

# Humanitarian Action, Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding through Education in South Sudan

Achievements, Challenges, and Lessons Learned



© United Nations Children's Fund

Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy Programme

Education Section, Programme Division

Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO)  
Nairobi, Kenya

July 2015

Cover photo: © UNICEF / Children at the Protection of Civilians (PoC) Camp within the UNMISS Camp/UN House, Juba, South Sudan

**Authors:**

Neven Knezevic, PhD (Education and Peacebuilding Specialist, UNICEF, ESARO)

W. Glenn Smith, PhD (Institut Supérieur de Gestion & European Management Centre, Paris, France)

**Acknowledgements:**

The writer are grateful to the following individuals who provided extensive support with revisions and improvements to several drafts and rigorous attention to improving the quality of this final paper: Dr. Thelma Majela (PBEA Programme Manager, UNICEF, South Sudan), Ms. Ticiana Garcia-Tapia (Education and Peacebuilding Specialist, UNICEF, South Sudan), and Genzeb Jan (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UNICEF, South Sudan). The substantial time and efforts they contributed have made the writing and completion of this report possible. The views and analysis in the report are those of the writers and do not reflect those of UNICEF or the Government of South Sudan.

# Table of Contents

<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Acronyms</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Document Overview</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>1. Programming Context in South Sudan</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 PBEA Background	1
1.2 Methodology and Research Limitations	3
1.3 The Current Context	4
1.4 Background factors underpinning the current crisis (structural and cultural)	5
<b>2. Humanitarian Context and PBEA Programming Responses</b>	<b>14</b>
2.1 Rapid Adjustments to the Programme TOC to Respond to the Crisis	14
2.2 Critical Risks Addressed by Programme Adjustments – Youth and Ethnic Division	15
2.3 Preventing Ethnic-based Conflict among Youth and Communities	17
2.4 Conflict Undermining Food Security and Resilience among IDPs	19
2.5 Conforming to EiE Standards and Integrating Conflict Sensitivity	20
2.6 Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace (LSaZoP)	22
2.7 Sport for Peace – Promoting Respect, Tolerance and Inclusion	25
2.8 Responding to Trauma and Displacement	27
2.9 Gender	29
2.10 Security Constraints and Education Service Delivery Gaps	30
2.11 Possible Future Collaborations for Peacebuilding – A Truth and Reconciliation Commission?	34
<b>3. Results, Lessons Learned and Recommendations</b>	<b>36</b>
3.1 Key Results being Achieved	37
3.2 Lessons Learned and Challenges	39
3.3 Recommendations	40
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>Annex A.</b> Basic Data on IDPs in South Sudan	45
<b>Annex B.</b> Theory of Change and Its Relevance for Humanitarian Action through Education in South Sudan	46

# List of Figures

Figure 1. Map	1
Figure 2. I Understand What Conflict Sensitivity Means	21
Figure 3. P. explains to Nile Model School Peace Club what the Club means to him	24
Figure 4. Nile Model School Peace Club, chemistry teacher and two officers	25
Figure 5. Sports are highly valued among PoC camp youth	26
Figure 6. Participants in Sport for Hope activities	27
Figure 7. Headmaster of Secondary School at PoC1, Juba	32
Figure 8. Participatory training session	33

# Acronyms

C4D	Communication for Development
CA	Conflict Analysis
CFS	Child-Friendly Schools
CMS	Church Missionary Society (Anglican)
CO	Country Office
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSE	Conflict-sensitive education
CSF	Child Safe Facilities
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EFA	Education for All
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EEPCT	Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition
ELDS	Early Learning Development Standards
EMIS	Education Management Information Service
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
FBO	Faith-Based Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GCPEA	Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack
GoN	Government of the Netherlands
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Populations
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IPC ERC	Global Emergency Review Committee
LS	Life Skills
LSA	Local Security Arrangement
LSaZoP	Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace

MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoCYS	Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports
MoEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (or MoE)
MoGEI	Ministry of General Education and Instruction (before 2013)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PB	Peacebuilding
PBEA	Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PB + LS	Peacebuilding and Life Skills
PoC	Protection of Civilians Sites
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RO	Regional Office
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SPLM	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (In Opposition)
TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
ToT	Training of Trainers
UAM	Un-Accompanied Minors
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
VAC	Violence Against Children
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

# Document Overview

## Purpose and Intended Use of the Case Study

This case study examines the role education can play and is playing in the conflict-induced humanitarian emergency in South Sudan. The study examines adjustments made by the Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme in response to the humanitarian crisis following 15 December 2015, including the role of education for the internally displaced population (IDP) camps (or Protection of Civilian Sites – PoCs), contributions to peacebuilding, and how in a humanitarian context education can help to forge resilient communities. When possible, the study gives a voice to the individual actors involved, especially children and adolescents.

This document is intended to be used by UNICEF staff, implementing partner organizations and other humanitarian practitioners in the education and peacebuilding field. It is hoped that the study will promote continued discussion and planning to improve

humanitarian action in response to conflict-induced crises in order to strengthen the effectiveness of lifesaving responses in a manner that will support a transition to peace and sustainable development. This paper explores:

- the programme adjustment made by PBEA to respond to the humanitarian crisis and to position education as a critical lifesaving response;
- how education advances conflict resolution, peacebuilding and community resilience in conflict and post-conflict contexts;
- the extent to which PBEA activities are contributing to programme outcomes and higher level results related to increasing social cohesion and resilience, including among displaced adolescent and youth communities;
- how education might do so even more effectively; and
- the challenges facing education programming efforts in South Sudan.

# Executive Summary

On 15 December 2013 the high hopes placed on South Sudan at Independence in 2011 had disappeared in an explosion of violence in the capital Juba. The fighting between troops loyal to the President (including many of the Dinka ethnic group) and soldiers loyal to the former Vice President, who had been sacked six months earlier, quickly spread beyond the barracks and into residential areas. Neighbourhoods where Nuer were residing came under attack and civilians who could escape fled to the protection of the UN bases in Juba, north to areas where the opposition was massing forces, or into neighbouring countries.<sup>1</sup> December 15 marked the onset of a third civil war. Attacks against civilians became commonplace through 2014 as the leaders of the two sides believed in their ability to achieve a military solution, with little regard for honouring ceasefires signed on several occasions in Addis Ababa. At the same time, significant doubt existed as to the ability of either leader to effectively implement any ceasefire due to the highly fragmented nature of combatant groups and incredibly weak command-and-control over armed groups nominally aligned to either of the two major factions. Although some hope has been raised in early February 2015, few see any easy route to resolving South Sudan's political quagmire in a highly fragmented society now dangerously divided along tribal and ethnic lines.

Violence and insecurity have become commonplace along the front lines of the war, with the death toll estimated as high as 50,000 and 100,000 as of November 2014 (Martell 2014). Education and other government services have naturally suffered since the fighting broke out. Government services, already terribly weak prior to the civil war, have been affected even in states away from the conflict due to the shifting of nearly all state resources to the war effort.

Those who are fortunate enough to be away from the front lines see their livelihoods, health and futures compromised due to the loss of livelihoods and property, experiences of trauma, and the interruption of education services and other key government services as nearly all state resources are shifted to the war effort. Moreover, donors seem to have prioritized humanitarian assistance at the expense of 'development programming,' thus potentially contributing to a 'war economy' at the expense of the non-conflict-affected states of South Sudan. UNICEF learned many lessons from its leading of the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) during the 1985-1989 famine in southern Sudan and in modified form into the 1990s. OLS became "institutionalized, part of the economic, political and military landscape in Southern Sudan" (de Waal 1997:148). The rethinking that took place since OLS, based on many similar examples globally, has led to initiatives such as PBEA and a determination from UNICEF to "do no harm" and alert the international emergency effort to the need for a conflict sensitive approach to humanitarian assistance, through training government officials in conflict sensitivity and monitoring conflict sensitive practices.

**Methodology.** This case study examines the key conflict drivers responsible for reigniting and prolonging the conflict in South Sudan and the role that education is playing in the internally displaced population (IDP) camps, also called Protection of Civilian sites (PoCs), inside the United Nations Mission for South Sudan (UNMISS) complex in Juba. The study is based on direct interviews in July 2014 with representatives of the international agencies in Juba, academics, implementing partners, school authorities, teachers and IDPs. Overall, **the number of persons providing direct information for this case study reaches over 110 individuals.** Information on conditions outside of Juba is based on secondary source

---

<sup>1</sup> As the details surrounding the events are still the subject of controversy, the reader is urged to consult the relevant UN reports (UNMISS 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) and additional references in section 1.3 below.

information, due to travel restrictions that prevented movement outside of the capital. Nevertheless, UNICEF staff provided extensive follow-up support to complete this case study and fill information gaps with primary data from the field and other sources of information that otherwise would not have been available. Whenever possible, the study gives voice to the individual actors involved, especially children and adolescents, in order to illustrate key aspects of the experiences of conflict-affected communities (trauma, gender, human security, ethnicity and politics).

### Main Findings:

It is generally accepted that the relapse to civil war in South Sudan was the result of historical legacies and the failure of traditional development approaches to work on unresolved social, political and governance dynamics, which as a result contributed to a reversal to violent armed conflict. The relapse to conflict gave rise to a new set of conflict drivers and risks of localized conflicts emerging, or a spreading of the conflict to other parts of the country. In this context, there was a need for immediate humanitarian assistance to 'save lives' and address the most visible impacts of the crisis and immediate risks such as famine and disease, while development programming was required to make adjustments to the new realities of violent conflict.

In the immediate aftermath of December 2013, UNICEF education and Communication for Development (C4D) staff in South Sudan, considered to be 'non-critical' to the humanitarian response, were evacuated to Nairobi, Kenya. It was during this period that serious consideration was given about how to reposition education interventions so that they would in fact be seen as 'critical and lifesaving'. At a time when the crisis for children in Syria was gaining global attention and concerns were rife about the risks of 'a lost generation', the repositioning of PBEA programming in South Sudan adopted a similar approach. Originally articulated as part of a Schools as Zones of Peace strategy based on the experiences of Save the Children in Nepal,

the premise underpinning the strategy was that it would help to:



...establish linkages between lifesaving humanitarian responses with development activities. Crucial for supporting the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development is the creation (or maintenance) of safe, protective learning spaces for children, adolescents and youth in which they will receive needed humanitarian and psycho-social support. Moreover, programmatic adjustments such as establishing Schools as Zones of Peace will help to begin the process of rebuilding social cohesion among divided communities, strengthening community resilience against conflict, and improving human security.

These early discussions informed a rethink of several key PBEA engagement strategies and a sharpening of the programme's existing theories of change (TOCs), with activities developed for engaging communities across the country, adapting and strengthening existing activities, and introducing initiatives deemed important for responding to the new realities in South Sudan, only several of which are explored in this case study. Following the return of UNICEF staff to South Sudan in March 2014, the TOC listed above was used to inform existing PBEA TOCs, with those related to 'youth' and 'marginalized children in high risk areas' being most directly related. However, these adjustments were, to some extent, diminished by subsuming the initial TOC underpinning the Schools as Zones of Peace strategy into existing PBEA TOCs, which did not sufficiently adapt their wording to reflect the actual changes taking place through PBEA programming on the ground. One potential consequence of this is that a strong and coherent narrative regarding the role of PBEA in emergency, recovery and development has not emerged, thus diminishing the potential for PBEA lessons learned to inform other partners in making similar linkages to overcome the 'development' and 'emergency' divide.

Despite the significant challenges, UNICEF rapidly deployed educational services and peacebuilding messages. Moreover, case study field observations and accounts of implementing partners, teachers, and children in the PoCs and available secondary data from other programme locations demonstrate that community resilience and social cohesion as well as protection were enhanced by the provision of life skills and conflict sensitivity education services, with noted achievement cutting across PBEA outcomes 1, 2, 3 and 4.

## Key Results Being Achieved

### Communicating for Peace (contributions to PBEA Outcome 3)

- A critical C4D messaging workshop attended by the ESARO regional peacebuilding advisor and C4D Advisor from UNICEF HQ organized in Juba on 2 April 2014 became **the basis for a large scale C4D programme funded by USAID** and implemented in partnership with Search for Common Ground;
- C4D was subsequently able to operate in 8 out of 10 states (according to CO monitoring), and to **convey a broad range of essential competencies for preventing conflict and promoting peacebuilding** by addressing conflict drivers and conflict triggers.

### Protection, mitigating conflict and promoting resilience (contributions to PBEA outcomes 3 and 4)

- Based on the views expressed by case study participants inside PoCs, **conflict and violence was often avoided** due to the availability of PBEA interventions, though proof of what did not happen is impossible to produce;
- PBEA was instrumental in bringing IDPs together in the PoCs to discuss ways of building capacities for peace and tolerance through LS+PE, and organized sports (football, volleyball) competitions leading to reduced tensions and mitigating against the risk of conflicts breaking out inside PoCs and with neighbouring communities;
- Provision of trauma treatment through discussions, activities, art, sports, and friendships have evidently worked to reduce trauma. They are now able to support one another, talk to other friends and vent out their frustrations in a safe environment;

- Provision of education gives children and youth a sense of normalcy and hope for the future. From interviews with the children who experienced the trauma of flight to the camp in mid-December 2013, it appears that investing in education has been their way of returning to a “state of normality”;
- In Bentiu, education was a critical service that mitigated risks of violence against children, abduction and recruitment by armed groups;
- Children and youth have begun acquiring skills that enable them to develop new livelihoods and recover from the conflict in a constructive manner.

### Addressing Youth Idleness and Frustration (contributions to PBEA outcomes 3 and 4)

- PBEA interventions helped youth to develop a sense of constructive citizenship by empowering them in taking leadership roles in organizing learning spaces, inter-PoC volleyball and soccer games, peace dialogues, or volunteering for teaching LS+PB;
- Sports for peace and peace clubs have supported inclusive and tolerant civic and social participation and increased societal resilience against conflict by creating ‘social spaces’ for communities to come together;

### Strengthening Capacities for Conflict Sensitive Education (Contributions to PBEA outcomes 1 and 2)

- CSE capacity development led to increased knowledge and understanding about conflict sensitive education among partners and strengthened the application of conflict sensitivity through Education in Emergencies (EiE) broadly;
- The LSaZoP initiative has strengthened policies for protecting children in conflict and raising awareness for preventing a ‘lost generation’ (though much follow up is required to better integrating this approach to government strategies);
- PBEA survey tools were rolled out during this period for measuring social cohesion and community resilience – commendable accomplishment being the first such attempt of any PBEA-supported country globally and achieved in the middle of a humanitarian crisis.

## Lessons Learned and Challenges

- Post-Independence politics have given rise to new patterns of exclusion based on the same centre-periphery model but with Juba as the centre and the rest of the country as periphery (hinterland);
- Environmental vulnerabilities and weak resilience are critically impacted by conflict. Much of the discourse on food security and resilience tends to ignore the critical impact that conflict has had on undermining resilience and fuelling patterns of vulnerability that lead to cyclical shocks related to food insecurity;
- Development programming prior to December 2013 operated on the basis of a 'business as usual' paradigm. This points to a broader challenge with the international community's engagements in fragile settings. As a result, the 'conflict blind' approach in South Sudan squandered opportunities to start fostering resilient communities with the social cohesion necessary to free themselves from cycles of violence;
- Humanitarian action generally considered conflict and conflict sensitivity as a minor issue, always overruled by the initial 'surge mentality' of 'saving lives' primarily through food, shelter, protection and medical assistance. In 2011 the OECD reported that the international community's adherence to Do No Harm is consistently weak across fragile state settings. Engagement in South Sudan today does not seem much better. While this may have been understandable during the acute early phase of the crisis, the focus on 'emergency' began to miss opportunities for building peace and achieving more immediate goals of bringing communities together, reducing friction and misunderstandings between groups, and for building effective coping mechanisms among conflict-affected communities – opportunities that would probably feed back into lifesaving efforts;
- There are limits to what can be accomplished in terms of interethnic peacebuilding in the typical South Sudan IDP camp context (often mono-ethnic), but EiE, particularly when extended through PBEA provides an opportunity to lay a groundwork for future interethnic engagement and strengthened social cohesion;

- UNICEF efforts to protect children against violence and recruitment to armed groups made notable accomplishments. However, the lack of command-and-control over local armed groups places many children at ongoing risk of recruitment, abduction and other forms of violence and exploitation.

## Recommendations

### Strengthen Conflict Sensitive Education Services

- Conflict sensitive EiE should be recognized as a lifesaving intervention in conflict-affected areas and IDP locations.
- In PoCs, the high educational aspirations of the students should be accommodated to the extent possible as these are the basis of a peaceful and prosperous South Sudan in years to come;
- Provide enough printed materials and enable their distribution to support teachers and trainers, and stimulate interest among students;
- Scale up the LSaZoP model to all education interventions in conflict-affected areas and those areas bordering conflict states where tensions may be high;
- Consistently apply conflict sensitive monitoring to education and other humanitarian interventions – no evidence was found that such a system is consistently applied;
- Strengthen education services by incorporating conflict sensitivity and risk informed planning to education sector plans (both strategic and operational plans).

### Strengthen social cohesion through adolescent and youth engagement

- Give tangible recognition and visibility to leaders of youth education, life skills and peacebuilding training activities;
- Support sports for peace as a way to ease tensions and bring adolescents and youth together;
- Build on peace club and youth peace dialogues as a means of mitigating conflict, empowering youth, and supporting peacebuilding.

## **Strengthen Humanitarian Response and Development Linkages**

- Adhere to agreed principles for operating in fragile states by systematically applying tools and procedures to adhere to principles of Do No Harm;
- Apply tools for measuring social cohesion and resilience in all areas where humanitarian actors operate (and ideally nationally through government systems as has been done by the Kenyan Commission on Social

Cohesion) as a means of identifying areas highly vulnerable to violent conflict;

- Capitalize upon the role of government social services as tools for peacebuilding;
- The PBEA programme in South Sudan should revisit the TOC underpinning the Schools as Zones of Peace strategy paper to better link programme TOCs to the actual programme adjustments on the ground and more strongly reflect the linkages between development and humanitarian action.

# 1. Programming Context in South Sudan

## 1.1 PBEA Background

The Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme is a four-year, US\$150 million initiative established in 2012. Funded by the Government of the Netherlands (GoN), the programme aims to strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts by improving policies and practices for education and peacebuilding.<sup>2</sup>

PBEA represents a continuation of the work of UNICEF and the GoN to implement education programming in conflict contexts. Specifically, PBEA followed the Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition (EEPCT) programme, carried out from 2006 to 2011 in 44 countries.<sup>3</sup> However, the specific focus of

PBEA on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding makes the programme unique. While past UNICEF interventions included elements indirectly supportive of peacebuilding, PBEA is the first to directly and explicitly work on factors giving rise to violent conflict, while also strengthening the application of conflict sensitivity through EiE responses in emergency settings. In conflict affected contexts, conflict sensitive approaches to service delivery also support communities in healing and dealing with trauma, protection of vulnerable children and adolescents, mitigating the spread of conflict, and to support rapid transitions to sustainable peace and development for children and adolescent.

Figure1. Map



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

2 UNICEF (2014) "About." Learning for Peace. Available at: <http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/about/learning-for-peace/>.

3 The goal of EEPCT was to support countries experiencing emergencies and post-crisis transitions in the process of sustainable progress towards provision of basic education for all. See UNICEF South Sudan 2012.

**PBEA in South Sudan.** PBEA emerged during a period of increased focus by UNICEF on strategic outcomes related to peacebuilding generally, and resilience in particular. In South Sudan, programming was tailored to the need to support peacebuilding goals and consolidating a new state following decades of conflict. Hopes were high on Independence Day in 2011 that the page had been turned and that the new government could set about building a unified nation in a region that had been all but neglected by its British and Sudanese overseers. Left with little infrastructure and massive challenges, including the highest female illiteracy and maternal mortality rates in the world, South Sudan undoubtedly faced massive developmental challenges and was far off track to meet most MDG targets. Ironically, despite massive oil wealth and revenues that qualify South Sudan as a “lower middle-income country” on the basis of GDP (World Bank 2015), extreme inequities in wealth distribution, lack of infrastructure and public services and ongoing civil war make it one of the least developed and most conflict-ridden countries in the world.

Following the events of 15 December 2013 many international partners were accused of failing to deliver programming in anything but a technical developmental fashion, geared towards improving development indicators. While the sudden and rapid unfolding of events in Juba was surprising to some, it would not be fair to say that the international community was caught off guard. Many had been warning of impending crisis, at least since the president sacked his cabinet and deputy in July 2013, given the row with Sudan over oil revenues and border demarcation, the chronic economic problems and the failure of DDR to prevent the continued existence of numerous armed groups since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and even after the country’s independence in 2011. This is symptomatic of the failure of traditional development programming approaches

to engage with the specific context of interventions. The almost single-minded focus on achieving MDGs and pursuing a technical approach to development were essentially divorced from the realities and challenges of a newly independent post-conflict state. It is thus *arguable that development programming was not ‘fit for context’*.<sup>4</sup>

Building on the approach of PBEA, UNICEF was determined to better take into account how political economy interacts with social services delivery in a way that contributes to social, economic and political pressures for conflict.<sup>5</sup> Following the onset of the civil war, and building on the approach of PBEA, UNICEF made adjustments to the management and country teams in order to leverage UNICEF’s unique capacities and address criticism that had emerged and which essentially required a shift in strategy to ensure that programming would be ‘fit for context’.

Significant adjustments included a much stronger focus on introducing ‘conflict sensitive education’ approaches to the delivery of education services, particularly since South Sudan tipped from a post-conflict state into one of civil war after PBEA was designed.<sup>6</sup>

This report will look at several issues including:

- Some of the challenges faced by programming in the humanitarian context (this case study) and the progress so far made to addressing them;
- Adjustments made by the PBEA programme to respond to the humanitarian crisis and position education as a critical and lifesaving set of interventions;
- How education advances conflict resolution, peacebuilding and community resilience in a context of humanitarian action, and the challenges facing programme efforts in the context of South Sudan;
- How education can do more to contribute to peacebuilding efforts, be more conflict sensitive and adhere to principles of ‘do

4 Similarly, in a chapter entitled “Insecurity, war and the diversion of resources,” the North South Institute and World Federation of United Nations Associations (2004) point to the troubling lack of a conflict link in the MDG goals at the global level: “Many NGOs are concerned that the MDGs do not make the links between peace and development more explicit. They are concerned that increased militarization, defence spending and the ease and willingness with which force is used will overshadow, and indeed prevent, any advances towards addressing global inequalities.”

5 Understanding these linkages is the principle aim of this case study and other completed and ongoing research by the CO, illustrated in the companion case study by recent CO-led peace initiatives in Wau and Tonj East.

6 A product of the previous EEPCT programme, the INEE Conflict Sensitive Education (CSE) Pack (available on [http://toolkit.ineesite.org/inee\\_conflict\\_sensitive\\_education\\_pack](http://toolkit.ineesite.org/inee_conflict_sensitive_education_pack)) was adapted to focus on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, going beyond simply the delivery of emergency supplies and basic education.

no harm' by removing biases to certain communities or ethnic groups;

- The study will also suggest some ways that the PBEA, EiE and broader education programmes and those of other humanitarian actors might strengthen adherence to principles of Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity to support conflict mitigation and peacebuilding.

## 1.2 Methodology and Research Limitations

**Methodology.** The case study methodology adhered at all times to UNICEF's guidelines on research ethics.<sup>7</sup> This case study was informed at the outset by interviews with key UNICEF PBEA staff members both in the Country Office (CO) in Juba, South Sudan and in the Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) in Nairobi, as well as Regional Office personnel involved in resilience programming and humanitarian action. All participants were informed of the purpose of the research and consented to participate.

### **Literature Review and background materials.**

A limited review of the literature relevant to the current conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan and the wider region, and on the contested historical roots of conflict, was subsequently conducted from France to inform the case study.

This case study was informed initially by interviews with and reviews of programme documents from key UNICEF PBEA staff members in the Country Office (CO) in South Sudan and the peacebuilding team at the Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) in Nairobi, which included personnel involved in resilience programming (approximately fifteen staff informed this case study).

### **Structured and Semi-Structured Interviews.**

The data gathering methods included semi-structured interviews with programme staff, youth, and implementing partners inside South Sudan. Questions were designed to explore the experiences of stakeholders about the support they received via programme

interventions studied herein. Follow-up structured interviews using guided questioning techniques were used for remote discussions with UNICEF staff to fill information gaps that emerged during initial report writing phases and later report revisions.

**Focus Group Discussions.** The study draws on information received in 7 focus-group discussions (FGDs) and over 60 one-on-one interviews in Juba. About 20 staff were interviewed from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MoCYS) involved in activities coming under the PBEA programme.<sup>8</sup> Approximately 20 children and adolescents in different groups of pupils and 12 teachers and aid workers at the Protection of Civilian (PoC) Camps at UN House (UNMISS Base) near Juba were also interviewed.

Additional consultations were held with INGO and NGO staff active in education, protection, peacebuilding, development and gender in Juba, including academic researchers from local universities and international institutes.

Overall, the number of persons providing direct information for this case study reaches over 110 individuals.

**Secondary data sources.** All available programme documents that outlined progress and challenges with different programming activities were provided for this study. These included monitoring and implementation reports of partners and PBEA Annual Reports and monitoring data. The documents were reviewed to gain an accurate understanding of the process for implementing support activities in POCs and other conflict-affected areas and their achievements and challenges. Significant amounts of data were subsequently provided to this study by UNICEF's Regional Office and the South Sudan PBEA team, especially in relation to providing a better understanding of the numbers of beneficiaries being touched by the PBEA programme. Internal UNICEF documentation in the form of trip reports were also accessed to draw upon and identify results being achieved in geographic areas that were not accessible as part of the initial fieldwork phase of this study.

7 UNICEF ERIC Compendium at <http://childethics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ERIC-compendium-approved-digital-web.pdf>

8 Other information was gathered in visits to Lologo School (formerly St. Andreas) and Nile Model Secondary School in Juba, and is presented in the companion case study on institutional capacity building.

**Limitations.** The following limitations should be taken into consideration when reviewing this report and its findings:

- The scope of the study is limited geographically to Juba, and the three Protection of Civilians sites (PoCs) hosted by UNMISS on the outskirts of the city. Travel outside of Juba was not permitted by UNDSS due to the security situation at Level 3, and a special requirement that incoming consultants could no longer travel on the basis of having received only a security briefing, but had to undergo the three-day Safe Training exercise.<sup>9</sup> The SSAFE trainings were unfortunately fully booked far in advance. No deferments or space to attend training was made available, despite requests from UNICEF's Regional Office and Country Office. Plans to visit Mingkawan IDP camp near Bor and the Wau and Tonj East areas had to be abandoned. To overcome these limitations, research concentrated on:
  - The Protection of Civilian Camps at UN House (UNMISS base) on the outskirts of Juba;
  - Schools in the Juba area; Interviews with specialists at UNICEF and in the INGO community;
- Due to the aforementioned restrictions on movement, this study cannot be taken as a broad evaluation of emergency in education and humanitarian responses throughout South Sudan. Nevertheless, it was possible to derive several benefits from the extended presence in the capital city, notably by:
  - Seeking a variety of opinions in the large international and research community based in Juba on conditions elsewhere in the country to try to understand the broader political economy issues affecting education responses in South Sudan;
  - Examining in more detail certain aspects of the conflict-education nexus that appear particularly relevant to PBEA actions and that might have been

overlooked by other studies;

- Collecting personal accounts of the conflict, flight and displacement of South Sudanese to reveal aspects of the 'larger picture';
- Painting a broader stroke by focusing also on historical and curriculum development issues in two separate South Sudan case studies, including the present study on EiE and humanitarian responses;
- Extensive remote follow-up and writing support throughout this report to ensure accuracy and quality of findings; and
- Examining the work of UNICEF colleagues for areas unable to be visited during the study (particularly Wau and Tonj East), key regions for understanding the context and evaluating the impact of PBEA peacebuilding actions in South Sudan.<sup>10</sup>
- To mitigate the above constraints, extensive desk research and contacts were maintained by telephone and e-mail with programme participants to monitor the impacts PBEA was having. UNICEF's Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) also provided extensive support in reviewing and finalizing the writing of this report.

### 1.3 The Current Context

In June 2014, the world's newest country, South Sudan, was put atop the Global Peace Fund's ranking of fragile states globally,<sup>11</sup> moving up from fourth place to displace Somalia. The infamous distinction was a result of South Sudan's descent into civil war, dashing the hopes raised in 2005 with the end of the second Sudan Civil War and in 2011 with Independence. This new civil war within South Sudan's boundaries broke out on 15 December 2013 between supporters of the President, Salva Kiir, and the former Vice President Riek Machar, reigniting interethnic violence on a scale not seen since the two civil wars with the North. At its simplest

9 The requirement for SSAFE Training would appear prudent. The numerous attacks on UN bases and the staff and IDPs sheltering within (UNMISS 2014a) as well as the defensive UNMISS response aimed at limiting further casualties can justify the high level of security, but one might still argue that in such situations the urgent need for local information, for understanding conflict drivers and for exploring peacebuilding and communication outreach strategies to mitigate against the spread of conflict, would call for a more flexible approach.

10 Despite very heavy workloads and high-level visits occurring simultaneously, all UNICEF and partner staff made themselves available to assist with needed data gathering.

11 <http://fpf.statesindex.org/rankings-2014>

expression, the conflict is a power struggle for control of the State apparatus, but it has ramifications that go much farther, including the fates of ethnic communities, the political economies of neighbouring countries, the control over the country's key resource, oil.

South Sudan today is a fragmented nation divided along ethnic and tribal boundaries, with a weak civil society, shackled by a post-independence transition process in which the levers of political power are dominated by former military commanders and their rank-and-file supporters. In many ways, the conflict is a continuation of the struggles for power and resources that marked South Sudan's pre-Independence history. The primary victims are, like before, the common people, especially children and adolescents, deprived of government services, infrastructure, and livelihoods, left to face insecurity, destruction of assets, famine and disease. Perhaps the rivals in the current struggle see it as a zero-sum game, one in which the winner will rule and the loser be subjugated, following historical precedents.<sup>12</sup> In simplest terms, and almost understandably given the country's tragic history of conflict, it is suggested that key power brokers in South Sudan pursue conflict in very *realpolitik* terms, with war simply being seen as 'politics by other means'.

During the writing of this case study, information pointed to an impasse in the peace negotiations aimed at a power-sharing arrangement, leading three UN Security Council members to threaten to put South Sudan on UN trusteeship, and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to prepare to impose sanctions.<sup>13</sup> A ray of hope was reignited on 2 February, with the signing of the 'Areas of Agreement on the

Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in the Republic of South Sudan' document by the two leaders of the warring parties GoSS and SPLM/A (In Opposition) at peace talks in Addis Ababa.<sup>14</sup> However, the track record of failed ceasefires over the past year does not bode well. As many expected, the 5 March 2015 deadline for signing a comprehensive peace agreement was missed.<sup>15</sup> The ceasefire was increasingly violated and full-scale military operations by both sides erupted in Unity State and Upper Nile State, with no end in sight. When the political ambitions of a few commanders can so easily thwart regional peace making, there must be some underlying factors playing into this fragile tinderbox which is South Sudan—one in which sparks can easily ignite localized incidents that spiral into widespread ethnic violence. If so, one needs to consider the background and context of the contemporary crises and look there for guidance on how to create or restore resilience to the country and build social cohesion among its diverse communities.

#### 1.4 Background factors underpinning the current crisis (structural and cultural)

All of the following causal factors feed on each other, multiplying their effects, and ultimately reducing the resilience of communities and public institutions and undermining social cohesion.

**The current conflict as proximate cause:** The present crisis began on 15 December 2013, leading to at least 10,000 deaths<sup>16</sup> and 1 million displaced, 70,000 of which are in three

12 Daniel Van Oudenaren (2015, 2 January) "Opinion: Peace and slavery in South Sudan, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/opinion-peace-and-slavery-south-sudan>

13 Fred Oluoch (2014, 30 November) "Igad threatens sanctions if talks fail; US wants UN trusteeship," The East African, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/South-Sudan-Igad-threatens-sanctions-US-wants-UN--trusteeship-/-/2558/2539592/-/mbnme1z/-/index.html>.

14 See "South Sudan Parties Sign Areas of Agreement on the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity," dated 2 February 2015 on the IGAD website (accessed 5 February 2015), [http://igad.int/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1041:south-sudan-parties-sign-areas-of-agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-transitional-government-of-national-unity&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=150](http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1041:south-sudan-parties-sign-areas-of-agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-transitional-government-of-national-unity&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=150).

15 IGAD declarations on the peace process and recent violations are on <http://southsudan.igad.int/>.

16 The figure of 10,000 dead is most frequently mentioned (ICG Africa Report No. 217 of 10 April 2014, South Sudan: A Civil War By Any Other Name). The official figure of 500 dead in Juba released a few days after the killings was dismissed by experts (Daniel Howden [2014] "The state that fell apart in a week" The Guardian dated 23 December 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week>). The ICG has recently suggested at least 50,000, if not double that figure, have died between December 2014 and November 2014 (see Peter Martell [2014]); see also [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Sudanese\\_Civil\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudanese_Civil_War)).

Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites under the protection of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) at its base near Juba. Other bases shelter large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are at risk due to their ethnic identity. As of the writing of this case study, OCHA estimated the number of displaced at 1.7 million (out of an estimated population of 11.74 million in 2014<sup>17</sup>) and the number facing alarming food insecurity at 4 million. Over 400,000 fled to neighbouring countries.<sup>18</sup> In addition, UNHCR was assisting over 265,000 refugees from Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and Ethiopia. Ironically, the political turmoil came just days after aid agencies met in Juba to discuss the need to build a resilience agenda. There was a feeling that all was not well between the political actors since a July 2013 cabinet reshuffle, but the meeting that day was on a resilience agenda for development and emergency programming primarily focused on food security and drought. One ESARO colleague said that in hindsight this showed that most UN agencies, including UNICEF, lacked an effective political lens and ability to monitor resilience on this important political economic level to better anticipate such significant changes and risks of violent intrastate conflict.

**Emerging issues of equity:** History has shown how inequities lead to grievances and conflict. Today, new forms of inequity have emerged, and caused new grievances. Until 2013, the two main ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer, were seen by some to be sharing power to the exclusion of the many minority groups. At the helm of the present government, some see only Dinka (though other groups are in fact represented throughout the government). Civil society's role is marginal, causing frustration and disillusionment among activists and intellectuals—many of whom returned from

successful lives abroad at Independence to help build a new South Sudan—and a sense of wasted effort. Resource distribution is notoriously unequal, as evidenced by the state of services delivery in various parts of the country. Some groups are particularly excluded, notably pastoral communities who live cut off from services many months of the year.

**Political:** Divisions and grievances dating back to the independence struggle against the north of Sudan (Khartoum) have not been addressed, nor has a determined and orderly transition from liberation army to political party structure been possible.<sup>19</sup> The diversity of South Sudan's ethnic groups, nationalities, political groups, women and youth have not been afforded proper or proportional representation within governance and decision-making structures, leaving them marginalized. In such a structure, there is often a tendency for decisions to be made by a few on the basis of co-optation rather than informed dialogue between the many groups and factions composing society. A common perception is that rebel groups at the centre of peace negotiations essentially inherited power without substantial involvement of civil society, creating paternalist, even militaristic, patterns of power and politics in which corruption can flourish.

**Security-related:** Security is not assured in most parts of the country. The traditional practice of cattle raiding continues in some areas, causing deaths and loss of property, virtually ensuring that desire for revenge on the part of victims will lead to cycles of raiding and violence. Finally, in and around displaced persons camps, attacks are not unknown; indeed, they even occur near or are directed against camps hosted by UNMISS.<sup>20</sup>

17 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan>.

18 OCHA South Sudan (2014a) "Situation Report No. 5 (as of 17 July 2014)" <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South%20Sudan%20Crisis%20SitRep%2045.pdf>

19 See ICG Africa Report No. 217 of 10 April 2014, South Sudan: A Civil War By Any Other Name.

20 The ICG Africa Report No. 217 (p. i) cites at least five attacks around UNMISS-hosted camps between 15 December 2013 and 14 April 2014. Attacks may be linked to oil in the north, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) activity in the southwest of the country, weak command and control structures of armed groups or lack of professionalism among police, or other issues to which such attacks are often linked.

**Infrastructural:** Communication, trade and government service delivery is plagued by poor roads and infrastructures, leaving vast swathes of the country virtually isolated from the rest of the country, particularly during the rainy season. Predictably, teachers and other civil servants are loathe to be given postings in such ‘hardship’ areas, and when in these times of civil war they are not even sure to be paid it is no wonder many positions remain unfilled.

**Weak governance and service delivery fuel conflict:** Weak governance structures have plagued South Sudan since Independence, an inheritance of historically ingrained governance patterns, and it is no wonder that the situation has only deteriorated since the crisis in the face of political turmoil (over the sudden sacking of the entire cabinet in July 2014<sup>21</sup>), insecurity, and poor infrastructure. International actors are perceived as the main service providers in some areas. The war has also interrupted the flow of oil revenues which constituted at Independence 98% of the South Sudanese national budget.<sup>22</sup> Administrative boundaries are vague and civil governments too weak to serve the role as neutral arbitrator. Inadequate justice mechanisms are responsible for allowing disputes over land or valued resources to morph into full-scale ethnic warfare. The delivery of social services, including education, was difficult or impossible during the two wars with the North in the united Sudan and thus expectations were high that an independent South Sudan would solve all those issues. These hopes have been dashed, leaving frustrations and grievances at the slow pace of change.

Despite the fact that an important milestone in education was reached following the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 that ended the Second Sudanese Civil War)—the key reform of standardizing a primary school curriculum<sup>23</sup>—the end of the war with the north did not eliminate problems of service delivery. Following the war, returnees were obliged to

return to their places of origin, often placing them in isolated regions without access to services and vulnerable to environmental, economic and social perturbations which their isolation exacerbated. As one key NGO informant explained, education suffered:

One of the reasons why many people live in remote areas is that it was a deliberate government policy to send people back to their area of origin, particularly during the returns process from Sudan, so there were 2.7 million people living around the greater Khartoum area who were commanded to go back to their land. The conflict was framed as a land war, with the North nationalizing land, taking control over land not so much as an occupying force would, but taking it up for its national resources; so it began this sort of what I call the sloganeering that “land was for the community” and “community ownership” and so I think what was sort of unfortunate in this post-CPA period is that we probably didn’t get to the point where we were really wanting to evaluate the returns process and the litmus test of durable solutions, etc. But then the conflict was (re-)started. So what we’ve seen time and time again: the people were waiting in way-stations, their passage facilitated by IOM, the reintegration package by UNHCR and other agencies, brought back, then govt. pushed them further and further into isolated areas where social services were lacking. This had a crucial impact on education.

The reason for returnees being pushed deeper into the hinterlands and away from services appears to have been a deliberate government policy to populate and “claim” the borderlands, their presence ensuring ‘security’ and surveillance. It was not intended to be a punishment, but how else could it be interpreted? It would have been more judicious,

21 See Warner 2013.

22 U.S. Energy Information Institute (2014) Country Analysis Brief: Sudan and South Sudan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy); <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=su>

23 ICG Africa Report No. 172 (p. 1)

of course, to ensure that services, roads and infrastructures were prepared in these border areas before forcing this resettlement. In any event, the account expresses a widespread perception of people in other areas where services are not assured. Inevitably, cutting people off from government social services is a sure-fire way to stoke grievances and encourage flight to the capital and other large towns in search of education (as some biographies will later show), employment or sustenance.

In three studies on perceptions of peacebuilding in Warrap, Jonglei and Unity states in 2011, Saferworld<sup>24</sup> show how *perceptions of inequities in services* (including humanitarian) delivery, insecurity, resources pressures and other factors complicate efforts to build peace in these multi-ethnic contexts. Informants in Warrap state give cattle raiding and access to water and land as the primary sources of conflict. Although these factors have long been a source of conflict in the state, even before the wars, new sources of conflict have emerged tied to perceptions of the humanitarian effort for many of Jieng Dinka, Luo and Bongo interviewed (Saferworld 2011c):

- Humanitarian actors gave food supplies to the Abyei refugees that some thought should have been distributed to the local population;
- Competition for food leads to insecurity around points where food supplies are stored. During distribution there is insecurity because the demand for food is higher than the supply;
- International actors do not distribute enough food leading to tensions between people.

International actors are seen as primary providers of social services including health care, education and even infrastructure development, and respondents indicate little expectation from the state to deliver on basic social services (Saferworld 2011c:4).

The possession and availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a major issue in all three areas. In Jonglei state, efforts at disarmament have led to perceptions of ethnic bias fuelling resentment among the main ethnic groups present (Murle, Jieng Dinka, Naath Nuer, Anyuak and Kachipos). Voluntary and coercive disarmament campaigns have been fraught with difficulties and revealing of the powerful legacies of ethnic mistrust that exist in South Sudan.<sup>25</sup> The key comments regarding state inability to provide services were regarding access to education to overcome the illiteracy problem and to provide avenues for alternative livelihoods (Saferworld 2011a:3). Cattle raiding, rebel militias and unemployment are only some of the many issues fuelling conflict in oil-rich Unity state between Nuer factions, Dinka and groups from neighbouring states (Saferworld 2011b). Unemployment is notably due to insecure access to education, which ill-prepares local youths to compete for jobs in the oil industry, and fuels resentment that jobs in this sector are being captured by Sudanese from across the border. The reintegration of opposing factions into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has proved problematic in Unity as in other states. The biographies of leading commanders frequently speak of rebellion, followed by reintegration, then renewed insurgency, without fear of being held accountable for collateral damage at each change in their personal political strategy. This lack of accountability has not only cost the lives of countless innocent civilians, but has fuelled the perpetuation of toxic ethnic narratives and legacies. Dynamics such as these in turn facilitated the rising feeling of exclusion and inequity, the perception that one's group is not receiving the same governmental support, evidenced by the obvious lack of social service delivery. One path can then lead to ethnic radicalization and recruitment to violent militia groups.

24 Saferworld (2011a, September) "Saferworld Briefing: People's Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and peacebuilding responses in Jonglei State"; Saferworld (2011b, September) "Saferworld Briefing: People's Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and peacebuilding responses in Warrap State"; Saferworld (2011c, September) "Saferworld Briefing: People's Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and peacebuilding responses in Unity State."

25 See Human Security Baseline Assessment (2006-2007) "Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent experiences and implication," Sudan Issue Brief 3 (second edition. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-03-Jonglei.pdf>)

**Conflict undermining Resilience - Asset stripping and livelihoods-based violence:** Asset-stripping has occurred as part of traditional warfare, when villages are ransacked, cattle rustled, and women and children abducted. It has also occurred as part of recent armed conflict in the region and was used during the civil wars as a way of denying local support for the SPLA,<sup>26</sup> or less directly but just as effectively, through forced displacement and discriminatory land tenure laws that have the effect of alienating people from their land temporarily or permanently. One of the ways in which land alienation, labour flight and asset stripping together victimized farmers was through the development of Islamic banking and Northern merchant financed agricultural mechanization schemes, particularly in Western and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile in South Sudan, and the Nuba mountains and Kordofan in Sudan.

The displacement of population from rebel-held areas to government controlled areas could then be promoted as agricultural “development,” and receive some international assistance under the control of the government.<sup>27</sup> The most severe famine in Sudan’s modern history (1985-1989) was facilitated by war (through “military means of famine creation”) and the self-perpetuating war economy (de Wall 1997: 93-98):<sup>28</sup>

The main instrument was the militia, specifically the Murahaliin militia, drawn from the Baggara Arabs of southern Kordofan and southern Darfur, which raided the Dinka of northern Bahr el Ghazal. The Murahaliin emerged from the conjunction of local factors (such as impoverishment and unresolved inter-ethnic conflicts) with political and military decisions in government. Their raids were frequent, widespread and devastating. The raiders stole livestock, destroyed villages, poisoned wells and killed indiscriminately (Amnesty International, 1989). They were also implicated in

enslaving captives. Displaced survivors fled to garrison towns, where they were forced to sell their cattle and other assets cheaply. They had to work for little or no pay; they were prohibited from moving outside the camps [or] further north where work or charity might be available. [...] Army commanders and local government officials also prevented relief assistance from reaching the displaced. [...] The cumulative effect of the raiding, restrictions and relief failures was to starve people to death. [...] More widely, localized famines were created by military tactics including raiding and requisitioning, scorched earth and sieges. The army and the militias raided cattle and other movable goods and stole food on operations. [...] Raiding cattle, depopulating villages and sweeping up their inhabitants into displaced camps were a violent form of expanding the political and economic power of the ruling elites [...] with powerful commercial and political connections. [...] Merchant-officer partnerships making windfall profits from contrived scarcities in garrison towns were a feature of the war from the outset: a war economy developed.

The same general famine scenario was repeated in 1998 in Bahr el Ghazal.<sup>29</sup> The use of tribal militias for political expediency, the lack of accountability, the manipulation of aid supplies, the real issue being the ownership of resources—all the usual ingredients were there. Even traditional societies with extremely resilient pre-capitalist systems of agro-pastoralism, such as the Dinka—that enabled them to survive through seasonal and even extraordinary environmental ups and downs—became vulnerable and eventually dispossessed through sustained politically- and economically-motivated raiding. Political economy explains just as well the reason why the two Bahr el Ghazal famines were tolerated (because they provided economic gains for the

26 Johnson 2003:151-157. The 2011 attack by North Sudanese forces on the disputed territory Abyei provides a well-documented recent example of asset stripping (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2011).

27 Ibid.

28 The famine in Bahr el Ghazal is described in detail in Keen 1994 and de Waal 1993.

29 Wealthy merchants from the North and South benefitted from the cheap wage labour provided by displaced Dinka. As Rhodes (2002:7-8) surmises, “as long as the war benefits a certain small but influential percentage of the Sudanese population, there are very little opportunities for lasting peace and a consequent end to famines.”

well-connected in the North and South) as why the 'Sahelian' drought and influx of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the mid-1970s was effectively combatted by 'almost exemplary famine policies' (at the time president Nimeiry had to collaborate with a fairly influential local parliamentary body).<sup>30</sup>

Even when government and opposition forces are not complicit in the exploitation, struggles over land, pastures, cattle, permanent water supplies, and other valued resources in a context of weakness or absence of police and judicial recourse often erupt into violence, and when along ethnic lines, can result in cycles of revenge violence. An ongoing state level conflict accentuates this "everyday" conflict. This conflict has fuelled added vulnerability to environmental stresses and shocks such as famine due to drought and flooding. During the rainy season, prime grazing and settlement zones are reduced due to flooding and competition arises over the few elevated sites situated just above water level. There is evidence that periods of food insecurity can also correspond with high levels of violence. In Jonglei State, a lull in inter-tribal violence in 2010 followed on from comparably high food production.<sup>31</sup> In 2014, because of the war, the South Sudanese largely missed the planting season and famine was often looming, while funding and relief delivery remained in doubt (see below 'Impacts of current crisis').<sup>32</sup>

The growth of village and cattle camp militias armed with automatic weaponry has been going on for some time; typically, fighting between groups resulting from critical livelihoods issues would provide a fertile environment for the application of government counter-insurgency strategies. One of the first tribal militias was set up in 1982 by the Equatorial regional government drawing on Kabora Mundari pastoralists in conflict with the Bor Dinka, who had been encroaching on Mundari grazing lands since the 1960s floods

covered many Bor pastures permanently. The same year, street brawling in Juba pitted Mundari against Dinka over control of the city's meat market.

**Attacks on and occupation of schools:** The conflict and emergency situation has serious repercussions on school functioning in a number of areas. Occupation of and attacks against schools are frequent.<sup>33</sup> The South Sudan Education Cluster counted as of 28 April 2014 that 85 schools were occupied by IDPs, armed forces and other actors (26 of which were in Jonglei state, 19 in Unity and 17 in Upper Nile). As of 17 June 2014, 78 out of 98 schools occupied since the fighting began were still being used by soldiers or IDPs (OCHA & South Sudan Education Cluster 2014), depriving children of access to education and health care and compounding the humanitarian crisis. Schools are being used as barracks and military staging points by both government and rebel forces (as of mid-2014). In a few regions, local communities welcome government military forces into local schools as they are seen as 'protection' against rebel groups. Others fear the militarization of school facilities will undermine the safety and protection that schools offer children and communities. Despite government intent to clear schools of military forces, command and control structures are such that directives to clear schools are not always heeded, particularly when issued by the political leadership of the opposition. Denying access to education to children makes them more vulnerable to abduction and recruitment by armed groups.<sup>34</sup> Nationwide, 1.4 million children are out of school in a country with the world's worst adult literacy rate, 27% (Okech 2015), threatening to prolong social vulnerabilities into the future.

**Abduction and recruitment of children:** Twelve thousand children have been made child soldiers in South Sudan since the civil war

30 Rhodes 2002 and de Waal 1997.

31 Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) (2012, October) "My neighbour, my enemy: Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei." Sudan Issue Brief 21, [http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB21-Inter-tribal\\_violence\\_in\\_Jonglei.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB21-Inter-tribal_violence_in_Jonglei.pdf).

32 L. Muthoni Wanyeki (2014) "South Sudan leaders alarmingly short-sighted," *The East African*, dated 12-18 July.

33 Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack 2014.

34 Information regarding attacks on schools and children are contained in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (A/68/878-S/2014/339) issued on 15 May 2014. (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 2014).

began in December 2013. Abductions and forced conscription continue unabated by ongoing ceasefires or peace talks (Coughlan 2015). The benefits for militia groups of child conscription are well known from other conflict zones. One could add the experience many South Sudan pastoral children have in guarding cattle in cattle camps from a young age and their knowledge of the terrain. The costs of child recruitment for militia groups are minimal. The costs for the country are of course deep and long term. Whether they have participated in routine combat or atrocities, children are marked for life, and unless their psychological and physical wounds treated, pass on militaristic ideologies and practices to subsequent generations in the form of renewed war, sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and the tendency to solve differences through recourse to violence.

**Cultural factors:** Cattle raiding has been a feature of Nuer, Dinka and pastoralist culture for generations, if not centuries, leading to cycles of conflict and revenge. Today, it is aggravating the country's humanitarian crisis. Some see it as an important fixture of pastoral life, perpetuating due to its cultural, social and psychological integration with other violent practices, including painful male initiations and participation in deadly warfare.<sup>35</sup> Yet, it would be too simplistic to regard raiding as simply the expression of timeless ethnic heritages or the markings of a "violent culture." While group conflicts were frequent, due to the absence of centralized political leadership in many of these traditional societies, there were rules defining allies and enemies, and an etiquette of war that served to limit violence.<sup>36</sup> Some ecological explanations of feuding have even suggested that so long as casualties are kept limited, feuding could be an adaptive mechanism to limit population distribution and densities to levels that do not exceed environmental carrying capacity, and

to allow for open spaces or bush between human settlements for the reproduction of pasturelands and fauna. There does not appear to be evidence to support a "feuding as population control mechanism" theory in the case of Dinka or Nuer pastoralists, though one needs to pursue the examination of systemic links between environment and livelihoods to see what other ecological or adaptive factors could be linked to conflict among pastoralists.

Cattle raiding has long been the principal means for a young man to assemble cattle, which represent the primary source of wealth and essential part of the dowry for marriage among pastoral communities in South Sudan. Traditionally, raiders would steal cattle, occasionally kill herders or abduct women and children, but not carry out systematic killings.

Recent developments (post-2010) bear some resemblance to the traditional practices of raiding, but the violence and lethality has been multiplied many times over as the raiding parties have developed into well-armed militias equipped with modern weaponry, older Kalashnikov or new Chinese-made assault rifles, and satellite phones to coordinate massive attacks.<sup>37</sup> The influx of affordable weapons has increasingly transformed traditional feuding into highly organized campaigns of destruction, where entire villages are destroyed and civilians annihilated, including – in a departure from traditional war practice – women, children and the elderly. Eleven major clashes occurred just between Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei between 2009 and 2012, each leaving between 8 and 1000 dead. The nine deadliest encounters resulted in an average of 428 killed.<sup>38</sup> The ready availability of inexpensive automatic weapons facilitates these new levels of violence.<sup>39</sup> Although many weapons were collected following the conclusion of the peace process in 2005, others were subsequently looted

35 Francis Mading Deng (1972) *The Dinka of the Sudan* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 68-80.

36 Among the Dinka, the concept of dheeng requires that a speared and fallen enemy may not be harmed if a woman has protected him by falling on him (Deng 1972:76). Among the Nuer, the "leopard-skin chief" is invested with ritual authority to compel negotiated settlement of serious offenses, including homicide, in place of violent retribution. See pp. 78-79 in Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1940), "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan," pp. 69-79 in Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford University Press).

37 ICG Africa Report No. 154 of 23 December 2009, *Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan*; HSBA 2012.

38 HSBA No. 21: page 3, Table 1.

39 See Pete Muller/Saferworld (2011) "Small arms and cattle raiding in South Sudan – in pictures," *The Guardian*, dated 7 July; <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2011/jul/07/southern-sudan-small-arms-cattle-raiding-in-pictures#/?picture=376520967&index=0>

from armouries and storage facilities and fell into private hands. Others flow in from neighbouring countries, and ammunition is often found for sale in stores.

Many men returned from the war still bearing their guns and intent on marrying and enlarging their herds; unemployed, they turned to their old rivalries. Polygamy is also a factor. Before, men married in their 20s and 30s would typically have three or four wives; interviews in March 2012 found that men were marrying younger and having more wives due to increased cattle theft. This leads to scarcity in the supply of women of marriageable age, which in turn causes dowry prices to rise,<sup>40</sup> encouraging a spiral of increasingly extensive cattle raiding.

The ease of obtaining automatic weapons, new marriage patterns, and subsequent rising demand for cattle, have combined to put pressure on pastoralist communities, particularly when their movements in search of pasturelands put them in conflict with other ethnic groups. Armed groups can manipulate these tensions by taking sides and supplying weapons to one or both sides, and partaking of the spoils. Whole villages can suddenly become the focus of attack, with women, children and elderly no longer spared, causing mass displacement that further adds to the gravity of the humanitarian emergency engulfing the country.

Each attack is filed away in the collective consciousness of the victimized ethnic group. Through these events may be far from Juba, the IDPs receive information and can articulate lists of grievances against the government or opposing ethnic groups for specific attacks on their people. Many of the youths in the IDP camps were students or intellectuals residing temporarily in the capital, but retaining strong links to the countryside.

**Summary analysis of section.** The brief review of critical political, social and economic pressures above begs that question that had UNICEF's peacebuilding programme, together with other development partners, been fully operational in the run-up to the 15 December

2013 events, the actions of protagonists could have been less virulent, though that would be much to ask of a limited pilot project. In hindsight, the cyclical nature of conflict, the role of revenge, and the political jockeying in South Sudan since Independence should have signalled that certain groups (such as the Nuer minority in Juba) would be vulnerable if events came to a head. Though it cannot excuse the abuses, the virulent nature of the attacks on suspected rebel supporters and sympathizers could have resulted from perceptions that government control of the capital was at grave risk; indeed, many observers credit the intervention of Ugandan troops on the side of the government with preventing the capital from falling to the rebels.<sup>41</sup> Or perhaps a more conflict sensitive mode of programming would have insisted more on the need to urgently ramp up development and services delivery in the areas of the country where pent-up grievances and feelings of abandonment were getting close to the bursting point.

The lesson for UNICEF and other agencies is that despite having in place humanitarian assistance responses—typically focussed on saving lives, providing emergency assistance and distributing supplies—they were not sufficiently engaging with the legacies and dynamics of conflict outlined in this section. As a result, there was little 'peacebuilding' going on with many caught 'off guard' when the civil war broke out. Humanitarian response tends to be very 'conflict blind', the blind spot sometimes justified by the notion that 'politics' should not get in the way of speedy food distribution and medical attention. PBEA is trying to ensure that an understanding of South Sudan's unique historical and social complexities can inform new modes of conflict sensitive programming capable of addressing the critical emergency and longer term challenges faced by the new country. A little better knowledge of conflict dynamics might even allow for efficiency gains in food and medical distribution through reducing conflict risks and, at a minimum, 'do no harm' by not contributing to the political economy driving the current conflict cycle.

40 HSBA 2012:6.

41 For example, ICG Africa Report No. 217 of 10 April 2014, South Sudan: A Civil War By Any Other Name, p. i.

## **Humanitarian Action in Education – Risks Being Addressed**

### **Potential Conflict Triggers**

- High levels of community mistrust based along ethnic lines creating pressures for renewed conflict or sporadic violence against vulnerable individuals.
- Conflict-induced trauma combined with idleness and fear threatening increased criminality that can trigger renewed deadly ethnic conflict.
- Schools used for non-education purposes (e.g., use by internally displaced persons, use by armed local groups including military personnel and police).

### **Protection Issues**

- Fear of attacks against children in schools or surrounding schools,
- Fear of children and adolescents being recruited into rival ethnic armed groups.
- Targeting of girls in school for sexual abuse.
- Increased violence among children and adolescents due to psycho-social trauma.

### **Undermining Community Resilience against Violent Conflict**

- Disconnect between humanitarian response and development work (creating dependency on external aid that will not support community level recovery resulting in increased vulnerability to shocks).

Drawn from: UNICEF, 26 January 2014, 'Draft Concept Note: Schools as Zones of Peace: Integrating Resilience and Social Cohesion with the Humanitarian Response to Support Early Recovery and Longer-term Development in South Sudan', Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) and Education in Emergencies (EiE), UNICEF, South Sudan, Education Team, ESARO Support team, pp. 5-6.

## 2. Humanitarian Context and PBEA Programming Responses

Education services in contexts of humanitarian crisis are considered lifesaving by parents when they provide safe learning spaces and information on dangers to their children, with children relaying information to other members of the family in turn. Yet, in situations of humanitarian crisis education is often considered less urgent than the provision of security, food or water, or sanitation and hygiene (WASH). While understandable during acute phases of an emergency, education becomes critical because of the role it plays in mitigating against new forms of conflict, reducing risks of child exploitation, reducing risks of idleness and the rise of negative coping strategies among young people – including recruitment to armed groups or criminal networks – and supporting transitions to recovery and development, among countless other benefits. A question that arises is to what extent education-related initiatives are being utilized to maximize upon their lifesaving potential and to ensure that a generation of children will not face dire futures that will expose them to other risks – including the risk of being trapped in a cyclical pattern of conflict from which they may never escape? This section explores why and how education interventions supported by PBEA were adapted to the crisis and how they have worked to prevent new forms of violence and strengthen community resilience against conflict. While it is arguable that these adjustments have not led to peacebuilding results, they certainly seem to have contributed to reducing violence, dealing with the impacts of the current conflict, and at a minimum supporting Do No Harm by promoting conflict sensitivity, thus creating space for peacebuilding processes to restart more quickly.

### 2.1 Rapid Adjustments to the Programme TOC to Respond to the Crisis

In the immediate aftermath of crisis' onset in December 2013, UNICEF education staff and others involved in C4D in South Sudan, considered to be 'non-critical' to the humanitarian response, were evacuated to Nairobi, Kenya. Spending over a month in Nairobi these staff, frustrated and eager to return to South Sudan knowing full well the risks children faced, engaged in extensive discussions with personnel from UNICEF's regional office, principally the Regional Office Education and Peacebuilding Specialist and Education in Emergency Specialist, advocating for their return and working to reposition education as a critical and lifesaving set of interventions. During this period, South Sudan's C4D officer also explored with regional office personnel ways for reshaping communication strategies to support conflict mitigation and peacebuilding messaging in high risk communities in South Sudan broadly, and PoCs in particular. At a time when the crisis for children in Syria was gaining global attention and concerns were rife about the risks of 'a lost generation', the repositioning of PBEA programming in South Sudan adopted a similar approach. Education, EiE, PBEA and C4D officers together conducted a rapid analysis to identify specific conflict risks (as well as 'conflict triggers'), identified risks for children and adolescents in South Sudan, and articulated a strategy for utilizing education to address protection issues. The aim was to prevent the loss of an entire generation of South Sudanese children by strengthening resilience and repairing frayed social bonds.

The premise underpinning the strategy was that it would help to:

...establish linkages between lifesaving humanitarian responses with development activities. Crucial for supporting the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development is the creation (or maintenance) of safe, protective learning spaces for children, adolescents and youth in which they will receive needed humanitarian and psycho-social support. Moreover, programmatic adjustments such as establishing Schools as Zones of Peace will help to begin the process of rebuilding social cohesion among divided communities, strengthening community resilience against conflict, and improving human security (UNICEF-ESARO 2014a:5-6).

The Theory of Change articulated for the strategy stated that: *If conflict sensitive peacebuilding strategies are introduced to humanitarian activities then communities will better understand conflict and violence risks and increase their resilience against violent conflict. Moreover, interventions that support local capacities for dialogue, reconciliation, and inter-group collaboration support strengthening community level social cohesion and collective action—key dimensions of resilience.*

These early discussions informed a rethink of several key PBEA engagement strategies and a sharpening of the programme, with activities developed for engaging with communities in PoCs across the country, strengthening existing programme activities, and the introduction of several initiatives deemed important for adjusting to the new realities of operating in South Sudan, several of which are explored below. Following the return of UNICEF staff to South Sudan in March 2014, the TOC listed above was used to inform and strengthen existing PBEA TOCs, the most relevant of which related to youth and marginalized children in high risk areas.

### Informing existing TOCs to respond to the crisis

- a) If youth from different tribes and ethnicities, male and female, are provided with venues where their voices and opinions can be heard and where they can compete and interact and demonstrate leadership and advocate for others in a peaceful manner, they will experience increased self-esteem and sense of belonging to a common identity.
- b) If marginalized children in medium to high risk areas regularly attend relevant LS+PB, livelihood and literacy and numeracy classes, then they will have increased access to relevant quality education that contributes to their positive behavioural and intellectual development.

## 2.2 Critical Risks Addressed by Programme Adjustments – Youth and Ethnic Division

**Youth frustration.** From discussions at Juba PoCs clearly there emerges a sense of frustration among youths, unable to safely leave the camp, and feelings of imprisonment and disempowerment on the outskirts of the capital city where only months earlier many were freely attending secondary schools and universities. New conflict dynamics have emerged as a result of the crisis. In the Juba camps, Nuer feel safe, but the men are reluctant to leave the protective perimeter of the UN House. A strong sense of victimization is central to the current mind-set of Nuer IDPs in the camp (from interviews and FGDs held inside the camp in July 2014). Camp members are eager to tell outsiders details of their treatment at the hands of military, militias, police and individuals who single them out for their ethnic identity. They say they are easily recognized as Nuer and are often stopped, harassed, beaten or worse. If possible, they will send a girl to town to fetch supplies or run errands for them rather than risk leaving the camp themselves.

In terms of the prognostics for future reconciliation, though they seem dim at present, the interviews held in the Juba PoC with frustrated youth hold out both challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, there is much concern: throughout the country many youths from both sides are less likely to heed the advice of elders, are reluctant to disarm, and are suspicious of voices urging restraint.<sup>42</sup> Youths are enrolled on both sides of the conflict as unofficial combatants to supplement regular forces, and enforce local security arrangements (LSAs) due to their intrinsic benefits (access to employment, food, cattle) and also to fill in the security gaps resulting from government incapacity in policing and law enforcement.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, many youths both inside and outside the emergency context are receptive to the peacebuilding education and peace messages that permeate UNICEF PBEA interventions, evidenced by their eager participation in Peace Groups and other discussion forums.

### Ethnicity and conflict

There is no doubt that the dominant form of violence in recent years has been ethnically motivated, but this pattern has persisted due to South Sudan's "history of war, criminal violence and abuse without any form of accountability or meaningful inter-communal reconciliation" (HRW 2014:2). Precise data are unavailable on the ethnic composition of those dwelling in the three Juba UNMISS PoCs, and in other PoCs around the country. Of the South Sudanese ethnic groups, the vast majority in the Juba PoCs are Nuer, as Nuer were the most at risk during the December 2013 crisis in Juba. Fleeing the Juba attacks and the destruction of their neighbourhoods were entire families as well as students and children that had been residing in Juba to pursue their education. Wives and children of Nuer soldiers stationed in Juba who had been killed in the fighting or fled north to join the rebel movement SPLM/A (In Opposition) are also a significant part of the population in the Juba PoCs, along with the many people made homeless by the destruction of the Nuer

neighbourhoods or feeling at risk. Around the country, PoCs provide shelter to those groups most at risk. As government forces control all of the major towns, most PoCs in and near them are sheltering a disproportionate number of Nuer as well, though Dinka and other ethnic groups are present to the extent they are at risk in each case. Many foreigners have also been victimized by the conflict, and sought shelter in the PoCs, among them the Eritreans, Somalis, Congolese, Ethiopians and Sudanese in Juba. In northern Unity and Upper Nile states, 200,000 Sudanese refugees fleeing the conflict that began in 2011 in Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States live in refugee camps, some with limited humanitarian access (IRC 2014). In all, the UN estimates over 100,000 IDPs and refugees are currently sheltering in PoCs under UNMISS control. A number of de facto settlements have sprung up where people fleeing fighting or threats have gathered. The largest of these, at Mingkaman in Aweriel County, Lakes State, has a population of 100,000 IDPs.

Ethnicity is frequently cited as the major cause of the current conflict, said to be one of Dinka against Nuer, a replaying of ancient enmities between the two groups. In interviews at the PoCs with Nuer and (in the companion case study) a key interview with the Dinka headmaster of an elementary school, it was clear that both groups feel they have been uniquely victimized down through history and in the present conflict, that one's own group has never attacked the other, and if the other suffered casualties these could only have been the result of legitimate self-defence. The predominantly Nuer composition of the Juba PoCs has created a situation where it is difficult to discuss issues of education without a preliminary clearing of the political atmosphere, so to speak. Education and day-to-day survival needs are voiced almost in the same breath with the broader political economic and security concerns, resource access rights, and even the question of the future leadership of the country, indicating enduring trauma, disorientation and fatigue.

42 Africa Confidential (2014) "South Sudan: Calling time on the killing" (2 May, vol. 55 No. 9, pp. 1-3).

43 See Human Security Baseline Assessment (2014) "Protective measures; Local security arrangements in Greater Upper Nile," Sudan Issue Brief 23 (July 2014), p. 1: "In Jonglei, thousands of armed Lou Nuer youths took control of Bor alongside rebel forces loyal to Peter Gadet in late December. Meanwhile, President Salva Kiir authorized the recruitment and training of thousands of youths for a Juba-based auxiliary force under his command, with many of the recruits drawn from the predominantly Dinka areas of Greater Bahr el Ghazal. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has also taken on new recruits from the Equatorias and Western Bahr el Ghazal to fight on the front lines in Unity and Upper Nile."

## 2.3 Preventing Ethnic-based Conflict among Youth and Communities

Youth interviewed in the PoCs expressed a high level of appreciation for UNICEF's presence, seen as essential for preventing attack from other ethnic groups just outside the camp. PBEA interventions focussing on LS + PE were instituted in the camp very early in 2014 as part of programmatic adjustments with the aim of mitigating specific conflict triggers deemed high risk in crowded PoCs. Evidence gathered in visits to PoCs demonstrated that PBEA LS + PB support in PoCs was very influential at promoting behavioural change among youth and turning them away from engaging in violence to resolve disputes or to seek revenge (*i.e. achievement of PBEA Outcome level 3 results*). Youths participating in this study consistently noted that access to LS + PB learning opportunities had helped them to begin coming to terms with feeling of trauma, and in some cases has helped to turn children and young people away from trauma and the desire to seek revenge. Instead, adolescents and youth, through participation in reconciliation and healing 'working groups', were beginning a process of healing and forgiveness and discussing how to reconnect with other members in their community to support a peaceful future for South Sudan (see video link in footnote).<sup>44</sup> The sentiments expressed by youth in the cited video documentation were widely shared by most of those interviewed in PoCs during July 2014. All were interested in restoring relations with former schoolmates and friends on the other side of the ethnic divide, and declared their commitment to peaceful resolution of grievances and deeply regretted the situation of insecurity around the camp and more broadly in the country. Moreover, for those participating in PBEA-supported activities inside the camps, the activities seemed to provide a channel for dealing with latent and potential aggressions, leading to a situation where they were less likely to develop negative

coping strategies or perpetrate new forms of violence against others inside the camps.

Presented with an outsider, the older student IDPs, who claimed they belonged to no particular faction, also took advantage of a rare chance to voice the feelings of victimization, trauma and disempowerment that struck them suddenly in December when "the state fell apart" (Howden 2013). It was suggested that educated Nuer youth could profit from discussions with Dinka and other intellectuals who are also peacemakers.<sup>45</sup> The Nuer in Juba PoC are in favour of the idea, as outlined above, several obstacles exist in the present context of insecurity and civil war. However, with the exception of PoC 3 (which has Eritreans, Somalis and other refugees in addition to Nuer), the Juba camps are for all intents and purposes Nuer settlements. With limited contact with the outside world, there is little opportunity for cross-ethnic or multi-ethnic dialogue. Due to this, strategies for *protection and conflict mitigation (ethnic group separation)* has remained the most sensible solution envisioned for now by NGO staff and IDPs themselves. Nevertheless, the interlocutors felt satisfied that *the exchange with UNICEF afforded them an opportunity to speak freely* and get a number of issues off their chest, as is encouraged in group discussions aimed at treating trauma and the feeling of disempowerment common to camp life.

Based on the sort of positive progress identified above with conflict prevention and reconciliation in PoCs, the PBEA programme incorporated similar approaches to its programming in other parts of the country where ethnicity and youth frustration create risks of conflict. Extracts from a UNICEF field mission report to Maridi County in WES demonstrate that this 'programme learning' bore promising results for preventing conflicts and also for promoting behavioural change that can support longer term peacebuilding outcomes.

44 See PBEA video document online that explores the experiences of one youth in a POC recovering from the loss of family and who is coming to terms with trauma and feelings of revenge, choosing a path to reconciliation and healing: <http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/blog/youth-strive-to-build-peace-in-south-sudan-2/>

45 Such individuals could be identified through consultations with NGOs and academics working on peacebuilding, among others: UNDP, UNMISS, IOM, NP (Nonviolent Peace Force), SFCG (Search for Common Ground, with whom ESARO is already working), CRS-Aecom, ZOA International.org, Nile Hope Development Forum, Sudd Institute (Department of Peacebuilding, Juba University).

### **Excerpts from Life skills & Peacebuilding Monitoring Report, Aug 2014, Maridi county WES:**

The key conflict drivers in Maridi include cattle interference with farms, Ibba-Maridi border dispute, land conflict over demarcation, conflict over natural resources and judiciary. The following activities have been conducted in Maridi County by the conference participants:

- After the conference, the department for youth and sports in Maridi effected registration of 16 football clubs, each with 25 players and 7 executive members, totalling to 33 members per football club. Registration was done in two weeks as from 15th-30th June, 2014. The sports clubs will be used to unite the youth in the County and promote peace. Games and Sports are available in Maridi. However, lack of materials is a big challenge that is limiting the sports to only football. There are 4 active Payams with sports in the County, but Nkozi is not active.
- After the killing of youth in Maridi in July by the army, 1 meeting was held with 30 youth to derive a mechanism for preventing violence. The meeting resorted to stopping any form of violence that could be sparked off by the youth. The youth worked through the commissioner and arrested the culprits who committed the crime.
- 1 Committee of 7 youth (2 girls) was formed as a justice body to take charge directly for scholarship selection when opportunities get to the County and ensure fairness in the selection process.
- 1 reconciliation meeting held by the youth, women, civilians and national army to bridge the relationship between the civilians and the army.

Also worth noting is that the field trip extracts suggest that the innovative approaches being applied for preventing conflict and promoting reconciliation were being used to rebuild trust between civilians the military – a two-way trust building relationship that has the potential to protect civilians by ‘humanizing’ them in the eyes of military personnel.

### **Study A – Increasing Social Cohesion in Yambio**

A PBEA documented Human Interest Story drawn from Yambio shows how ‘teacher X’ experienced ethnic tensions and stress in his school due to teacher dynamics. The teacher was concerned after observing that teachers were socializing according to tribal affiliation. Following attending a conflict sensitive education, the life skills and peacebuilding training, the teacher requested to run a similar training for his school. Teachers in the school later appreciated the training and there was subsequently a significant change in behaviour among the community of teachers in the school. Divisions and exclusionary behaviour based on tribal affiliation decreased and teachers were able to easily interact with one another irrespective of tribal or ethnic identity, with the tension that existed significantly reduced in the school.

As shown in Study A, the conflict sensitive education and Life Skills capacity development training was, at times, also replicated at school level at the own initiatives of local community members and PBEA training participants. While the specific number is not clear as monitoring of this type of self-help initiative was not built into the programme monitoring systems, PBEA staff note that this sort of local initiative was quite common across several different states and was typically organized and implemented by PBEA training participants who hoped to address ethnic or tribal tensions and, ideally, to improve community relations and levels of trust.

Another example is ADRA's intervention (a UNICEF implementing partner) in Nassir County in Upper Nile where *impressive progress with Outcome 4 for increasing access to conflict sensitive education services has been demonstrated*. Although much of the area is hard-to-reach and a conflict-affected emergency area, during 2014 ADRA established six Temporary Learning Sites (TLS) in two payams, reaching over 2000 children, adolescents and youth, 713 of which (or some 36%) were female. It also reached 65% of IDPs in the area and established inclusive committees, peace ambassadors, and engaged students and youth in sports for peace as part of the Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace (LSaZoP) strategy. These initiatives helped to address a large number localized conflicts and related conflict triggers, thus strongly contributing to achieving PBEA Outcome 3 results for changing behaviour and promoting peaceful dispute resolution. Moreover, in addition to selecting peace ambassadors in each TLS, ADRA established two Youth Centre Management Committees (YCMC) with nine members, five of which were female (or 55%). Their common vision was (and is) "to build a peaceful generation". The mandate of the YCMC includes strengthening protection of human rights, especially of children and other vulnerable groups, by identifying risks, monitoring and reporting protection issues, such as GBV in-school and out-of-school, sexual abuse, forced marriage and unaccompanied children; to advocate for recognition of child rights and protection in schools; to be focal persons for youth; to raise awareness on healthy living, HIV/AIDS, STD and hygiene and to promote team building spirit and tolerance among children and youth through activities involving sports and other recreational activities. Activities of the YCMCs were launched with a sports tournament with the theme "creating a non-violent society is a responsibility of all". Speaking for many of

the young people involved in the activities organized by the YCMCs, a participant stated that, "the sports project has encouraged team building and tolerance among youth and therefore must continue." Many youth in the area have expressed frustration over their current risky life styles in the current conflict, where fighting is perceived as the only solution to a problem. These forums are the only spaces young people have to express their frustrations and to seek peer support.

## 2.4 Conflict Undermining Food Security and Resilience among IDPs

In the UN and non-UN displaced persons camps throughout the country, the conflict has given rise to multiple crises of food insecurity and disease.<sup>46</sup> The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification or IPC (updated 10 June 2014)<sup>47</sup> determined that 3.5 million people in South Sudan are in Crisis and Emergency requiring urgent humanitarian assistance (IPC Phase 3 Crisis & 4 Emergency). Between June and the end of August 2014 this number was considered likely to increase to 3.9 million. Although famine was not declared at this time in South Sudan either at State or County levels, "...the IPC Analysis may have missed Phase 5 Famine for areas within counties due to the spatial resolution of analysis." Even if this conclusion cannot be substantiated with the available data and thus warrants further investigation, the IPC ERC<sup>48</sup> believes that "...the evidence indicates that there are likely households in Phase 5 Catastrophe". It further notes that "...famine is likely to occur in selected areas if (1) conflict continues, (2) there is limited humanitarian access, and (3) aid resources are not provided." The most affected States are Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei where as many as from 45% to 70% of population are in crisis or emergency.

46 Stefan Stefansson (Partnership Manager, ESARO & South Sudan CO) and James Elder (Regional Chief of Communications, ESARO), interviewed on 20 July 2014, shared data showing that 495 in the under 5s category had died in PoCs in the first six months of 2014: 45% from nutrition-related; 57 are SAM (severe acute malnutrition), watery diarrhoea. As the sample is 10% of the displaced population, multiplying this figure by 10 would mean an estimated 5000 have died for 6 months of data or 12 per day, from nutrition-related illnesses.

47 IPC (2014a) "South Sudan needs to urgently scale-up humanitarian interventions to prevent famine," IPC Alert, Issue 1, dated 9 May 2014, updated 10 June 2014 (retrieved 11 January 2015), [http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/1\\_IPC\\_Alert\\_SouthSudan\\_Crisis\\_May2014.pdf](http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/1_IPC_Alert_SouthSudan_Crisis_May2014.pdf).

48 IPC Global Emergency Review Committee 2014:4.

The most affected populations are IDPs who are dispersed and the host communities affected by the on-going conflict. This complex emergency in South Sudan is caused by high underlying vulnerability, the effects of conflict and displacement compounded by the coming lean season and resulting in loss of livelihoods, income, assets, inadequate food access, market disruption, high prices, and unsustainable coping.<sup>49</sup>

The existence of multiple crises in and around IDP camps is manifest in several parts of the country, notably Bentiu and Malakal, where serious issues of camp security, health, sanitation, food security, water contamination, etc., have been experienced. In the Bentiu (Unity state) camp, which lies on a flood plain, many of the 46,872 IDPs counted in August 2014 have been surviving in knee deep water for months.<sup>50</sup> Attacks on the camp are frequently threatened by warring parties. Then occurred the 26 August 2014 shooting down of a UN helicopter over Bentiu killing three crew members. Some promising signs were noted in the September 2014 results of using the IPC methodology and improvement was expected to continue into December 2014.<sup>51</sup> In the absence of peace, the situation remained nonetheless critical.

In response to the risks of food insecurity caused by conflict, UNICEF in partnership with War Child Canada, became involved in three types of activities aiming to increase food security resilience and reduce related conflict drivers in the IDP community in Malakal and for refugees in Wau Shiluk. The project has three specific objectives: 1) Increase action taken by young women and men in the PoC to prevent violence, exploitation, and gender-based discrimination in their communities; 2) Increase access to functional literacy and numeracy (FLN) skills for young women and men from PoC; and 3) Increase participation of young women and young men in sustainable fishing and Village Saving & Credit Association (VSLA). The approach aims to strengthen

youth in their crucial role in the economic development of the country and to promote their access to economic opportunities. No evidence showing achievement of desired objectives was accessible for the purposes of this case study. However, similar programmes supported by UNICEF in cattle camps (see companion case study) and in PoCs cited above where evidence is showing progress with similar objectives suggests that programmes to increase food security resilience will yield positive results related to peacebuilding.

## 2.5 Conforming to EiE Standards and Integrating Conflict Sensitivity

It is worthwhile to review briefly how the Juba PoC visited during the case study fieldwork phase stacks up in terms of the four education in emergencies (EiE) foundational guidelines and how EiE was strengthened by incorporating principles of conflict sensitivity. It should be emphasized that EiE's concerns are focused primarily on ensuring continuity of education services, universal access, minimum standards for physical structures and environment, community inclusion, teacher training and materials provision, risk reduction, and protection of children. Essential in establishing the rights of children to education, EiE has become an essential guide for education programming in crisis situations.

- **Access and Learning Environment:** equal access is provided to *all in the camp, though access to the camp itself was extremely risky during height of crisis, and furthermore Juba PoCs are virtually mono-ethnic*; protection and well-being ensured *inside the camp, but travel outside and to town is risky, some voice fear of possible attack in the future or of ongoing intelligence infiltration*; facilities and services meet minimal standards, *but risks to continuity of service have arisen at times due to government statements that IDPs are not at risk and should return home, raising fears of closure*;

49 Ibid.


50 OCHA (2014b) "South Sudan: Floods, disease and death in Bentiu," dated 29 August; <http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/south-sudan-floods-disease-and-death-bentiu> (consulted 11 January 2015).

51 See IPC (2014) "IPC in South Sudan," Region and Country Work, <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-countries/ipcinfo-eastern-middle-africa/South%20Sudan> (consulted 11 January 2015).

- **Teaching and Learning:** curricula, training, professional development and support are ensured by UNICEF and partners based on EiE best practices; instruction and learning processes are adapted to local conditions, language and needs;
- **Teachers and Other Education Personnel:** recruitment and selection; conditions of work are acceptable with teachers recruited from the PoC, are IDPs themselves and of the same ethnic group ensuring cultural and emotional proximity to students *though some classes are very large, salary is considered low and more perks would be appreciated; support and supervision exist though more trainings are requested, including in peacebuilding;*
- **Education Policy:** law and policy formulation, planning and implementation have been carried out well in areas visited. out at the national level as evidenced by the many policy documents UNICEF and the government ministries have agreed upon and published (UNICEF South Sudan 2012; UNICEF, MoGEI & MoCYS 2013; South Sudan Education Cluster 2012; MoEST & MoCYS 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; MoGEI & MoCYS 2012). Moreover, the government issued a Communique expressing its support for mainstreaming protection and lifesaving approaches into education through Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace (LSaZoP).

To strengthen the capacity of government and partners to implement conflict sensitive education services, EiE responses were strengthened through a PBEA initiative launched in early 2014 to conduct conflict sensitive education trainings for government and implementing partners. Starting in March 2014 the PBEA administered Conflict Sensitive Education (CSE)<sup>52</sup> training in Juba that was subsequently extended to other states such as Malakal. The intention was to improve the provision of EiE in a conflict sensitive manner. Throughout 2014, a total of 143 education duty-bearers from government and implementing partners were trained in conflict sensitive education service delivery.<sup>53</sup> The significant increases in levels of understanding among duty-bearers about conflict sensitivity and how to apply it to their daily work was also *strong evidence of progress with increasing institutional capacity to deliver conflict sensitive education services (PBEA Outcome 2)*. Using the Likert scale on 11 questions, the pre-post assessment on Conflict Sensitive Education (CSE) managed to assess knowledge change through the CSE trainings. The Likert scale measured perceived sense of understanding from one (1) to five (5) where 1 = No Understanding, 2 = Understanding is Not Good, 3 = Not Sure, 4 = Understanding is Good and 5 = understanding is very good.<sup>54</sup>

Figure 2. I Understand What Conflict Sensitivity Means



52 Malakal CSE Training Report \_January 2015\_FINAL

53 South Sudan PBEA Annual Report 2014. It should be noted that PBEA programme officers feel the numbers of recorded participants in fact significantly understate the actual numbers of persons trained as in some states data was not collected in a systematic fashion by implementing partners.

54 Since the reposting is on proportion, the sample size difference on the pre- and post- test doesn't affect the result.

Following trainings, the proportion of participants reporting “*not enough understanding*” (i.e. ‘not at all’ and ‘not good’) decreased significantly from 43% to 18%. At the same time, the total percentage of individuals with increased understanding of conflict sensitivity after the training rose to 82% (a combination of ‘good’ and ‘very good’). As a result of this partners are better equipped to design and manage projects in a conflict context.

Additionally, In Bentiu the PBEA programme was able to integrate with EiE through the Windle Trust teacher development programme. The teacher training programme is reaching out to dozens of teachers who are expected to undergo a 3-month training to increase their capacity to deliver Life Skills and Peacebuilding education materials and strengthen the quality of conflict sensitive education service delivered in PoCs, with a particular focus on promoting trust, tolerance, respect for diversity.

**Challenges with integrating conflict sensitivity beyond education.** PBEA initiatives for integrating conflict sensitivity to humanitarian action seemed entirely sensible and appropriate for ensuring, at a minimum, adherence to ‘Do No Harm’. However, efforts at delivering conflict sensitive training beyond the education sector and with development partners appeared to consistently encounter bottlenecks. Confronted with the pressures of responding to a humanitarian emergency, it was all too common to hear statements from humanitarian actors such as “if it’s not about saving lives it’s not a priority”, including from UNICEF staff not directly involved in the PBEA or education programmes. Discussions within UNICEF were ongoing during the fieldwork for this case study to conduct cross-sectoral and inter-agency conflict sensitivity training to strengthen humanitarian responses. However, there was every indication that, given the ‘surge mentality’ and rapid short-term emergency deployments to South Sudan, such training was still far the making. Such realities essentially highlight the ongoing challenges of integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches to the work of international agencies within

both humanitarian and development sectors. This points to broader challenges within the international community and how it engages in fragile settings and is consistent with 2011 OECD findings, which lists adherence to Do No Harm as a major weakness. The OECD notes that one of the worst performing areas for adhering to agreed upon principles of operating in fragile state settings is the systematic application of mechanisms to ensure adherence to principles of Do No Harm.<sup>55</sup>

## 2.6 Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace (LSaZoP)

Based on a strategy that emerged as a specific response to the conflict-induced humanitarian crisis aiming to position education as a critical lifesaving response and to protect children, LSaZoP affirms both the right of children to receive education in a safe and secure environment, and the notion that the places where education is dispensed are off limits for the installation of anything not connected with education. Arguably informing much of the EiE response in South Sudan as well as government policy, the strategy was initially entitled ‘Schools as Zones of Peace’, which was subsequently renamed ‘Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace’ in order to accommodate non-formal learning spaces for children and young people. Based on the Nepalese Schools as Zone of Peace model developed by Save the Children, the approach was linked to existing TOCs of the PBEA (see above).

At a time when UNICEF was strongly advocating with government to promote the protection of children in a context where thousands of children had been recruited to armed groups, while the education of hundreds of thousands others had been interrupted (i.e. addressing both protection issues and prevention of a ‘lost generation’ akin to the children of Syria), the significance of the initiative is arguably clearest at policy level (i.e. PBEA Outcome 1).

In late 2014 after months of advocacy with government, a two-day conference was organised in Juba on 19 and 20 November entitled “Learning Spaces as Zones of

55 OECD (2011), *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do better?* Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD) Publishing, p. 11.

Peace (LSaZoP): A Call for South Sudan.”<sup>56</sup> At the beginning of the “ground breaking” conference “attended by virtually every senior government official from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport”, a communique was signed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. Part of the conference’s strategy was to put technical experts and high-level delegates together with children, adolescents and youth, so as to dialogue directly and publicly on issues, constraints, needs and hopes of young people.<sup>57</sup> Creating platforms for young people to dialogue with government leadership and policymakers – particularly on the need for Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace in conflict-torn or fragile communities – are critical landmarks for the PBEA global Initiative. By reflecting on case studies from Nepal, Uganda and Kenya, the conversations in Juba focused on lessons learnt for promoting the culture of peace within the education sector and beyond. Other key presentations during the conference in Juba were on mainstreaming life skills and peace education into the national curriculum, and a KAP survey: ‘Social Cohesion and Resilience-Building in the Context of South Sudan’ – another PBEA initiative. There was also a dialogue on the key roles that both sports and teachers’ education can play in peace-building in South Sudan. The joint communique issued following the conference outlined the government’s commitment to promoting LSaZoP, thus achieving the main goal of the conference to obtain government endorsement to protect children and ensure they are able to access quality education.<sup>58</sup> The conference also offered a platform for young people to express their concerns about conflict and call on government leaders to protect the children of South Sudan. Two subsequent conferences in Yambio mobilized 65 youth and civil society on the topic of Communities and Schools as Zones of Peace and 55 youths on

Constructive Citizenship and the Role of Youth in Peacebuilding, covering conflict sensitivity, conflict drivers, and conflict mitigation and prevention strategies.<sup>59</sup>

Since its introduction the concept of LSaZoP has been mainstreamed in both EiE as well as in PBEA initiatives, among PBEA partners (ADRA, Right to Play and Africa Educational Trust) with activities in Nasir, Juba, Yambio, Wau and Tonj East. Partners have integrated diverse issues into their programming to include life skills and peacebuilding messages, mature programming reflecting HIV and AIDS as health messages becoming social tools for promoting peace, while addressing gender-based violence has become integrated into all partners activities as part of the broader peacebuilding approach (i.e. addressing norms on the use of violence).

For the present study, a learning space that is truly a zone of peace was visited in Juba, which provides insights into how peace clubs are supporting reconciliation among children and building social cohesion between previously divided communities.

### The Nile Model Secondary School

Nile Model Secondary school is one of the schools piloting the implementation of Life skills and peacebuilding in the classroom and has been used as a pilot Life skills and Peacebuilding education school utilizing a LSaZoP approach. The school received learner support materials and has been able to bring learners from different ethnic backgrounds together. The teacher teaches various themes on personal and social development, stress management, civic and constructive participation. The students have opened up and are discussing painful issues in their lives and they use co-curricular activities such as peacebuilding and sporting clubs for inclusion of life saving messages. Some of the students mentioned that they never used to interact

56 The conference focused on the following topics and their relation to LSaZoP: sports, teacher education, civic education, constructive citizenship, transitional justice education, GBV, Sexual Reproductive Health and Sexuality Education as well as healing and reconciliation through education.

57 Similarly, in June 2014 as part of celebrations commemorating the Day of the African Child, PBEA organized advocacy events to give provide a platform for South Sudanese children to advocate with government by calling upon them to build peace and support the LSaZoP model, see: : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrXsYOPocgo>

58 The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology now aims to strengthen the Schools Standards which are currently to be finalised by integrating the principles in LSaZoP.

59 [http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5440\\_feb2015\\_regional-update.html](http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5440_feb2015_regional-update.html)

with members from other ethnic groups and there were obvious ethnic patterns of interaction even during play. But since they started actively discussing themes in the life skills and peacebuilding curriculum guidelines, they are now making efforts to engage with others and there is freedom of interaction with limited tribal differentiation. The peace clubs allow space for open discussion and strengthening of social bonds between groups of children previously divided along ethnic lines.

A class of some 30 students were asked what benefits they felt they had received from participating in the peacebuilding education class and peace club. One male student, P., stood up:



What I can say about this club? I have learned more in this club because it has taught me a kind of feeling of love and respect, all this. Peace is essential

to us so that in any case that arises we need to solve it using peace, as a peacemaker solving all kinds of problems using peace and dialogue. Making peace means you are a mediator who can tell the right things. We are people, we love our country, one nation. Our motto in school is peace. Peace among ourselves, among our community, among our society. I have learned many things in Peace Club. If people are fighting in the street, I will go ask what the problem is. [...] I am a peacemaker, I will not fight, I can consult. I can look for a solution. I have to bring the laws. I hope the Peace Club will expand, because it is what will change our country. Peace in the Bible talks about love. They write "Love One Another". We are one nature, from God. In reality we are one, in the image of God. God gave us this message, that we are one. I was one of the school leaders, and I once stopped a fight, and solved the problem the two people had.



Figure 3. P. explains to Nile Model School Peace Club what the Club means to him



Figure 4. Nile Model School Peace Club, chemistry teacher and two officers

Another student stood up to give his opinion:



Peace Club is I think good for every person to be in, when you get a problem. Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good (the Bible). So one day there was fighting in my house between my mother and somebody who was married to my mother. My first father liked to fight, and that man used to bring wine. So I saw them, they were fighting. So I told them fighting is not good. Fighting will not take us forward. It is better for us to say peace, with love. And there was one friend who said to me, 'Brother, if I were you I would have fought with that man.' But I told him that would not solve anything. The man might get killed or me in prison. No, you have to find the solution. [You have to ask] How did that problem happen? So that's what I have to say.

All of the speakers were boys; the girls were too shy, though Elisabeth said that normally they speak up in class.

Fortunately, the Peace Club is headed by an extremely resourceful teacher, able to come up with many subjects for discussion, act as

moderator, and invent scenarios on the fly for play acting, as she says she has received little material on which to base the Peace Club's activities. The high level of motivation found in these high school groups suggests that in addition they would be very receptive to structured lesson plans or discussion ideas for working through key conflict issues. There is no limit to what Peace Clubs can accomplish if they are provided the tools to do conflict analysis, to deconstruct false histories, and to adapt peacebuilding strategies to their own local contexts.<sup>60</sup>

## 2.7 Sport for Peace – Promoting Respect, Tolerance and Inclusion

In numerous PoCs and conflict-affected areas PBEA-supported programmes have emphasised the role of sports and life skills in promoting peace in formal and non-formal education settings with partners such as Sports for Hope, a local NGO.

One example identified as part of this case study was from February 2014, when 7,000 in- and out-of-school adolescents and youth as well as parents from different ethnic groups in Juba (including the Dinka, Nuer and Zande) came together to play various sporting

<sup>60</sup> Members of this and other Peace Clubs expressed a desire for recognition of their role in building peace and reconciliation, and a way to identify themselves as peacebuilding leaders and spokespersons. Simply being able to put on a T-Shirt that signifies their membership in their club, or in a wider movement for peace, would satisfy this simple desire.



**Figure 5 - Sports are highly valued among PoC camp youth**

activities and access information on HIV and AIDS prevention, community resilience and peace building.<sup>61</sup>

**Study B – Learning to resolve disputes through sport**

Sports for Hope activities in Juba helped bring IDP children and adolescents from different ethnic groups together through sports and life skills awareness raising sessions. Children from Dinka and Nuer tribes that used to fight on the playing field have learned to respect each other and to play together, celebrating defeats and victory in a way that is not disrespectful and that is built on fair play and team work. Even if they are from Dinka or Nuer, they are one team. Each day before soccer matches, all children sing the national anthem while in the background songs of peace can be heard from the nearby Church. The captain of the team knows that leadership matters and that his team must represent players from each Tribe, and they must give each

other a chance in the next match. If a fight occurs during the game, they have the skills to separate individuals engaged in disputes, to listen and to reconcile differences, and to continue games peacefully and constructively. They know that what causes conflict and violence can ultimately lead to serious harm and injury. They have learned that they must accept, respect and trust, and recognize and relate to each other. Now they call them themselves the “Young Cassava” team.

PBEA programme personnel note that quantitative baseline data measuring social cohesion and resilience has been gathered to provide a more robust analysis of the extent to which activities such as those in Study B have really promoted peacebuilding and helped address legacies of conflict, as well as the impacts of the current conflict. However, end line data will not be available until the end of 2015 or early 2016 meaning only qualitative observations and the views of beneficiaries

<sup>61</sup> For the companion study, visits, FGDs and interviews were made in two quite different learning spaces that are truly zones of peace thought they are located outside of the PoC, in the town of Juba. One a secondary and the other a primary school, they provided varied insights on the opportunities for and challenges to peacebuilding education.

can be used to gauge what progress is being made. Nevertheless, programme monitoring reports and the positive interactions outlined here suggest that conflict sensitive sport activities are playing a transformative role and improving levels of social cohesion between ethnic groups. The value of bringing together youth from disparate ethnic groups seems clear: in few parts of South Sudan today is it possible to organise inter-ethnic activities of this magnitude because community level mechanisms for bringing people together are often lacking (i.e. for promoting constructive civic and social engagement). Few other activities can have as much peacebuilding potential as simple inter-ethnic contact, though the situation nowadays is that such opportunities are increasingly few and far between.

## 2.8 Responding to Trauma and Displacement

IDPs in South Sudan face numerous threats to their physical and psychological safety (IDMC 2014). The UNICEF engagement in the PoCs and in other IDP camps throughout the country works to treat trauma, as well as channel frustrations – over unmet grievances, the lack of clear perspectives for their future, and the long wait for a return to normality – into arts, education, dialogue and sports. Many of the individuals interviewed at the Juba PoCs were eager to share their experience of flight to the UNMISS camp during the December 2013 crisis. Their experience and biographies demonstrate the importance of education in their lives, as many came or were sent to Juba for that reason. Others come from prominent families in Juba who unfortunately found themselves on the losing end during the crisis.



Figure 6. Participants in Sport for Hope activities

One young informant,<sup>62</sup> an orphan, came to Juba in 2009, from his village one week's walk away from Bentiu. His uncle, who worked in the Ministry of Environment, brought him to Juba for a good school. He described his fear during the flight to the UNMISS camp:



When the fighting was starting, we were near here, but we thought maybe the fighting was for soldiers only, so we waited a day. But when they fought the Nuer in Juba they came and attacked our area, attacking any area where the Nuer lived. My uncle then came to bring me to the UN camp. The checkpoint is not far from here. We were fearful, but we were not hurt. The big people yes, but for us youngest ones, they just took our phones and what we had in our pockets.

D., mother of six (aged 2 to 14) who attends adult education, lost her First Lieutenant husband when he was killed in Malakal. Everything they had there was destroyed or looted. As her late husband was close to Reik Machar, the former Vice President and current rebel leader, she received assistance from him until he fled Juba for the bush in December 2013. She had come to Juba to benefit from Machar's support and to put her children in good schools in a safe place. She had her youngest child with another man, who gives her nothing, so she now survives only on humanitarian support.

Another male informant, 39 years old, is an older student from Unity State who was studying in his second year at the College of Education at the University of Juba. He has suspended his studies while in the camp, because he would have to go through four or five checkpoints in order to get to classes. When the troubles occurred, he was able to save his entire family and get to the camp in about an hour of running.

P. was born in 1987 in a rural area of Ayod, where he took care of the cattle and went to school. In 1996, at 9 years of age, the civil war brought fighting to his county wedged between the Sudan border and areas controlled by the SPLA. He lost his sister when she was

attacked and killed in the compound. The father, who was an SPLA officer, fled with the family.



At that time, SPLA was requesting a boy from each family. If you didn't provide they would come back and choose one. When my father was away with the SPLA, they took me and sent me to Bentiu to child soldier training camp. I stayed from 1999 to 2003. But I didn't see action because I had an accident in a transport car and it broke my thigh. They took me back to Juba to hospital to get pins put in my thigh. The first time I saw fighting was here in Juba last December. I could have fought but I didn't have any weapon. Now, first of all, I want to educate myself.

R., 13 year of age, stays with one of her brothers in the PoC. Her parents sent her to go join her sister in Juba to get an education at Lologo School (formerly St. Andreas) in Juba. She was one of the four Nuer at the predominantly Dinka school, and though they were treated well there, when the troubles began they stayed at home. When the fighting began to approach their area, they fled in a car to the UNMISS camp. She recalls the fear that gripped her each time their car was stopped. "It was only thanks to God that we got through. They made us get down and asked us lots of questions. But each time they let us go because we were young." She is intent on learning while in the camp. Her only request is to have a textbook that she can study in her free time.

R. is only one of many children who witnessed horrific events and survived a traumatic flight to find shelter. Her case was unique for this study because it was possible to trace her school, Lologo, and speak with the headmaster. He recalled the young Nuer children who fled the school in December, in a movement that virtually ended ethnic diversity and inter-ethnic cohesion overnight as Lologo neighbourhood became a no-go area for the Nuer. In the Juba area, these multiple crises have impacted children and communities in terms of social

62 Personal names have been changed or left out for reasons of confidentiality.

cohesion and resilience. Though this Nuer girl was perfectly integrated in Lologo School, her ethnicity made it imperative that she leave.<sup>63</sup>

L., now aged 13, was born in Khartoum in 2002. Originally from the Nuba Mountains, her parents brought her to Juba in 2010 at the time of the Referendum to get English instruction. She recounted the horror of the night in December 2013 when her neighbourhood became the focus of intense fighting<sup>64</sup>:



Following a night of fighting, the killing was continuing in the morning, and many were dying. The neighbourhood was next to the headquarters of the SPLA so it was in the crossfire. Seeing many people were fleeing to the UNMISS camp, my parents decided to follow them. We were driven from Mia Sabah to Gudele in a car in an hour. The main roads were full of military, so we had to take back roads. From Gudele, we had to walk and cross fields on foot to reach the camp safely.

L.'s wish, now that she is safe under the protection of UNMISS, is that she can keep studying in a good school, "free and safe like in the PoC." The only problem is that when noon comes, there is no porridge. Aside from a daily porridge meal at school, L. also dreams of obtaining a school uniform. Similar requests were common from other youngsters and adults alike. Trainers requested T-shirt, gum boots and rainwear not only to facilitate their work and travel between PoCs but also as a form of recognition for their status as educators.

In the UNICEF tents set up at the PoC 1, the children showed no signs of the trauma that they must have endured long after these events. *UNICEF support for life skills, education and peace education likely has a hand in this by helping provide children, adult students and volunteers with a place to discuss their*

*experiences, fears and concerns* and to focus on their future, preparing the groundwork for an eventual return to peace and development.

South Sudanese have an advantage over many northern and western societies, where by the age of 10 most children (at least those who do not see themselves destined to become performing artists) feel a bit inhibited to express themselves in poetry, song and dance. Quite the opposite is the case in South Sudan, where children readily engage in individual and group creative expression. The arts can thus be an excellent entry point for reflecting on conflict, peace and trauma, as well as cooperation, respect, difference and diversity.

## 2.9 Gender

The accounts of flight to the UNMISS base suggest gendered bases for the violence of 15 December and for a few months after: pre- and young adolescent boys and girls can be passed over if lucky, but young men risk execution and young women rape. The violence is genuinely gender-based (GBV), but after being against women and men during the peak of the crisis has shifted and, contrary to what would be expected, is now primarily aimed at men as they are seen as potential 'fighters' – while sexual violence against women in the form of rape has declined even though it remains a risk. Women began to venture out several months after arriving in the camps:



In the last few months, women have been able to go out. But in the beginning, [the attackers] would get them, rape them, and take their property. They have money, they would take the money. That's the way they were doing at that time.<sup>65</sup>

Outside of the IDP and PoC camps, women face a number of specific risks, including violence and abuse in the form of rape, abduction, forced marriage, "girl compensation," and

63 A description of this school and an extensive interview with the headmaster is found in the companion case study on institutional capacity building.

64 On the attacks and ethnic targeting in Juba, see UNMISS 2014a, pp. 6, 18-22.

65 The situation in Juba is not unique. Complete loss of trust between communities is currently responsible for keeping some 2700 Nuer in fear of leaving the UNMISS facilities near Bor.

other traditional or cultural forms of abuse. Another risk women face stems from the absence of family planning and reproductive health services outside the main towns.<sup>66</sup>

The degree to which unarmed civilian women can become victims of the tumultuous political and ethnic histories of Southern Sudan can be appreciated in the horrific account offered by Martha Nyedier Akok, who describes her flight to Ethiopia and Kenya to the researcher Stephanie Beswick see Beswick 2001:84-88). The many reports since 15 December 2013 of dangers faced by women in flight suggest that similar trials are not unimaginable in 2015. An adult woman interviewed in PoC 1 T., about 28 years of age, is a Nuer who did university studies in Cairo before returning to South Sudan. Speaking Arabic through an interpreter, she shows signs of lingering trauma when speaking of the particular victimization reserved for women and ethnic targeting, but ends with the hope for peace:



When the war broke out in Juba, the people who were most affected were the women. Some women were raped by Dinka men, and then some of them were killed. And also the children were killed and the husbands were killed in front of them. [...] When the war broke out, they saw that [the attackers] were intent on finishing us all off [as a way of] ending the war. Our houses were looted, burned, and we had nothing left. We came to UN camp and were given food, shelter, water, so now we're ok...[There is no solution for] all of us, unless we have peace, and we come together.

Cognizant of these issues, PBEA has ensured that the Life Skills and Peacebuilding Education which is being piloted in schools across South Sudan include content specific to dealing with SGBV. The SGBV content was recently enhanced during the revision of the Curriculum Guidelines for this subject at all levels, including ECD. In addition promoting

gender sensitivity through curriculum, PBEA, in partnership with WASH, has distributed Girls Hygiene Kits to schools in Yambio and Torit. A focus group interview with adolescent girls on the effect of the Hygiene Kits indicated that the intervention has improved girl's confidence in mixing with each other and boys during menstruation. They even suggested that use of Hygiene Kits need to be incorporated in classroom lessons and should be taught by any teacher irrespective of gender. The lesson on Hygiene Kits need not be considered different from lessons on condom use. Girls are becoming more confident to talk because they belong to clubs that promote participation with boys.

PBEA has also, with its partner Sports for Hope, carried out awareness raising sessions on SGBV in the POC in Juba through sports clubs and sports training activities that reached 8000 young people, 34% of who are females. Over a period of several months, this engagement with girls resulted in an increase of girls' participation in sporting activities by a rate of 35%. While no concrete data is available for this study, findings from FGDs conducted by the PBEA programme suggest that girls are becoming more vocal and confident in group discussions, which indicates that girls are increasing feeling confident and empowered as a result of participating in sporting activities.

## 2.10 Security Constraints and Education Service Delivery Gaps

Many of the older students interviewed at the Juba PoC were enrolled in university studies in Juba when the crisis broke. Exams were actually scheduled for the day after the violence broke out in December 2013 before being cancelled. Understandably, they are asking for the international community (UNICEF/Education Cluster) to provide a way for them to complete their education, either by bringing teachers in or sending them to schools abroad. Fear prevents them from returning to town to complete their diplomas, as one man explained:

66 These complex issues, which are not specific to the emergency context, are covered in the companion case study.



The men are afraid. When you go out, if they see you outside there, they will recognize you ... they will catch you when you go outside the market and pick you up there.

Clearly education is seen by those in the camps as the major key to building a peaceful, secure and prosperous future, very simply because they see around them that those who are able to avoid violence, gain employment in the urban sector, or have a hope of expatriation if all else fails, are those with education. Many of the children who find themselves in the camp were originally brought to Juba for access to decent schools, where they could obtain an education of recognized value. Despite this heavy demand, and the potential of education to address issues of social cohesion and resilience, and for life skills to provide potentially lifesaving training, the most basic education, like other emergency programmes, are *presently funded at no better than fifty per cent*.<sup>67</sup>

**Security concerns** also limit access by government education officials in camps with large numbers of IDPs sympathetic to the rebel cause. A role for the government inside many camps is difficult if not impossible to maintain, leaving to international and local NGOs the task of implementing new curriculum, adapting it to local needs, and monitoring the suitability and quality of education delivered. Nevertheless, the situation in the emergency setting might actually be better than in areas where normal education delivery is hampered by conflict, occupations of structures, roads and weather, lack of communication, materials or teachers. Most government funds have been channelled to support the war effort, with serious consequences for MoEST's ability to assume its responsibilities for services delivery.

Insufficient classroom space. Allocation of classrooms has not kept up with a very high demand in the PoCs. The Headmaster for the secondary schools in the camps, who holds an MA in Strategic Studies from the University of Juba, spoke of this intense interest in

education. He has 560 students in the three high school classes, 29 of which had just sat for the graduation exam (secondary school certificate). Teaching so many under any conditions is a big challenge, but this is EiE and there is not enough space.



It is difficult for us to operate, due to lack of class space. We have to share. There is one [empty U.N. airplane] hangar, where we can squeeze in many. Due to the space problems, not all students come. They were 560 that we registered at the beginning, just for secondary 1, 2 and 3. At the moment, we've resumed the new classes, and we find less than before, because they're no materials, or space. I estimate that about 30% of them have become discouraged and no longer come. [...] This is the only camp that has the class, so the other PoC have to walk here. They find no space and just walk around. The main problem is the lack of books. No books, no classes, and these kinds of teaching aides (boards, blackboards, tables, chairs). They come with their chairs from home.

It is unfortunate that the enthusiasm of so many youth cannot be accommodated due to space limitations and insufficient activities to engage older adolescents and youth in a constructive manner. Finding or building the necessary space for education should be a top priority of camp administrators, if only for security reasons. *Frustration and idleness among youth* no doubt contributed to the violence in the Juba PoCs in late November 2014, when 60 were injured, some seriously, when two clans fought over an alleged case of adultery involving a woman whose husband was away fighting with the opposition forces (Sudan Tribune 2014). When youth idleness is addressed, and youth are safe and occupied with meaningful activities that contribute to their fulfilment, and by extension their community's resilience and cohesion, the space for conflict is reduced. Teachers trained in conflict sensitivity are also instrumental

67 <https://twitter.com/tobylanzer/status/524969971181686784>



**Figure 7. Headmaster of Secondary School at PoC1, Juba**

in reducing conflict. The lack of space and engaging activities must also be a stumbling block for getting more conflict resolution and peacebuilding training to reach youth at the secondary level, though it is obvious from the Headmaster's response that his main worry is preparing secondary school students for the graduation exams based on core subjects.



We are teaching only what is contained in the South Sudan curriculum. It depends on time, because the subjects are many. Conflict resolution education can be given if there is time for recreation, using some videos, during free time. It is an extra thing, that's why it is in a Saturday [slot].

Other issues were raised that could become constraints (or suggest opportunities for improvement) for education service delivery. Adult classes draw large numbers, according to J., a teacher (150 females and 100

males in July). However unlike the primary and secondary teachers, adult teachers are volunteers and would appreciate being paid. The adult classes also lack learning materials (textbooks), and as their learning space floods during rains, are in need of benches for learners to sit on. Some PTA members also would like to take on roles in teaching, and be paid for it. A minor differential in regular teacher's pay between the Juba PoCs was reported to the Peacebuilding team and they took immediate measures to ensure the standard rate was paid in each PoC.

**Lack of learning materials**, including dictionaries,<sup>68</sup> is frequently mentioned as a problem by students and teachers alike. Students would like to have a physical book in their hands at least in class, or if possible take it home to continue learning on their own. A few students said any book would be appreciated; such is the paucity of intellectual stimulation in the camps. Teachers and trainers simply need the support materials in order to prepare and deliver their lessons effectively. Teacher

68 Dictionaries are considered essential because almost no learners in South Sudan have English as their mother tongue.

training was also mentioned by teaching staff concerned with improving their teaching skills, and by observers who feel there are not enough teachers for all the students. As many were seen being trained in July, and soon after presumably were operational, the logistics of classrooms is probably the limiting factor rather than teachers per se at least for the primary level (though the secondary level functioned with only three outside teachers in July 2014). University teaching is much more problematic. For the many university students stranded in the camps, peace may be the only solution.

According to Nicolo' di Marzo (Programme Development Advisor at IBIS, UNICEF's implementing partner in the Juba PoCs, UNESCO and UNICEF are in fact getting ready to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the very subject of providing books for the PoC camps. Di Marzo said one issue to keep in mind with books donated from Europe was that the very high level of English, and the subjects tended to be centred on European culture and unfamiliar for local readers. This is another argument in favour of helping teachers obtain materials on South Sudanese literature and culture to feed into their lesson plans, and avoiding too many stories of elves and fairies.

**Filling critical service delivery gaps.** UNICEF seemed to be stepping in to fill many needs and to ensure education was being provided as a critical lifesaving intervention for conflict affected children and adolescents. Working with its partners UNICEF established LS+PE in the three PoC settlements at the UNMISS camp implemented by INTERSOS, and is ensuring education provision in other PoCs around the country, despite the challenges facing all settlements (overcrowding, security concerns, materials distribution, etc.). These may not represent solutions to all the problems besetting the IDP settlements, but it seemed that few other agencies were engaged with education in emergency and were working to ensure that young and adolescent children access education as was UNICEF. PBEA supported the MoEST through training-of-trainers, training of teachers and other education officials. In 2014 and early 2015 more than 500 teachers were trained in Life skills and Peacebuilding education. PBEA also trained over 200 education personnel in Conflict Sensitive Education. Furthermore, PBEA engaged teachers in curriculum development and revision and other peacebuilding innovations such as Social and Child Financial Literacy programming to support young people to find 'resilience paths'.



Figure 8. Participatory training session

**Supporting the provision of learning materials.** PBEA's approach to supporting the development of learning materials also addressed some of the cited weaknesses with learning materials that emerged during the onset of the humanitarian crisis. While not a direct response to the crisis, materials such as Life Skills and Peacebuilding Education curriculum and textbooks were already developed with a methodology to ensure that they are context sensitive and based on local culture. A case study<sup>69</sup> on the curriculum development process verified that PBEA used a context based approach involving 439 people, 26% of whom were female. This participatory approach was employed from the outset with defining the concept of life skills to deciding on the different themes and subthemes that should constitute the curriculum. The same technique was used in textbook writing for the LSPE, especially in identifying stories that are relevant and culture sensitive to the learners of South Sudan. An interviewee from the ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports indicated the following:



The stories were not collected ahead of time. They were written according to what came into the minds of the writers. ....However, the stories selected by respective teams at the preliminary breakaway discussion were presented to the whole writers group to allow others to critique on it. This ensured cultural sensitivity. Later, Conflict Sensitive Education was introduced after the December 2013 conflict in South Sudan to strengthen response and mainstreaming.

## 2.11 Possible Future Collaborations for Peacebuilding – A Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

At the time of this case study, UNICEF was planning to step up engagement with faith-based organisations to build peace through them, and participation in a Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism was also mentioned as a possible avenue for engagement. There are ways for UNICEF to avoid going it alone and at the same time build synergies with UNMISS, which is providing security for the PoC camps. This would be a way of ensuring long term security and reinforce UNMISS commitment to protect IDPs for the duration.<sup>70</sup>

The National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation (NPPR) was formally launched on 4 April 2014. A joint initiative for peace, healing, and reconciliation the NPPR is spearheaded by three principal institutions: the SSPRC, the faith-based Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, and the Specialised Committee on Peace and Reconciliation in the National Legislative Assembly. Might this Platform include what earlier initiatives have omitted: truth-seeking? The early indications are that it might.

Amauel M. Gebremedhin, Senior Peace Building Advisor Civil Affairs for UNMISS, who has been working on peacebuilding in South Sudan for several years, most of which spent with UNDP,<sup>71</sup> is optimistic after a few months working with the three institutions that compose NPPR. First is the faith-based Independent Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation. Second is from the government side, the South Sudan Peace and

69 Case Study-Process and Results in Peacebuilding through Life Skills Approach-Feb 2015.

70 Reconciliation can, of course, be helped along by the sort of re-evaluation of historical documentation presented herein and in the Appendix C of the companion case study, which could form part of expert testimony on legacies of conflict/peacebuilding of relevance for the proceedings.

71 Cosmas Ba-Ana-Itenebe, Peace and Community Security Specialist at UNDP, was interviewed at length for this report, but the possibility of collaboration in peacebuilding initiatives was not discussed.

Reconciliation Commission. And the third is the Specialized Parliamentary Committee for Peace and Reconciliation. The National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation (NPPR) was formally launched in Juba on 5 April 2014, supported by UNDP. They were to travel to all parts of the country, and at the time of interview (July 2014) were in consultations with forty-six youth groups and even more women's groups. Indeed, UNICEF's programs could gain from the NPPR's focus on faith-based and youth, by exploring synergies and melding networks. Next step for NPPR is to bring in academia, in late August, and then media. The NPPR wants to be home-grown, and independent of government in order to provide the truth and reconciliation forum that is so lacking in South Sudan, to enable the discussion of all contentious issues, going as far back in history as is necessary to put the past behind and achieve closure on the bitter political and ethnic cycles of revenge and violence that have plagued the country for so long. It remains to be seen if the NPPR will satisfy the requirements for a thorough airing of grievances that can pave the way for sustainable peace, but it appears to be a step in the right direction.<sup>72</sup>

PBEA has made efforts to link up with the National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation

by inviting Dr Bernard Surur to present in the Conflict Sensitivity Workshop to demonstrate the link between healing, reconciliation, education and peacebuilding. His message is that humanity starts in the mind and the heart and the more education promotes tolerance, respect, compassion and care for the other and promotes the power in diversity, the more we will see transformational change. This comes from the family, community, village, state and national levels and underlines the urgent need for education that confronts differences and addresses national identity as opposed to tribalism in the South Sudan of today. Perhaps opportunities exist for UNICEF to engage collaboration on peacebuilding with UNMISS and UNDP.

A role for traditional leaders and peacemakers may also hold a key to sustainable peace in South Sudan. Without waiting for them to emerge from their societies, the education system can begin to tell the real story about traditional peacebuilding, and how traditional ethnic relations in South Sudan were much less contentious that is widely believed. This would go a long way to restoring social cohesion between ethnic groups to its rightful place in South Sudan's historical record, and in the minds of pupils today, all in the spirit of delegitimizing violent conflict tomorrow.

---

72 Two important articles describe the issues that a South Sudanese truth and reconciliation commission will have to confront if it is to be successful: Adel Sandrai and Augustino Ting Mayai, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Sudan" (27 February 2013, Juba: Sudd Institute) and Sudd Institute, "Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan: A Conversation for Justice and Stability (7 June 2013).

### 3. Results, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

It is generally accepted by observers that the onset of civil war in South Sudan was the result of historical legacies dating back to the period of colonial rule and the failure of traditional development approaches in the post-CPA and post-independence periods to work on unresolved social, political and governance dynamics, which as a result contributed to the reversal to violent armed conflict. The relapse to conflict also gave rise to risks that even minor incidents or tensions along ethnic lines could become conflict triggers among displaced communities, or that could result in a spreading of conflict to other parts of the country not yet touched by war. In this context, there was a need for immediate humanitarian assistance to ‘save lives’ and address the most visible impacts of conflict such as displacement, the risk of disease and famine, gross human rights violations and the protection of civilians. At the same time, in order to avoid the failures of the past and ensure adherence to principles of Do No Harm, development programming was required to make rapid adjustments to the new realities in the country.

In the immediate aftermath of December 2013, UNICEF education and C4D staff in South Sudan, considered to be ‘non-critical’ to the humanitarian response, were evacuated to Nairobi, Kenya. It was during this critical period that serious consideration was given about how to reposition education interventions so that they would in fact be seen as critical and lifesaving. At a time when the crisis for children in Syria was gaining global attention and concerns were rife about the risks of ‘a lost generation’, the repositioning of PBEA programming in South Sudan adopted a similar approach. PBEA and C4D staff from South Sudan, together with UNICEF Regional Office personnel, sought to reposition education as a critical and lifesaving set of interventions to prevent the ‘loss of a generation’ of South Sudanese children and adolescents by addressing factors such as: ethnic mistrust and fear, targeting of vulnerable groups, trauma and idleness, abduction and violence against children, and

a disconnect between humanitarian response and development. Originally articulated as part of a Schools as Zones of Peace strategy based on the experiences of Save the Children in Nepal, the premise underpinning the strategy that was that it would help to:

...establish linkages between lifesaving humanitarian responses with development activities. Crucial for supporting the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development is the creation (or maintenance) of safe, protective learning spaces for children, adolescents and youth in which they will receive needed humanitarian and psycho-social support. Moreover, programmatic adjustments such as establishing Schools as Zones of Peace will help to begin the process of rebuilding social cohesion among divided communities, strengthening community resilience against conflict, and improving human security (UNICEF-ESARO 2014a:5-6).

The Theory of Change articulated for the initial strategy stated that: *If conflict sensitive peacebuilding strategies are introduced into humanitarian activities then communities will better understand conflict and violence risks and increase their resilience against violent conflict. Moreover, interventions that support local capacities for dialogue, reconciliation, and inter-group collaboration support strengthening community level social cohesion and collective action—key dimensions of resilience.*

These early discussions informed a rethink of several key PBEA engagement strategies and a sharpening of the programme’s existing TOCs, with activities developed for engaging communities in PoCs across the country, adapting and strengthening existing activities, and introducing several initiatives deemed important for responding to the new realities in South Sudan, only several of which have been explored in this case study. Following the return of UNICEF staff to South Sudan in March 2014, the TOC listed above was used to inform existing PBEA TOCs, with those

related to youth and marginalized children in high risk areas being more directly related.

This repositioning of education and the overlapping theories of change (i.e. existing PBEA TOCs and the one developed for the Schools as Zones of Peace strategy) suggest that the initial adjustments proved highly effective, at least to some extent, at sharpening the pre-crisis theories of change and activities underpinning pre-crisis PBEA activities. From the visits to the PoC Camps in Juba and other locations, every indication is that UNICEF support for education and LS + PE is critical for maintaining children in school with a program enriched with LS+PE, and for keeping a high level of youth and student engagement in education and peacebuilding issues. Without PBEA's investment in such conflict-affected areas, the camps would be at risk of becoming vectors for ethnic radicalism, or in other cases lead to a spreading of conflict to vulnerable areas of South Sudan. At the same time, a focus on conflict sensitive education capacity development for government and partners helped to improve the quality of services in conflict-affected areas and to link humanitarian response to recovery, and in turn with development interventions for those communities that have proven resilient against relapsing into conflict or engaging in new forms of violence. However, these adjustments were, to some extent, diminished by subsuming the initial TOC underpinning the Schools as Zones of Peace strategy into existing PBEA TOCs, which did not sufficiently adapt their wording to reflect the actual changes taking place through PBEA programming on the ground. As such, these adaptations and linkages between existing PBEA interventions with the humanitarian responses are not so easily identified by observers. One potential consequence of this is that a strong and coherent narrative regarding the role of PBEA in emergency, recovery and development has not emerged, thus diminishing the potential for PBEA lessons learned to inform other partners in making similar linkages to overcome the 'development' and 'emergency' divide.

Despite the significant challenges faced in trying to provide education in a context of humanitarian crisis and internal displacement, UNICEF rapidly deployed educational services and peacebuilding messages following the 15 December 2013 crisis. Moreover, case study field observations and accounts of

implementing partners, teachers, and children in the PoCs and available secondary data from other programme locations demonstrate that community resilience and social cohesion, as well as the protection of children, were enhanced by the provision of life skills and conflict sensitive education services, with achievements cutting across PBEA outcomes 1, 2, 3 and 4.

### 3.1 Key Results being achieved

#### Communicating for Peace (contributions to PBEA Outcome 3)

- While not covered in the body of the report, as part of programmatic adjustments to the crisis a C4D messaging workshop attended by the ESARO regional peacebuilding advisor and C4D advisor from UNICEF HQ was organized in Juba on 2 April 2014 with selected government ministry partners, civil society representatives and students to identify conflict mitigation and peacebuilding messages for responding to the humanitarian crisis. Becoming the basis of a large scale C4D programme funded by USAID and implemented in partnership with Search for Common Ground, the workshop included children and youth participants to solicit their views on issues to be addressed through social media and messaging for peace.
- C4D was subsequently able to operate in 8 out of 10 states (according to CO monitoring); the activity with Search for Common Ground was effective in Warrap, UN, WBG, EES, CES, Jonglie, and Lakes states. The broad range of essential knowledge and competencies through the messaging campaign provided to children and youth is readily transferrable to adults and out-of-school children.
- The peacebuilding competencies addressing different types of conflict drivers and conflict triggers include respect for diversity, tolerance and social interaction, and in the PoCs, engagement in sports, including messages that were developed through the C4D strategy to enabled adults to experience social cohesion and engagement. Parents could read the messages and integrate them in the sporting events because there were no conflicts and people focused attention on sports as medium of social interaction.

### **Protection, mitigating conflict and promoting resilience (contributions to PBEA outcomes 3 and 4)**

- In the PoC settlements in Juba, all interviewed said they felt more secure now that they had been in the camp and the assurance of continued education;
- Based on the views expressed by case study participants inside PoCs, conflict and violence was often avoided due to the availability of PBEA interventions, though proof of what did not happen is impossible to produce;
- PBEA was instrumental in bringing IDPs together in the PoCs to discuss ways of building capacities for peace and tolerance through LS+PE, and organized sports (football, volleyball) competitions between the three camps visited. These activities seemed to have a positive effect for reducing tensions and mitigating against the risk of conflicts breaking out inside PoCs and with neighbouring communities;
- Provision of trauma treatment through discussions, activities, art and sporting activities have evidently worked to reduce trauma among the many who gave horrific accounts of their flight to the PoC in Juba, as their current state appeared free of trauma and optimistic for the future. They are now able to support one another, talk to other friends and vent out their frustrations in a safe environment;
- Provision of education gives children and youths, many of whom experienced a high-risk or traumatic flight from Juba to the PoC camp, a sense of normalcy and hope for the future. From interviews with the children who experienced the trauma of flight to the camp in mid-December 2013, it appears that investing in education has been their way of returning to a “state of normality”;
- In Bentiu, during school visits conducted by PBEA personnel teachers reported that education is a critical service that offered structure to the children and saved them from wandering into unprotected environments and becoming exposed to risks of violence, abduction and recruitment by armed groups;
- Education with life skills messages integrated in art and creative child friendly services encouraged learners to find purpose in coming to school and continuing to learn;
- Children and youth in PoCs and other

locations have been acquiring skills that enable them to develop new livelihoods and recover from the conflict in a constructive manner through LS+PE, as well as to continue their education that was interrupted by war.

### **Addressing Youth Idleness and Frustration (contributions to PBEA outcomes 3 and 4)**

- PBEA interventions in PoCs and other locations have helped to develop a sense of constructive citizenship among youth by empowering them in taking leadership roles in organizing the use of learning spaces, inter-PoC volleyball and soccer games or volunteering for teaching LS+PB, as many youths in the Juba PoCs are enthusiastically doing. The formation of a Youth Union in Yambio initiated a process of ownership for youth involvement, while youth-led peace dialogues offered an opportunity for youth to initiate processes of conflict resolution in the pastoral communities (see companion case study on this latter point).
- Sports for peace and constructive social engagements through peace clubs have supported inclusive and tolerant civic and social participation among disaffected and idle youth, while at the same time increasing societal resilience against conflict by creating ‘social spaces’ for communities from different backgrounds to come together;

### **Strengthening Capacities for Conflict Sensitive Education (contributions to PBEA outcomes 1 and 2)**

- CSE capacity development trainings led to a marked increase among PBEA partners and government with their knowledge and understanding for delivering conflict sensitive education services. Moreover, programmatic adjustment made by the PBEA helped to strengthen the application of conflict sensitivity through EiE approaches broadly;
- UNICEF advocacy for scaling up the LSaZOP initiative have contributed to strengthening government policies and commitment to protecting children in conflict, promoting the protection of children, and raising awareness about the importance of ensuring access to education to prevent a ‘lost generation’;

- PBEA monitoring and evaluation tools were developed and rolled out during this period for measuring social cohesion and community resilience – commendable considering this was the first such attempt of any PBEA supported country globally and was done in a context of humanitarian crisis.

### 3.2 Lessons Learned and Challenges

- *Post-Independence politics have given rise to new patterns of exclusion* based on the same centre-periphery model but with Juba as the centre and the rest of the country as periphery (hinterland). Like in the pre-Independence configuration, social services are unevenly distributed outside of the capital, leading to grievances from areas that produce value for the state (agriculture in the south, oil in the north) but feel short changed in terms of services;
- *Environmental vulnerabilities and weak resilience are critically impacted by conflict.* Much of the discourse on food security and resilience often neglects the critical impact that conflict has on undermining resilience and fuelling patterns of vulnerability that lead to cyclical food-related shocks. Dispossession of southern Sudanese was well underway long before Independence. Slavery, raiding, famine, forced displacement, and forced labour have been used since pre-colonial times as methods for capturing valued resources, including land, water and assets. Even traditional societies with extremely resilient systems of agro-pastoralism that enabled them to mitigate extreme environmental shocks for centuries became vulnerable and eventually dispossessed through politically- or economically-motivated raiding. Avenues of vulnerability have multiplied with conflict, as the war economy inevitably takes over, giving conflict every reason to continue. Communities that have been plundered no longer have the reserve grain, cows and health to enable them to cope, to get over, temporary perturbations in rainfall, flood levels and food production;
- *Development programming prior to December 2013 operated on the basis of a 'business as usual' paradigm, concerned primarily with delivering goods and services with little regard to the conflict entailments* of such aid, or concern with maximizing the assistance entry points to begin peacebuilding. This tends point to broader challenges with the engagement of the international communities in fragile settings. The 'conflict blind' approach squandered opportunities to start fostering resilient communities with the social cohesion necessary to free themselves from cycles of violence, conflict and dependency, as well as liberation from all exploitative historical legacies;
- *Humanitarian action generally considered conflict and conflict sensitivity as a minor issue, always overruled by the initial 'surge mentality' of 'saving lives', primarily through food and medical delivery.* This was certainly understandable during the acute and early phases of the crisis. However, as identified by the OECD in 2011, one of the worst performing areas of the international community has been with systematically apply mechanisms for ensuring adherence to Do No Harm in fragile settings, with actors in South Sudan appearing not to perform much better. As a results, the 'tunnel vision' on 'emergency' began to miss opportunities for building peace, freeing victims from cycles of violence, achieving immediate goals of bringing communities together, reducing friction and misunderstandings between groups, and for building effective coping mechanisms among conflict affected communities – opportunities that would probably feed back into the lifesaving efforts;
- *There are limits to what can be accomplished in terms of interethnic peacebuilding in the typical South Sudan IDP camp context (often mono-ethnic), but EiE, particularly when extended through PBEA provides an opportunity to lay a groundwork for future interethnic engagement and sharing of knowledge of South Sudan's ethnic heritage of peace;*
- *UNICEF efforts to protect children against violence and recruitment of children made notable accomplishments with the release and hundreds of children from armed groups.* However, the lack of command and control over local armed groups poses significant problems for children, with many still at risk of recruitment, abduction and other forms of violence and exploitation.

### 3.3 Recommendations

#### Strengthen Conflict Sensitive Education Services

- Conflict sensitive *EiE should be recognized as a lifesaving intervention in conflict-affected areas and IDP locations*. EiE should adhere to ESSP and minimum standards and be paired with PBEA approaches to deepen the conflict prevention, protection, and recovery benefits associated with conflict sensitive EiE responses;
- *In PoCs*, the high educational aspirations of the students to access relevant quality education (e.g. larger classrooms, to pass graduation exams, to obtain textbooks, to gain skills for recovery and livelihoods, etc.), should be accommodated to the extent possible as these highly motivated students are the basis of creating social cohesion and resilient communities necessary for lasting peace in South Sudan;
- *Provide enough printed materials* and enable their distribution to support teachers and trainers, and stimulate interest among students;
- *Consider providing reading materials* over and above what is required in class (books, textbooks, etc.), games, sports equipment, Internet kiosks, or any other items that can stimulate youths intellectually and prevent idleness and frustration;
- *Scale up the LSaZoP model* to all education interventions supported by donors and government in conflict-affected areas and those areas bordering conflict states where tensions may be high or on the rise;
- *Consistently apply conflict sensitive monitoring to education and other humanitarian interventions*. While recognition that such systems are important components of humanitarian action, no evidence was found that such a system is consistently applied across different humanitarian interventions, including education;
- *Strengthen education services by incorporating conflict sensitivity and risk informed planning to education sector plans (both strategic and operational plans)*.

#### Strengthen social cohesion through adolescent and youth engagement

- Consider ways of giving tangible recognition and visibility to leaders of youth education, life skills and peacebuilding training activities (T-shirts, gum boots, etc.);
- Continue to support sports (essentially volleyball and football) as a way to ease tensions between clans at the PoCs, perhaps even organizing matches and tournaments as suggested by youth;
- Using the PBEA entry point to the PoC context, ensure better knowledge, socialization and adherence among youths and adults of the reconciliation efforts going on in Juba and elsewhere in the country led by prominent FBOs, intellectuals and civil society actors.

#### Strengthen Humanitarian Response and Development Linkages

- *Adhere to agreed international principles for operating in fragile states*. The humanitarian community needs to develop and systematically apply tools and procedures for adhering to principles of Do No Harm, and ideally promote conflict sensitivity through all forms of humanitarian assistance in South Sudan;
- *Consider applying tools for measuring social cohesion and resilience* in all areas where humanitarian actors operate (and ideally nationally through government systems as has been done by the Kenyan Commission on Social Cohesion<sup>73</sup>) as a means of identifying areas highly vulnerable to violent conflict;
- *Seriously consider and capitalize upon the role of government social services as tools for peacebuilding*, rather than only as a 'peace dividend';
- *The PBEA programme in South Sudan should revisit the TOC underpinning the Schools as Zones of Peace strategy paper* to more strongly link existing TOCs with programme adjustments on the ground and to better reflect the linkages between development and humanitarian action that have emerged.

73 See, KIPPRA (2014) The Status of Social Cohesion in Kenya, 2013, Draft Report, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, compiled by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA).

# Bibliography

- Africa Confidential*. 2014. "South Sudan: Calling time on the killing." *Africa Confidential* 55(9, 2 May):1-3.
- Beswick, Stephanie. "If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!" Rape, Suicide, and Violence: The Voices of Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps. *Northeast African Studies* 8(3):69-98.
- Coughlan, Sean. 2015. "South Sudan's struggle for schools hit by abductions." 25 February. *BBC News Business*; <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31587963>
- Deng, Francis Mading. 1972. *The Dinka of the Sudan*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- de Waal, Alex. 1993. "Starving out the South 1984-9," in M. W. Daly and A. A. Sikainga, eds, *Civil War in the Sudan*. London: British Academic Press.
- de Waal, Alex. 1977. *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1940. "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan," pp. 69-79 in Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems*. London: Oxford University Press.
- GCPEA. 2014. "South Sudan," *Education Under Attack. Country Profiles*; [www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/eua\\_2014\\_country\\_profiles\\_south\\_sudan.pdf](http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/eua_2014_country_profiles_south_sudan.pdf).
- Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. 2011. *Satellite Sentinel Project: Burned to the Ground: Intentional Destruction of Abyei Town*; <http://www.satsentinel.org/press-release/satellite-sentinel-project-releases-new-visual-evidence-government-sudan-war-crimes-abyei>.
- Howden, Daniel. 2013. "The state that fell apart in a week." *The Guardian* dated 23 December; <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week>.
- Human Rights Watch. 2014. *South Sudan's New War: Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*. New York: HRW.
- Human Security Baseline Assessment. 2006-2007. "Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent experiences and implication," *Sudan Issue Brief* 3 (second edition, November 2006-February 2007); <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-03-Jonglei.pdf>.
- Human Security Baseline Assessment. 2012. "Small Arms Survey: My Neighbor, My Enemy." *Sudan Issue Brief* 21 (October 2012); [http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB21-Inter-tribal\\_violence\\_in\\_Jonglei.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB21-Inter-tribal_violence_in_Jonglei.pdf).
- Human Security Baseline Assessment. 2013. "DDR in South Sudan"; <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/ddr/HSBA-DDR-in-South-Sudan.pdf>
- Human Security Baseline Assessment. 2014. "Protective measures; Local security arrangements in Greater Upper Nile," *Sudan Issue Brief* 23 (July 2014); <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB23-Local-security-arrangements-in-Greater-Upper-Nile.pdf>.
- ICG. 2009. *Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan*. Africa Report No. 154, 23 December 2009.
- ICG. 2011. *Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan*. Africa Report No. 172, 4 April 2011.
- ICG. 2014. *South Sudan: A Civil War By Any Other Name*. Africa Report No. 217, 10 April 2014.

- IDMC. 2014. South Sudan: Greater Humanitarian and Development Efforts Needed to Meet IDPs' Growing Needs; <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Africa/South-Sudan/pdf/201407-af-southsudan-overview-en.pdf>
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 2015 (2 February). "South Sudan Parties Sign Areas of Agreement on the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity," (accessed 5 February 2015); [http://igad.int/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1041:south-sudan-parties-sign-areas-of-agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-transitional-government-of-national-unity&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=150](http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1041:south-sudan-parties-sign-areas-of-agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-transitional-government-of-national-unity&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=150).
- IPC. 2014a. "South Sudan needs to urgently scale-up humanitarian interventions to prevent famine," *IPC Alert*, Issue 1, dated 9 May 2014, updated 10 June 2014.
- IPC. 2014b. "IPC in South Sudan," Region and Country Work; <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-countries/ipcinfo-eastern-middle-africa/South%20Sudan>.
- IPC Global Emergency Review Committee (IPC ERC). 2014. *Conclusions and Recommendations on the South Sudan Preliminary IPC Country Results. 4 June*; [http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC%20ERC%20South%20Sudan%20Report\\_June%202014.pdf](http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC%20ERC%20South%20Sudan%20Report_June%202014.pdf)
- International Rescue Committee (IRC). 2014. *Uprooted by Conflict: South Sudan's Displacement Crisis*; [http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/SouthSudan\\_report\\_v5.pdf](http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/SouthSudan_report_v5.pdf)
- Johnson, Douglas H. 1979. "Colonial policy and prophets: The Nuer Settlement, 1929-1930." Manuscript available on [http://www.isca.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/ISCA/JASO/Archive\\_1979/10\\_1\\_Johnson.pdf](http://www.isca.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/ISCA/JASO/Archive_1979/10_1_Johnson.pdf).
- Johnson, Douglas H. 1983. "Review of L. M. Passmore Sanderson and G. N. Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan 1899-1964*, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 46: 204-205.
- Johnson, Douglas H. 1994. *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Johnson, Douglas H. 2003. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Johnson, Douglas H. 2014 "The fate of Ngundeng's dang," Rift Valley Institute; <http://www.riftvalley.net/news/fate-ngundeng%E2%80%99s-dang>.
- Johnson, Ginger A. 2013. "'There is Violence Either Way So Let Violence Come with an Education': Southern Sudanese Refugee Women's Use of Education for an Imagined Peaceful Future" pp. 70-84 in Lesley Bartnett & Ameena Ghaffer Kucher, eds., *Refugees, Immigrants, and Education in the Global South: Lives in Motion*. New York: Routledge
- Jok, Jok Madut. 2007. *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*. Oxford: Oneworld.
- Keen, David. 1994. *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine in South-Western Sudan, 1983-1989*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- KIPPRA. 2014. *The Status of Social Cohesion in Kenya, 2013, Draft Report*, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, compiled by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA).
- Kustenbauder, Matthew. 2008. "Prophetic movements: Eastern Africa," pp. 261-270 in *New Encyclopedia of Africa 4*, ed. John Middleton and Joseph C. Miller. Detroit: Thomson/Gale.
- Martell, Peter. 2014. "50,000 and not counting: South Sudan's war dead," *Agence France-Presse* dated 15 November; <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/50000-and-not-counting-south-sudans-war-dead>.
- MoEST & MoCYS. 2013a. *Life Skills Education Curriculum Guidelines for South Sudan (Early Childhood Development)*. Juba: MoEST & MoCYS.
- MoEST & MoCYS. 2013b. *Life Skills Education Curriculum Guidelines for South Sudan (Primary School Level)*. Juba: MoEST & MoCYS.

- MoEST & MoCYS. 2013c. *Life Skills Education Curriculum Guidelines for South Sudan (Secondary School Level)*. Juba: MoEST & MoCYS.
- MoGEI & MoCYS. 2012. *Life Skills Education Curriculum Guidelines for South Sudan (Out of School / ALP – Level)*. Juba: MoGEI & MoCYS.
- Muller, Pete / Saferworld. 2011. "Small arms and cattle raiding in South Sudan – in pictures," *The Guardian*, dated 7 July; <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2011/jul/07/southern-sudan-small-arms-cattle-raiding-in-pictures#/?picture=376520967&index=0>.
- North-South Institute & World Federation of United Nations Associations. 2004. *We the Peoples, A Call to Action for the UN Millennium Declaration: Civil Society Engagement with the Millennium Development Goals*. Ottawa: The North-South Institute & the World Federation of United Nations Associations.
- OCHA. 2014a. "Situation Report No. 5 (as of 17 July 2014)"; <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South%20Sudan%20Crisis%20SitRep%2045.pdf>
- OCHA South Sudan. 2014b. "South Sudan: Floods, disease and death in Bentiu," dated 29 August; <http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/south-sudan-floods-disease-and-death-bentiu>.
- OCHA South Sudan. 2015. "Situation Report No.72 (as of 29 January 2015); [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South\\_Sudan\\_Crisis\\_SitRep\\_No\\_72.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South_Sudan_Crisis_SitRep_No_72.pdf)
- OCHA & South Sudan Education Cluster. 2014. *South Sudan: Occupied Schools by County as of 17 June 2014*; [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/School%20Occupation%20Map\\_23%20June%202014%20v2.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/School%20Occupation%20Map_23%20June%202014%20v2.pdf).
- OECD. 2011. *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do better?* OECD Publishing.
- Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. 2014. "South Sudan" (based on report dated 15 May); <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/south-sudan/>.
- Okech, Francis. 2015. "No teaching in S. Sudan as militants, IDPs occupy schools." *Andalou Agency*. 3 February; <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/460186--no-teaching-in-s-sudan-as-militants-idps-occupy-schools>
- Oluoch, Fred. 2014. "Igad threatens sanctions if talks fail; US wants UN trusteeship," *The East African*, dated 30 November; <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/South-Sudan-Igad-threatens-sanctions-US-wants-UN--trusteeship-/-/2558/2539592/-/mbnme1z/-/index.html>.
- Oudenaren, Daniel Van. 2015 (2 January) "Opinion: Peace and slavery in South Sudan, *Radio Tamazui* (website); <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/opinion-peace-and-slavery-south-sudan>.
- Øystein H. Rolandsen & Cherry Leonardi. 2014. Discourses of violence in the transition from colonialism to independence in southern Sudan, 1955–1960, *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8 (4): 609-625.
- Prendergast, John. 1997. "Applying concepts to cases: Four African case studies," pp. 153-180 in John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Ransford, H. Edward (1968) Isolation, powerlessness, and violence: A study of attitudes and participation in the Watts riot, *American Journal of Sociology* 73(5, March):581-591.
- Rhodes, Tom. 2002. Famine politics and the cycle of relief failure in Sudan's civil war: A case study of the OLS relief operation in the Bar el-Ghazal famine, 1998. *Global Politics Network*; [http://www.globalpolitics.net/essays/Tom\\_Rhodes.pdf](http://www.globalpolitics.net/essays/Tom_Rhodes.pdf).
- Saferworld. 2011a (September). "Saferworld Briefing: People's Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and peacebuilding responses in Jonglei State." London: Saferworld.

- Saferworld. 2011b. (September) "Saferworld Briefing: People's Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and peacebuilding responses in Warrap State." London: Saferworld.
- Saferworld. 2011c. (September) "Saferworld Briefing: People's Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and peacebuilding responses in Unity State." London: Saferworld.
- Sanderson, Liliane M. Passmore and G. Neville Sanderson. 1981. *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan, 1899-1964*. London: Ithaca Press.
- Sandrai, Adel and Augustino Ting Mayai. 2013 (23 February). "Truth and Reconciliation in South Sudan." Juba: Sudd Institute.
- South Sudan Education Cluster. 2012. *South Sudan Minimum Standards for Education in Emergency*. Juba: UNICEF & INEE.
- Sudan Tribune*. 2014. UN expresses concern over violence inside IDP camps in South Sudan. *Sudan Tribune* 5 November; <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52962>.
- Sudd Institute. 2013 (7 June). "Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan: A Conversation for Justice and Stability." Juba: Sudd Institute.
- UNICEF. 2014. "About." *Learning for Peace*; <http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/about/learning-for-peace/>.
- UNICEF ESARO. 2014a. 'Draft Concept Note: Schools as Zones of Peace: Integrating Resilience and Social Cohesion with the Humanitarian Response to Support Early Recovery and Longer-term Development in South Sudan', Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) and Education in Emergencies (EiE), UNICEF, South Sudan, Education Team, ESARO Support team, 26 January.
- UNICEF ESARO. 2014b. Raymond – You strive to build peace in South Sudan; <http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/blog/youth-strive-to-build-peace-in-south-sudan-2/>
- UNICEF South Sudan. 2012. *Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition: 2011 Programme Report*. Juba: UNICEF.
- UNICEF South Sudan. 2014. Day of the African Child – A call to peace from the children of South Sudan; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrXsYOPcgo>
- UNICEF, MoGEI & MoCYS. 2013. *Life Skills and Peacebuilding Training Manual for Trainers of Trainers*. Juba: UNICEF, MoGEI & MoCYS.
- UNMISS. 2014a (8 May). *Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report*. Juba: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.
- UNMISS. 2014b (9 December). South Sudan / Destruction of Weapons (video, 2:54). Juba: UNMISS; <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/2014/12/south-sudan-weapons-destruction/>
- UNMISS. 2014c (19 December). UNMISS destroys weapons in Bentiu camps; <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/unmiss-destroys-weapons-bentiu-camps>.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2014. *Country Analysis Brief: Sudan and South Sudan*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
- Wanyeki, L. Muthoni. 2014. "South Sudan leaders alarmingly shortsighted," *The East African*, dated 12-18 July.
- Warner, Lesley Ann. 2013. "Why did South Sudan's president dissolve his government?" *The Christian Science Monitor*. 24 July; <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2013/0724/Why-did-South-Sudan-s-president-dissolve-his-government>.
- World Bank. 2015. "Data: South Sudan"; <http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-sudan>.

# Annex A

## Basic Data on IDPs in South Sudan

Source: OCHA South Sudan, Situation Report No.72, as of 29 January 2015

- People to be assisted by the end of 2015: 4.1 million
- People facing crisis/emergency levels of food insecurity Jan-Mar 2015: 2.5 million
- People internally displaced by conflict since December 2013: 1.5 million
- 1.6 million people are to be assisted with food support (787,200 men; 819,400 women)
- 2.8 million people to be assisted with livelihoods inputs (1.4 million men; 1.4 million women)
- 1.7 million people are to be reached with livelihood assets (812,600 men; 845,800 women)

### Estimated number of displaced by State, Country:

#### States

Jonglei	621,600
Unity	345,300
Upper Nile	258,000
Lakes	154,700
Central Equatoria	64,400
Western Bahr el Ghazal	26,000
Warrap	11,600
Eastern Equatoria	7,600
Abyei region	6,700
Western Equatoria	4,700
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	2,600

**Total** 1,503,200

#### Countries

Ethiopia	195,217
Uganda	140,462
Sudan	120,211
Kenya	44,953

**Total** 500,843

### South Sudan

Source: wfp.org, 10 February 2015

**Land surface:** 644,329 km<sup>2</sup>

**Population:** 10.3 million (estimated)

Approximately 90% of households depend on crop farming, livestock, fishing or forestry for their livelihoods.

# Annex B

## Theory of Change and its Relevance for Humanitarian Action Through Education in South Sudan

Based on programme adjustments in early 2014 in response to the humanitarian crisis, as part of the development of a Schools as Zones of Peace strategy a Theory of Change was articulated that stated: *If conflict sensitive peacebuilding strategies are introduced to humanitarian activities then communities will better understand conflict and violence risks and increase their resilience against violent conflict. Moreover, interventions that support local capacities for dialogue, reconciliation, and inter-group collaboration support strengthening community level social cohesion and collective action—key dimensions of resilience.*

While this TOC seemed to inform many of the adjustment to the humanitarian crisis, it seems that it was subsequently ‘subsumed’ under existing TOCs of the programme. These existing TOCs are still relevant as there are a number of linkages between the one cited above and those already in place. The ToC is still relevant to this study of IDP educational programming and response in that it provides starting points for adapting a ToC to underpin future studies in emergency contexts in South Sudan. Lessons learned in South Sudan may be relevant for crisis situations in other countries. Below, the most relevant parts of the PBEA ToC (parts d and e; in italics) are examined and suggestions for adapting them proposed.<sup>74</sup>

d) *If marginalized children in medium to high risk areas regularly attend relevant LS+PB, livelihood and literacy and numeracy classes, then they will have increased access to relevant quality education that contributes to their positive behavioral and intellectual development.*

From the visits to the PoC Camps in Juba, it is clear that UNICEF support for education and LS+PB is critical for maintaining children in school with a program enriched with LS+PB, and for keeping a high level of youth and student engagement in education and

peacebuilding issues. The predominantly Nuer youth and students could potentially represent a serious conflict risk themselves due to their deep sense of victimization, validated by the December 2013 and subsequent incidents, and they are a continuing target of attack from other groups that surround the camps where they are sheltering.

e) *If up-to-date conflict analysis and relevant lessons learnt documents are disseminated among key stakeholders in the national and international community, then education and peacebuilding programming is more likely to draw on these to deliver conflict sensitive education services.*

Addressing the misinformation and historical and contemporary inaccuracies that circulate in South Sudan in the absence of a comprehensive reconciliation programme would focus attention on how critical thinking and dismantling toxic histories can be more a part of education and peacebuilding programming, and available for use by educators. Caregivers and teachers often speak of the need for information and materials to assist their action and inform the students they teach of the latest findings, methodologies and analyses pertinent to understanding the world around them. Likewise, government officials need to receive up-to-date information for formulating policy responses that are conflict sensitive. In the absence of rigorous analyses of conflict and peacebuilding, trainers and decision-makers alike may be tempted to fall back on their own impressions, preconceptions, and biases, or neglect to adequately test policies for their conflict sensitivity.

Linking high quality LS+PB with critical thinking skills, conflict analysis and the imparting of tools for dismantling toxic histories (uniting points d and e, so to speak) should be the eventual goal for conflict sensitive primary and secondary education, particularly in the emergency context. An analysis of the critical role of prophets in traditional peacebuilding drawn from the historical record is offered in Annex C of the companion case study, as a starting point for creating the tools for dismantling toxic histories.

74 ToC points a, b and c are addressed in the institutional capacity building case study.



United Nations Children's Fund  
Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO)  
UNON, Gigiri  
P.O. Box 44145-00100 Nairobi, Kenya  
Tel. Office +254 20 762 2741,  
Website: [www.unicef.org/esaro](http://www.unicef.org/esaro)

**For further information contact:**

Neven Knezevic (PhD)  
[nknezevic@unicef.org](mailto:nknezevic@unicef.org)  
Humanitarian Action, Resilience and Peacebuilding Section (HARP)