500 children and youth in 225 communities, in Borno and Yobe, through new non-formal and safer formal education, while laying a foundation for sustainable, conflict-sensitive improvement of education systems at the community and government levels. AENN is implemented by FHI 360 in partnership with Save the Children US (Save), Viamo, the Nigerian Government and selected community-based organizations (CBOs). The AENN team will leverage partnerships with stakeholders in Borno and Yobe, including the Education in Emergencies (EiE) Working Groups, universities, and state and local government education authorities (LGEA) and build their capacity to plan, manage and oversee education activities with a strong focus on the collection and use of data for decision-making. The AENN team will facilitate community-led action planning and dialogues to identify barriers to education and implement solutions. AENN will harmonize curriculum quality and certification frameworks to improve transition pathways to formal education systems.

## **Rapid Education and Risk Analysis and Gender Equity and Social Inclusion Analysis Overview**

Conflict-sensitive and inclusive education programming depends on a nuanced understanding of the two-way relationship between the activity and conflict dynamics. The Rapid Education and Risk Analysis (RERA) and Gender Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) analysis were conducted together at AENN start-up in order to provide conflict, gender, and socially-inclusive recommendations for AENN operations and programming. A qualitative Safer Learning Environments (SLE) assessment was embedded as well.

Designed by USAID's Education in Conflict and Crisis Network (ECCN), the RERA is a situation analysis that examines the education sector, learners, and their communities as a dynamic system of multiple contextual risks and assets. It investigates how contextual risks, such as violence, insecurity, natural hazards, and health pandemics, impact education; how education influences these risks; and how these risks influence each other. The central focus of this analysis is the school community and its sources of resilience. The RERA methodology integrates elements of conflict analysis, disaster risk assessment, resilience analysis, and political economy analysis. It involves the collection and analysis of secondary and primary data. Primary data collection draws upon a limited, purposive sample of school communities, and in this case was designed to include many elements of ECCN's SLE qualitative assessment toolkit, to understand safety issues in and around the school that are relevant to the conflict-sensitive and gender-sensitive implementation of the program.

At the same time, the GESI analysis, which this RERA also incorporates, seeks to understand problems of access, retention and completion of education, especially for girls and children with disabilities, leading to a set of AENN-specific recommendations for building an education program that is socially inclusive.

## **Methodology**

The methodology for the RERA/GESI involved 1) An extensive secondary desk review examining the two-way interaction between education and conflict in Northeast Nigeria as well as literature on gender equity and social inclusion in relation to education; 2) Qualitative primary data collection in four purposefully selected Local Government Authorities (LGAs) from among those selected for implementation using ECCN’s SLE framework; and 3) Validation workshops in Maiduguri and Abuja with key stakeholders to share the preliminary results and co-develop recommendations for AENN’s design and implementation.

### Desk Review Methodology

The secondary data and evidence review aimed to provide a deeper understanding of the conflict context and education in Northeast Nigeria and the two-way interaction between the conflict and the education system, with a focus on Borno and Yobe states. This review first examined the Boko Haram conflict in Northeast Nigeria, analyzing factors that drive and mitigate conflict. It then examined the education system in the Northeast, concentrating on access, quality, and specific challenges to access and retention. Next, this review analyzed the two-way relationship between education and conflict, looking at the impact of conflict on education and education as a mitigating factor to conflict. Finally, the desk review focused on the GESI context, including sociocultural norms and practices that impact gender and social inclusion as they relate to education. The review also identifies relevant evidence and research gaps.

### Primary Data Collection

#### Target Population

Primary data collection activities for both RERA and GESI sought to reach a sample of children, parents, head teachers of informal and formal schools, facilitators and coordinators of non-formal schools, community leaders, government and local authorities, and humanitarian organizations. We employed a combination of focus group discussions (FGD) and structured key informant interviews (KII) with respondents at the LGA/community level and at the state level. Table 1 below shows the target respondent groups and associated methods of data collection. FGDs targeted 6-8 participants with a facilitator and note-taker, while KIIs involved one participant with an interviewer and a note-taker.

**Table 1. Target population groups and data collection methods**

<b>Respondent Group</b>	<b>Data Collection Method</b>
<b>LGA/Community Level</b>	
Students in formal schools, females	FGD
Students in formal schools, males	FGD
Out of School children and youth, females	FGD
Out of School children and youth, males	FGD
Parents, females	FGD
Parents, males	FGD
Teachers in formal schools, females	FGD
Teachers in formal schools, males	FGD
Facilitators in non-formal schools, females	FGD

Facilitators in non-formal schools, males	FGD
Community meeting, host community	FGD
Community meeting, IDPs	FGD
Head teacher, formal school	KII
Head teacher, non-formal school	KII
Coordinator, non-formal school	KII
Religious leader	KII
Female leader	KII
Local security sector agent	KII
Camp manager	KII
Representative of the LGA	KII
Representative of the LGEA	KII
<b>State Level</b>	
Representatives of Education in Emergencies Working Group	KII
Representative of the Ministry of Education	KII
Representative of the SUBEB	KII
Representative of the Ministry of Religious Affairs	KII
Representative of the SAME	KII
Representative of the MRRR	KII

### Community Sampling

The RERA/GESI data collection targeted a sample of four school communities (located in and around a school/educational catchment area) in Borno State, and one community in Yobe State. We have selected more communities in Borno than in Yobe because the AENN program is more heavily focused on Borno, which has borne the brunt of effects of the armed crisis. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are scattered throughout the two implementation states, and the communities that AENN will target for implementation will include both IDP camps and IDPs integrated into host communities.

For the RERA/GESI, four communities were purposefully selected to represent four types of communities where the AENN activity will be implemented. These include:

- Borno state (context: heavily affected by insurgency; huge numbers of IDPs; many IDP camps, and most settled communities hosting IDPs):
  - Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC): an urban IDP and host community setting at the heart of all Northeast Nigeria’s humanitarian and development work, where hundreds of thousands of IDP children and youth are seeking safety from the conflict; severe overcrowding with limited access to most services;
  - Jere: a semi-rural IDP and host community setting, reachable by road from MMC, with some limited access to humanitarian services; and
  - Hawul: A more remote IDP and host community setting where IDPs are integrated into host families/communities and possibly into the host education system, reachable by road but difficult to access from MMC due to the insecurity of direct routes.

- Yobe state (context: proximity to conflict; smaller numbers of IDPs; no IDP camps; communities hosting IDPs mainly from Borno state):
  - Damaturu: an urban IDP setting where IDPs are mostly integrated into the host education system, reachable by road from MMC.

**Methods and Instrumentation**

Community meetings were held with self-selecting members of the community. These community meetings intended to provide a voice to community members not included in education-centered focus group discussions to provide a better understanding of community dynamics, inclusive of gender equality and social inclusion norms, community tensions, and conflict dynamics.

The project conducted ten focus group discussions in each of the four communities with ten different respondent groups. In addition, focus group discussions were held in the form of community meetings with self-selecting members of the community. These community meetings intended to provide a voice to community members not included in education-centered focus group discussions in order to provide a better understanding of community dynamics, inclusive of gender equality and social inclusion norms, community tensions, and conflict dynamics. Criteria for participation required that the participant was a resident of the community; participants of focus group discussions and key informant interviews were not discouraged to attend, but priority will be given to community members who have not yet participated in an AENN interview.

**Table 2. Risk factors explored by data collection tools**

Internal Risks	External Risks	Barriers to Access/ Retention
School-related gender-based violence	Incidental violence to and from school	Perceptions of Education
Bullying and fighting	Armed conflict/Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs)	Hunger, food insecurity
Overcrowding	Gender-based violence in the home/community	Disability
School infrastructure	Environmental risks (drought, fire, floods)	Work outside of school
Physical violence/ corporal punishment		Early marriage/pregnancy
		Displacement
		Trauma

The tools developed sought to answer the following research questions, refined through the objectives of the RERA and the gaps in the secondary desk research:

- What is the relationship between contextual factors and the education sector, particularly at the school and community levels? How do these contextual factors affect various actors and segments of the school community?

- What are the resilience factors that positively influence access and the safety and quality of education? How can these factors be strengthened?

Each instrument followed the subsequent pattern, which was applied in the tools for all respondent groups in order to triangulate responses: **detection of presence of risk factor**, including descriptions of incidences, frequency, involved actors, and motivations; **identification of response taken by school**, including descriptions of responses, involved actors, existence of policy or procedure; **discussion of reaction and endorsement of response taken**, including an exploration of perspectives held by focus group or interview participants, actions taken against or endorsing current school response, and collection of recommendations to change school responses and diminish the risk factor.

### Enumerator Team and Scope of Work

The project engaged sixteen enumerators to conduct the data collection which consisted of four teams of four enumerators each. Teams included two male and two female enumerators, such that the lead moderator and notetaker were of the same gender as focus group discussion participants and interviewees. In the same vein, mixed focus groups had one male and one female enumerator to maintain gender dynamics representative of participants. Each team was assigned one community and spent a full week in the community. The Damaturu and MMC teams, each of whom were in the state capitals, did not have to deal with challenges related to travel were also assigned state-level interviews to conduct, adding to their workload.

**Table 3. Enumerator schedule**

<b>Week 1</b>	Enumerator training, including field practice
<b>Week 2</b>	Data collection (each team spending one full week in their assigned community)
<b>Week 3</b>	Data transcription, coding and analysis workshop

All enumerators attended a week-long training session, orienting enumerators to the USAID/AENN activity, data collection instruments, and data collection process. This training included an orientation to the research frameworks, a translation workshop, piloting of the tool in two local communities including an IDP camp, and several modules on implicit bias, ethics, conflict sensitivity, and gender sensitive approaches.

Following the week-long training session, enumerator teams conducted one week of data collection. Following data collection, all enumerator teams returned to Maiduguri for a data transcription, coding and analysis workshop, providing an opportunity to consolidate and synthesize notes taken, conduct initial coding, and provide a preliminary, field-validated analysis of findings.

During fieldwork, all participants orally confirmed their consent to participation, and received the following information from enumerators: (1) the purpose of the study; (2) their role as a participant in the study; (3) risks and benefits of participating in the study; (4) that they can choose to participate or not, and choose to refuse to answer any individual questions of

interviews, focus group discussions, or surveys should they accept to participate and that they can withdraw at any time; (5) who they may contact if they have more information; and (6) that all responses would remain confidential and will not be shared or communicated with anyone outside of the room including primary caregivers and employers.

## Data Analysis

According to USAID guidelines, the RERA is an approach intended to provide stakeholders with a rapid and “good enough” situation analysis of the interaction between the education sector and a number of risk factors. However, the RERA toolkit does not provide a guide to analysis, and therefore the RERA USAID/AENN team designed an analysis approach based on the risk factors and barriers included in Table 2. Analysis involved two stages of coding. First, the enumeration teams did an initial coding of each transcript almost immediately following translation and transcription. Following this, the codebook was updated, and transcripts were then recoded using Dedoose, a qualitative coding and analysis software. During the coding processes, new codes were created as themes emerged and process were in place to ensure intercoder reliability.

Upon the completion of the coding process, the first round of analysis involved creating case profiles for each FGD and KII. Profiles were also made for each of the main themes that emerged, including community dynamics, perceptions of education, barriers to education access and retention, external risks, internal risks, responses, and recommendations. In the final round of analysis, Dedoose was used to export families of code in order to analyze data within communities, across communities, within respondent types, and across respondent types. Main findings and recommendations that emerged from primary data analysis were synthesized and included in this report.

## Summary of Primary Data Collection Participants

A total of 494 individuals participated in focus groups and interviews across the four sampled communities.

**Table 4. Total number of participants in RERA/GESI data collection activities**

Formal & Non-formal School Actors	Males	Females	Total
Students in formal schools	37	35	72
Head Teachers in formal schools	3	1	4
Formal School teachers	35	33	68
Head Teachers in non-formal schools	2	1	3
Non-formal school facilitators/ coordinators	38	33	71
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>218</b>
Community Actors	Males	Females	Total
Out-of-school children and youth	51	33	84
Parents	19	31	50
Community members	57	56	113
Religious leaders	5	0	5
Female leaders	0	4	4
Camp manager	2	0	2

Security sector representative	4	0	4
LGEA representative	4	0	4
LGA representative	1	0	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>267</b>
<b>State-Level Actors</b>	<b>Males</b>	<b>Females</b>	<b>Total</b>
Representatives of Education in Emergencies Working Group	1	0	1
Representative of the Ministry of Education	2	0	2
Representative of the SUBEB	2	0	2
Representative of the Ministry of Religious Affairs	2	0	2
Representative of the SAME	1	0	1
Representative of the MRRR	1	0	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>

Data collection was conducted in three languages: primarily Hausa, with some conducted in Kanuri, and policy-level interviews were conducted in English.

### RERA/GESI Validation Workshops

AENN hosted two one-day validation workshops in January 2019, in Maiduguri and Abuja, during which preliminary findings from the RERA/GESI were shared, discussed, and validated, and recommendations were prepared. Participants in the Maiduguri workshop included Borno and Yobe state and local-level actors from the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), Ministry of Education (MoE), State Agency for Mass Education (SAME), members of community coalitions, representatives of teachers' unions, and education secretaries from all of the LGAs where data was collected. Participants at the national level workshop included officials from the key organizations mentioned above, and also from the Federal Ministry of Education, National Commission for Mass Literacy, Adult and Non-formal Education, Nigeria Educational Research and Development Center, and Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC).

In both workshops, participants were placed into groups of four to validate community profiles for each of the four LGAs in which data was collected. Specifically, each group was asked to indicate if their assigned LGA is urban, semi-urban, or rural; the status of conflict (ongoing, immediate post-conflict, or post-conflict); status of people in need (conflict-affected host-community, newly arrived or protracted IDPs, returnees); IDPs place of origin; language of instruction in schools; language of IDPs; and general humanitarian/education needs. This was followed by a presentation of key findings along specific themes namely; the changing relationship between education and conflict; community dynamics; barriers to education access; external and internal risks; gender equity and social inclusion; threats to education and AENN activities; and opportunities for the AENN activity. Participants then provided feedback on the findings under each thematic area, and identified opportunities and threats, as well as offered recommendations on how to mitigate the identified threats. Finally, the workshop was concluded with the facilitators guiding participants to link the threats, opportunities, and recommendations to AENN's result/sub-result areas.

### Limitations

Because the RERA and GESI are both meant to be 'good enough' analyses intended to inform program design and implementation, rather than as generalizable research, deliberate trade-offs were made during the design process that can also be described as limitations. These included purposeful sampling of communities and a limited data collection period, described below.

**Purposeful, not representative sampling.** The purposive sample was not intended to be representative of all school communities across the communities of implementation, but rather was aimed at providing in-depth insights into the dynamics of risk and education at a range of locations in which AENN would be implemented in its first year. However, even purposeful selection was not easy to do for this activity. LGA site selection for AENN took place during the same week that the RERA/GESI enumerator training was conducted, which was the week before data collection commenced, and during that week we learned that two Northern Borno LGAs had been selected for implementation (Dikwa and Monguno). Based on this development the RERA/GESI team selected Dikwa as one of the four LGAs to visit for the RERA/GESI, in order to represent those more remote, challenging, conflict-affected contexts, both of which are only helicopter-accessible. However, we were not able to get the enumerator team onto the flight schedule in time, and there was no option to delay the data collection because of the approaching holidays (data collection was taking place during the last week that schools were open before the holidays and a delay of a few days would have put the activity behind schedule by a month or more). Therefore, the team decided to replace Dikwa with Jere, which is a much more accessible LGA due to its proximity to MMC. To mitigate this gap, the team intends to conduct a mini-RERA/GESI (primarily FGDs with community members) at the time of community entry into Dikwa and Monguno, in order to understand the unique aspects of education risks in Northern Borno contexts that might not have been identified in the Southern Borno contexts of MMC, Jere and Hawul.

**Risk of Social Desirability Bias.** This kind of bias involves respondents answering questions in a way that they think will lead to being accepted and liked. This is difficult to control, because some people will report inaccurately on sensitive or personal topics to present themselves and their communities as well as possible. Enumerators were trained to phrase questions to show it is acceptable to answer in a way that is not socially desirable, but there is always a risk of social desirability bias coming through. Because of the sensitive nature of RERA and GESI topics, it is likely that difficult topics such as SRGBV have been underreported, rather than overreported, and respondents may have focused more on community connectors than on dividers.

**Limited data collection period.** The data collection period was limited to one week per site. One week was generally sufficient to carry out the data collection activities, although a longer period of data collection would have enabled the teams to gain more depth of understand of the context and specific challenges.

## **Desk Review: Conflict, Education, and GESI in Northeast Nigeria**

In this section, we begin with a discussion of the Northeast Nigeria conflict context, followed by a discussion of conflict drivers and conflict mitigating factors. We then discuss education in Nigeria, the effects of conflict on education, and how education might contribute to or mitigate conflict (the two-way interaction between education and conflict). We conclude with a brief



summary of the literature on gender equity and social inclusion issues in education in Nigeria and in the Northeast.

### Northeast Nigeria Conflict Context

The conflict context in Northeast Nigeria is complex and involves many actors. We begin with a background and overview, before delving into conflict and displacement, conflict and gender-based violence, finally concluding the section with an introduction to the relationship between conflict and education in Northeast Nigeria.

#### Background

The conflict in Northeast Nigeria can be characterized as a protracted and violent armed conflict, creating a level of devastation and destruction unmatched since the country's civil war in the late 1960s. It has culminated in one of the largest humanitarian and displacement crises in the world, affecting over 15 million people and leaving over seven million in need of humanitarian assistance, half of whom are children (UN OCHA, 2018). Approaching its tenth year, the conflict has resulted in human, economic, and social loss, numerous human rights violations, widespread infrastructure damage, over two million IDPs, and approximately 31,000 deaths (ACLED, 2019). Beginning in 2009, the armed group Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram,<sup>1</sup> has engaged in attacks against Nigeria's government, security forces, and civilians in an effort to establish extremist Islamic rule in northeastern states, mainly impacting Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi, and Taraba states. The insurgent group's name in Hausa is roughly translated into English as "Western education is forbidden."<sup>2</sup>

Throughout the conflict, Boko Haram insurgents have carried out multiple brutal attacks, inflicting large scale damage on property throughout northeastern states, including educational facilities, government offices, religious institutions, and military bases. Citizens have also been terrorized as armed assaults have targeted government officials, policemen, religious leaders, teachers, and students. A recent study found that 49 percent of households in the Northeast have experienced at least one event of conflict or violence from 2010 to 2017 (Azad et al., 2018). In addition, Boko Haram has been responsible for acts of abduction, forced child recruitment, arson, robbery, and sexual violence. Human Rights Watch reported that approximately 10,000 civilians died between 2009 and 2016 due to Boko Haram activities (Human Rights Watch, 2016c). By 2016, the government reported that almost 50,000 children had been orphaned in Borno alone due to the conflict (Famuyiwa-Alaka et al., 2018). Engaging in a higher amount of direct armed conflict, battles, and bombings before 2016, the group has changed tactics in recent years and now resorts to sporadic village raids and abductions, and increased suicide attacks, often aimed at civilian populations in public centers (Matfess, 2017). After 10 years of conflict, Boko Haram is continuing to cause damage and harm across northeastern states, including Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which have been most affected by the conflict. Although government and military officials have declared the defeat of Boko Haram many times in the years since 2014, the conflict is ongoing and continuing to devastate parts of the Northeast (Matfess, 2017; ACLED, 2019).

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<sup>1</sup> In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged alliance to the Islamic State (IS) and renamed itself to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). This report refers to the group as Boko Haram.

<sup>2</sup> Some scholars have criticized this translation for being incomplete.

## Conflict Overview

Boko Haram originally formed in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno state's capital city. Its founding is inextricably linked to the democratization of Nigeria in 1999 and subsequent division among Islamic sects centering on the implementation of sharia law in Borno.<sup>3</sup> The group's founding principles were 1) Western education is Quranically forbidden, and 2) employment in service of the Nigerian government is forbidden (Matfess, 2017). Until 2009, Boko Haram was considered a largely nonviolent fundamentalist religious movement that had occasional bouts of criminality and low-level conflict, and the group even received political backing in the region (Matfess, 2017). However, conflict erupted in 2009 after Boko Haram carried out targeted attacks on government buildings and police stations, and assassinated local officials, provoking the federal government to initiate a security response. The response resulted in the killing of 700-1,000 members of the insurgency, which caused resentment of security forces among communities and played a role in propelling Boko Haram into a full-fledged insurgent group (Walker, 2012; Matfess, 2017). Early government security responses that used indiscriminately violent measures against Boko Haram and carried out extrajudicial executions proved to be counterproductive and provided fuel for the insurgency group to expand (Walker, 2012). Additionally, there were several reports of human rights violations by security forces in the early stages of the conflict that contributed to some civilian deaths (Amnesty International, 2012).

Following the initial outbreak of conflict in 2009, Boko Haram went "underground" until reemerging in mid-2010, attacking a wider geographic area and using new tactics, including almost weekly bombings of government, military, religious, and school buildings that resulted in the deaths of civilians (Walker, 2012). Boko Haram also engaged in village assaults and targeted government officials, ward heads, security personnel, policemen, religious leaders, and journalists for assassination (Matfess, 2017). In one of its most severe attacks outside of the northeastern region, Boko Haram bombed the UN compound in Abuja in August 2011, killing 23 people (Walker, 2012). The increasing level of attacks on civilians from 2011 to 2013 led to the government of Nigeria declaring a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in May 2013 (Campbell, 2013). A Nigerian joint task force was deployed to the region but proved ultimately ineffective as it was hampered by unfamiliarity with the territory, lack of trust in the security sector by communities, and a lack of resources (Matfess, 2017). After the deployment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a collection of community-based vigilante groups, Boko Haram shifted from an urban-based insurgency to a rural-based insurgency. Additionally, during this time, targeted attacks on education began.

The height of the conflict lasted from 2013 to early 2015 as Boko Haram gained territory throughout the Northeast, declaring a Caliphate in August 2014. During this time period, the humanitarian situation deteriorated and Boko Haram increased attacks on education facilities, teachers, and students (UN Security Council, 2017). From May 2013 to late 2014, Human Rights Watch estimated that over 4,000 civilians were killed in over 192 attacks with approximately 2,000 being killed in the first half of 2014 alone (Human Rights Watch, 2014). For comparison, a 2012 Human Rights Watch report estimated that approximately 1,500 civilians had died as of a result of violence from 2009 to 2012 (Human Rights Watch, 2012). In April 2014, Boko Haram received international attention after abducting 276 girls from their dormitory in the remote town

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<sup>3</sup> For more on Boko Haram's sociocultural, religious, and historical foundations, see Matfess 2017.

of Chibok, Borno state, leading to the “Bring Back our Girls” campaign (Human Rights Watch, 2014). However, Boko Haram had been kidnapping boys and girls and recruiting boys from schools in the months and years leading up to this incident. In late 2014, an emboldened Boko Haram attacked a Damasak primary school, abducting approximately 400 women and schoolchildren and using the school as a base and detention center (Human Rights Watch, 2016c). In January 2015, Boko Haram carried out one of its largest attacks in Baga, Borno state, in which an estimated 2,000 people were killed. Additionally, the use of “suicide bombers”<sup>4</sup> increased during this period. Women and girls were primarily used for such attacks, as more than 240 female suicide bombers were used between 2011 to 2017 (Warner and Matfess, 2017).

In January 2015, the spread of Boko Haram into neighboring countries resulted in the establishment of a new Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) comprised of members from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin (ACAPS, n.d.). Despite facing logistical and funding challenges, by mid-2016, the MJTF was able to regain almost all of the territory previously held by Boko Haram in the region (Matfess, 2017). Insurgent groups retreated to the Sambisa forest and other remote locations near the borders of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. In 2016, Boko Haram reportedly split into multiple factions (Matfess, 2017). However, numerous attacks were still carried out by Boko Haram during this period as the group has shifted to the use of asymmetric warfare. Through 2016 and 2017, Boko Haram’s attack locations and targets stayed relatively similar: rural villages, military outposts and barracks, mosques, schools, and IDP camps. Of the attacks in 2017, approximately 70 were armed assaults and approximately 40 were suicide attacks, with most occurring in Northeast Nigeria. At least 967 people were killed by Boko Haram in 2017, with Maiduguri experiencing the highest number of fatalities (Wilson, 2018). Damaturu, the capital of Yobe, also experienced a high level of attacks. From late 2016 to the end of 2017, over 180 civilians were killed by suicide bomb attacks, mostly in Maiduguri. Additionally, 115 children, 38 boys and 77 girls, were used as suicide bombers in 2017 compared to 19 children used for this purpose in 2016 (UNOG, 2017). These attacks not only led to death and destruction, but also invoked a sense of fear in communities of recently released or rescued children and women who were previously detained by Boko Haram (Searcey, 2017). Suicide attacks have taken place at markets, universities, and in IDP camps (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

### **Conflict and Displacement**

The escalation of violent conflict by all involved parties in 2014 resulted in a massive spike in population movement in 2015. IDP numbers have hovered between 1.7 million and 2.2 million from 2015 to 2018, as population movement has further complicated the already complex conflict dynamics in the Northeast (IOM, 2018). In October 2018, the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reported 2,026,602 IDPs in Northeast Nigeria, noting that IDP trends have been increasing since December 2017 (IOM, 2018). Of the over 2 million IDPs, approximately 1.48 million are in Borno, 136,600 are in Yobe, and the rest are in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba (IOM DTM, 2018). Levels of displacement, including secondary and tertiary displacement, have continued to grow in recent months and are approaching levels similar to the height of the displacement crisis in 2015 when

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<sup>4</sup> The use of the term “suicide bomber” can be a misnomer because in many of these cases, perpetrators were just as much victims as they were forced into these acts by insurgents.

over 2.2 million people were displaced (UN OCHA, 2019a). The primary movement trigger is ongoing conflict, but other causes of displacement include poor living conditions, voluntary relocation, flooding, fear of attack, and military operations. Additionally, IDPs in camps and urban areas face challenges including food insecurity, overcrowding, exploitation, health risks, and negative effects of trauma (UN OCHA, 2019a). It is important to note that the latest DTM report identified 1.64 million returnees, signifying the two-way movement of population in the Northeast (IOM, 2018). The number of returnees has been steadily increasing since 2016. While the conflict has led to massive displacement, it has simultaneously restricted access and movement in many parts of the Northeast, presenting challenges for security forces, humanitarian response, and civilians. As of November 2018, more than 800,000 people remained in areas that were inaccessible to humanitarian organizations (UN OCHA, 2019a).

### **Conflict and Gender-Based Violence**

For the entirety of the conflict, Boko Haram has perpetrated acts of sexual and gender-based violence, primarily against women and girls. Such acts include killing women and children and carrying out targeted abductions of females that mainly took place in homes and fields, traveling on roads, or at secular schools. The UN estimated that at least 7,000 girls and women suffered from sexual violence perpetrated by Boko Haram from 2009 to December 2016. During this time period, the UN verified 199 incidents of rape and other acts of sexual violence affecting 217 children in Northeast Nigeria (UN Security Council, 2017).

From 2014 to mid-2015, at least 2,000 women and girls were abducted by Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016). Abducted girls were often held in captivity, resulting in sexual slavery, sexual abuse, rape, forced marriage (usually after forced conversion to Islam if the female was Christian), and forced pregnancy (Human Rights Watch, 2014). While in captivity, girls and women were also subjected to psychological and physical abuse, including whippings and beatings for refusal to convert to Islam, forced labor, forced participation in military operations, and were responsible for household chores including cooking and cleaning (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Watchlist, 2014). As previously mentioned, girls and women have been primarily used by Boko Haram to carry out suicide bombings in recent years.

Many victims of GBV who were able to escape captivity or who were released by Boko Haram suffer from long-term effects from their experiences, including deep fears of re-abduction, sleeplessness, and frustration over insufficient government support (Human Rights Watch, 2014). As counseling is severely limited in Northeast Nigeria, many women and girls who are subjected to sexual abuse never receive mental health or medical care (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Federal and state funds set up with the support of international agencies after the Chibok abductions have benefitted some of the escaped Chibok girls, but many others who were abducted and experienced GBV have never received any form of support (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In addition, lacking security responses to abductions and GBV have dismayed girls, causing them to underreport their abductions, escapes, or experiences in captivity (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Despite the decreased level of conflict incidences since 2016, abductions have continued as at least 67 women and children were abducted by Boko Haram in 2017 (UNICEF, 2017).

During the conflict, military and security officials, soldiers, policemen, and other authorities have also perpetrated acts of sexual and gender-based violence against girls and women displaced by the conflict. In 2016, Human Rights Watch documented the sexual abuse, exploitation, and rape of 43 women and girls living in IDP camps across Maiduguri (Human Rights Watch, 2016b). In the same year, the UN reported 83 cases of GBV affecting girls and women that were perpetrated by security guards, camp officials, CJTF members, and other security personnel (UN Security Council, 2017). Women and girls abused by members of security forces and civilian vigilante groups reported that they felt powerless and feared retaliation if they reported their abusers. Victims who became pregnant as a result of rape faced discrimination, abuse, and stigmatization in their communities. Severely compounding this issue, some of the victims had previously been sexually abused or forced into marriage by Boko Haram fighters. Many IDPs also have not received psychological counselling and are at higher risk for HIV and other infections (Human Rights Watch, 2016b).

To exacerbate the problem of conflict-related GBV and general GBV in the region, Nigerian government authorities downplay the problem of sexual violence and abuse of IDPs and conflict-affected communities due to a lack of awareness, stigmatization, and cultural factors that contribute to underreporting (Human Rights Watch, 2016b). Additionally, girls and women who are abducted by Boko Haram and then return are often marginalized and excluded by society upon arrival back into their communities (International Alert, 2016).

### **An Introduction to the Relationship between Conflict and Education in Northeast Nigeria**

This section briefly examines the relationship between the conflict and perceptions of education in Northeast Nigeria. This two-way relationship is further analyzed later in the secondary data review. Unlike many other protracted armed conflict contexts across the globe, the conflict context in Nigeria presents a uniquely challenging situation for the education sector in the Northeast as the institution and practice of western-style secular education are primary targets of Boko Haram. In protracted armed conflicts in many other countries, the education sector is indirectly impacted by armed conflict or is weakened or destroyed as a byproduct of war. *However, the education sector in Northeast Nigeria has been directly targeted and under attack since the early stages of the Boko Haram conflict.* As the group's name suggests, Boko Haram is in direct opposition to non-Islamic or western education. Yet, this is an incomplete interpretation of the meaning and motivations behind targeting and attacking the institution of education. In Arabic, "haram" refers to something that is forbidden in Islam, while "boko" refers to something that involves fraud or deception. In Northern Nigeria, western education is widely viewed as "a fraudulent deception being imposed upon the [Northern Muslim] population by a conquering European force" (Ross, 2014).

However, it is critical to acknowledge that Boko Haram did not introduce these ideas in Northern Nigeria. For decades, it has been the common perception that western education undermines traditional values, leading to a deep mistrust of education in Northern Nigeria. This ideology has been accepted by Northern Nigerian government officials, traditional rulers, and even by academics and students in the region. Already plagued by a deep mistrust of education, lack of resources, and low education quality, Boko Haram's targeting and attacking of education institutions has exacerbated almost every major challenge already affecting the education sector in addition to creating numerous additional short and long-term challenges.

## Conflict Drivers

Conflict drivers refer to the root causes of conflict in any given context. In Northeast Nigeria, we discuss the following drivers: economic and political marginalization and inequality in the Northeast, political instability and weak governance, grievances towards the government exacerbated by the security response to Boko Haram, poverty and lack of opportunity for youth, religious beliefs and ideology, recruitment of youth and children, the flexibility and resilience of Boko Haram, intercommunal violence, and the fragmentation of insurgent groups.

### **Economic and Political Marginalization and Inequality in the Northeast**

Although low levels of development and inequality are not necessarily direct causes of conflict, these factors create a context in which conflict is more likely to ignite and become protracted (Masha et al., 2017). Boko Haram has been able to capitalize on longstanding political and economic marginalization of citizens living in the northeastern region of Nigeria. Inequality in the distribution of goods and resources has deepened grievances against the federal government as the Northeast has remained the poorest region in the country and suffers from weak infrastructure and lack of basic services (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid, 2015). Additionally, perceived inequality or relative deprivation increases the level of frustration in Northeast Nigeria, making some more likely to join insurgency groups (Mercy Corps, 2016). Boko Haram has been able to take advantage of peoples' feelings of deprivation or marginalization to recruit disgruntled, usually young males, to join the group.

Political marginalization, a lack of representation, and limited opportunities to express grievances led to many people supporting the opposition group in the early stages of conflict (Mercy Corps, 2016). In Northeast Nigeria, the government was perceived to be largely absent from community life and providing insufficient services. Poverty and a lack of service provision has caused resentment of the political status quo among the Northern population and contributed to rejectionist thinking (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid, 2015). Additionally, as the federal government operates from a capital city environment radically different from the day-to-day reality of the northeastern states, decisions that are made do not translate easily for local officials in the Northeast trying to address the severe needs of communities and IDPs (ACAPS, 2016).

### **Political Instability and Weak Governance**

Weak political institutions and governance lead to unstable social and security situations that create avenues for the continuity of violent conflict and crisis. Weak governance is a cause of poor development outcomes and constrains responses to conflict and displacement, acting as a conflict driver in Northeast Nigeria (Masha et al., 2017). Political power is centralized at the state level in the region and there is weak accountability at the LGA level. Control of government patronage and corruption increase political instability and create frustration among communities. Corruption and the inability of youth to attain government or higher-level jobs due to nepotism or patronage have resulted in frustration with political processes. Additionally, the presidential, parliamentary, and governor elections taking place in February 2019 will likely have a significant impact on political operations at the federal, state, and LGA level (UN OCHA, 2019b).

## **Grievances toward the Government Exacerbated by the Security Response to Boko Haram**

In the beginning of the conflict, Boko Haram capitalized on communities' deeply held grievances toward the government for its lack of service delivery in the Northeast. The heavy-handed response by Nigerian security force and its use of indiscriminate violence and extrajudicial executions created frustration in local communities and garnered support for Boko Haram in the early years of the conflict (Matfess, 2017; Walker, 2012; Asfura-Heim and McQuaid, 2015). Shifts in the insurgency's tactics and rhetoric can be traced back to government's frequent use of indiscriminate violence to counter Boko Haram (Matfess, 2017). Boko Haram took advantage of these feelings, creating footholds in communities that generally supported them and hoped it would bring change (Mercy Corps, 2016). Additionally, use of the CJTF by the government has led to human rights abuses that create tension in local communities and exacerbate existing frustration with the government and security forces (Masha et al. 2017).

## **Poverty and Lack of Opportunity for Youth**

Although studies have shown that unemployment of youth and poverty may not directly lead to violent conflict, they both act as enabling factors that can contribute to an increased likelihood of youth being recruited by armed groups or voluntarily joining the parties involved in the conflict. In Northeast Nigeria, unemployment rates are estimated to be over 40 percent and widespread poverty and marginalization create a pool of unemployed and disenfranchised youth who are at risk of joining the conflict (Masha et al., 2017). A lack of employment and livelihood opportunities for youth compound social polarization and increase frustration with the government, leading to increased potential of radicalization (UN OCHA, 2019a).

## **Religious Beliefs and Ideology**

In Northern Nigeria, religion is central to identity and there is a long history of protest movements and reformist groups dating back to the nineteenth century (Masha et al., 2017; Asfura-Heim and McQuaid, 2015). These movements have sought to challenge the government and perceive it as politically and socially corrupt and unjust and seek to purify society on ideological beliefs (Masha et al., 2017). In the Northeast, Boko Haram is rooted in this history and exploits peoples' religious beliefs, using ideology to influence peoples' decisions to join or follow the group. Boko Haram has been able to draw in community members who wanted to become more devout or who subscribed to practicing a stricter form of Islam that called for the eradication of western-influenced systems (Mercy Corps, 2016). Although Boko Haram does not practice systematic or widespread religious or ideological indoctrination to the extent of other religious extremist groups, some youths have cited joining the group because they agree with the ideological sentiments of Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016). Additionally, for women, joining Boko Haram meant an opportunity to learn the Quran. For some women and girls who did not get the opportunity to go to school or dropped out at a young age, joining the insurgency became a way to learn (Mercy Corps, 2016).

## **Recruitment of Youth and Children**

The recruitment of male youth and children is key to the longevity of Boko Haram. In Northeast Nigeria, male youth have limited economic or employment opportunities and seek ways to gain capital or leave their communities. Boko Haram exploits these desires in male youth by offering them loans prior to joining the insurgency group. Boys also join in the hopes of receiving loans

to begin small businesses (Mercy Corps, 2016). In this way, recruitment into Boko Haram functions almost as an economic transaction as the group is filling a gap in financial services for local youth with small businesses. In addition, youth are influenced by key figures in their peer networks or *majalisa* to join Boko Haram.<sup>5</sup> Former Boko Haram members cite family, friends, and colleagues influencing them to join Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016). With this knowledge, the group solicits members to recruit other youth within their networks.

### **Flexibility and Resilience of Boko Haram**

After almost 10 years of conflict, Boko Haram has proven to be adaptable and resilient, withstanding numerous counterattacks and maintaining a regional presence. A possible reason why the group has been able to remain active is that members come from diverse ethnic, economic, and educational backgrounds, making it difficult to profile a typical member (Mercy Corps, 2016). Some members joined after previously being employed while others joined due to unemployment. Others went to Islamic school, while some went to secular school, and some have university degrees, while others have dropped out of school.

### **Intercommunal Violence**

Although more common in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, some incidents of intercommunal violence have been reported in northeastern states during the conflict (ACAPS, 2016). Usually, this violence takes the form of local farmers clashing with Fulani herders and local criminal gangs. This community-level violence can place further stress on the already delicate social fabric of the Northeast conflict context.

Additionally, the conflict has increased tension between multiple groups in Northeast Nigeria. Throughout the conflict, there has been varying levels of tension between IDP and host communities, Muslims and Christians, returnees and people who did not leave, and families of Boko Haram members and victims of Boko Haram violence (Mercy Corps, 2016). Former members of Boko Haram face persecution upon returning to their communities. Local CJTFs sometimes retaliate against former insurgents or come under scrutiny and surveillance. Sometimes the tension upon returning to their communities can lead to former members returning to Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016).

### **Fragmentation of Insurgent Groups**

Since 2014, there have been reports of fragmentation of Boko Haram's main groups, leading to splintering and the formation of smaller armed militias. Despite this leading to the recovery of land previously controlled by armed groups, fragmentation creates complicated challenges for Nigerian security forces and sometimes instigators of attacks cannot be identified by group. In 2018, non-state armed group (NSAG) activity increased with significant attacks against Nigerian security forces. These attacks are possibly linked with leadership struggles and division among factions (UN OCHA, 2019a).

### **Conflict Mitigating Factors**

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<sup>5</sup> *Majalisa* is the Hausa word for "council," commonly used to describe formal and informal peer groups.



Mitigating factors refers to institutions, individuals, places and activities that build peace and bring people together in the midst of conflict. Here, we discuss traditional institutions and local associations, local strategies to prevent violence, social connections and youth groups and schooling and skill-building programs.

### **Traditional Institutions and Local Associations**

Despite many factors driving conflict, traditional institutions and locally-run associations have demonstrated resilience during the conflict. These institutions have managed to uphold and promote social solidarity in local communities and provide low-level conflict resolution and services (Masha et al., 2017). Some of these associations have been directly affected by hostilities and decreased legitimacy through politicization of traditional authority but remain sources for peacebuilding and conflict mitigation at the community level.

### **Local Strategies to Prevent Violence**

In the face of adversity, a large majority of children and youth have refrained from joining insurgency groups. Communities in Northeast Nigeria have created local strategies to prevent violence and support youth, which can form a strong foundation for youth and create stability in local communities (Mercy Corps, 2016). In some communities, local religious and traditional leaders have created a narrative of Boko Haram as a greedy and corrupt organization that is focused on enriching its leaders. These sentiments play to community members' existing concerns about corruption and unresponsive governance, leading to youth resisting to join Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016). In addition, family dialogue about the negative impact of Boko Haram deters youth from joining Boko Haram.

### **Social Connections and Youth Groups**

Just as peer influence can be a driver of conflict and lead to youth joining the group, it can also play a positive role in mitigating conflict (Mercy Corps, 2016). Youth with strong social connections, particularly outside of their immediate communities, such as trading with others outside the community, or through school and religious groups, are better able to resist becoming involved in conflict. Local youth groups were able to provide support for fellow members who were being pressured to join Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016).

### **Schooling and Skill-Building Programs**

Mainstreaming youth in post-conflict activities for recovery and reconstruction is key for enabling youth-led development. Educational opportunities provide children and youth with the skills to build resilience against future instability (Masha et al., 2017). Igbinedion (2017) found that 86 percent of schools identified during a needs assessment reported to have functional school-based management committees (SBMC) or parent-teacher associations (PTA) (p. 5). Schools that are supported by the community and parents can help strengthen the education system and increase opportunities for social cohesion.

## **Education in Nigeria**

The education system in Nigeria is large and complex. In this section, we provide an overview of education, followed by a discussion of the key barriers to educational access (poverty, community perceptions/mistrust, low quality, and marginalization of certain groups).

### Education Overview

In 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria introduced the Universal Basic Education Act that provides nine years of free education from primary to Junior Secondary School (JSS) for children aged 6-15. The education system in Northeast Nigeria begins with pre-primary education, followed by primary (grades 1-6) and JSS (grades 7-9) managed by SUBEB and culminating in the Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE). The next level, Senior Secondary School (SSS) (grades 10-12), is managed by the State Ministry of Education. Private secular schools managed by faith organizations and regulated by the Ministry of Education also exist. In addition to the formal schooling system, two main informal religious schools exist: 1) Islamiyah schools, which are a combination of a modified version of the national curriculum and Islamic teaching, and 2) Tsangaya schools, which teach a purely Quranic curriculum. International organizations fund non-formal learning centers (NFLCs) inside and outside of IDP camps (Famuyiwa-Alaka et al., 2018).

**Table 5: Primary attendance in Borno and Yobe**

Source: Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (REACH, 2018).

STATE	AGE	% ATTENDING PRIMARY SCHOOL
BORNO	0-5 years	10.8%
	5-9 years	42.8%
	10-14 years	43.4%
	15-19 years	16.5%
YOBE	0-5 years	8.9%
	5-9 years	47.8%
	10-14 years	38.7%
	15-19 years	4.1%

The most recent data from Nigeria’s EMIS shows that primary net enrollment was around 64 percent in 2010 (UIS, 2018). UNESCO estimated that Nigeria had over 10 million out-of-school children, 10 percent of the total amount of out-of-school children globally, with the majority, over 60 percent, living in Northern states (Human Rights Watch, 2016c). The most recent MICS data shows that approximately 40 percent of children in the Northeast are out of school, the

highest rate in the country (16 percent in Borno and 42 percent in Yobe) (MICS, 2018). Additionally, primary net attendance ratio (46 percent) and transition rate to secondary (31 percent) in the Northeast are the lowest in the country. A recent World Bank study found that in Northeast Nigeria, 29 percent of males and 44 percent of females have never been to school and that less than half of the population has completed primary school (Azad et al., 2018). Borno, the most affected state by the conflict, has some of the lowest education outcomes. According to the 2015 NEDS report, only 16 percent of parents and guardians sampled were literate, compared to 28 percent in the Northeast and 47 percent nationally (Famuyiwa-Alaka et al., 2018). MICS data from 2016-2017 show that only 28 percent of women and 42 percent of men aged 15-24 in Yobe were literate, some of the lowest rates in the country (MICS, 2018).

### Barriers to Education Access

Poverty is the main barrier to education in Northeast Nigeria (Igbinedion et al., 2017). Despite primary and JSS being free and compulsory, parents cannot afford to pay the costs that come with sending children to school, including school fees, levies, and uniforms, and children engage in income generating activities, such as hawking or farming, instead of going to school (UN OCHA, 2019b). Poverty also leads to food insecurity and hunger, which was cited as a barrier in the joint education needs assessment (Igbinedion et al., 2017).

Community perceptions of education, and mistrust of formal education. Assessments show that communities prefer informal religious or Quranic schooling to formal education. Additionally, sociocultural factors affect girls' education. Girls in Borno state alone represent approximately 50 percent of the population of OOSC in all of Nigeria (UN OCHA, 2019a). Lack of teacher capacity, teacher welfare, materials, inadequate learning environments (infrastructure, materials) (UN OCHA, 2019b).

Girls face barriers to education access than boys. Cultural and parental beliefs can impede a girl from accessing education or fear of potential kidnapping or attack. Additionally, girls are susceptible to early marriage, which can be an economic decision, or pregnancy (Igbinedion et al., 2017). Igbinedion et al. (2017) found that there is little provision for students with special needs within mainstream education (p. 20). According to the needs assessment, three special schools exist that cater to students who have visual or hearing impairments, or learning disabilities (Igbinedion, 2017). However, at one of these schools, enrollment was less than 200 students and 90 percent of all other schools have no provision for students with special needs.

### Effects of Conflict on Education

The conflict context in Nigeria presents a uniquely challenging situation for the education sector in the Northeast as the institution and practice of education are the main target of Boko Haram. Unlike other global protracted conflicts in which the education sector is indirectly impacted by armed conflict and violence, the education sector in Northeast Nigeria has been profoundly impacted by conflict. Already plagued by a deep mistrust of education, inadequate school infrastructure, lack of teaching and learning resources, and low education quality, the conflict has exacerbated essentially every major challenge already affecting the education sector and has created numerous additional short and long-term consequences.

The impact of the conflict has led to “lost generations” of children with the opportunity to receive educations. Since 2009, over 900 schools have been damaged or destroyed and more than 1,500 schools have been forced to close, with at least 867 schools still being non-functional as of late 2018. As a result, an estimated 900,000 children have lost access to education while roughly 75 percent of children in IDP camps do not attend school. Additionally, over 611 teachers, have been killed and 19,000 have been displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2016c). As of early 2019, 2.2 million school-age children and teachers in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa are in need of immediate education assistance, including 1.5 million children in Borno and 200,000 children in Yobe (UN OCHA, 2019a).

### Attacks on Education

Attacks on education present a major threat to education in any context, but due to the fact that attacking education is a main tactic used by Boko Haram for political, religious, and ideological

reasons, this danger presents a range of complex and devastating effects on the education sector.<sup>6</sup> In Northeast Nigeria, attacks on education have come in a variety of forms including: 1) violent attacks on schools and other education facilities that have resulted in the death of teachers, students, and education personnel, and the damaging or destruction of education infrastructure; 2) deliberate and indiscriminate killing, abducting, maiming, and traumatizing of students, educators, and education personnel; 3) military use of education facilities, usurping education spaces for military purposes and endangering school populations; 4) child recruitment into insurgency groups at, or en route to and from school; 5) sexual and gender-based violence by all parties involved at, or en route to and from school, exacerbated by previously mentioned forms of attacks on education including abduction, military occupation, and child recruitment; and 6) attacks on higher education institutions and students, professors, and other staff at these institutions. Overall, it is difficult to quantify the aggregate impact of attacks on education in Northeast Nigeria, however, it is evident that these attacks have numerous short-term and long-term effects.<sup>7</sup>

### *Attacks on Schools*

From 2009 to 2013, Boko Haram carried out numerous attacks on government public schools, using arson and other means to destroy schools, mostly at night (Watchlist, 2014). Boko Haram targeted the government school system in retaliation for what it viewed as a government attack on the traditional Tsangaya Quranic school system (Walker, 2012). However, in 2013, attacks on schools began happening more frequently and during school hours, leading to the killing of at least 126 students and 70 teachers that year (Amnesty International, 2013; UN Security Council, 2017). From 2014 to 2016, 1,500 schools and universities were reported to be attacked, resulting in the killing, abduction, or injuring of at least 1,280 students and educators at all levels of the education system (GCPEA, 2018a). Additionally, many schools closed from December 2013 to June 2015 due to increasing number of attacks (UN Security Council, 2017). No attacks on schools were reported in 2016 in Northeast Nigeria (UN General Assembly and Security Council, 2017). After 2016, it is possible that attacks on education decreased because many of the education facilities accessible to Boko Haram had already been targeted, partially or fully destroyed, or closed (GCPEA, 2018c). By 2016, UN data showed that 1,697 schools were closed in northeastern Nigeria, of which 1,063 were in Borno and 110 were in Yobe. It is important to note that attacks on schools have led to the destruction and loss of school records, teaching materials, and learning materials.

Examples of attacks on schools include:

- Between February 21 and March 1, 2012, approximately 12 public schools in Maiduguri were burned down at night leading to 10,000 students being forced out of education (Walker, 2012 and Amnesty International, 2012).

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<sup>6</sup> This report uses GCPEA's definition and conceptual framework for attacks on education. GCPEA defines attacks on education as "any threatened or actual use of force against students, teachers, academics, education support and transport staff (e.g. janitors, bus drivers), or education officials, as well as attacks on education buildings, resources, material, or facilities (including school buses)." Types of attacks on education include: 1) Attacks on schools, 2) Attacks on students and staff, 3) Military use of facilities, 4) Child recruitment, 5) Sexual violence, and 6) Attacks on higher education (GCPEA, 2018a).

<sup>7</sup> It is important to note that the highly volatile and rapidly evolving security situations in northeastern Nigeria often result in limited information that does not reflect the extent of grave violations committed against education systems and actors (UN Security Council, 2017).

- In November 2014, a suicide bomber wearing a school uniform killed at least 47 schoolchildren and injured 117 others at the Comprehensive Senior Science Secondary School in Potiskum, Yobe State (UN Security Council, 2017).
- In 2017, the UN verified four attacks on schools in Northeast Nigeria attributed to Boko Haram (UN General Assembly and Security Council, 2018).

#### *Attacks on School Students, Educators, and Education Personnel*

Since the beginning of the conflict, a primary strategy of Boko Haram has been the killing, abducting, injuring, and threatening of school students, educators, and education personnel across all levels (Amnesty International, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2016c; GCPEA, 2018c). As a result, students and teachers have been shot, burned, and kidnapped, with higher frequencies from 2013 to 2017 compared to the early years of the conflict. Additionally, students and teachers were left traumatized by experiences they faced or events that they witnessed during the conflict and no longer were going to school (Amnesty International, 2012; Amnesty International, 2013). From January 2013 to June 2016, attacks on schools resulted in at least 480 schoolchildren deaths and at least 200 others being maimed (UN Security Council, 2017). In addition, at least 2,295 teachers have been killed and over 19,000 have been displaced by the conflict (UNICEF, 2017).

#### *Use of Education Facilities for Military Purposes*

The escalation of conflict and increased military response in 2013 led to increased use of schools by Nigerian security forces for barracks and detention centers. From 2013 to 2016, at least 10 schools in Borno and two schools in Yobe were used for military purposes (UN Security Council, 2017). In 2017, UNICEF reported that 10 schools in Borno and seven schools in Yobe were being used by government forces full-time (GCPEA, 2018c). For example, national security forces occupied the Government Day Secondary School in Ngoshe, Borno, using it as barracks and detention centers. Increased presence of military and security forces in schools increased susceptibility of these schools being attacked by Boko Haram, potentially putting more students and education personnel in danger (GCPEA, 2018c). Additionally, Boko Haram occupied an unknown amount of education facilities at the height of the conflict, using them as detention or killing centers. For example, in 2014, Boko Haram used a primary school in Damasak as a military base and detention center for months after kidnapping approximately 300 students and keeping them in school premises (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

#### *Recruitment of Children at, or En Route to and from, School*

Child recruitment became a common practice during the Boko Haram conflict. A 2017 UN Security Council report estimates that at least 8,000 children were recruited and used by Boko Haram since 2009 (UN Security Council, 2017). The UN reported 278 verified cases of child recruitment in 2015, increasing to 2,122 verified cases in 2016 (UN, 2017a). In Maiduguri, two religious schools were main locations for recruitment into Boko Haram, targeting school dropouts until 2014 (UN Security Council, 2017). The abundance of out-of-school children and unemployed youth provides Boko Haram with a large population of potential recruits (Human Rights Watch, 2016c).

The CJTF estimated that it had 26,000 members by the end of 2016, including many boys between the ages of 10 to 18 years old (UN Security Council, 2017). Between November 2015

and December 2016, the UN verified the recruitment and use of 228 children, including 209 boys and 19 girls, mainly used for intelligence and patrol (UN Security Council, 2017). In November 2015, 30 boys and four girls (ages 9 to 16) recruited by the CJTF were observed manning the security gates at Galtimari Primary School in Maiduguri (UN Security Council, 2017).

#### *Sexual and Gender-Based Violence by all Parties Involved at, or En Route to and from, School*

As discussed previously, Boko Haram has perpetrated numerous acts of sexual and gender-based violence during the conflict. At the school level, the insurgent group has abducted female students from school and kept them in detention, perpetrating acts of sexual slavery, rape, forced marriage, and forced pregnancy. In addition, girls in school uniforms en route to or from school have also been abducted (GCPEA, 2018b). GCPEA estimates that approximately 600 women and girls have been abducted from school (GCPEA, 2018c). The abduction of school girls has been detrimental to female students' access to education because many have had to permanently drop out as a result (GCPEA, 2018b). Girls also report that their parents are too afraid to send them to school due to kidnapping or incidents of GBV that could occur on the way to and from school or at school (GCPEA, 2018b). Similarly to the Chibok kidnapping of 2014, the kidnapping of 111 school girls from the Government Girls Science and Technical College in Dapchi, Yobe in February 2018, led to girls being physically, psychologically, and sexually harmed by Boko Haram, further deepening fear and strengthening barriers to education for girls in Northeast Nigeria (GCPEA, 2018b).

#### *Attacks on Higher Education*

Boko Haram has an established pattern of attacks on higher education facilities, students, and staff. Higher education institutions have been impacted by suicide bomber attacks, arson, and armed attacks. In 2014, Boko Haram killed approximately 59 male students in the Federal Government College, Buni Yadi, in Yobe state, while females were ordered to attend Quranic school or get married (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In 2017, six attacks took place on the University of Maiduguri alone. In 2013, armed insurgents believed to be associated with Boko Haram attacked the College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe state, killing 65 students and setting fire to multiple classrooms (GCPEA, 2018c).

#### *The Impact of Conflict on Teachers*

In addition to teachers being targeted and directly attacked, intimidated, and harassed by Boko Haram, the practice of teaching and the lives of teachers have been deeply impacted by the conflict. A 2018 EDOREN study on teachers in Borno found that despite the teaching force remaining relatively stable during conflict, many teachers experienced physical and psychological trauma at some point during the conflict (Famuyiwa-Alaka et al., 2018). Teachers report that hardships, including loss of property, loss of loved ones, and witnessing of violent events have led to high levels of fear, depression, and in some cases, mental illnesses. Additionally, some teachers have become displaced, adding a heavier burden to preexisting trauma and anxiety (Famuyiwa-Alaka et al., 2018). Finally, teachers must simultaneously deal with the impact of their own stress and trauma and nurture students in their classes who have experienced similar psychological and physical trauma from the conflict and displacement. To compound issues of teacher wellbeing, low salaries and late compensation, poor teaching conditions (i.e. severely overcrowded classrooms), and a lack of teaching and learning materials impede teachers from providing quality education (Igbinedion et al., 2017). For example, less

than two-thirds of schools had a functional blackboard and chalk for each classroom (Igbinedion et al., 2017).

### **Short-Term Consequences of the Impact of Conflict on Education**

In this section, we describe the short-term consequences of the impact of conflict on education, including decreased access, retention and quality; extended school closures; decreased capacity to provide safety to students and school infrastructure damage; and inadequate education and WASH facilities.

#### *Decreased Education Access, Retention, and Quality*

Almost one million children lost access to learning during the conflict. For example, in Borno, 70 percent of girls of primary age are out of school, according to the most recent Humanitarian Needs Overview (UN OCHA, 2019a). In the short-term, conflict decreases education access, retention, and quality, which usually has a larger impact on vulnerable groups, including girls, children with disabilities, orphans. According to a recent empirical study on the effect of the Boko Haram conflict on education in Northeast Nigeria, conflict reduces school enrollment, especially for children who are no longer of mandatory school age (i.e. for whom school is no longer free and compulsory) (Bertoni et al., 2018). This study finds that an increase in the number of fatalities within five kilometers from a child's village (i.e. closer proximity to conflict incidents) reduces school enrolment probability and educational attainment, especially for male students (i.e. conflict reduces the number of years of education completed). Additionally, the negative effect of conflict exposure decreases as distance between conflict incidents and villages increases (Bertoni et al., 2018). Data on learning outcomes show that of children who are able to attend school, 72 percent are unable to read upon completion of sixth grade and Borno has the lowest literacy rates in the country with 35 percent of female and 46 percent of male adolescents (UN OCHA, 2019a).

The conflict also impacts education access and retention as it can cause “fear-induced withdrawal from schools” (Human Rights Watch, 2016c).

#### *Extended School Closures*

From the early stages of conflict when attacks on schools began, schools that were directly, and sometimes not directly impacted by attacks began to close (Amnesty International, 2013). All primary and secondary schools in Borno were closed in March 2014 as most primary schools remained closed for almost two years (UN Security Council, 2017). From 2013 to 2017, 600,000 children lost access to education as an estimated 943 out of 1,627 schools in Borno state remained closed (Human Rights Watch, 2016c). About 57% of all schools in Borno were still closed in late 2017 (UNICEF, 2017). A 2017 education needs assessment found that three out of 16 schools were open in Gubio, eight out of 75 in Kondugo, seven out of 44 in Mafa, and four out of 38 in Monguno during data collection, and some were being used as shelter for IDPs (Igbinedion et al., 2017).

#### *Decreased Capacity to Provide Safety to Students and School Infrastructure Damage*

Some schools that have remained open or reopened are damaged due to attacks. A joint education needs assessment found that 28 percent of school sites visited reported damage from

bullets, shells, or shrapnel. Another 20 percent reported being deliberately set on fire and over 30 percent experienced looting. Despite the risk of IEDs and landmines around some schools that could lead to further damage or loss of life, only one percent of schools had lessons on mine risk education (Igbinedion et al., 2017). With nearby presence of armed group or for schools with a higher risk of attacks, armed guards are placed at school gates for protection purposes. Some schools have military at or in school for protection purposes, which may lead to an increase in the chance of a school being targeted or cause fear in children (Igbinedion et al., 2017).

### *Inadequate Education and WASH Facilities*

The conflict has created an acute need for safe learning environments and has resulted in the overcrowding of existing schools where classrooms meant for 50 pupils now accommodate 150 learners (UN OCHA, 2019a). One study found that approximately 1,890 classrooms were non-functional across 332 schools (on average, six per school) and that half of schools in the sample had little to no furniture (i.e. desks, chairs, mats) in classrooms while one third of schools were holding classes under trees (Igbinedion et al., 2017). Only 34 percent of schools surveyed had clean drinking water and 35 percent had no toilet facilities. Additionally, only 16 percent had adequate handwashing facilities (Igbinedion et al., 2017).

### **Long-Term Consequences of the Impact of Conflict on Education**

One of the gravest and most long-term consequences of the conflict is the “lost generation” of learners. A recent GCPEA report estimates that over 12 million children in Northern Nigeria are out of school, with the number in the Northeast increasing over the past decade (GCPEA, 2018b). In addition, physical and psychological trauma, which are also short-term consequences of conflict, can persist for years after the conflict, with PTSD, physical disabilities due to injury, and anxiety due to fear (GCPEA, 2018c). Although a lack of research exists on the long-term impacts of conflict on education in Northeast Nigeria, it is likely that the Boko Haram conflict has exacerbated existing vulnerabilities and social exclusion, while simultaneously reinforcing discriminatory norms and sociocultural practices that can lead to increased barriers to education, especially for girls. Similarly, fear and a negative perception of education can last for years, especially if the conflict continues and education continues to be attacked. Finally, attacks on education can undermine the institution of education, impeding socioeconomic development and contributing to state instability (GCPEA, 2018c).

### **How Education Might Contribute to or Mitigate Conflict**

Although research in other conflict contexts analyzes the impact of education on conflict, there is a large gap in the literature on this topic in Northeast Nigeria.

One potential avenue in which education can mitigate conflict is to build on pre-existing social connectors and conflict mitigators. Local counter-narratives to Boko Haram’s messages can be amplified in schools. Additionally, forming activity clubs both within formal schools and informal or non-formal schools can help strengthen youth networks and provide opportunities for continued learning (Mercy Corps, 2016). Educating parents on the importance of education can help to increase awareness. Education can help children and youth to learn and build skills to help them pursue their careers and have increased livelihood opportunities.



The complexity of this conflict becomes evident when exploring the provision of education as a way to mitigate conflict. In other contexts, the provision of educational services can greatly mitigate conflict as unemployed youth and young children can go to school and attain an education to help them pursue future endeavors. However, in Northeast Nigeria, it is important to consider that the provision of education or the creation of more schools can actually place more students in danger as institutions of education are a primary target of Boko Haram. Although the provision of education services is certainly a better option than the alternative, the conflict context in Northeast Nigeria produces an environment in which the impact that education can have on either mitigating or perpetuating the conflict must be closely monitored.

### **Gender Equity and Social Inclusion in Education**

Issues of gender equity and social inclusion have been integrated into all components of the desk review, with a strong focus on gender-based violence. In this section, we briefly discuss policy frameworks and remaining challenges, gender norms and educational exclusion for girls, and barriers to educational access for marginalized groups in general.

#### **Policy Frameworks and Remaining Challenges**

Nigeria has numerous policies that support access to education for all. These include: the Child Rights Act (yet to be domesticated in all states in the Northeast), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child (ACRWAC), the Universal Basic Education Act and the National Policy on Gender in Basic Education. Despite the existence of these policy frameworks, in Nigeria, 20 million children are out of school and over half of this number are girls (UNICEF, 2018). A review of available literature on gender inequality and social exclusion in education in Nigeria depicts girls, the poor, and children with disabilities as those facing the most extreme social exclusion from education. Numerous structural barriers affect access, retention and completion of school. Over two thirds of girls who enroll in school drop out of by the end of primary four.

Poor access, retention and completion of education for girls and children with disabilities can be linked to poor planning, management of educational systems, gender insensitive instructional materials and pedagogies, disability insensitive learning, instructional materials and curriculum, gender blind curriculum, girl and disability unfriendly school infrastructure, few female teachers, poor planning for children with disabilities, lack of teacher training for children with disabilities; are all contributors to the high number of school drop out for girls and children with disabilities. In addition, gender bias, sexual harassment, school related gender-based violence, and poverty are critical factors that exacerbate poor access, low retention and lack of completion of education for girls in Northern Nigeria including Northeast Nigeria. In the Northeast, as is common in other parts of Northern Nigeria, many girls enroll in non-formal Islamic education centers, where retention rates are higher than formal education centers (NPOGIE, 2006).

#### **Gender Norms and Educational Exclusion for Girls**

In Northern Nigeria, hegemonic masculinity, patriarchy, gender stereotypes, harmful gender norms, social exclusion and a general discrimination against persons due to their gender or disability status is rife. Evidence supports that men are perceived as the economic backbone of

the family. Men wield economic power and have a higher economic status than women. Society views certain jobs as befitting for men while others are befitting for women. Men are expected to be the ones to pursue careers that are deemed prestigious, less stressful and more lucrative. Jobs like teaching, nursing, caregiving and petty trading are perceived appropriate for women. Most work done by women are either poorly remunerated or are generally unpaid. Such work includes household chores, reproductive work, agricultural work and a host of others. In the social sense, men and women do not attract equal social status. In Nigerian society, a male child is priced higher than the girl-child. In the education sector, though perceived to be gradually receding, the education of the female child was non-priority since it was perceived that she would be trained in school and educated but would someday be given out in marriage to another man.

In Northern Nigeria, due to cultural and religious beliefs, the girl-child was commonly expected to get married at the age of 13. This age of marriage is gradually increasing to between 15 to 18 and a girl is usually not expected to remain in their parent's house beyond these ages as the community will discriminate against her. The insurgence in North East Nigeria has exacerbated the need for the girl child to be married early so insurgents will not abduct her or forcefully marry her.

Worthy of note is a lack of gender sensitive pedagogy in schools as teachers are a product of the society where gender stereotypes and harmful gender norms are rife. There is a perception among teachers that certain courses are offered by boys and some for girls. There is this retrogressive speculation that mathematics and sciences courses are for males while females are better in the literary arts and home economics. It is a general perception that boys are good in the sciences and girls are good in the arts.

### **Barriers to Educational Access for Marginalized Groups**

Besides gender norms that affect access to education for girls, affordability is another issue affecting access to education for girls and children with disabilities. Large sections of the society in the north east lack the means to afford education for all their children. This leaves families with the onus to prioritize who needs education the most, among their children. The children who are mostly left behind are girls and children with disabilities. Some parents especially in rural areas believe the girl child will marry and move to her husband's house and thus be of no benefit to her parents. Children with disabilities usually bear the brunt of the scale of preference of who will be sent to school. Parents perceive that schools are ill-equipped to cater for children with disabilities and teachers lack the skills to interact with them, thus children with disabilities are left behind.

Deprivation of full participation or the total lack of participation for socially excluded groups in getting an education has improved over the years. This is largely due to the activities of civil society organizations working for social change in communities and advocating for policies in government that support equal access to education. Civil society organizations, aware of the strong influence religious and community leaders wield over community members in the north, leveraged on this influence in favor of equal access to education especially for the girl child and disabled child. Community leaders and religious leaders have played a critical role in ensuring the age of marriage for the girl child increases to at least 18 and that parents and community members send their children or wards to school. While this is progress, much needs to be done to

ensure the girl child and children with disabilities not only enroll in school, but are retained and complete their education to any level.

### Primary Data Collection Findings

Below the USAID/AENN team presents the main findings from the primary data collection conducted through focus group discussions and key informant interviews in a purposive sample of communities with a wide range of community stakeholders. As mentioned in the limitations section, it is important to note that these findings are not intended to be representative of the education sector in Borno and Yobe states as a whole, and there is a particular gap in that data collection was not conducted in two of the more extreme LGAs in Northern Borno, Dikwa and Monguno. Nevertheless, qualitative analysis of the data shows clear patterns across regions and communities sampled regarding community dynamics, perceptions of education, barriers to education access and retention, as well as risk factors that are both external and internal to schools.

### Profiles of the Sampled Communities

**Table 6. Community profiles**

LGA	URBAN/ RURAL	CONFLI CT SITUATI ON	IDP SITUATION	COMMUNITY/ EDUCATION ISSUES
<b>MMC, BORNO</b>	Urban (state capital)	Post- conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urban, post-conflict, has formal and informal IDP camps</li> <li>• Receives IDPs, but also have protracted caseloads from the beginning of the conflict</li> <li>• IDP areas of origin: Kukaka, Abadam, Guzamala, and Mobbar</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Host communities are overpopulated: they are around three times more populous now than before the conflict (leads to school overcrowding)</li> <li>• Planning education response has been difficult due to continuous influx of IDPs and repeated displacement</li> </ul>
<b>DAMATU RU, YOBE</b>	Urban (state capital)	Post- conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Receives IDPs and returnees</li> <li>• IDP areas of origin: Gujba, Gulani, Ajigan</li> <li>• Language of IDPs: Hausa, Kanuri, Fulani, Fulfulde</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community needs: shelter, food, health, PSS, vocational skills</li> </ul>
<b>HAWUL, BORNO</b>	Semi- urban (insecurit	Post- conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No IDPs, only conflict-affected host</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remote, difficult to access</li> </ul>

	y on the road)		communities and returnees (displaced are in Bui)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communities feel a lack of support by the government and INGOs in general</li> </ul>
<b>JERE, BORNO</b>	Semi-urban (accessible by road from MMC)	Immediate post-conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One formal IDP camp and other informal camps</li> <li>• IDP areas of origin: Kukawa (Baga), Monguno, Mafa, Marte, Dikwa</li> <li>• IDPs are not willing to return to their communities of origin</li> <li>• Language of IDPs: Hausa, Kanuri, Fulani, Arabic, Shuwa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited/no access to school for IDPs.</li> <li>• Formal schools have reopened, but there is not enough room for IDPs</li> </ul>

### Community Dynamics Related to Conflict

**Across the four sampled communities, nearly all respondents reported living in relative peace with each other.** This included both host community respondents and IDPs. One male community member in Damaturu said, “The community lives peacefully and is harmonized. There are no major problems here.” This sentiment was frequently echoed by participants from each community. In addition, participants provided insight into specific connectors and dividers, with significantly greater focus on connectors. Specific institutions, events and individuals were cited as responsible for building community cohesion (discussed in more detail below in the section on community connectors). Participants mentioned a range of small-scale community dividers that were similar across communities and did not mention any major sources of tension or division (discussed in more detail below in the community dividers section).

**There is a strong sense of improved security in recent months and years in the sampled communities, but fears related to the conflict continue to cause tension within communities.** Adult participants mentioned a general sense of increased security due to the decreased threat of insurgency in their communities in recent months and years. However, due to the nature and intensity of the conflict in the recent past, participants mentioned that rumors of approaching insurgency groups or incidents of active conflict continue to stoke feelings of fear, tension and uncertainty that weigh on these communities, particularly in the less urbanized contexts of Hawul and Jere. Adult respondents discussed how the insurgency had created chaos and undermined security in the recent past, but in all the communities visited, active armed conflict was no longer perceived as a major threat in respondents’ daily lives.

### Relations between Community Members and IDPs

**A sense of unity between host communities and IDPs was a theme across sampled communities.** An adult female host community member in Damaturu said, “We don’t differentiate

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*“We don’t differentiate between IDPs and the host community because it is not their [IDPs] making us leave their community and come to ours.”*

**EXCERPT FROM FGD WITH FEMALE HOST COMMUNITY MEMBERS IN DAMATURU**

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between IDPs and the host community because it is not their [IDPs] making to leave their community and come to ours.” A host community member in MMC expressed a similar sentiment saying, “We are living here peacefully despite being from different places.” A female IDP in Damaturu said, “The people of this community have accepted us and we don’t have problems with them.”

**In some communities, new arrivals (including IDPs) are taken to traditional leaders in a community, introduced and "registered" so that they are known and can be accounted for.** A female leader in Damaturu described this process saying, “The IDPs when they come into the community at first, they will be taken to the *Lawani* or *Bulamas* to introduce themselves so that they will know the kind of people who are living in the community as IDPs and so that if anything happens we can easily identify them.”

**Despite the general consensus that local community members and IDPs live in harmony, there were a few references to tensions.** For example, a ministry official in MMC said, “the displaced children are stubborn and causing nuisance,” and a government representative and a local security agent in MMC both mentioned that there used to be some conflict between IDPs and host community members, though it has decreased more recently.

**IDP camps do have their own sense of community that is separate from host communities.** “Connectors” within IDP camps were named by some respondents and included peer group associations, reconciliation committees, and local markets.

**IDP camps do sometimes face security threats including those related to the distribution of relief items.** In Jere, Hawul and MMC, some participants mentioned that the distribution of relief items in IDP camps sometimes causes tensions between IDPs and host communities, and even among IDPs. In Jere, a lack of security in IDP camps was mentioned as a problem. For example, respondents noted that boys from host communities sometimes break into camps at night, leading to fear within the IDP community. Additionally, a female leader in a Jere IDP camp mentioned that the other IDPs fear strangers in the camp and are afraid when gates are left open. Respondents mentioned that this has led to increased security at camps and in schools to some extent.

### Community Dividers

**The only major source of tension consistently mentioned was the stress and concern associated with living with an ever-present fear of the resurgence of armed conflict.** Overall, the communities visited are not currently dealing with active armed conflict in their daily lives, but (as mentioned above) rumors or news about insurgent activity in the area can cause tension and fear to increase among community members. Most participants did not mention any major sources of division within their communities.

**Some community members and policy-makers mentioned that unemployed, out-of-school male youth cause tension in the community.** Youth “idleness”, gang participation, and abuse of drugs and alcohol, were noted as risks facing young men, and also facing communities. Respondents across age groups often noted that those responsible for gender-based violence, including rape, were usually older boys and young men.

Additional minor tensions mentioned by a small number of participants included the following:

- Land disputes between neighbors, sometimes between Fulani herders and local farmers
- Day-to-day disputes over ordinary issues (local politics, finances, sports)
- Ethnic and religious differences
- Disputes with those lacking education
- Disputes over boreholes and water
- Fighting for seats on local council/chieftaincies
- Izala (Salafi) sect creating rifts (noted once, in Hawul)
- Lack of government support leading to bad roads and a lack of boreholes (noted once, in Hawul)

### Community Connectors

**Across the communities visited, respondents noted many examples of people working together to overcome hardship, improve safety, and recover from the effects of the armed conflict.** These included multiple activities that unite individuals and communities, such as community meetings (including women-only meetings), dispute settlement/conflict resolution meetings, youth groups, religious activities, sporting events, weddings, and other ceremonies. Community members also mentioned individuals who serve as community connectors, including traditional leaders and elders, district and ward heads, religious leaders, head teachers, youth leaders, and Community Coalitions, Community Action Cycles, and CBOs. A male community member in MMC said, “Community elders are the ones that speak. They are respected. They usually solve crises and misunderstandings. Traditional rulers also assist by identifying who best fits for those involved in issues.” Specific locations for bringing people together that were mentioned include traditional leaders’ houses, religious institutions/places of worship, markets, community centers, and schools.

Aligning with the finding that communities live in relative peace, was the sense that increased safety acts as a unifying force and way to mitigate tension. When asked about community connectors, many participants mentioned a sense of safety that is helping to bring people together and recover from the effects of conflict. Additionally, a local government official in Hawul noted that because everyone in the community was impacted by the conflict, it actually has played a role in bringing people together in the post-conflict environment. Similarly, a community participant in Jere said, “The conflict actually brought the community closer because everyone was affected equally by the panic.” A local education official in MMC had a similar sentiment saying that the conflict has “provided room to go for education, consensus between ethnic groups and religious leaders, hitherto they cannot allow small issues to come between them.” Interestingly, education itself was also mentioned as a unifying entity to help bring communities together.

### Perceptions of Formal Education

This section details findings around perceptions of formal education among participants, which was a major theme of the RERA/GESI activity. We begin with a discussion of how perceptions of the value of formal education appear to be changing, then discuss perceptions of the importance of access to education for girls and excluded groups. This is followed by a discussion

of perceptions of the relationship between parents and teachers, perceptions of school safety, and perceptions of NFLCs.

### Changing Perceptions of the Value of Formal Education

**The conflict has led to a shift in perceptions of the importance of education – some people now value it more and view formal education as being formative to children’s, and also society’s, development.** As discussed in the desk review, the literature clearly demonstrates that in Northern Nigeria, there has been a long-term and deep mistrust in the formal education system. This was validated through primary data collection, alongside a finding that was not in the desk review: many respondents reported that

there has been a shift in the value that communities place on education in general and formal education in particular. This shift is considered to be directly related to the perception that the insurgency was caused in large part by the low value placed on education in the past.

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*“Prior to the insurgency, communities did not value the education, but with insecurity the people came to realize the value of education as ignorance and illiteracy is blamed for recruitment of armed groups.”*

**EXCERPT FROM FGD WITH FEMALE TEACHERS IN MMC**

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As a male teacher in MMC said, “If you ask me what the root cause of Boko Haram is, I will say it is the neglect of education.” This shift toward valuing education is now emerging as a female teacher in MMC said, “Prior to the insurgency, communities did not value education, but with insecurity the people came to realize the value of education as ignorance and illiteracy is blamed for recruitment of armed groups.”

Primary data collection revealed that some community members are beginning to view education (both formal and non-formal) as a community connector. A conversation in an MMC community focus group included respondents saying, “I want to emphasize education, which helps in uniting people. Education unites us,” while another respondent followed saying, “Education will help us now and hereafter.” This signifies an increased awareness of the importance of education not just for the increase of knowledge, but also for its impact on community dynamics and social cohesion.

Signs of a shift around the value of education after conflict were echoed in many FGDs and KIIs across the communities:

- Jere education official: “Without education, no society will progress. We have seen the impact of lack of knowledge. Lack of knowledge is the main factor that necessitates this issue of Boko Haram... [Community members] now know the importance of education as a result of the trauma they went through.”
- Male teacher in Jere: “In this area, we value education and everyone has gotten to know its value. If not for education, we will find ourselves in awful situations, such as insurgency.”
- Male parent in Jere: “We want our children to get education. Education is the progress of a nation. Any child that does not have education cannot make any good of his life. Time has changed; it is not like our time in the past.”

- Religious leader in Damaturu: “Conflict didn’t [negatively] effect enrollment in this community. Instead it boosted the enrollment number. Many children are in school now and more people are enlightened than before.”
- A male community member in MMC: “Usually there are a few and they are people who do not know the value of education. There was a person who fought us because we enrolled his children in school, but he has now joined school himself.”
- Religious leader in Damaturu: “Yes both boys and girls are encouraged to attend school both formal and non-formal learning centers, this is so important we need to educate our young ones to be able to become good people in the society, we need to alleviate poverty and ignorance, this can be done via good sound education to be able to make the society more enlighten both in this life and hereafter.”
- A SUBEB representative in Damaturu noted that the conflict has led to the promotion of literacy and improving school infrastructure.
- A male non-formal teacher in a focus group in Damaturu said, “Community members are more familiar with informal education like Islamiyah and Tsangaya, but are now ready to take part in western education. People are now more serious about education.”
- Female teacher in Jere: “Some people in the community believe [education] is important, but some are ignorant about the importance of education, but children around the community like going to school. We want you to convince them about the importance of education.”

**However, even though some people are now valuing education more as a result of the conflict, there are still varying perceptions overall about the importance of education and some parents remain skeptical.** Even with signs of a shift in community perceptions of education due to the conflict, it is also evident that the conflict has had some negative impacts on perceptions of the value and/or safety of education. For example, a male parent in MMC said, “Children want to join school, but parents are not willing. The Boko Haram is in our hearts. We need advocacy and awareness for parents to know the importance of schools.”

While the overall perception of education seems to be shifting, there are still varying degrees of parental understanding of the importance of education. The consensus among community members who participated in this study is that education is important, and communities, parents, and teachers should support children to go to school. Despite this consensus, many respondents across all four communities noted that less educated parents and community members may not see the importance of formal education and subsequently may not send their children to formal schools.

**A range of perceptions on religious education vs. formal education were discussed among participants in all communities.** A SUBEB representative in MMC mentioned that some parents only value religious education and not formal education. Additionally, a SAME official in Damaturu said that some parents do not agree with the content that is taught in formal education, so they only send their children to religious schools. The preference of religious schooling to formal education was echoed in Jere as community members mentioned that some parents still prefer religious schooling despite the movement toward formal education. However, a religious leader in MMC felt that community members do not see formal education as a threat to religious education, and that children can (and often do) participate in both.



Participants also mentioned that some low-income parents think it is better for their children get to jobs rather than continue schooling. For example, an education official in Damaturu said that some parents send their children to work or to learn a trade because they see others who are educated, but unemployed. In addition, a few references were made about parents only sending children to school to receive what NGOs have supplied. A SUBEB representative in MMC said, “Some parents just want to send their children to school because of what they are given by NGOs.” As perceptions toward the importance of education are shifting, traditional views of religious education and mistrust or undervaluing of formal education remain.

### **Across communities, children, both in and out of school, p**

Even with varying community and parental perceptions of education, the overall consensus of in-school and out-of-school children and youth in sampled communities is clear: they highly value education and the opportunity to go to school. Across all four communities, female and male student respondents in formal schools value their education and enjoy going to school. Student respondents in formal schools believe that their education is helpful for pursuing

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*“Without proper education, one cannot achieve target goals. We want to enroll and do our best to become what we want to become in the future.”*

**EXCERPT FROM FGD WITH FEMALE OUT-OF-SCHOOL YOUTHS IN MMC**

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future goals and they feel supported by their teachers and parents. Out-of-school children and youth also value education and express a strong desire to enroll in formal schools or return to formal schools if they have previously dropped out. In Hawul, female out-of-school youth expressed sadness about never attending formal schools or if they had previously dropped out of formal school. An out-of-school youth in MMC said, “We all want to go to school. We are all sitting at home and not doing anything. We want to go to school if given the opportunity.” It is important to note that many of the out-of-school respondents attend non-formal schooling in the form of religious/Quranic education in evenings, but still expressed a strong desire to also attend formal school as they believe formal schooling will help them achieve their goals in the future. In focus groups and KIIs with formal, non-formal and head teachers in all communities, they verified that their students and other children in their communities want to pursue formal education and enjoy learning.

A few parents and teachers mentioned that some children, especially males, simply lack the motivation to attend school and choose not to go even if they are supported, but this was not the norm.

### **Perceptions of Access to Education for Girls and Excluded Groups**

**In general, community leaders, parents, teachers, and students claim to *want* boys and girls to have equal opportunity to enroll in formal or non-formal schools. However, the perceptions on whether boys and girls *actually have* equal opportunities to access education vary.** For example, many participants think that it is important for boys and girls to have equal educational opportunities, but say that it is easier for boys to enroll in school. In MMC and Damaturu, a few respondents cite higher enrollment rates for girls and use this as evidence to say that it is easier for girls to enroll in school, but in the same interviews, they also discuss more barriers that are specific to girls’ education. Additionally, some participants state that less educated parents do not value girls’ education and say that some people think that girls’

education “ends in the kitchen.” There is also a community perception of “waywardness” when girls begin mingling with boys around marrying age (14-18 years old).

**Among students, there are also varying perceptions about the opportunity for boys and girls to go to school.** For example, in MMC, male OOSC said that boys have a greater opportunity to be enrolled in formal schools due to females facing more barriers to access, such as early marriage. However, female OOSC in the same community said that girls and boys have equal opportunities to enroll in school.

The following conversation between community members in MMC shows the range of perceptions about the importance of girls’ education. A community member began, “We give more priority to boy education as he may end up bearing the responsibility of the house unlike the girl who will end up in her husband’s house.” Someone in the same focus group responded to this saying, “we are now understanding the importance of girl education, almost the same as boy child.” Another participant followed this saying, “My daughter wants to be a doctor and so she is not ready for marriage until after completion of school.”

Parents, teachers, head teachers, and government officials mention that there are increased awareness campaigns to help parents understand the importance of girls’ education. A ministry official in Damaturu said, “To our own expectation, both boys and girls have the same opportunity to access education in Yobe state. But in some instances, culture and norms believe that girl children are not stronger than boys, but we are trying to let them be aware that they are all equal in terms of education and other aspects of life.”

**Participants believe that children with disabilities should have equal opportunities to education. However, the degree to which people think children with disabilities are accessing educational opportunities differ.** Most respondents report that students with disabilities are accessing education similarly to all other children. However, some cite specific challenges faced only by disabled learners, such as a lack of sufficient infrastructure and lack of teachers trained to assist learners with disabilities. Some participants mention that children with physical disabilities do not have a way to get to and from school unless another child carries them. Further, some participants express that they do not have knowledge of issues that children with disabilities face because they do not have disabilities themselves or children with disabilities.

**Overall, parents decide whether or not to send their children to school, and which kind of school.** Through interviews across communities, this study found a variety of factors that influence parents’ decisions to send their children to school or not. Some participants mentioned that some parents send younger children to school instead of older children in order for the younger children to learn how to read and write. Others said parents choose based on which child is the most committed to her studies. Some participants also noted that it could be a financial decision and a parent might not be able to afford to send all of his children to school even if he wanted to.

### **Perceptions of the Relationship between Parents and Teachers**

**In general, parents and teachers across MMC, Damaturu, Hawul, and Jere claim to have cordial relationships.** In focus groups in MMC and Damaturu, teachers in a more educated community felt that because parents and other community members had higher levels of education, teachers were valued and able to have stronger relationships with students' parents in these communities.

**Despite claiming to have cordial relationships with parents, a common perception by formal, non-formal, and head teachers across communities is that teachers are undervalued and not respected by community members and the government.** For example, male teachers in formal schools in MMC, voiced clear frustration over the negative perception of teachers across the community and by the government. A female non-formal teacher in Damaturu said that sometimes teachers are referred to “third-class citizens” and other teachers mentioned that male teachers are sometimes not allowed to have wives. Community members, local government officials, and even some teachers cited that a perception of low teacher quality may be a reason that they are not valued by the community. Other teachers said that community members and parents believe teachers take classroom materials provided by the government to sell and one participant in MMC said that she believed this to be true. Some teachers who did feel respected in their communities did not feel valued by the government, saying that teachers are paid as low as 7,000-10,000 Naira, while workers in other sectors are paid over 30,000 Naira.

**In line with the shift of perceptions mentioned earlier in this section, non-formal female teachers in MMC said that prior to the conflict, teachers were not valued, but now people are starting to have a more positive perception of them as perceptions of education are shifting to become more positive and schools are becoming safer.** In addition, even though many teachers felt that they were negatively perceived by the community or government, it did not stop teachers from valuing their jobs and teaching students. Teachers expressed a great deal of satisfaction in knowing that they were teaching children and said that their learners value and respect them in return. Additionally, teachers discussed having good relationships among themselves and with head teachers.

**There are mixed perceptions of the level of parent involvement in schools and with their students' learning.** Some teachers and head teachers said that parents were involved and would follow up about their children's performance in school. However, some teachers said that many parents remain uninvolved and do not attend PTA or SBMC meetings or do not provide their children with learning materials and uniforms.

### Perceptions of School Safety

**Many respondents across the sampled communities noted that schools have become safer since the height of the conflict.** An education official in MMC said that increased safety and security in the community and at schools has led to improved enrollment rates and to more children returning to formal schools.

### Perceptions of NFLCs

**In MMC and Damaturu, community members and parents have a very positive perception of NFLCs.** Formal teachers in Damaturu said that non-formal education has been accepted by the community because of increased quality, and a religious leader in Damaturu noted that the

community has been appreciative of the opportunities provided by non-formal education. A Damaturu female teacher said, “Non-formal education has been accepted by this community because the non-formal education schools have been upgraded which give opportunity to those who were not able to go to formal school.” A female parent in MMC said, “With the advent of non-formal centers, the children are learning better, they read complete alphabets in Hausa, and can spell their own names and others’.” Another participant added, “We are grateful for the coming of non-formal learning centers. The centers are closer, the facilitators have total control of the learners. Material sharing and feeding in the school system comes together in strengthening the learners’ performance and retention in schools.”

**Community members and parents also have a positive perception of teachers and facilitators in NFLCs.** A parent in MMC felt that facilitators in NFLCs know their students better than formal school teachers. Additionally, both male and female non-formal teachers in MMC feel valued and respected by the community and parents of their students.

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*“Non-formal education has been accepted by this community because the non-formal education schools have been upgraded which give opportunity to those who were not able to go to formal school.”*

**EXCERPT FROM FGD WITH FEMALE TEACHERS IN DAMATURU**

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**However, there were also mentions that mainstreaming children from non-formal to formal education remains a challenge as there is no policy in place for this.** There is also still a perception that formal school is ultimately a better option than non-formal education. A Damaturu non-formal teacher said, “Non-formal school, I see it as a second chance given to children that are affected by insurgency and are displaced and affected by conflict that happened in the past... but the non-formal schools are not as strong or good or big as the formal schools.”

### Barriers to Education Access and Retention

Barriers to education access and retention are organized into multiple sub-sections, including poverty, armed conflict, overcrowding and inadequate space in schools, child labor, gender norms, and children with disabilities. The section concludes with a brief discussion on community perceptions of existing responses to these challenges.

#### Poverty

**Poverty is considered the main barrier to education access and retention in all four sampled communities. A main finding is that poverty both indirectly and directly impedes the ability of children to attend and stay in school.** Poverty indirectly impacts access to education by leading to food insecurity and a preference by parents to send their children to work. An underlying theme discussed by participants is that in the conflict and post-conflict context, it became difficult to send children to school when families could not afford basic necessities for survival, including food and shelter. Additionally, participants mentioned that poverty rates in some areas increased due to the conflict, leading to even more difficulty for families to afford daily expenses.

**Many participants recognized that hungry students have more difficulty learning and eventually stop going to school.** A head teacher of a non-formal school in MMC mentioned that

sometimes teachers collect money among themselves to pay for food to feed their students, but due to low teacher salaries, they cannot always provide food.

**In terms of direct impact, poverty impedes education access and retention as families and students cannot afford to pay the direct costs of school fees, exam fees, uniforms, and learning materials. The lack of ability to pay for PTA fees and cost of transportation also came up in focus group discussions.** Three examples highlight how poverty and the inability of families to afford the direct costs associated with schooling impede children’s access to education. First, an out-of-school boy in Damaturu said, “I want to be in formal school not only the Islamiyah, but we don’t have money to pay for uniforms.” A female parent in MMC noted that “some children have completed primary school education, but also had to drop out at a point of entry to JSS 1, 2, or 3 due to financial constraint. Normally, 1,000 to 2,000 Naira is paid as registration fee at point of entry to secondary schools.” Finally, a female out-of-school youth in MMC added that even if her mother could afford to enroll her in school, she would not be able to afford a uniform or learning materials and would eventually drop out. As shown by this third example, even if families could afford one-time payments to enroll their children in school, recurring payments associated with keeping children in school become barriers to retention for impoverished families.

**In addition, a male student attending a non-formal school in Hawul said that students who have ripped or dirty uniforms, and cannot afford new ones, get bullied.** In this way, embarrassment or stigmatization can lead children to stop attending school. In addition, a female leader in MMC noted that poverty is even more of a burden for IDPs and is preventing them from enrolling their children in schools, especially in urban and semi-urban areas.

In sum, poverty is the most direct barrier to education access and retention because families and students simply cannot afford the direct costs that come with enrolling a child in school and keeping that child in school. Poverty is also an indirect barrier to education access and retention as it leads to families sending their children to work to increase household income. Basic necessities for survival, such as food and shelter, often take priority over education.

### Armed Conflict

Although the communities sampled are not affected by active armed conflict on a day-to-day basis, the conflict has created critical barriers to education access. A ministry official in Damaturu said, “The impact of conflict to our education system has been immeasurable because it has affected children, staff, the Ministry itself, and the whole community.”

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*“The impact of conflict to our education system has been immeasurable because it has affected children, staff, the Ministry itself, and the whole community.”*

**EXCERPT FROM KII WITH A  
MINISTRY OFFICIAL IN DAMATURU**

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**In places most severely impacted by the conflict, the focus became survival, and education was not a priority.** As a head teacher in Hawul mentioned, education provision in his community essentially stopped during the height of the conflict. This led to a gap in learning for all students in the community and made it difficult to re-enroll students who had lost years of education. A head teacher in Damaturu said, “[The conflict] affected many people because we were thinking of saving our lives, not going to

school.” Additionally, significant structural damage occurred during the conflict as education buildings, including schools and administrative offices, were either fully or partially destroyed and remained closed for over a year in some cases. The targeting and destruction of physical learning spaces, teachers, and students by insurgency groups clearly became a major barrier to access during the conflict. Education officials in Damaturu mentioned that their buildings and vehicles were burned, leading to the loss of instructional and training materials and office closures that lasted for months. Many participants noted that even today, schools are still damaged and being rebuilt.

**Another result of the conflict that has proven to be a major barrier to education access is forced displacement. This has led to many children missing out on months and years of education as going to school was less of a priority than survival and education services were not often available in IDP camps and host community settings.** In a focus group of out-of-school boys in Damaturu, one boy said, “In my former community, I used to go to school, but after we came back here, we don’t go to school, only Islamiyah.” Another followed saying, “We stopped going to school because we left our communities.” In addition to displacement being a barrier to education access, IDPs and people in conflict-affected communities also had to deal with the death of family members and parents. In some cases, this meant children no longer had support to go to school and moved to live with other family members or to orphanages.

**As a result of the many hardships that stem from the conflict, many community members, and IDPs in particular, face immense levels of psychological trauma.** Community members and teachers mention that students, especially IDPs and those who witnessed violence, struggle with trauma. In Jere, it was noted that trauma impacts pupils’ performance in schools. In addition, teachers and head teachers mention that they experience the effects of trauma themselves and have to deal with this while also helping their students who are traumatized. The reality of conflict, displacement, and experienced trauma can also create a sense of hopelessness or fatigue as a parent in Jere said, “This insurgency has affected everyone, if you don’t have the strength to put them through school, you don’t put them through school.”

**Finally, as previously mentioned, the conflict has instilled fear into people which can sometimes lead to parents preventing their children, especially girls, from attending school, despite the shift toward more positive perceptions of education.** There were two specific references made to major kidnappings at girls’ schools in Northeast Nigeria. A parent mentioned the kidnapping of 276 girls at Chibok in 2014 and an education official mentioned the kidnapping of 110 girls in Dapchi in 2018 and said that parents still fear sending girls to school, especially boarding school, due to these events. It is evident that the fear instilled by these kidnappings and other horrors of the conflict remain with parents, and in some cases, keep them from sending their girls to school.

### **Overcrowding and Inadequate Space in Schools**

**A byproduct of conflict and displacement that has become a critical barrier to education access and retention is the overpopulation and overcrowding of schools and classrooms.** Clearly this challenge will only be exacerbated by the changing perceptions of formal education discussed earlier. Overcrowding in schools has been a longstanding issue in Northern Nigeria, but the conflict and subsequent displacement has intensified the problem. Participants in MMC

focus groups and KIIs made several references to overcrowding as a main issue facing school communities.

**The influx of IDPs and increased population movement into the relatively safer Borno capital has resulted in an overall shortage of schools, classrooms, and materials.** Teachers mentioned classes with over 150 students, and in some cases up to 300 students, in classrooms meant for no more than 50. Teachers mention that in some cases, this leads to them having no place to stand in the front of classrooms as they trip over students' feet. Another teacher mentioned a school with over 2,200 pupils in primary grades alone and a non-formal teacher in MMC said her school had over 10,000 pupils. In MMC, a local education official said that before the conflict a local school had 5,000 pupils enrolled, but due to displacement, that school now has over 8,000 students.

### **Child Labor**

**Domestic chores, hawking, and other forms of child labor are barriers to access and retention. Across each community, domestic tasks including cooking, cleaning, fetching water, farming, and caring for younger siblings impeded access to educational opportunities.** Those responsible for these tasks often differed by gender and age as girls generally remained at home to cook and clean, while boys did more chores out of the house, including farming fetching water. However, both boys and girls across communities mentioned that these tasks are not exclusively for one gender, and both genders participate in each depending on family situations. Some parents and teachers said that domestic chores or running errands caused children to be late to school or miss full days of school. However, some children in formal schools mentioned that they were able to complete domestic chores and also attend school.

**Hawking, or selling items in the streets, is common practice in each of the sampled communities and is usually associated with females.** However, this study found that boys also sell items on the street, although it is not called hawking when done by boys. Hawking was mentioned across communities as a barrier to retention and participants often blamed parents for sending their girls hawking.

### **Gender norms**

Longstanding cultural and gender norms present challenges for girls to access education and stay in school. Boys face their own challenges with educational access and retention. As summarized in the primary data collection findings, dropout factors are laid out in the table to the right for girls, boys, and both sexes.

**Table 7. Dropout factors by gender**

<b>Girls</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Parents do not value girls' education</li> <li>• Parents fear sending girls to school due to kidnappings</li> <li>• Expectation that girls will not continue education after primary</li> <li>• Early marriage</li> <li>• Pregnancy</li> <li>• GBV</li> <li>• Lack of senior secondary schools for girls</li> <li>• Hawking</li> <li>• Domestic chores (cleaning, cooking, child care)</li> </ul>
<b>Boys</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employment</li> <li>• Domestic chores (fetching water)</li> <li>• Farming</li> <li>• Selling on streets</li> </ul>
<b>Both</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poverty</li> <li>• Armed Conflict</li> <li>• Displacement</li> <li>• Trauma</li> <li>• Overcrowding</li> <li>• Lack of parental awareness</li> </ul>

**There is a common perception that girls should marry between the ages of 14 and 18 years old.** Some community members mentioned that girls can get married at the age of 12 while others said that it is okay for girls to marry around the age of 20. However, women who remain unmarried are shunned by other community members.

**In addition to being deeply rooted in the historical and cultural fabric**

**of society in Northern Nigeria, one participant mentioned that early marriage for girls is also an economic decision for families.** A male IDP said, “Affordability to take care of schooling needs is a challenge, is not all about age when it comes to girl marriage, is about having the money to marry her out and this largely depends on the individual wealth.” Female leaders and some government officials identified early marriage as a major problem, but felt that it was out of their control because it is a decision made on the family level.

**Teen pregnancy was identified as a barrier to access and retention as girls who get married and have children rarely return to school.** Additionally, participants noted that girls who get pregnant out of wedlock, even if by rape, face extreme stigma in their communities. One participant mentioned a girl being expelled from school after getting pregnant out of wedlock.

**Secondary school options for girls are very limited.** In addition to barriers such as early marriage and pregnancy, the expectation that girls should not or cannot continue education after primary school presents a major challenge to education access and retention. Most community members prefer to send girls to girls-only secondary schools. In Damaturu, many participants pointed out that a senior secondary school for girls simply does not exist.

### **Children with Disabilities**

Although communities and schools want to, and are trying to, meet the needs of children with disabilities, several barriers to education access and retention exist.



**Some participants mentioned that there are specific schools and classes for children with disabilities. However, these schools remain in poor condition and facilities at these schools and regular schools are not accessible for children with disabilities (i.e. no ramps). In some cases, no schools for disabled children exist.** A community member in Jere said, “Truly, for the disabled, there’s no school for them.” Multiple teachers mentioned that there is a lack of training in special needs education. Some parents and students mentioned that the distance or route to school can also be a barrier to education access for children with disabilities.

**Yet, primary data collection revealed that even with the numerous barriers to access for children with disabilities, community members, teachers, and other children have developed their own strategies to assist children with disabilities.** Examples include carrying them to school if they don’t have a wheelchair, using physical items or making sounds to help deaf and blind children learn (i.e. counting sounds for blind children or moving children with hearing/vision difficulties to the front), and community leaders advocating for children with disabilities to go to school. Some teachers seemed eager to be trained in special needs education.

### Responses to Barriers to Access and Retention

Communities discussed several strategies that are already in place in some communities to address barriers to access and retention. These included general awareness raising about the importance of education, often accompanied by enrollment drives, mainly focused on girls, and sometimes IDPs and learners with disabilities. Donor campaigns to stop hawking and child trafficking, as well as skills acquisition classes for girls, were also mentioned.

### External Risks

In this section, we examine external risks faced by schools and pupils in the immediate environment. We begin with a short section on armed conflict, followed by a lengthier discussion of insecurity on the route to and from school, and a discussion of gender-based violence in the community and how this relates to educational participation. The section concludes with a brief summary of what responses may already be in place in some communities to deal with external risks.

#### Armed Conflict

**In the four sampled communities, armed conflict and attacks on education are not currently risks, despite heavily disrupting learning in the recent past.** However, as mentioned in the previous section, armed conflict presents a variety of barriers to education access and retention that increase risks, including education systems closing, displacement, death of family members and parents, and trauma. In addition, there are prolonged after-effects in the post-conflict and immediate post-conflict communities that are still in recovery phases and leave populations with lingering fear and tension.

#### Insecurity on the Route to and from School

Insecurity on the route to and from school was discussed in most FGDs across communities, and manifests in multiple ways. **The consensus across communities is that the route to school is safer than it used to be, but fear remains about IEDs, bomb blasts, and kidnappings that**

**were more prevalent during the height of the conflict.** Kidnappings on the route to school remain risks across communities as students, especially females, expressed concern over being taken. A parent in MMC said the following:

“Mostly incidences happened on the learners’ way to school. When the situation was at its peak, some children are kept away from school for preventive measures. Recently two kids were stolen and the missing children’s mother is mentally affected. These signify the insecurity on the learners’ safety – a child wearing uniform can get lost without a trace.”

Kidnappings and their impact on families pose a major threat to education as it creates fear within communities and among students that could lead to families not sending their children to school or children not wanting to trek to school.

**The majority of participants said that children usually walk to school, regardless of the distance. Long distances from home to school present a risk as it creates a longer period of time for incidents to occur and increases the number of potential issues a child may face on the way to or from school.** Participants discussed how longer distances to school are a greater risk for females, young children, and children with disabilities. Parents and teachers said that girls are more likely to get tired than boys and that young children are more likely to become scared or lost, especially if traveling alone. A community member in MMC said, “My sister could not go to school due to disability. She cannot walk the distance, but with a bicycle, she could.”

**Crossing busy roads and heavy traffic also cause insecurity on the route to school.** Some head teachers and teachers mentioned incidents in which children were struck by bicycles, motor bikes, or cars on their way to school. Students expressed fear about crossing roads and again mentioned the increased danger for young children. Students in Jere said that police sometimes assist children with crossing roads.

**Another major risk on the route to school across communities is bullying and fighting.** A parent in MMC said:

“The majority of learners trek down to school each day. There is an act of bullying happening among the children everyday going to and from school. Most of it affects the younger learners and is performed by older boys on the little boys. When the bullying becomes severe, parents report such incidences to school authorities for solutions.”

In focus groups with students, they verified that bullying and fighting occurs on route to or from school and mainly involves boys, although girls are also picked on and harassed.

**Other risks on the route to school as well, including flooding and gender-based violence.** In Hawul and Damaturu, flooding during the rainy season was also mentioned as a potential risk to student safety on the route to school. GBV and harassment on the route to school and are discussed in more detail in the following section.

## Gender-based Violence

Across communities, GBV in homes and communities was identified as mainly impacting girls, children with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups.

**Female children and youth, both in and out of school, talked about being touched inappropriately by boys, including male neighbors and brothers' friends.** A female student in Damaturu said, "We feel shy to report and boys do touch our body and we don't like it when they do that." As seen in this quote, students also do not feel comfortable reporting incidents of GBV. A different female student in Damaturu said, "[GBV] happens to girls mostly. It happens but people are secretive about it so that his mates will not look down on you. Or if rumors have it that it happened to someone, we hardly disclose it for fear of isolation among our peers." This shows that children, especially girls, fear that they will be excluded if they report these incidents, which could lead to further trauma from cases of GBV if not addressed.

**The existence of rape in the community was acknowledged and described in multiple interviews and FGDs.** In Jere, female students mentioned being afraid of men coming to rape them at night. There were a few cases mentioned of girls being raped by gang members. A local education official in Damaturu said, "Girls are mostly the victims [of GBV]. We have had a few cases of girls being raped after school." There was also one mention of a girl raped in her uniform outside of school, and a local government official explained that this led to girls not being allowed to wear uniforms outside of school. In all FGDs and KIIs there were three specific mentions of adult males raping children under eight years old.

*[GBV happens to girls mostly, it happens but people are secretive about it so that his mates will not look down on you. Or if rumors have it that it happened to someone, we hardly disclose it for fear of isolation among our peers.]*

EXCERPT FROM A FEMALE STUDENT IN DAMATURU

**Girls that are hawking in the streets may be more susceptible to gender-based violence.** In Jere, a community member said, "The other people that are being harassed are mostly girls that are hawking. They are teased, harassed, and undermined by local boys whenever they are out hawking."

## Responses to External Risks

Community members discussed a few responses already present in their communities related to external risks. These included community-driven school security meetings, teachers and parents walking children to and from school, teachers and parents discouraging children from talking to strangers, and increased community security measures.

## Internal Risks

In this section, we discuss findings related to risks internal to the school environment. This includes school infrastructure, school security, school climate, corporal punishment, bullying, and school-related gender-based violence. The section concludes with a brief discussion of response already in place in some communities to deal with these challenges.

### School Infrastructure

**Sampled communities faced school infrastructure challenges (shortages of buildings and classrooms) even before the conflict, but the destruction, displacement and increasing**

**demand for educational services that resulted from attacks has exacerbated these challenges.** Particularly in Jere and Hawul, participants mentioned shortages of school buildings and classrooms due to the burning of schools and communities during the conflict. In MMC and Damaturu, the shortage of infrastructure was more due to large populations of IDPs causing overcrowding on an already overburdened system.

**Another major infrastructure risk mentioned across communities was a lack of WASH facilities often leading to open defecation.** Many participants mentioned lack of toilet facilities, including gender-separate or student-teacher separate. In addition to the lack of toilet facilities, participants mentioned a lack of sanitation materials and washing facilities, as well as a lack of sanitary kits. In MMC, multiple students and teachers mentioned that a lack of toilets leads to open defecation. In one case this issue was so severe that it made it difficult to teach in classrooms. A male teacher in MMC provided the following anecdote:

“You discover that children defecate in the open. Now we are in the cool season, but had it been you come in the hot season, you cannot stay in the class for ten minutes due to stink. They resort to open defecation because the toilets are not enough... As teachers we normally go to nearby houses to meet our needs, but only for women. But for men it is not possible because you cannot visit someone’s house for this purpose. You have to hire a bike to go home... How can two to three toilets cater for over two thousand pupils?”

Some participants also mentioned a lack of water supply in some schools in Damaturu and Hawul.

### **School Security**

Despite active conflict not being a daily risk in the communities sampled, lingering fear remains pervasive around school safety and security as discussed in previous sections. In general, most participants acknowledged that schools are relatively safe for students and teachers in their communities.

**However, fences around schools are considered important for the sense of security and safety for students and teachers.** Participants cited that a lack of school fences could lead to children being kidnapped from school premises. In addition, a lack of fencing leads to motorists cutting through school grounds, which present threats to student safety and disrupts learning due to noise and distraction. Some participants also mentioned that fights sometimes occur near schools and there was one mention of a time when older male students brought weapons (knives and machetes) to school for a fight. Participants mentioned that fighting occurs due to politics, monetary disputes, and over girls.

### **School Climate**

**Across communities, teachers appear to have strong relationships with each other and with head teachers.** Many teachers mentioned feeling supported by head teachers and respecting their head teachers. Teachers also said that they have good relationships with their students and students mentioned that they feel comfortable discussing issues with teachers, nurses, and head teachers. Teachers report low levels of absenteeism among themselves and some mention that they have systems to track teacher and pupil attendance. However, there are some minor cases of

teacher absenteeism due to illness, maternity leave, and distance to school. This can burden other teachers who must then be responsible for classrooms with no teacher or lead to classes having no teachers for short periods of time.

Despite having positive relationships between teachers and students, participants mention several risks to teaching and learning quality. **First, as previously mentioned, overcrowding and a shortage of classrooms creates environments that are not conducive for quality teaching and learning.** A lack of desks, benches, school supplies, and learning materials were all mentioned as challenges in schools across communities. In terms of teaching, teachers, head teachers, and government officials noted that there are underqualified and underpaid teachers, inadequate instructional materials, and a lack of teacher training.

**In the immediate post-conflict environments, student and teacher wellbeing were referenced several times across communities.** Teachers pointed out that they are sometimes the only support for traumatized students, but they also have to deal with trauma themselves. Additionally, teachers are sometimes not paid on time and need to work other jobs. Some teachers in MMC and Damaturu mentioned implementing PSS/SEL best practices that they learned in teacher trainings from previous education projects implemented in the region. Additionally, teachers discussed how they attempt to use inclusive practices in the classroom to include girls, children with disabilities, and traumatized students.

### **Corporal Punishment**

**Different types of punishment, including corporal punishment, are used across communities with mixed perceptions about whether this is a good practice or not.** In general, students and teachers mentioned a few different types of punishment, including payment of noisemaking fees (students pay 10 Naira for making noise), writing names in books, frog jumps/crouching, corporal punishment (i.e. struck by cane or “lashes”), and suspension or expulsion for severe acts. Teachers and students are in consensus that different types of punishment are used based on level of the act. Additionally, participants either mentioned that there were no differences between how boys and girls were punished or that there were slight differences. For example, girls may receive less lashes than boys and are only beaten on the bottom and hands while boys are beaten all over.

**Some parents and even students are okay with corporal punishment if “the punishment matches the crime.”** A female student in Damaturu said, “[Punishment] is okay to us because it is only someone who loves you that will correct you when you did something wrong. Those who don’t correct you don’t like you because if they did not correct you, then you will be put to shame for whatever act you are doing.” Another student added, “Our parents usually ask us why we were punished and if the punishment is okay they will be glad you were corrected. You are being punished so that you will remember not to commit such offense in the future.”

**However, some students report it to their parents who get upset and bring the issue to school authorities.** Some teachers say they do not practice corporal punishment anymore or only use it as a threat, while others say that they do it when needed. One head teacher mentioned that it has been banned from his school completely after “do no harm” trainings from a different education program in the region.

**In many focus groups with formal students, both males and females expressed displeasure over corporal punishment by prefects.** Children reported getting physically punished by prefects, sometimes for no reason at all. However, students acknowledged that this can lead to prefects being retaliated against outside of school.

### **Bullying**

**Acts of physical and psychological bullying were mentioned across sampled communities, with the consensus being that it is harmful for students.** A female parent in Jere said, “[Bullying] affects a child’s learning because it can be psychologically disturbed if the bullying becomes so often, this can lead to dropout or demanding for change of class.” Student participants discussed younger children, usually males, being bullied by bigger or older male children. In addition, community members said that IDPs, orphans, and other vulnerable groups are more prone to being bullied. A female student in Damaturu referenced a specific instance when she was bullied based on her religious beliefs.

**However, teachers and head teachers were adamant that discrimination and bullying based on ethnicity and religion is not tolerated.** Teachers, head teachers, and education officials were strongly against bullying and mentioned responses such as suspending or expelling perpetrators, or reporting this behavior to parents. Most students felt comfortable reporting acts of bullying to students and teachers, but teachers said that sometimes they may not be aware of all cases of bullying because there are so many students and schools are so overcrowded.

**Students report being bullied by school prefects.** A female student in MMC said, “We are always bullied by senior students, especially the school prefects. They are all the time when the teacher isn’t in class and they come strike us without any reason. They also insult us and prohibit us from coming with slippers while they wear them in school.” Some students recommended that school prefects should not be allowed in the classroom when the teacher is not present or should not be allowed in the classroom at all.

### **School-related Gender Based Violence**

**From FGDs with female and male students, it is evident that SRGBV occurs at school, despite many teachers, head teachers, and education officials reporting that it does not happen or claiming that they are unaware of any cases in schools.** Female students are the main victims of SRGBV, along with other vulnerable children, such as children with disabilities, orphans, and children of lower socioeconomic status. A female student in Hawul said, “Male pupils, male teachers, boys and girls in the community all perpetrate this type of thing but it doesn’t often happen to male pupils.” Another student mentioned that richer students are more often the perpetrators of SRGBV.

**Female students were more prone to discussing SRBGV and mentioned being touched inappropriately at school by male students.** One female student mentioned a time when boys were pretending to play with her, but then started touching her. Female students reported feeling shy or embarrassed to report cases of SRGBV to parents and teachers, sometimes leading to them not reporting it at all. As previously mentioned, some female students mentioned that they

did not want to discuss times that they were inappropriately touched with their friends over fear of rumors spreading about them.

**Even though girls are more likely to be victims of SRGBV, sometimes male students are victims too.** A male student in Hawul said, “When your trouser is torn, some people used to touch one’s penis with a stick. It doesn’t feel okay and I don’t report it in order to avoid getting in trouble.” In addition to being a victim of SRGBV, this boy does not want report it over fear of being punished.

**Additionally, blame for incidents of SRGBV is sometimes placed on the victims, especially girls.** A female parent in MMC said, “Girls are the victims even though some of their acts lead to the happenings. Girls act wild and behave arrogantly in the school these days.” A male parent in MMC said, “I heard of [SRGBV] happening once, but the girl was at fault as she was the one looking for the boys’ trouble.”

**Teachers are also sometimes implicated in cases of SRGBV.** A ministry official mentioned one rape of a female student by a teacher in a Bolori Quranic school. An education official in Damaturu mentioned an issue with volunteer teachers committing acts of SRGBV, so they stopped hiring volunteers.

**Overall, there is a sense that schools do not have sufficient responses to sexual harassment and assault in school and education officials mention that there is inadequate monitoring of cases of SRGBV.**

### Responses to Internal Risks

Community members referenced a number of responses already in place to deal with some of the internal risks faced by schools. In some communities, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of school buildings, classrooms, and toilet facilities has been prioritized, and fences have been built around schools. School evacuation plans, and evacuation teams in IDP camps, are sometimes in place. Sometimes, schools contact local security when there is a risk or even have a security guard at the school gate. Respondents also mentioned providing training for teachers in psychosocial support and social-emotional learning for teachers, teachers discouraging bullying and discrimination, and teachers providing general support to traumatized and hungry students.

### Recommendations

This section uses a table format to summarize headline conclusions from the RERA and GESI accompanied by high-level recommendations that will be useful in bringing multiple stakeholders within and around the AENN program together around key issues and trends. These are organized by Community Dividers, Community Connectors, Barriers to Enrollment/Retention, External Risks, Internal Risks, Gender-Based Violence Inside and Outside of Schools, and Cross-cutting Issues.

### Community Dividers

Headline	Recommendations
Conclusions	

<p><b>Fear and trauma cause tension in both IDP and host communities, even when there is no active conflict.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education programming should work to enroll children and youth in both IDP and host communities equally to address lost time and build a sense of normalcy, stability and long-term investment. This may necessitate setting criteria for enrollment if demand exceeds supply including measures to ensure transparency with the community, which must comply with the “Do No Harm” principle. The student database should include a waiting list.</li> <li>• The selection of Return to Learning and NFLC facilitators should include clear criteria and a transparent process with the community (because this is good practice and also in order to be cognizant of potential host community concerns about IDPs being sympathetic with insurgent groups).</li> <li>• AENN needs to be aware of fluctuating tensions and fears in these communities and how they affect educational choices for parents and children/youth. AENN may consider Rolling Assessments of tensions/fears and educational choices of parents through the bi-weekly phone surveys.</li> <li>• Social-emotional learning should be provided to children, youth, and teachers (leveled by age group) to build coping skills to deal with trauma and build resilience. This should feature recreation in addition to other strategies, such as referral pathways for children to receive more targeted and specialized support. SEL messaging should also be provided to parents.</li> </ul>
<p><b>The idleness and/or hostility of male youth is sometimes blamed for community tensions.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Out-of-school boys, especially older boys, may need specific strategies to enroll and keep them in school or in NFLCs and prevent dropout.</li> <li>• Within AENN, this should be a cross-cutting issue that is addressed through different sets of activities, including materials development, teacher professional development, community level interventions, etc.</li> <li>• AENN should consider how to identify boys in need of support.</li> <li>• AENN should consider the use of positive role models (for boys as well as girls) in programming.</li> <li>• In addition to the Activity’s direct or indirect interventions focused on older boys and girls, the Activity should reach out to other stakeholders involved in productive vocational and recreational skills interventions to help address male and female youth idleness and/or hostility of male youth.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Distribution of relief items to IDPs can cause tensions between IDPs and host communities.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict Sensitive Education guiding principles and strategies should be complied with when providing education support to IDPs and host communities.</li> <li>• To avoid creating tensions between IDPs and host communities, education programming should be available for all who need it without a focus on either IDPs or host communities.</li> <li>• Interventions for formal schools and NFLCs should not be</li> </ul>



	dramatically different; for example, if NFLCs receive more support, this could create a sense of inequity among students and create new problems. The community mapping will help identify who is the 'most at risk' and AENN will need to ensure that additional support is provided to support equitable outcomes
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### Community Connectors

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>There is significant goodwill towards IDPs among host communities.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should work with local leaders to build opportunities to bring IDP and host communities together through educational programming at the community level, capitalizing on an overall sense of goodwill and understanding.</li> <li>• Community mapping that is participatory and inclusive of both IDPs and host communities should identify key institutions, locations, actors, and events that bring the community together.</li> <li>• The Community mapping should identify ways in which communities would be willing to show their support for AENN (tutoring, provision of snacks, provision of exercise books and pencils, etc.).</li> </ul>
<b>There is a strengthened belief and increased trust in education for all children (girls, the displaced, the disabled), possibly as a direct result of the conflict.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Find respected community leaders who can be identified, trained and recruited as local champions for inclusive education in their communities.</li> <li>• In the communities where AENN works, the Activity should strive to provide enough non-formal educational opportunities for all who need it and want it, and most importantly, to make sure that the NFLC classes meet the needs of the population (groupings, timings, etc.), with specific attention to marginalized communities (girls, pregnant/married adolescent girls, the disabled, overage boys who might be viewed as troublemakers, etc.) and also without becoming overcrowded (consider pupil-teacher ratios).</li> <li>• With more interest and trust in education, AENN faces pressure to truly find opportunities for mainstreaming following participation in NFE. In policy discussions, the Activity must increase advocacy for, and maintain a strong focus on, the transition from NFE into FE, which is not currently standardized. The details are inconsistent and variable. This must be a main focal area for policy discussions going forward.</li> <li>• Relatedly, AENN risks building up hopes and not being able to meet them if the formal system can't cope with the needs of completers. AENN must work with SUBEBs and others through the Data Hubs to acknowledge the growing demand and improve planning processes to accommodate these changes. AENN should consider Rolling Assessments of changes in demand for education.</li> <li>• The safety and quality of the learning environment must be well-</li> </ul>

	addressed, and parents and communities meaningfully engaged, so that parents do not lose their new trust in education.
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### Barriers to Access and Retention

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Hunger is a major challenge for targeted children and youth. Children will not be able to attend and learn if they are hungry.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN must find ways to creatively address school feeding. AENN can look for community, government, and partner solutions to address school feeding issues where possible. AENN should include resources in the community mapping exercise to assess feeding options.</li> <li>• Community-led school feeding approaches can be realistic and sustainable if communities have means for food production locally.</li> </ul>
<b>Direct costs of schooling are a barrier for many families.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should consider community and school-level interventions to address the costs of uniforms, school supplies, school fees, and more. These can be realistic and sustainable when communities are involved.</li> <li>• AENN should liaise and collaborate with other agencies that are involved in livelihood development interventions.</li> <li>• The program needs to consider how the lack of learning materials will be managed going forward. Government agencies, other key stakeholders and communities need to be engaged in discussions on provision of learning materials.</li> </ul>
<b>Some parents do not value formal education, for various reasons.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (As above) Respected community leaders should be identified, trained and recruited as champions for inclusive education in their respective communities</li> <li>• AENN should organize community sensitization and advocacy activities to promote the importance of education, teachers, learning, especially for girls.</li> <li>• We need to have respected community leaders publicly support education. For example, bringing in one-time speakers at events, and developing a set of “Education Champions” if available.</li> <li>• Community mapping should assess the reasons why some parents do not value formal education, in order to inform advocacy efforts.</li> </ul>

### External Risks

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Fences are considered important for keeping traffic and unauthorized</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should consider community-level solutions for building and maintaining fences around schools as part of the school safety approach.</li> </ul>

<b>adults out of school.</b>	
<b>The route to school can be dangerous, especially if children have a long way to walk.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should organize community-level solutions such as escorts on the way to/from school, mine clearance activities, or “community buses” where children meet in one location and walk to school together. This will require involvement of parents and communities.</li> <li>• During community mapping, AENN should examine locations of existing schools and NFLCs and strive to keep NFLCs within the communities where children live whenever possible to reduce distance traveled. AENN should also attempt to choose sites that are socially acceptable to the community and removed from hazards to children (busy highways, construction sites, etc.).</li> <li>• AENN should consider whether mine risk education referrals may be necessary.</li> </ul>

### Internal Risks

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Many schools face extreme overcrowding.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should support head teachers and teachers with school climate interventions that are appropriate for overcrowded conditions.</li> <li>• In the short-term, AENN can relieve some of the burden on formal schools by providing the option of NFLCs especially for overage youth. However, AENN must consider the implications of drawing children away from formal schools for non-formal learning, when the long-term goal is to bring more children into the formal system. AENN must put measures in place to address this realistic scenario.</li> <li>• AENN should consider Rolling Assessments of enrollment numbers/ages/PTRs in AENN schools to keep track of changes.</li> <li>• In the long-term, AENN should work with education authorities to develop strategies to increase the supply of formal and non-formal educational opportunities to meet the growing demand. Increasing supply of formal education should eventually reduce the burden on the NFLCs.</li> <li>• To advocate for increased provision of formal education, AENN should consider bringing local policymakers on study tours of overcrowded schools to understand the needs and challenges and discuss the implications for how to relieve the burden on formal schools, including sensitization about the role NFLCs can play.</li> </ul>
<b>The lack of sufficient toilets and WASH facilities in schools is a huge problem and in many</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocating for sufficient and gender-appropriate and gender-segregated toilets, latrines and other WASH facilities in NFLCs and formal schools must be a priority for the Activity. AENN should address this within community engagement activities and also liaise and collaborate with agencies involved in WASH (i.e. linking with the WASH working group/cluster to identify partners who can</li> </ul>

<p><b>schools, there is open defecation, and lack of sex-separate toilets.</b></p>	<p>provide support).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Through the Data Hubs, AENN should work with SUBEBs and others to measure and understand the need for toilets and improve planning processes to address the gaps. Again, consider study tours for first-hand views of the situation in some schools. AENN should consider Rolling Assessments of WASH issues.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Corporal punishment is widely practiced, accepted and even desired by teachers, families and some pupils, and is often abused by prefects.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide training for the WHOLE school (prefects, students and teachers) on expectations for behavior. Kids who have only learned to behave from fear of a whip will also need coaching on how to follow rules without the threat of corporal punishment. Social and Emotional Learning curriculum implementation will play an important role in addressing violence in schools.</li> <li>• Train teachers in codes of conduct and alternative positive discipline strategies.</li> <li>• Educate communities about the links between corporal punishment and reduced educational outcomes for their children.</li> <li>• The prefect system should be addressed to prevent prefects using their powers to bully and beat other children (consider retraining prefects).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Bullying mainly affects children who are already marginalized, is exacerbated by extreme overcrowding, and is a source of frustration for teachers who struggle to manage it.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should provide training and develop codes of conduct for the whole school on positive school climate and expectations for behavior: head teachers, teachers, parents, students (especially prefects).</li> <li>• AENN should consider training and sensitizing parents, community leaders and community members in positive discipline strategies and the links between corporal punishment and reduced educational outcomes for children</li> <li>• Prefects should be retrained in less violent methods with new strategies enforced.</li> <li>• AENN might consider a set of school and student-level initiatives to address bullying in schools (reporting and response mechanisms, student clubs, social-emotional learning activities, complaint box, etc.).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Teachers suffer from lack of respect, low pay, their own challenging life conditions, and a huge burden of responsibility to care for overwhelming numbers of children, many of whom have dealt</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN Activity need to address issues related to: teacher-teacher relations; teacher-head teacher relations; teacher-pupil/student relations; teacher-parent relations; pupil/student-pupil/student relations; teaching large class sizes.</li> <li>• Teachers need to be supported in multiple ways by AENN, with a focus on their own well-being (training, mentoring, teacher learning circles, teacher recognition)</li> <li>• Community interventions should aim to improve community appreciation of and support for teachers and build respect for teachers.</li> <li>• AENN could provide recognition to high-performing teachers each year.</li> </ul>

<b>with trauma and conflict.</b>	
<b>Teachers are inadequately prepared for the challenges they face in the classroom.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN should provide training to teachers on classroom practices, including large class sizes and multi-grade teaching</li> <li>• AENN should provide training to teachers on core topics as well as conflict-sensitive education, SEL, teaching children with disabilities</li> <li>• Ongoing mentoring and coaching will be critical.</li> </ul>

### Gender-based Violence Inside and Outside of Schools

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>GBV in the community and school does happen and sometimes the victims (often girls) are blamed for it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide gender trainings to AENN staff regularly including reflection on how to change mindsets in schools and communities around GBV</li> <li>• AENN Activity should also liaise and collaborate with organizations or programs working in GBV to help address GBV matters more holistically at home, school and community levels.</li> <li>• All AENN training should include a GBV component</li> <li>• The Community Action Cycle and school safety plans should both look at options for a response mechanism for victims and their families at the local level, and AENN needs to look at options for referral pathways.</li> <li>• Schools need codes of conduct, teachers need to be trained in them, and head teachers need to enforce them.</li> <li>• Teachers and head teachers need to receive training and coaching on how to spot signs of GBV, provide support to students, and referral pathways</li> <li>• Social-emotional learning activities should support children to gain coping skills to deal with trauma and should include differentiated strategies for boys and girls.</li> </ul>

### Cross-Cutting Issues

<b>Headline Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Little to no data to understand school contexts exists or is shared, particularly around education quality, GBV, etc.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AENN Activity should work closely with governmental agencies, UNICEF, other organizations/programs, education sector groups (ex. EiEWG), universities and colleges to address education data needs.</li> <li>• AENN's data hubs should consider the gaps in data and key issues that SUBEBs and partners need information about to facilitate planning processes</li> <li>• AENN should work closely with EiEWG and coordinate with</li> </ul>

	<p>relevant partners; information sharing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Improve communication with NGOs and government entities collecting data on population, security, child protection</li></ul>
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## Annex 1: Output of Maiduguri RERA/GESI Validation Workshop

Intervention #	Threats and Opportunities	Recommendations
<b>1.1 Establish EIE partnership</b>	<p>Threats:</p> <p>A. Lack of coordination among partners in targeting communities and distributions</p> <p>Opportunities:</p> <p>B. Positive perception of education by variety of stakeholders</p>	<p>A. Regular meetings, mapping of activities by each partner in each location</p>
<b>1.2 RERA</b>	<p>Threats:</p> <p>A. Lack of co-operation from stakeholders</p> <p>Opportunities:</p> <p>B. Community and religious leaders support in awareness raising activities</p>	<p>A. Sensitization and advocacy to have the maximum co-operation and support from stakeholders</p> <p>B. Utilize community and religious leaders in awareness raising activities</p>
<b>1.3 Improve education monitoring and response</b>	<p>Threats:</p> <p>A. Lack of data that is accurate and shared about education local authorities and school leaders</p> <p>Opportunities:</p> <p>B. Strong education system/structures still in place at the local and national level</p>	<p>A. An updated database should be made available and be regularly updated. Data should be collected in a consistent way using similar methods.</p> <p>B. Coordination with local education authorities</p>
<b>1.4 Improve non-formal education policies</b>	<p>Threats:</p> <p>A. Religious and cultural reasoning that inhibits equal access to education – local stakeholders may not implement policy appropriately</p> <p>B. Lack of commitment from policy-makers</p> <p>Opportunities:</p> <p>C. Government agencies are on the ground and present in local communities</p>	<p>A. Training and proper sensitization for traditional/religious and school leaders to ensure that policies are implemented correctly</p> <p>B. Advocacy for policy change and improvement to legislators</p> <p>C. Coordination and training of local government agencies</p>
<b>2.1 Establish/Revitalize NFLCs</b>	<p>Threats:</p> <p>A. Poverty</p> <p>B. Negative perception of education by parents</p> <p>C. Student absenteeism</p> <p>D. Issues mainstreaming into formal schools</p> <p>Opportunities:</p> <p>E. Positive perception of education by students</p>	<p>A. Govt or partners should provide learning materials, uniforms, etc. to help reduce “hidden fees”</p> <p>B. Awareness and sensitization on importance of education for parents</p> <p>C. Same as B</p> <p>D. Clear government policies and procedures for mainstreaming</p> <p>E. Outreach to target children</p>

<b>2.2 School safety plans, early warning systems</b>	Threats: A. Active insurgency B. Insecurity in IDP camps C. Dangerous route to school D. Damaged school infrastructure	A. Liase with government to provide security monitoring of schools B. Same as A C. Organize walking groups, have landmines and IEDs cleared, put school in safe location D. Identify safety issues in each school and create a plan to address them
<b>2.3 Teachers deliver conflict-sensitive quality basic ed</b>	Threats: A. Low teacher well-being B. Limited to no teacher training C. Low and late teacher payment D. Teachers don't feel valued	A. Training for teachers B. Same as A C. Payment of teachers on time, advocacy with government for payments D. Awareness with community on importance of teachers, increase parent and teacher interactions in a positive way (PTA)
<b>2.4 Develop minimum package of learning materials</b>	Threats: A. Inadequate learning materials B. Inadequate learning spaces C. Overcrowded classes	A. Distribute learning materials B. Construction of new learning spaces C. Same as B
<b>3. 1/3.2 Teacher recruitment</b>	Threats: A. Low academic level or training of teachers B. Location of schools C. Learning materials not relevant to local culture D. Low and late teacher payment	A. Provide training to teachers, recruit teachers who have completed a secondary level of education, test teachers on basic skills to make sure they can read, write, do math, etc. B. Provide transportation or money for teachers or build schools in convenient locations C. Make sure names, pictures, content match community D. Pay teachers more and on time
<b>4 – All community related activities</b>	Threats: A. Lack of security B. Mainstreaming into formal schools C. Lack of awareness of parents D. Negative perception of education by parents E. Poverty F. Fear of sending children to school G. Inadequate school facilities H. Dropouts I. Lack of services for children with disabilities	A. Updates to schools about security situation, plans to practice drills, security scanners B. Awareness of education opportunities and mainstreaming policies C. Awareness on importance of education D. Same as C E. Reduce cost barriers by providing uniforms, learning materials, etc. F. Same as C – and awareness of school safety measures G. Advocacy with government to rehab and build new

	<p>Opportunities:</p> <p>J. Community and religious leaders support in awareness raising activities</p> <p>K. Positive perception of education at community level and by children</p>	<p>schools, referrals to other education partners</p> <p>H. Same as C</p> <p>I. Training for teachers on how to help children with disabilities</p> <p>J. Involve community leaders and religious leaders to support in awareness raising activities</p>
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## Annex 2: Output of Abuja RERA/GESI Validation Workshop

Intervention #	Threats and Opportunities	Recommendations
<b>1.1 Establish EIE partnership</b>	Threats: C. Lack of communication between NGOs and the government D. Lack of funding for education activities	B. Regular meetings, mapping of activities by each partner in each location C. Advocacy with donors, seek interventions from development actors
<b>1.2 RERA</b>	Already completed	N/A
<b>1.3 Improve education monitoring and response</b>	Threats: C. Constant movement of IDPs – coming and going – is difficult to track movement of teachers and students accurately D. Lack of standardized data collection tools and procedures E. School level and government level staff are not trained on how to use and collect data	C. Improved communication between NGOs and government who are tracking IDP movement and education authorities at the SUBEB and school level D. Create adequate data collection tools E. Provide training to school level and SUBEB level staff on how to use data collection tools and how to use data to inform education activities
<b>1.4 Improve non-formal education policies</b>	Threats: D. Policy-makers do not understand the reality on the ground – the various needs and levels of students, especially in crisis locations E. School staff are not aware of the policies and do not know how to carry them out F. Limited funding availability	D. Policy-makers should visit the field to understand the needs E. Training for school staff on the policies and how to implement them F. Advocate for adequate funding from government and NGOs
<b>2.1 Establish/Revitalize NFLCs</b>	Threats: F. Insecurity G. Parents' negative attitude toward western education Opportunities: H. Positive perception of education by communities and students	F. Provision of security in schools, school safety plans and trainings G. Campaign and sensitization for stakeholders conducted by community leaders on the positive effects of education
<b>2.2 School safety plans, early warning systems</b>	Threats: E. Active insurgency F. Insecurity in IDP camps	E. Create school safety plans and early warning systems F. Same as A
<b>2.3 Teachers deliver conflict-</b>	Threats: E. Lack of conflict-sensitive education curriculum	E. Develop a conflict-sensitive education pack in collaboration with government agencies

<b>sensitive basic ed</b>	<b>quality</b>	F. Lack of teacher training in conflict-sensitive education G. Teachers do not have copies of the curriculum to use in schools	F. Conflict-sensitive education training for teachers G. Print curriculum for teachers
<b>2.4 minimum of materials</b>	<b>Develop package of learning materials</b>	Threats: D. Inadequate learning materials E. Inadequate learning spaces F. Overcrowded classes	D. Distribute learning materials E. Construction of new learning spaces F. Same as B
<b>3. 1/3.2 recruitment, training</b>	<b>Teacher</b>	Threats: E. Not enough facilitators and teachers available F. Low academic level or training of teachers G. Inadequate teaching and learning materials available H. Limited teacher training or previous teaching experience I. Low and late teacher payment J. Lack of training materials	E. Hire retired teachers, engage stakeholders to identify candidates F. Provide training to teachers, recruit teachers who have completed a secondary level of education, test teachers on basic skills to make sure they can read, write, do math, etc. G. Same as B H. Pay teachers more and on time I. Create teacher training materials (SEL, pedagogy, school safety, etc.)
<b>4.1</b>		Threats: L. Insecurity M. Language – IDPs speak a variety of languages N. Tension between IDPs and host-community Opportunities: O. Positive perception of education at community level and by children	K. Community-based early warning system L. Find community awareness facilitators who speak same languages as the IDPs M. Integrate both host-community and IDPs in community activities
<b>4.2</b>		A. Insecurity B. Major differences among coalition members C. Fear and tension	A. Community-based early warning systems B. Dispute settlement meetings C. Community involvement and active participation
<b>4.3</b>		A. Tension between IDPs and host-community	A. Equal involvement of different communities, understanding the tensions present in the community
<b>4.4</b>		A. Inadequate resources – teachers, land, teaching and learning materials, infrastructure	A. Support communities to identify locally available resources
<b>4.5</b>		A. community level tension	A. Equal involvement of different communities