LIBYA YOUTH SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
Final Report—Revised

June 8, 2020

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International (MSI), a Tetra Tech Company.
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# ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABA ROLI</td>
<td>American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEP</td>
<td>Accelerated Education Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Contracting Officer’s Representative</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAI</td>
<td>Development Alternatives International</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DenCA</td>
<td>Denmark Christian Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNH</td>
<td>Do No Harm</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELSA</td>
<td>Elections and Legislative Strengthening Activity (USAID Activity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GISR</td>
<td>Governance Integration for Stabilization and Resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>Government of National Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBTCI</td>
<td>International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-Agency for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOPCD</td>
<td>International Organization for the Protection of Children and Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>LEGS</td>
<td>Libya Elections and Governance Support Program (USAID Activity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTI</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGCS</td>
<td>Local Governance and Civil Society (USAID Activity)</td>
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<td>LNA</td>
<td>Libyan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTI</td>
<td>Libya Transition Initiative (USAID OTI program)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LYD</td>
<td>Libyan Dinar</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
LYSA  Libya Youth Situational Analysis
ME/TS  Bureau of Middle East Technical Support
MEDA  Mennonite Economic Development Associates
MENA  Middle East and North Africa
MH  Mental Health
MOE  Ministry of Education
MOL  Ministry of Labor
MSI  Management Systems International
NBTVE  National Board of Technical and Vocational Education
NDI  National Democratic Institute
NGO  Non-governmental Organization
PGD  Peer Group Discussion
PSS  Psycho-social Support
PTSD  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PUBG  Player Unknown’s Battlegrounds
PYD  Positive Youth Development
SLEIDSE  Support to Libya for Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Development
SME  Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
SOW  Statement of Work
TIC  Trauma Informed Care
TOT  Training of Trainers
TVET  Technical and Vocation Education Training
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNHABITAT  United Nations Human Settlement Program
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS  United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WFP  World Food Program
WHO  World Health Organization
YA  Youth Assessor
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ASSESSMENT PURPOSE

The purpose of the Libya Youth Situational Assessment is to generate actionable information and recommendations on the integration of youth development into the full range of current and future USAID/Libya Mission programming, at both program and strategy levels. The assessment engaged youth throughout to demonstrate that youth can be active partners in building the knowledge base about issues that affect them.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

“The circumstances we live in have forced us to focus our dreams in this narrow framework that does not reflect our true dreams.” (Youth Assessor, Tripoli)

Libyan youth are tempering their expectations—with a focus on stability and income—due to the ongoing conflict and economic uncertainty. When asked about their dreams for the future, the majority of young respondents in this assessment used phrases like “a steady job” and “a decent income.” They also expressed a strong desire “to complete their education” and for self-improvement more generally.

But key institutions intended to serve youth were weak prior to the civil war, and the conflict has further disrupted what services and opportunities there are for youth, closing schools, constricting economic growth, limiting travel (especially among women), bringing changes to traditional patterns of family formation, and causing physical and psychological harm. Indeed, “Youth are the fuel of the war” was the most frequently repeated sentence across interviews and peer group discussions.

EDUCATION FOR WORK AND LIFE

Libya’s education system leaves youth largely unprepared for the changing labor market. Common problems across the general education and technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems include mismatches between what is learned and what the labor market needs; insufficient opportunities to learn soft skills; and insufficient attention to career exploration in the educational process. Critical gaps in TVET, in particular, include up-to-date curricula in economic sectors with growth potential; access to quality TVET for people in remote areas, females generally, youth who have missed formal opportunities, and other vulnerable groups; and assistance with transition to the workplace.

Youth engaged by the assessment value learning, but they disparaged the quality of education and underlined the frequent disruptions to learning. Young people also realize that the education they receive does not correspond to the expectations and requirements of the employers in the private sector. However, openness to TVET among youth is increasing, albeit largely from necessity.

WORKPLACE TRANSITION

As of 2015, youth unemployment in Libya stood at 41 percent, more than twice the overall unemployment rate. Unemployment rates were especially high among graduates and young women. Fortunately, several labor-market studies since 2015 have identified economic growth sectors, including those open to women in the Libyan context and to youth with low to moderate skills. Conspicuously, the Libyan public sector is no longer the default employer for most. These studies, supported by assessment field data, also found significant skills gaps, particularly in the area of soft skills. Employer demand is highest for skills such as
time management and giving and following directions, followed by communication, customer service, management, computer literacy, numeracy, Arabic language literacy, and English.

Youth participating in the assessment expressed mixed feelings about public vs. private sector employment and about non-“white collar” jobs. Many youth—male and female—seem to be finding jobs for pragmatic reasons, because they need the money to support their family. Some appeared torn between getting an income and working in an area that they like but in which they cannot find a job, highlighting a mismatch not just of skills but between youth aspirations and the job market. Young men in the peer group discussions (PGDs) sometimes described women as competition in the job market, pointing to a need for gender sensitivity in designing and implementing activities related to employment.

VOICE AND PARTICIPATION

Interest in volunteering and civic engagement varied widely among youth participating in this assessment, but, overall, the literature review, key informant interviews (KIIs) and PGDs indicated low levels of civic engagement among Libyan youth. Negative views of unpaid activity emerged as a central hurdle to youth engagement, compounded now by economic stresses; other reasons included Libya’s limited tradition of volunteerism, lack of time, lack of awareness of opportunities, wariness of the organizations doing the mobilizing, and the closing of space for youth activism after their participation in the 2011 revolution. Youth in the PGDs also did not generally seem to understand what civic engagement might entail beyond charitable activities, refurbishing public areas, debate competitions and student councils. Youth are reluctant to engage politically because of the physical risk it currently entails for those who might disagree with authorities or opposing sides (as well as the sense that older people dominate). Barriers to mixed-gender gatherings hinder young women’s engagement, especially for those living outside Tripoli and Benghazi, with the marked exception of girls’ and young women’s high levels of participation in debate clubs.

The use of digital platforms by youth is a bright spot, despite the dangers of hate speech and false information, and despite problems with connectivity, bandwidth and electricity. For youth, digital platforms—especially Facebook and YouTube—are a critical part of communicating, learning, running a business, looking for employment, and socializing (especially for women).

MENTAL HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

Around 40 percent of the Libyan population suffers from mental health issues, according to a 2017 MHPSS.net/World Health Organization (WHO) report and an expert interviewed for this assessment.

There is a significant lack of psychosocial professional support in Libya, however. According to an expert interviewed by the LYSA team, there are fewer than two dozen psychiatrists in Libya, with most in Tripoli and Benghazi. Only seven Libyan doctors have graduated with a specialization in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and most are abroad. There is one mental health facility in Tripoli, one in Benghazi, and a branch facility in Misrata. Former Minister of Education Otman Abdul alil had begun to implement a plan to train school counselors and teachers to provide some level of psychosocial support to students in need, marketing it as a social skills-building program within the school system. It is believed that the program was halted in April 2019 after Minister Abdul Jalil’s resignation. Other psycho-social support (PSS) activities identified by the assessment include a United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) collaboration with the Libya Psychosocial Support Team on a hotline.

At the same time, the stigma around mental health issues is very strong, according to the literature reviewed, KIIIs and PGDs, leading to the underuse of the few existing facilities.
VULNERABLE GROUPS

Libyan youth experience multiple forms and intersections of vulnerability. All Libyan youth are vulnerable to consequences of decades of conflict, political instability and poor governance, including disruption of education and other essential services, un- and underemployment, violence, and mental health problems. Young men are at risk of recruitment into violent groups and/or illicit activities, due to un- or underemployment, poor quality education and youth exclusion on the one hand, and the attractions of militias in terms of income, power and security on the other. Libyan women, people with disabilities, LGBTI individuals, ethnic minorities (especially those without citizenship documentation), internally displaced persons and migrants face additional barriers to school, employment and civic participation, along with vulnerabilities to violence.

While there is much to celebrate about the position of women in Libya—particularly their educational attainment levels and rates—young women in general face structural and cultural barriers that limit their choices and potential and may make them vulnerable to GBV in schools, families, workplaces and the community. KIIIs and PGDs elicited powerful stereotypes across respondents. Most young men in the PGDs held traditional gender norms, while a number of young women expressed frustration with limits to their employment and travel. At the same time, patterns of family formation and women’s employment are in flux as a result of the conflict. Some changes are providing opportunities for women, particularly in income-earning, but this changing gender dynamic appears to be generating stress among men.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The leap from what limited shelter educational institutions provide to the world of work is especially fraught now in Libya. Libyan youth need support to meet their aspirations in ways that are pragmatic, realistic and adaptable to the uncertain and insecure context. The recommended overarching goal for USAID efforts to support youth in Libya is therefore to build more secure, flexible pathways to productive adulthood for Libyan youth. Recommendations fall into three major categories: learning for employability; engagement in communities; and mental health and well-being. These areas are mutually reinforcing and involve the development of skills, values and behaviors that are transferable across multiple domains of young people’s lives, including family, community, education and employment.
LEARNING FOR EMPLOYABILITY

Equipping young people with marketable skills that they can readily use in the transition to the workplace, as well as with positive associations and a sense of purpose around work, is of prime importance in Libya. Priorities for USAID consideration fall in three inter-connected areas, all aimed at narrowing the gap between education and the job market for youth.

1. **Identifying and strengthening pathways within the TVET system—with youth input—to high demand occupations that align with youth interests and aspirations** is a high impact, feasible opportunity for USAID. The universe of current donors is quite small, and the Ministries of Education and Labor appear open to donor partnerships. Elements of support can include:
   a. Mapping current and emerging job market needs and their respective training and skills needs and revising training curricula accordingly, with a focus on the institutions that serve the majority of TVET students (in Libya, these are the almost 400 Intermediate Institutes covering grades 10-12).
   b. Integrating PYD into this process with government counterparts, other donors and the private sector representatives by creating and supporting platforms that enable youth to have input on youth aspirations, ways of working, gender norms and shifts, and views on various sectors.

2. **Engaging the private sector** is most readily initiated by working with Chambers of Commerce on:
   a. Promoting apprenticeship through adoption of an Apprenticeship Charter and linking apprenticeship opportunities to the Intermediate Institutes.
   b. Linking the private sector to the TVET reform processes.

3. **Leveraging the general education system** through:
   a. After-school and extracurricular programs (these are discussed in detail in the report under recommendations for Engagement in Communities and Mental Health and Well-Being).
   b. Training/upskilling school counseling units to help youth with career exploration.
For out-of-school youth, USAID might consider supporting one or more types of accelerated education programs (AEPs). AEPs provide a condensed curriculum, ideally tailored to the sub-population in need, to enable youth who have missed out on months or years of formal schooling due to a conflict or crisis to catch up on their education and eventually reintegrate into a formal school.

ENGAGEMENT IN COMMUNITIES

Engagement in communities involves the cultivation of opportunities for youth to move gradually but steadily beyond “survival” mindsets typical of conflict-affected countries to expand their understanding of what civic participation can mean. The assessment recommends that USAID consider developing a dedicated youth civic engagement activity, as well as working to integrate youth into existing activities that seek to build citizen participation and work with municipalities. Recommendations put youth aspirations, perspectives and leadership at the center to ensure interventions motivate youth to engage and are inclusive.

1. **Strengthening civil society and municipal pathways to engagement** involves at least three major aspects:
   a. Supporting the development of locally appropriate platforms for youth that enable them to identify and prioritize their needs. This might start with a community youth mapping process, facilitated initially by trusted, nationally present organizations like the Scouts/Guides and Red Crescent, to enable youth to identify local youth-led and youth-oriented associations and determine their capacity and interests.
   b. Working with local youth organizations and other civil society organizations to provide on-going opportunities for youth engagement and learning. These should include specialized approaches for such vulnerable groups as youth with disabilities and out-of-school youth.
   c. Working with adults at the municipal/community level to welcome youth voices through such platforms as Municipal Youth Advisory Councils and the integration of youth into existing USAID-supported community consultation processes. As municipal level opportunities will vary, it is critical that civic engagement programming seek to provide positive experiences for youth and their interlocutors to sustain enthusiasm and avoid cynicism.

2. **Leveraging the general education system** will build on existing and past USAID programming and comparative advantage. The assessment recommends continuing support for such interventions as debate clubs and student councils/unions and their networks.

MENTAL HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

Awareness of conflict-related psychosocial stress and how to help youth manage it needs to be integrated into youth activities of all kinds in Libya in culturally appropriate ways, with an emphasis on doing no harm.

The assessment recommends that USAID consider incorporating “trauma informed care” (TIC) into projects that work with youth, so that activities can begin to heal psychosocial wounds left by Libya’s conflict and services do not re-traumatize beneficiaries or staff. This would entail support for training adults working with youth in the four key elements of TIC, to the extent attainable: 1) realizing the widespread impact of trauma and understanding potential paths for recovery; 2) recognizing the signs and symptoms of trauma; 3) fully integrating knowledge about trauma into policies, procedures, and practices; and 4) seeking to actively resist re-traumatization. Awareness of conflict-related psychosocial stress and how to help youth manage it needs to be integrated into youth activities of all kinds in Libya in culturally appropriate ways, with an emphasis on doing no harm. Evidence-based approaches to building the well-being of youth need not be termed “mental health” or “psychological counseling” which are strongly stigmatized in the Libyan context.
Other assessment recommendations focus on leveraging the general education system as the entry point for this sensitive work. Safe schools and non-formal learning spaces are some of the most beneficial environments for children and youth during a period of uncertainty, and education settings bring children and their peers, parents, families, and communities together in ways that can support broader well-being.

1. An initial targeted step would be to provide training to school counselors under the auspices of the MOE and promote the use of these professionals. Potential partners are the Ministry of Health, World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and universities. School counselors can provide a wide range of services that integrate mental health support without labeling it as such. Training might progress from trauma-informed care approaches that focus on healthy classrooms to proactive counseling with students and families.

2. USAID should continue to support after-school and extra-curricular activities that encourage youth to become positively engaged and also incorporate effective approaches to PSS and healing, such as play, socio-cultural and art-based activities. These might be bolstered with deliberate attention to recent guidance on how to engage communities in school life to undertake healing activities.

3. Providing opportunities for older youth to volunteer in schools to mentor younger youth and thereby promote positive self-identify, belonging and teamwork. By leveraging the youth platforms developed under the engagement cluster of recommendations, such opportunities would both help expand play activities for younger children and reduce burdens on teachers and counselors, while supplementing engagement options for older youth.

CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

Four main cross-cutting themes shape the recommendations: the importance of soft skills, attention to vulnerable populations, gender equity, and conflict sensitivity.

Soft skills lie at the intersection of the assets that youth need to effectively navigate and succeed in the transition to adulthood. The recommendations therefore integrate soft skills development as a “connecting tissue” to expand and reinforce interventions across sectors. With regard to vulnerable populations, the strategy put forward seeks to reduce the vulnerability of youth overall to poor life outcomes due to the conflict, systemic flaws in the education and training systems, and Libya’s weak economy. The assessment also recommends special attention to the inclusion of persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities and internally displaced youth, and provides ideas for how this can be done. Gender considerations and conflict sensitivity are integrated across the recommendations.
ASSESSMENT PURPOSE

The main purpose of the Libya Youth Situational Assessment (LYSA) is to generate actionable information and recommendations on the integration of youth development into the full range of current and future USAID/Libya Mission programming, at both program and strategy levels. The process aspect involves demonstrating that youth can be active partners in building the knowledge base about issues that affect them, and the assessment seeks to strengthen the assets of youth by using a positive youth development (PYD) approach.

RESEARCH DESIGN SUMMARY

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The assessment questions are based on the Statement of Work (SOW), a case study, the results of a survey of USAID/Libya implementing partners (IPs), a literature desk review, and ongoing discussions with the USAID GISR MENA and USAID/Libya teams.

The overarching research questions are: (1) what do Libyan youth prioritize as needs in their transition to adulthood, and (2) how can USAID build on opportunities and assets to engage youth and meet these needs, given its existing (and expected) resources, comparative advantages and the context? Specific research questions fall into three major clusters: (1) learning and education for life and work; (2) workforce transition and youth employment; and (3) voice and participation. Additional questions cover contextual and demographic information, and health and security.

YOUTH-CENTERED PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES

The assessment design applies a PYD lens throughout the methodologies, approaches and activities. Twenty-one young people (11 male, 10 female, aged 19-29) actively participated as Youth Assessors in the data collection. The table in Annex 1 summarizes the characteristics of the Youth Assessors.

In addition, the Youth Assessors:

- Were trained for three days in data collection methodologies and instruments, including how to obtain informed consent and facilitation techniques;
- Helped recruit appropriate youth to peer group discussions (PGDs);
- Served as facilitators, interviewers and note-takers during data collection;
- Helped review what was and was not working in data collection to improve approaches; and
- Contributed to data analysis through regular debriefs.

The LYSA team recruited the Youth Assessors through the on-the-ground networks of MSI's GISR MENA consortium sub-partner, Navanti Group, which has existing networks of data collectors and researchers with experience working throughout Libya. These Youth Assessors came from a diversity of backgrounds, rural and urban areas, with varying education levels and socio-economic backgrounds. They all had a minimum of a high school education and a background in data collection, research, and experience working with youth.

PYD-oriented data collection and analysis approaches included conducting a remote train-the-trainer (TOT) program for the three Regional Coordinators (based in Gharyan, Sabha and Benghazi) to ensure that they understood and implemented PYD principles in the context of data collection and prepared them to train the Youth Assessors (held on February 17, 2020). The three-day in-person training program
for the Youth Assessors also integrated PYD concepts and exercises and enabled the Youth Assessors to practice data collection skills, as well as using LYSA data collection instruments (held February 18-21 simultaneously in three locations). The Regional Coordinators and MSI’s Youth Expert then provided ongoing, real-time monitoring and mentoring to the Youth Assessors throughout data collection (February 21 – March 15). They used a WhatsApp group to create an informal network for sharing information, asking questions, exchanging suggestions on how to effectively use the instruments, providing psychological support, and addressing daily challenges.

LYSA adapted PGD protocols and instruments that have been successfully used in other youth assessments (for example, Ethiopia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan), and applied a PYD lens to the assessment.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The LYSA team employed a combination of data collection methods to triangulate findings at multiple levels and generate credible evidence to answer the research questions, incorporating youth-centered approaches as discussed above. Methods and sources are summarized in the table below.

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<tr>
<th>Data Collection Method</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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| Survey of IPs and USAID staff | • Libya IPs  
• USAID/Libya staff  
• USAID/ME/TS staff | • Identifying key questions  
• Background information |
| Desk literature review | • USAID documents, including IP reports and documents  
• Other donor documents  
• Government databases and publications  
• Secondary literature, think tank reports | • Country context  
• Sample frame  
• Youth demographics  
• Inventory of youth programs  
• Identifying key questions |
| Peer Group Discussions (PGDs) | • Youth from designated cohorts (by age, sex and location), including marginalized groups | • Youth aspirations and needs  
• Awareness of opportunities  
• Differences between cohorts |
| Key Informant Interviews (KII) | • Stakeholders other than youth, including civil society leaders, training providers, private sector representatives, national and local government officials, local level leaders (informal), mental health professionals | • Opportunities and best practices  
• Barriers to youth accessing opportunities/gaps  
• Adult attitudes to youth |

As shown in the map below, fieldwork took place in seven locations across Libya—Bayda and Benghazi in the east; Ghadames, Gharyan and Tripoli in the west; and Kufra and Sabha in the south. The assessment conducted a total of 21 PGDs, with a total of 165 participants (75 female, 90 male) across these locations (see Annex 2 for details). The Youth Assessors also conducted 14 KIIs in the field (4 female) (see Annex 3). MSI team members conducted 32 remote KIIIs (14 female), including nearly all current USAID/IPs (see Annex 3). Twenty of the 21 Youth Assessors provided individual responses to the PGD questionnaire, and the three Regional Coordinators documented debriefs held with Youth Assessors after the training, during data collection and after the close of data collection. A literature desk review was included with the workplan, but the team continued to collect and distill relevant research, reports and documents during the course of fieldwork and afterwards.
The assessment team used several methods to analyze the various data streams. Fieldwork notes were analyzed by research question(s) and sub-question(s); emerging themes; factors that may influence outcomes in learning, workforce transition, engagement and other areas; and cohort characteristics (or KII respondent characteristics). Responses were compared by gender, location and other respondent characteristics. The various data sources were used to triangulate findings, while noting divergent or outlying views.

Regarding gender considerations, the team sought to hold PGDs with equal numbers of girls/young women and boys/young men, and to interview equal numbers of women and men. The Youth Assessors comprise almost equal numbers of young women and men. Gender considerations (and their intersectionality with other identities) were integrated into the data collection instruments and analysis plan, as detailed in the workplan. Assessment findings, conclusions and recommendations highlight the most salient of these differences and commonalities.

LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

The findings and conclusions presented here have several limitations. The first is generalizability. The PGDs and KIIs were selected to capture a range of views by place, sex, ethnicity and organizational affiliation. Given the small numbers of respondents and the fact that they were selected purposively (or by snowball), the findings for any given cohort are not generalizable to the corresponding population. Finally, not all topics could be covered in every PGD or KII, so it is not possible to compare responses by sex, place, or ethnicity across all topics. While the assessment sought to triangulate findings across sources and provided daily monitoring of fieldwork, reliability remains a limitation as facilitation, note-taking and translation varied in quality across data collection events.

Conditions in Libya also created challenges. The accelerating nature of the conflict in Libya during the fieldwork, lack of internet and up to 12-hour electricity cuts in a day pushed the Regional Coordinators and Youth Assessors to schedule data collection as rapidly as possible. Many of the Youth Assessors were also balancing academic, work and family commitments. However, this speed, along with frequent connectivity outages in the field, hindered debriefs and quality control processes. In some cases, the Regional Coordinators did not have all the PGD reports from a research location to review until after all PGDs from that location were completed, limiting their ability to provide corrective feedback or action.

The northwest was the most volatile security-wise; the Tripoli municipality KII, for example, had to be rescheduled eight times with three different municipality members. Youth in Tripoli appeared to be significantly less comfortable with participating in PGDs than youth in other areas because of perceived
potential security risks, and the Youth Assessors had difficulty identifying a suitable location for the PGDs (Tripoli University was closed as it was near the frontlines).

The primary lesson learned is that ample time is needed to fully engage youth in an assessment process in a way that also fully satisfies data quality needs. More comprehensive engagement and improved data quality would entail: a longer TOT and longer, iterative Youth Assessor training, interspersed with rounds of data collection and reflection.

**FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

**DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT**

**YOUTH DEMOGRAPHICS AND COHORTS**

While population growth has declined over the last decade, and almost stalled since 2011, Libya is still one of the youngest countries in the MENA region with 32 percent of the population below 18, 42 percent under 24, and 60 percent below 34. More detailed demographic data on youth, including statistics by place, ethnicity and disability status, are lacking, however.

A rough sketch of age cohorts, as perceived by Libyans interviewed for this assessment and supported by the literature, is as follows:

- <18: In secondary school and still with family
- 19-early twenties: at university and away from family
- Early to late twenties: youth are seeking employment and to start a family
- From their thirties, youth are (ideally) settled in employment and family life

However, these patterns and milestones are shifting as a result of the conflict.

When asked to distinguish cohorts, by far the most frequently mentioned difference among youth was rural vs urban, with cities described as more “diverse” and the youth in them more “cosmopolitan.” These descriptions apply to Ghadames and Sabha, as well as Tripoli and Benghazi. Libya is highly urbanized, at 85 percent, and rural to urban migration, for the purpose of finding employment and for education, is significant. Rural youth were described as more vulnerable by some key informants due to lower levels of essential services outside cities. Rural areas were also described as “more stable” in terms of providing family and community support to youth. KIIs indicated, in particular, that tribal structures, values and practices in rural areas assisted in dispute resolution and keeping youth from unsafe behaviors (although KIIs also indicated that youth engagement in illicit trading was acceptable as a source of income).

Socio-economic status did not emerge as a clear marker of differences separate from location, ethnicity, or migrant status, although this is not a conclusive finding. This may be a manifestation of the leveling effects of the Ghaddafi period and of Libya’s subsequent economic decline, which made everyone worse off; or it could be because other identities are more powerful than socio-economic status. Libya’s economic decline does appear salient as an inter-generational issue, with youth growing up in circumstances much different from their parents.

Ethnicity, gender and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and migrants are discussed in sections below.

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GENDER NORMS AND OTHER SOCIAL PATTERNS

“The Government is supporting the notion that more women enter work. But not many women are in decision-making positions. These cultural norms start at an early stage in life. Most of the decision-makers are adult males who are protecting their positions and limiting youth and women in taking their roles in decision-making.” (KII with Libyan expert)

First, as the box below indicates, there is much to celebrate about the position of women in Libya. Women’s average education levels and labor market participation rates are higher than in most other MENA countries.²

Gender norms are closer to those of the MENA region. Both young men and young women usually (though not uniformly) described roles in the family and “appropriate” employment largely in the same way. Women care for children, clean and cook in the home, while men perform heavier chores when needed. Women work in education, health care (though not all specializations), and jobs that require contact with women, like cosmetics and clothing stores; and they may run food and handicrafts businesses, usually from home. They also increasingly work in offices. Men work in jobs that require physical strength and travel, and effectively all the sectors not mentioned as appropriate for women.

Statistics on Education and Employment by Sex³

- There are more women (14%) than men (3%) who have no formal education or an incomplete primary education.
- There are almost as many women (32%) as men (33%) who hold a university degree or higher.
- 66% of women who have a university education or higher report being employed compared to 69% of men with the same educational attainment.
- The majority (77%) of Libyan women under 25 intend to pursue higher education compared to 67% of men.
- The top fields of study young women would like to pursue are medicine, applied sciences and languages.
- 73% of women under 25 would like to pursue a career versus 70% of men. The top career choices of young Libyan women are physician, teacher or lawyer.
- Women’s labor force participation in Libya is significantly lower than men, with 43% of women reporting work for pay compared to 66% of men.
- Women 25-54 are the most economically active and women’s employment is higher in urban (44%) than in rural areas (32%).
- More women in the eastern (45%) and western (43%) regions of Libya work for pay compared with women in the middle or southern regions (both at 30%).
- Of women who work, two-thirds are employed in the education industry and 13% in the health industry.
- The government/public sector is the main employer of men (70%); however, significantly more men (26%) are employed in the private sector than women (7%).

Young men’s discourse about women’s roles and abilities was often strikingly belittling, supporting earlier research in this area.⁴ For example, a youth from Ghadames said, “The role of men in society is to lead it; women have no specific role,” and a youth from Benghazi “[could not] deny their role in helping men.” By contrast, many of the young women in PGDs clearly chafed under the traditional division of labor, aspired

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⁴ UNFPA, 2018. The Libyan Youth Today: Opportunities and Challenges. This report cites the 2015 World Values Survey which found that about 80 percent of Libyan men considered themselves to be better than women in terms of political and business leadership.
to a wide range of professions, and were sometimes dismissive of men, particularly for their roles in the home.

“As for males, they mostly aspire to have a job with a good financial package in order to be able to build their life and feel stability. I personally aspire to be a Minister of Health one day. This is my goal. I want to correct the current situation, which I think is wrong.” (Young woman in Bayda PGD)

Amazigh are largely seen as holding less traditional gender norms than Arabs (this was also the primary way in which ethnic differences among cohorts were mentioned), but this should be taken as a perception and not necessarily reality.\(^5\) The South was described as more traditional than cities or coastal areas.

Finally, recent literature, KIIIs with Libyan youth experts and PGDs point to changes in traditional patterns of family formation.

While there is a relative vacuum of data regarding family formation in Libya, the most recently available research\(^6\) indicates that the age of first marriage for males is 34.4 years and 30.1 years for females. This late marriage phenomenon is explained by the high cost of marriage in the context of worsening economic conditions and the ongoing security crisis, and that fact that young people are pursuing their education for longer periods of time. Some young men in PGDs voiced anxiety that the absence of employment or a good salary is forcing them to delay marriage, echoing other consultations that donors have held with youth;\(^7\) and experts interviewed also suggested marriage is being delayed for financial reasons. Girls are increasingly marrying men who are ten or more years older than they are (at 56.2 percent of the total number of girls married in the age group of 15-19 years, 47.9 percent for the 20-24 age group, and 24.2 percent for those in the 30-34 age group). This can be explained as a result of insecurity among girls arising from the conflict and resulting physical safety and financial security concerns. At the same time, a United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) report indicated a slight increase in females marrying before the age of 18 years, as well as agreeing to enter into polygamous marriages. Experts interviewed attributed this phenomenon to the absence of suitable younger men for marriage. Early marriage (before the age of 15) is nearly extinct now, however. No reliable or recent data was found on divorce rates. Interviewees posited some additional changes to family formation, but these could not be triangulated with other data sources:

- A reported decrease in marriage and an increase in relationships outside of marriage;
- Women will typically begin to have children soon after they marry, but with fewer children now, on the average of 3-4 per family;
- An increase in alternatives to arranged marriages, with youth having more autonomy in their choices, although women do still agree to enter into arranged marriages, particularly in the South; and
- An increase in the number of divorces.


\(^6\) UNFPA. 2018. The Libyan Youth Today: Opportunities and Challenges.

\(^7\) In the course of the National Consultation on Youth, Peace and Security carried out in 2017, male participants cited the increasing negative consequences of the lack of job opportunities and sources of revenues for youth; these prevent them from realizing goals such as becoming autonomous, marrying and starting their own families.
VULNERABLE GROUPS

Libyan youth experience multiple forms and intersections of vulnerability. First, all Libyan youth are vulnerable to consequences of decades of conflict, political instability and poor governance, including disruption of education and other essential services, un- and underemployment, violence, and mental health problems. Young men are at particular risk of recruitment into violent groups and/or illicit activities, while some interview respondents plausibly argued that male youth 19-25 were the most vulnerable to recruitment into militias or criminal behavior. These youth are exiting an educational system that has poorly prepared them for the labor market; face high levels of unemployment or uncertain income; and likely cannot (legally) match the lifestyles of those who reached adulthood before 2011. At the same time, as is discussed below, the militias provide income, status and protection.

Second, consistent with vulnerabilities identified worldwide, Libyan women, people with disabilities, and LGBTI individuals face additional barriers to school, employment and civic participation, along with vulnerabilities to violence. Ethnic minorities, particularly those without citizenship documentation, are additionally vulnerable to exclusion from public services and participation; their exclusion is most likely to persist under the Libyan National Army (LNA) which adheres to Ghaddafi-like, pro-Arab, homogenizing policies on Libyan nationality.

Research reflects a significant dearth of information on people with disabilities in Libya, across government data collection and reporting and relative to policies. As such, people with disabilities remain largely “invisible” for the purposes of assessing accessibility and service delivery. While no estimate of total numbers or percentage of the population could be found, the UNOCHA 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview found that persons with disabilities comprised up to four percent of the population of some regions. A 2018 report citing data in Arabic from the Libyan government stated that “43.57 percent of persons with disabilities had mobility impairments; 22.84 percent mental disability; 13.74 percent hearing impairment; 12.64 percent visual impairment; and 7.21 percent psychiatric disability.” A 2006 report by the Ministry of Social Affairs identified almost half of all persons with disabilities as under 35 years of age. The government has historically prioritized access to treatment, rehabilitation and benefits for those disabled through “revolutionary” armed conflict, including treatment abroad, while others received more limited services within Libya. Youth with disabilities have also been historically marginalized in mainstream education, with a large portion not attending school due to stigma and a lack of physical access.

In addition, Libya hosts large populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and migrants, both of which are highly vulnerable. IDPs are equal to around 5 percent of Libya’s population, at 355,762 as of December 2019, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). All but three percent had been displaced due to the conflict. The largest concentration of IDPs (at 24 percent) is in the Tripoli region.

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8 The assessment deliberately did not ask directly about sexual orientation. The PGD guide included this question: “I’d like to ask about the health and well-being of youth in your community. Tell me about the general health status of youth in your community. [Prompts: communicable diseases; Malnutrition/ food security; Physical fitness; Physical safety, security; Mental wellness (including trauma, depression, and anxiety); Substance abuse (drugs, alcohol, tobacco, other); Behavioral addiction (gambling, pornography, internet use, video games, sex, etc.)]” We do not know how many Youth Assessors actually used the prompt for sexual orientation. In one PGD, according to a debrief, the facilitator mentioned “homosexuality” with a chilling effect on the discussion.

9 No research regarding people with disabilities in Libya has been published in scholarly journals since 1983.

10 Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research, 2018. People with Disability in Libya are a Medicalised Minority: Findings of a Scoping Review (citing reports in Arabic from the Health Information Center Department, 2012, and Libyan Ministry of Health, 2010). MSI could not access the original material and so cannot confirm the accuracy of the translation of the terms from Arabic into English or clarify the terms’ definitions.

11 Ibid.


According to IOM disaggregation, 46 percent are aged 18-59, and 33 percent are aged 6-17. All age cohorts are equally divided between males and females. Living conditions for IDPs vary from area to area but are especially difficult in the South. IDPs are staying in shelters ranging from rented accommodation to schools, factories and empty buildings; access to essential services is similarly variable. A 2017 assessment of areas with large numbers of IDPs found that around 30% of school-aged children were not enrolled.\(^\text{14}\)

Migrants passing from sub-Saharan Africa through Libya are equal to around 10 percent of Libya’s population, at around 654,000 in December 2019, according to the IOM.\(^\text{15}\) Nine percent are children (the IOM does not further disaggregate by age.) Almost half are in the West, while the remainder are evenly divided between the East and South. They are primarily from sub-Saharan Africa, transiting through Libya in hopes of traveling to Europe; this is a fluid population that tends not to settle in Libya. Migrants are vulnerable to grave human rights violations and abuses, by state and non-state actors, including high levels of gender-based violence. Migrants also have limited access to essential services, including health, water, hygiene and sanitation.\(^\text{16}\)

**INTERNET ACCESS AND USE**

“If it were not for the internet, I would not have reached where I am now.” (Youth in Ghadames PGD)

Estimates of internet penetration rates in Libya vary, from 20-59 percent as of 2017.\(^\text{17}\) Daily internet usage in Tripoli and Benghazi is over 50 percent; in Misrata, Zuwarah and Sabha, it is 25 percent of the local population.\(^\text{18}\) Seventy-seven percent of young people use computers compared to 31.6 percent for the older generation. The proportion of young people who use the internet daily is 55.3 percent compared to only 16.5 percent for those aged 50 or more.\(^\text{19}\) Mobile phone penetration is 169 percent (with 11 million mobile subscriptions among a population of 6.7 million), and most people access the Internet from their mobile phones—63 percent of web traffic goes through phones.\(^\text{20}\) The assessment was unable to find sex-disaggregated data on internet access and phone use.

The largest numbers of Libyan active social media users are on Facebook (72 percent of users) and YouTube (17 percent). About 38 percent of Facebook users are women. Most Facebook users are found in the major cities, like Tripoli (41 percent) and Benghazi (17 percent). Libyans use social media for communication, socialization, transactional business, entertainment and as a source of news.\(^\text{21}\)

Views of how and why youth access digital platforms tended to converge. The most popular platforms are Facebook, WhatsApp and YouTube. Respondents also mentioned Viber, Instagram and Tik Tok. LYSA data indicates youth access digital platforms daily via their phones. Youth use digital platforms for a host of purposes: to communicate with each other, learn new skills or augment school teaching, advertise their businesses, find work, and push out news. Female youth are especially dependent on social media for socializing and for running home-based businesses as their travel outside the home is limited.

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\(^\text{16}\) The assessment did not examine Libyan out migration, although some youth in the PGDs expressed a desire to emigrate.


\(^\text{18}\) https://medialandscapes.org/country/libya/media/digital-media.

\(^\text{19}\) UNFPA, 2018. The Libyan Youth Today: Opportunities and Challenges.


Many KIIs and PGDs also referred to negative aspects of digital platforms, including their ability to propagate hate speech, rumors and false information. Adult respondents were much more likely to emphasize negative aspects of digital platforms than youth. A surprising number of respondents (adult and youth) were convinced that the game PUBG (PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds, a first- and third-person shooter game notable for being available free on Android mobile devices) promotes violence; no other game was mentioned.

**DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT CONCLUSIONS**

A lack of statistical data presents challenges for understanding the needs and status of various groups and therefore targeting programming (the last census was conducted in 2006, and many reports providing quantitative data relevant to this assessment predate 2014 [see Revised Workplan, February 12, 2020, Annex 3]). This challenge applies to almost every assessment question and potential programming pillar, as we lack granular current data on, for example, school drop-out rates. Assessment data did not, therefore, allow a clear segmentation of youth into cohorts, beyond rough stages of life, intersecting with gender, and broad cross-cutting distinctions by location and ethnicity. It is also unclear if/when youth or age trumps other identities, such as tribe, ethnicity, location, political allegiance, or gender as a mobilizing trait.

UN agencies and key informants identify youth at large as vulnerable in Libya: the stage of adolescence and young adulthood involves transition from childhood to adulthood which even under ideal circumstances can be stressful. Many youth experience lifelong socio-economic marginalization that contributes to poor life outcomes in health, education and employment. These groups include youth with disabilities, minorities, IDPs and migrants. Young women in general face structural and cultural barriers that limit their choices and potential and may make them vulnerable to gender-based violence (GBV) in schools, families, workplaces and the community. Young men appear especially vulnerable to recruitment into networks that espouse violence.

Regarding gender norms around employment, KIIs and PGDs elicited powerful stereotypes across respondents, including those with university educations, from cities, and with “white collar” jobs. Most young men in the PGDs held traditional gender norms, while a number of young women expressed frustration with limits to their employment and travel. At the same time, patterns of family formation and women’s employment are in flux as a result of the conflict. Some changes are providing opportunities for women, particularly in income-earning, but this changing gender dynamic appears to be generating stress among men.

The use of digital platforms by youth is a bright spot, despite the dangers of hate speech and false information, and despite problems with connectivity, bandwidth and electricity. For youth, digital platforms—especially Facebook and YouTube—are a critical part of learning, making money and socializing (especially for women), suggesting that efforts to reach and upskill youth should integrate social media platforms for maximum impact.

**ENABLING ENVIRONMENT**

**NATIONAL LEVEL**

**LAWS RELATED TO YOUTH**

The legal and policy environment for youth is mixed. The draft constitution of 2017 has not been ratified, so Libya operates without a legitimately enacted constitution. Some laws, if they were implemented, might have positive effects on youth. These include the legal right to equal pay for men and women (“Law 12“),
the 10 percent quota for women in elective office proposed in the draft election law, and the
decentralization law (“Law 59”; see next section for details). While some respondents indicated that the
quota for women had been successfully implemented in the last election, the assessment could not find
information to confirm these statements. Other progressive legislation appeared to be ineffective.
Legislation may also have contradictory effects; for example, the Labor Law (“Law 12”) also makes it hard
to fire workers, contributing to a rigid labor market and reinforcing demand for foreign labor. Personal
status laws discriminate against women, particularly with respect to marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

Activists are working with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), National Democratic
Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), with USAID funding, to ensure improved access
to polling stations and in universities for disabled populations.

Law Number 24 on Libyan nationality makes a specific reference to residing in Libya prior to the date of
the 1951 Libyan Constitution. This is used as the legal basis for denying citizenship to thousands of
Tuareg and Tebu people in particular. They are in turn denied access to education and health services and
voting rights. Several respondents referred to minorities lacking full citizenship rights. A PGD with male
Tuareg youth in Sabha coincided with the “Enough Silence” movement in Sabha – calling for Tuareg in the
Libyan south to be given national identity numbers – and the PGD was tense. Participants expressed anger
that many of them had been denied national ID numbers and questioned whether their opinions would
matter. One participant slammed the table in a moment of anger, leading to the other participants chanting
“We want our rights.” Displaced people and Libyan women married to foreigners also have limited or no
access to certain documentation, which denies them access to certain state allowances, subsidized food
and the right to vote.

It is also worth noting that one IP reported that it cannot work with informal youth groups, as under
Libyan law non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must be registered through the Civil Society
Commission, which closely monitors partner engagements.

GOVERNMENT BODIES RELATED TO YOUTH
The Authority for Youth and Sport (formerly the Ministry for Youth and Sport) was described as
ineffectual by both adult key informants and youth in PGDs, with the exception of some adult key
informants affiliated with the Authority who argued that it has ideas but few funds. KIIs and PGDs
suggested that the Authority plays a limited role in government and youth matters, lacks a vision for Libyan
youth, and controls few resources. KII respondents in Ghadames, Gharyan and Sabha complained that
what programs the Authority supports are limited to the large cities on the coast.

Instead, the Ministry of Labor (MOL) appears to be the locus of government activity benefiting youth
currently, with a focus on promoting entrepreneurship and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). For
example, the Ministry just launched a financial facilitation fund to provide subsidized, interest free loans
for existing and promising youth projects; the program also provides training and incubator services. This
program is being rolled out in collaboration with the Youth Authority, the War Veterans Ministry, the
Ministry of Local Government (for activities in municipalities) and the Ministry of Education (for activities
in universities). It is supported by several international donors and their IPs, including Expertise France,
GIZ and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

The Ministry of Education, during the leadership of former Minister Otman Abdul Jalil, became more open
to working with external programs and experts, including in the development of course curricula on civics
and voter education, gender equality, women’s and children’s rights, and human rights, including through

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22 For a comprehensive review of the enabling environment for minorities in Libya, see “In Legal Limbo: An Assessment of Laws
and Practices Affecting Amazigh, Tebu and Tuareg in Libya,” by ABA ROLI (provided to MSI by USAID).
USAID-funded programs by IFES. It is worth noting that participants in one PGD pointed to this change, suggesting that reformist leadership could make changes that are palpable on the ground. The Ministry will split into two in the near future, according to well-informed interviewees—a Ministry of Education covering K-12 and a Ministry of Higher Education covering universities, technical and vocational education and training (TVET) institutions.

DONORS SUPPORTING YOUTH PROGRAMMING

Donors mentioned in KIIs as supporting youth programming (apart from USAID) were the British Council, Danish Refugee Council, European Union (EU), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), IOM, Norwegian Refugee Council, UNFPA and UNICEF. GIZ reported that it has shifted part of its work to focus more on youth. In January 2020 it launched a new program, which translates into English as “youth and their role in peace building.” Another GIZ program aims to create more jobs through better training and private sector/entrepreneurship promotion, including for women. While the assessment did not attempt to map or review donor portfolios in-depth, a list of relevant programs that emerged is included in Annex 5.

Donor-funded programs were described positively, although they received some generally worded criticisms related to frequently shifting priorities, short durations, lack of geographic coverage, and insufficient attention to specific local needs.

According to several KIIs, a Youth Working Group on Libya meets monthly in Tunis, chaired by UNFPA, and includes the following institutions: ACTED (Humanitarian Relief NGO), British Council, Expertise France, FAO, FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), GIZ, International Labor Organization (ILO), IOM, UN, UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNFPA, UN Human Settlement Program (UNHABITAT), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Office for Project Activities (UNOPS), UNWOMEN, World Food Program (WFP), and World Health Organization (WHO). UNDP has recently initiated a mapping of youth and gender activities, including donors and partner groups, according to a representative interviewed, while UNFPA recently conducted a mapping of Libyan youth and other local CSOs working in response to COVID-19 in Benghazi, Sabha, Sirte and Tripoli.

COMMUNITY AND FAMILY LEVEL

MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE

Laws 59 (2012) and 180 (2013) established 112 municipalities consisting of elected municipal councils spread across the country’s three regions; elections for the municipal councils started in 2012 and continued until 2018, and the second round in 2019 covered only a few municipalities due to escalation of the conflict. Municipal councils should have at least one female and “one member from revolutionaries with special needs” (person with disabilities). The legal framework of Law 59 is weak and does not specifically delegate duties or rights to municipalities. Under the law, most basic services—education, finance, housing, water, sewage, electricity, etc.—fall under the control of state agencies. Municipalities have traditional roles such as collecting garbage, issuing construction permits, administering environmental programs, and installing and maintaining streetlights. A lack of substantial funding from the central government hinders their efforts. The effectiveness of local authorities varies; some municipalities efficiently administer primary services and control of their territory even within a foggy legal framework, while others remain inept or paralyzed by underfunding. Some have been effectively displaced by LNA

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24 Executive Regulation of Law (59) of 2012, Concerning the Local Administration System, Article 32, Composition of the Municipal Council, National Transitional Council.

militias. Election turnout for the councils has been weak, at less than 30 percent in most locations. Initially, local councils were viewed as the most legitimate formal governance institutions in Libya according to a 2016 IRI survey.26 A follow-up survey found a significant decrease in public trust in municipal councils' abilities to represent constituents, from 33 percent to only five percent at the end of 2018.27

One interesting provision under Law 59 is that the municipality “shall establish small project incubators and follow up on their implementation in order to create job opportunities.”28 These incubators are to be based on economic feasibility studies and assist each municipality to meet their economic goals. This provision might provide an entry point for engaging youth in community development projects and employment opportunities, although there is no data to indicate how often, or even if, this provision is followed.

PGDs and KIs with a small number of municipal councilors did not provide evidence of significant interest in or opportunities for youth engagement at the local level. The assessment team understands that USAID partners are currently working with or in municipalities across the North, South, East and West of Libya. However, due to urgent service delivery demands and the ongoing conflict in some regions, there have not been significant efforts in youth outreach and the inclusion of youth perspectives in participatory planning and prioritization of community needs.

USAID’s “Taqarib” Local Governance and Civil Society (LGCS) project is still in the early stages of implementation and selection of targeted municipalities. It will provide expanded opportunities for youth engagement in local governance planning going forward. Another USAID-funded project, Public Financial Management, is also in the early stages, but it anticipates creating Citizen Consultation Committees that will provide opportunities for youth, women and ethnic minorities to engage with local government authorities on local budgeting issues.

The Libya Elections and Legislative Strengthening Activity (ELSA), also funded by USAID, has just begun implementation of a promising model. Community Organizing Youth Groups in remote and rural communities in the West and South will conduct small scale, youth-led and youth-focused community development projects, such as garbage clean-up and rehabilitation of parks. They will engage youth, municipal councils and citizens through focus groups and other “listening activities” to identify and select projects to address community needs and priorities.

According to youth, however, there remain few opportunities for youth participation and leadership in their communities, particularly at the local governance level, with most municipal councils or tribal councils led by senior male community or religious leaders. In addition, as is discussed further below, some youth respondents feel that volunteering is not worth engaging in when their ideas are not taken seriously by local authorities and leaders.

YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

Respondents were able to name many youth-serving organizations, including a number run by women, suggesting awareness and interest among youth (although the assessment sample skews towards better educated youth). Annex 3 provides a simple list of all organizations mentioned. The best-known national organizations/networks, among the youth sampled for this assessment, are the Scouts, Red Crescent, debate clubs, and university student councils/-unions. Other organizations mentioned multiple times include H20, Moomken, Jusoor Center for Studies and Development, Tatweer, Tanmia (or Development)

26 Executive Regulation of Law (59) of 2012, Concerning the Local Administration System, Article 32, Composition of the Municipal Council, National Transitional Council.
28 Executive Regulation of Law (59) of 2012, Concerning the Local Administration System, Article 98, Establishment of Small Project Incubators, National Transitional Council.
360 and Y-PEER; the latter is youth-led. The number of organizations serving youth with disabilities appears to be increasing.

While more frequently mentioned youth organizations tended to be well-established, national organizations or networks working with international donors, respondents were nevertheless generally able to name local organizations as well. By location, Sabha KII and PGD respondents were able to name by far the largest number of youth-serving organizations, including women-led efforts and organizations serving persons with disabilities. Generally, however, respondents in the south tended to believe that opportunities and services for youth were better in coastal cities.

The assessment was not able to determine the capacity, needs or reliability of Libyan youth organizations. The organizations named in PGDs were all mentioned positively, although some respondents referred to youth groups they knew as being severely under-resourced. Nor could the assessment determine if all the organizations, networks and activities mentioned by respondents were still operating. A number of efforts related to passage of a constitution, peacebuilding and elections appear to have been disrupted by the repeated failure to hold elections in 2018-2019, as well as active conflict and the end of funding.

Several IPs mentioned their decision to engage less with some higher-profile youth organizations that were typically funded by various donors in favor of smaller, less known organizations. One partner added that they had pulled back funding from any organization whose members publicly supported political agendas or attended potentially controversial political meetings, blurring the line between organizational and individual representation. Four KIIIs with Libyans suggested that the interim government in the east is increasingly constraining youth organizations, but they did not provide details.

**ADULT PERCEPTIONS OF YOUTH**

KIIIs and PGDs confirm literature review findings that adults generally do not value and even actively discourage youth participation in decision-making in public life. Youth said this in discussions, and some interviewees in a position to support youth, including municipal officials and civil society organization representatives, manifested this attitude. Both male and female youth, across regions, often attributed their successes to parental support, but some (especially young women) recounted experiences of being discouraged in pursuing their aims. This trend is amplified for youth with disabilities and, in particular, young women with disabilities.

**ENABLING ENVIRONMENT CONCLUSIONS**

The legal environment for youth is mixed: Libya has some promising legislation but, generally, it is not clearly defined or (yet) implemented, or it is differentially implemented in the East and West. But the bottom line is that Libya simply does not have a fully authoritative legal environment. The lack of citizenship documents is a flash point for ethnic minorities. Establishing policies and systems enabling youth participation at the national level is a daunting task that will take years of consultations and negotiations, and which can only be started once a recognized central government is established.

The Ministries of Labor and Education appear to provide entry points for youth-supporting programs, although this assessment could not determine their capacity.

The municipal level appears to provide opportunities for youth engagement, although it is uncertain at this time how much effort and resources local governing entities can devote to youth initiatives given the ongoing conflict, dysfunctionality of “national” government bodies, and the urgent need to focus on service delivery. It will be important to find entry points that provide meaningful opportunities for engagement and action without raising expectations among youth that cannot be met in the context of the conflict and unresolved governance issues at national (and municipal) levels. Current USAID IPs, Libya Transition
Initiative (LTI), ELSA and Taqarib, provide immediate and logical entry points for increased youth engagement at the municipal level. They provide models for participatory approaches to community development that could directly engage youth, while also enhancing immediate service delivery needs.

National level youth-supporting organizations exist and are known to and respected by youth. The two most notable are the Scouts and Red Crescent. Given the interest of donors and IPs in identifying lesser known, locally based youth organizations in more remote areas to better serve marginalized communities, the ability of youth outside Tripoli and Benghazi to name groups is promising. Sabha appears as a bright spot in terms of youth-oriented civil society, based on PGD data, and is the location of a number of USAID project offices with the potential to provide grants and partnership opportunities to local youth organizations for increased youth engagement. This assessment could not determine which of the organizations mentioned might be reliable or what their specific needs are, however.

**LEARNING FOR LIFE AND WORK (EDUCATION)**

**GENERAL EDUCATION SYSTEM**

"After graduation, I was very disappointed due to the lack of correlation of my studies with what the work required of me, and I felt as if I had wasted years of my life doing nothing.” (Young woman from Tripoli)

As of 2016, basic education enrollment rates for children aged 6-14 were 97.5 percent for males and 98.5 percent for females; secondary education rates were 81.5 percent for males and 82.5 percent for females. These are significant improvements over 1991 rates, with rates among females improving more rapidly.

Field research confirmed findings from the literature desk review regarding the general education system. PGDs painted a common picture of university-level education:

- The “knowledge” gained in university is valued, regardless of the respondents’ criticisms of other aspects of the system listed below;
- Universities do not provide practical training;
- Teaching is often poor, due to underqualified staff, poor methods or both;
- Curricula are outdated;
- Secondary education does not prepare youth for university, and then university does not prepare them for the job market or workplace; and
- The system makes shifting (or even choosing) fields difficult.

Nevertheless, the desire to obtain a university degree remained almost universal among PGD participants. Recent UN assessments of general education in Libya underline the disruption to the system caused by the conflict on top of its existing flaws, with effects on infrastructure and coverage, retention and quality. Some areas (including Tripoli and Benghazi) and sub-populations (like the internally displaced) are more

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29 Schooling in Libya is compulsory only through Grade 9. Approximately 30 percent of pupils do not continue their schooling beyond this level, according to interviews with MOE officials.
30 UNFPA, The Libyan Youth Today: Opportunities and Challenges, 2018
31 LYSA Revised Workplan, February 12, 2020, pp. 91-94. This section of the literature desk review provides links to documents with detailed examinations of Libya’s educational system. See also USAID, 2019. Libya Ministry of Education Human and Institutional Capacity Assessment: Final Report.
affected than others.\(^\text{32}\) Nevertheless, as of 2017, the majority of Libyan households with school-aged children (over 87 percent) reported facing no barrier to accessing education.

Out-of-school youth are of three distinct types: drop-outs, who are relatively few in number at approximately 1.5 percent of non-displaced children;\(^\text{33}\) those who have lost access to education due to displacement (5-30 percent of IDP children are not attending school depending on the study);\(^\text{34}\) and those who lack citizenship documentation allowing them to access education services (primarily Tuareg and Tebu youth).\(^\text{35}\)

UNICEF is the main provider of developmental and humanitarian assistance in the general education sector.

**TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING**

Responsibility for TVET in Libya falls under the Ministry of Education (MOE), which is responsible for initial training and supervises technical and vocational educational institutions, and the Ministry of Labor (MOL) which deals with continuing training. The table below lays out the system.\(^\text{36}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Delivery</th>
<th>Number of facilities</th>
<th>Managed by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate institutes</td>
<td>Grades 10-12</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>398 (372 public, 26 private)</td>
<td>National Board of Technical and Vocational Education (NBTVE), under the MOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher institutes</td>
<td>Higher Education (3 years)</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>NBTVE (MOE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical colleges</td>
<td>Technical bachelor’s degree (4 years)</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>24 (17 active)</td>
<td>NBTVE (MOE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public vocational training centers</td>
<td>Short-term (3 months)</td>
<td>Non-formal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public vocational training centers for people with disabilities</td>
<td>Short-term (1-6 months)</td>
<td>Non-formal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private vocational training providers</td>
<td>Short-term (1-6 months)</td>
<td>Non-formal</td>
<td>~450</td>
<td>MOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organizations</td>
<td>Short-term (1-6 months)</td>
<td>Non-formal</td>
<td>~40</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private companies</td>
<td>Short-term (1-3 months) (on the job)</td>
<td>Non-formal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME apprenticeships</td>
<td>Several years</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMEs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Government vocational institutions provide technical courses in a wide number of areas, including mechanics, electricity, electronics, and engineering specializations. Centers focusing on agriculture, hospitality, fishery, and management remain very limited. The system has weak links to the labor market, with no real coordination between vocational schools and employers. The quality of training is low due to outdated curricula, an absence of continuing professional development and poorly equipped schools. This has a negative effect on the attractiveness of the system and does not encourage local companies to recruit graduates from vocational schools. KII and PGD respondents’ views supported the literature on TVET, describing out-of-date curricula and materials, as well as dilapidated buildings and equipment.

The great majority of formal TVET institutions (62 percent) are in the western region of Libya where the density of population is higher, followed by the eastern region and the south. When training is available in rural areas, it offers a very limited range of specializations, often not relevant to the needs of the local economy; for example, a local official in Gharyan wanted people with skills in glass manufacturing, while another in Ghadames believed they could bolster tourism using skilled young workers, but training in these skills was not readily available. For students in rural areas, distance from home and the lack of transportation infrastructure is often problematic.

Only 6.7 percent of young people enroll in TVET, according to the data collected in 2017 by Libya’s education management information system at the MOE. Attendance is by default rather than by choice. Admission and vertical progression through the formal training system in Libya is determined by exams: those with higher marks tend to choose to progress through the general system while the remaining 20-30 percent move onto the vocational path or directly enter the labor market. Youth who cannot complete grade 9—even if this is due to conflict-related school disruption—cannot join a government TVET program (unless they repeat grade 9). Only a small number of students seem to choose their area of study because they think it would help them get a job in the future. Career guidance and orientation services for students are completely absent at all levels of formal education.

Girls and young women are underrepresented at all levels of the formal TVET system, constituting approximately 40 percent of the students at the intermediate and higher institutes and 26 percent of all students in technical colleges. (They constitute most students in universities, at 59 percent in 2012.) Factors such as parental discouragement, early marriage, household responsibilities, distance to centers, lack of adequate physical and sanitary facilities, transportation constraints and sexual harassment constitute serious barriers to women’s access to skills development, reinforcing occupational segregation.

The public, non-formal centers offer a wider range of subjects and appear to be more responsive to the labor market. Among these, the Libyan Korean Center is the best known and perhaps most effective, according to KIIs. Most of the provision of non-formal training takes place in private centers around the country, which are usually directly contracted by ministries or companies; courses concentrate on English, IT and management.

Currently, the British Council and GIZ are working with a limited number of Vocational Training Centers to enhance the quality of the training in those centers and offer better training outcomes for the students. The 2014 Torino Process, under the auspices of the EU, had also begun a range of TVET reforms. Annex 6 provides further information on TVET actors.

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38 The legal working age is 18.
39 UNICEF, 2018. Mapping of the TVET System in Libya, pages 15-17, provides detailed information on which inter-institutional transfers are and are not allowed.
Data from this assessment suggests youth are aware of the availability of different types of TVET programs, but not in all locations. An important finding is that youth appear to be increasingly willing to consider TVET and associated jobs due to the economic hardship caused by the war and the lack of public sector and “white collar” private sector jobs. Nevertheless, youth remained most interested in subjects, skills and jobs—such as IT—that did not involve heavy manual labor. Parents’ attitudes to TVET appear to lag behind those of youth, remaining more negative.

Entrepreneurship training programs appear to have increased visibility among both youth and adults. The Libyan Enterprise and the Support to Libya for Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Development (SLEIDSE) program funded by the EU and implemented by Expertise France were mentioned in KII. KII suggested that the former has suffered from implementation problems, but the latter is succeeding. See Annex 5 for a list of donor-supported entrepreneurship programs. In PGDs, youth most frequently mentioned Tatweer Research’s program,\(^{42}\) BYTE and Hexa Connections (all of which are described in a 2018 UNICEF TVET mapping report\(^{43}\)).

**SOFT SKILLS**

Soft skills do not appear to be formally taught in public educational and training institutions (including TVET). Donors such as USAID, UNICEF and the British Council are introducing soft skills into schools (including through civic education, debate clubs and “citizenship clubs”). These skills include critical thinking, problem-solving, teamwork and leadership.

PGDs indicated that soft skills were clearly valued by some youth. PGD participants highlighted teamwork, leadership and communication (including presentation and resume skills). But many did not fully understand the concept of soft skills, despite a definition and examples provided by the facilitators. In addition, even those who understood tended to think that the more intangible skills are taught or learned in “civic organizations,” donor civic engagement programs, or everyday life, rather than as an essential part of education and professional training.

**LEARNING FOR LIFE AND WORK CONCLUSIONS**

Libya’s education system leaves youth largely unprepared for the changing labor market. Common problems across the general education and TVET systems include mismatches between what is learned and what the labor market needs; insufficient opportunities to learn soft skills; and insufficient attention to career exploration\(^{44}\) in the educational process.

The needs for improvement in the quality of general education are multifaceted and need to be addressed by the MOE over the next years in a coordinated manner across the entire system. Youth engaged by the assessment research value learning, including at universities, but they disparaged the quality of secondary and university education and underlined the frequent disruptions to learning. Young people also realize that the education they receive does not correspond to the expectations and requirements of the employers in the private sector.

TVET, both public and private, also has a well-rehearsed set of flaws. UNICEF concludes, “The Libyan [TVET] system … was only worsened by the ongoing conflict. As a result, the system is failing to provide young Libyans (and adults) with the necessary skills to support lifelong learning and to meet the immediate

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\(^{42}\) Tatweer is supported by UNDP.


\(^{44}\) Career exploration entails learning about various occupations and their “fit” with an individual’s unique career preferences and skills, and ideally begins well before an actual job search.
and future requirements of the labor market.” Critical gaps include up-to-date curricula in economic sectors with growth potential; access to quality TVET for people in remote areas, females generally, youth who have missed formal opportunities, and other vulnerable groups; and assistance with transition to the workplace. However, openness to TVET, private sector employment and entrepreneurship is increasing, albeit largely from necessity.

UNICEF’s 2018 “Mapping of the TVET System in Libya” and the European Training Foundation’s 2020 “Vocational Training and Education in Libya” provide detail on the TVET system and needed reforms beyond the scope of this assessment.

**WORKFORCE TRANSITION (EMPLOYMENT)**

“The situation has changed, and youth have started working in fields that they used to avoid. They are now even receiving encouragement from family and friends.” (Young man in Tripoli)

“Many opportunities for livelihoods are available. Most of them may be bad and do not conform with the academic background, but in current circumstances, you would work in any job. The simplest example is that any person can use his private car as a taxi.” (Young man in Bayda)

“Until now, there are no real or legal opportunities to earn livelihood in the South. Only the illegal ones are available like smuggling and drug trafficking of all types. The only opportunity available for youth is to travel or join the unofficial armed factions.” (Young man in Sabha)

**YOUTH EMPLOYMENT**

Although Libyan youth account for half of the active population, the available data suggest high rates of unemployment and underemployment among this group. Youth unemployment increased from 27.7 percent in 2012 to 41.2 percent in 2015, according to the General Information Authority. This figure is more than twice as high as the national average unemployment rate, and the labor market will continue to need to absorb new entrants. Unemployment rates are especially significant among graduates. Female youth are especially economically marginalized: unemployment is widespread among girls, at 67.9 percent compared to 40.9 percent of males ages 15–24; unemployment among women 25-34 is 32.8 percent, compared to 23.8 percent among men in this age group.

The chart below shows youth employment as of 2016. The public sector, at approximately 40 percent, no longer provides the majority of employment for youth. However, women are still more likely to find employment in the public sector than men, largely because there is still high demand in the education sector.

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46 Ibid.
A November 2019 report by Voluntas for MEDA (Mennonite Economic Development Associates) provides the most up-to-date information concerning opportunities for youth employment and needed skills.\(^{50}\) Briefly, in both the short term (defined as until the conflict ends) and the medium term, employment prospects are as follows:

- Hospitality and education are high growth and open to women; hospitality is open to those with low education levels.
- Financial services and telecommunications sectors provide opportunities, including for women, but are small and can require high levels of technical knowledge.
- Information and communications technology (ICT), food and beverage manufacturing, building material manufacturing, construction, transportation, and wholesale and retail trade are big sectors with a promising outlook that are open to youth with medium skill levels.
- Little to no long-term growth is expected in the oil and gas sector.

A 2016 study showed significant discrepancies between sectors identified as attractive by young people and those sectors’ actual needs.\(^ {51}\) ICT, oil and gas, and legal and accounting services have many candidates and limited openings, while sectors such as education; national police and army; transport, logistics and

\(^{50}\) Voluntas, 2019. High Potential Growth Sector Analysis: Skills Gap Assessment for Youth Libya, Libya Economic Empowerment Program. See also their earlier report: Voluntas, 2017. Libya Workforce Market Survey Report. The latter provides a review of several previous labor market studies; the most recent prior report is by the World Bank (2015).

\(^{51}\) Altai Consulting and Expertise France, Youth motivations to employment and entrepreneurship, Final Report, October 2016.
storage; and hotel, catering and tourism have very few candidates for numerous job openings. Field research also suggested Libyans’ perceptions do not fully align with conditions: while a wide variety of sectors were mentioned by respondents, oil was perhaps the most commonly named growth sector despite economists classifying it as low or no growth.

Youth expressed mixed feelings about public vs. private sector employment and about non-“white collar” jobs. The public sector still appears as the default source of employment and worker benefits, despite increasingly uncertain paychecks and the need for “connections” to get such work. The PGDs also generally supported literature review findings of a reluctance to engage in heavy manual labor.

Regarding skills, the 2019 Voluntas study found that soft skills are the priority across sectors, while hard skills needs are sector dependent. The majority of employers highlighted the need for soft skills such as time management and giving and following directions. Employers also need skills in the areas of communication, customer service, management, computer literacy, numeracy, literacy and English, according to the Voluntas study. At least six assessment KIIIs supported Voluntas’ findings with regard to soft skills.

Not all youth respondents fully understood the concept of soft skills when asked about them. But many did understand, volunteered examples and noted soft skills were lacking in the curricula of the general education and TVET systems.

In addition to skills gaps, a 2016 study found that youth blame the general security and political situation first (35%) followed by the lack of jobs available in the public sector (23%) for reducing job opportunities. Other obstacles to employment were the use of favoritism, nepotism and corruption — in particular within the public sector — to grant jobs to family members, relatives or people from the same tribe. The field research for this assessment paralleled these findings. Minorities without a national ID number cannot work in the public sector.

With regard to finding work, the most common response among youth in this assessment was that they seek and find work through online ads. Respondents also mentioned friends and family and “connections.”

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Youth (and adults) face barriers to entrepreneurship, with the most important being access to capital, market knowledge, technical skills and the security situation. The MOL is promoting entrepreneurship, along with donors and other entities in both the West and East (see Annex 5). Entrepreneurship appears to be increasingly attractive to youth, according to PGD discussions. Many PGD participants cited entrepreneurs as role models, and several young respondents were aware of entrepreneurship training programs and competitions. An example is the Hult Prize business plan competition which is being run in several Libyan universities [http://www.hultprize.org/about/](http://www.hultprize.org/about/).

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52 This is not true for undocumented minorities who cannot work in the public sector.
54 Altai Consulting and Expertise France, Youth motivations to employment and entrepreneurship, Final Report, October 2016.
GENDER
Most PGDs described clear divisions between typical women’s and men’s work based on physical strength and social acceptability. Women acknowledged that they were primarily employed in the education and health sectors and were limited in how far and when they can travel for work, and they chafed under these constraints. Respondents were able to describe a number of interesting women-led entrepreneurial efforts and small businesses, like the Take a Step entrepreneurship support program in Sabha and the Yummy App (https://www.wellandgood.com/good-food/yummy-app-libya-gender-equality/). There is also evidence that women are, of necessity, taking over typically male economic activities if they become head of household due to the conflict or migration.

Men and some women tend to believe that a job serves primarily to support the family (rather than as a career), and that men’s jobs and advancement are still the priority, according to a private sector respondent. Young women in PGDs also reported struggling to assert their positions and rights in the workplace. Men are viewing women as competition: Participants in Bayda PGDs for male youth argued, “Females take more than they deserve in work because girls do not achieve much work like males,” and “there is a huge bias for females when hiring.” The young men with disabilities in a Tripoli PGD complained that women “take men’s jobs…beyond their specialties,” and wished the state would somehow divide the work equitably.

WORKFORCE TRANSITION CONCLUSIONS
Assessment fieldwork confirmed much of the desk research on youth employment in Libya, particularly the issues of prolonged unemployment, the need for more than one job for sufficient income, and the mismatch between what the education system has provided and what jobs require. Many youth—male and female—seem to be finding jobs for pragmatic reasons, because they need the money to support their family. Some appeared torn between getting an income and working in an area that they like but in which they cannot find a job, highlighting a mismatch not just of skills but between youth aspirations and the job market.

Labor market studies are available, but each provides somewhat different conclusions regarding growth sectors; considering that the conflict and COVID-19 may prompt changes to the labor market, any activities related to labor market needs should conduct further research prior to design.

Youth interest in economic entrepreneurship is encouraging, but the challenge for the government and donors in the current environment is how to support it in ways that lead to sustained income generation and employment, rather than false starts and disappointment among young entrepreneurs. Given interest levels among Libyan ministries and donors in entrepreneurship and SME promotion activities on the one hand, and this assessment’s conclusion that attention to improved career paths more generally is critical, the assessment concludes entrepreneurship promotion should be a lesser priority for USAID.

The importance of digital platforms for supporting business endeavors, improving skills and finding work was another bright spot.

While the assessment provides a snapshot of female youth employment, it could not obtain detailed data of employment by sector or on changes in sectors and levels. Young men’s view of women as competition in the job market points to the need for gender sensitivity in designing and implementing activities to increase employment.
VOICE AND PARTICIPATION (ENGAGEMENT)

ACTIVITIES AND LEVELS

“The types of activities carried out by youth differ according to personality. Some of them go to the gyms, others enjoy the company of friends on the streets or in cafes or play video games. Only a small number of them make use of their spare time by engaging in the activities carried out by civil society organizations. This is due to a lack of societal culture in this regard.” (Tuareg youth from Sabha)

The 2018 UNFPA study found that only about four percent of Libyans are involved in volunteering organizations and associations. The study also found low youth membership in political parties, parliamentary and local councils, and low access to leadership positions in government, with weak participation in the social momentum for peacebuilding (reconciliation committees), despite the prominent role youth had played in the 2011 revolution. Only about 28 percent of youth aged 18-29 who are entitled to vote registered to participate in the 2014 legislative elections, compared to 42 percent overall and 64 percent of those aged 50-59 (the legal voting age for both sexes is 18, according to the Election Law).  

In examining youth engagement, this assessment focused on community participation, with questions approaching the topic from different angles. PGD facilitators asked youth how they spend their free time and how they participate in community activities. Prompts included questions about volunteering, participation in local level decision-making bodies (such as local governance bodies, school management bodies and community development committees), knowledge of civically or politically active youth, barriers to participation, adult attitudes, and gender differences.

When asked where youth spend their free time, by far the most frequent response across all locations was: “In cafes/coffee shops or at home.” Much less frequently mentioned locations were gyms, clubs, parks and “the street.” Male youth spent their free time in all these places, but young women were largely limited to their homes (although this is likely to vary between coastal cities and the interior). Respondents agreed that there is a lack of recreational spaces and community-based and extracurricular activities. No respondents offered community activities. A few said they had no free time outside school, work and family obligations.

The assessment could not determine levels of participation in community activities, for example, in terms of how frequently youth participate or how widespread participation is. PGD participants said that youth do volunteer but disagreed on how many and how often. Youth in PGDs mentioned as examples street painting, tree planting, waste removal and providing food for migrants during Ramadan, and referred generally to charitable and “humanitarian” work. Organizational auspices included the Scouts, Red Crescent, and unnamed charitable organizations. Online initiatives and activists can attract large numbers of followers (for example, disability activist Ahmed Ajaj and his wildlife promotion group with almost 30,000 youth followers). It is unclear how online following translates into action on the ground, however.

The most frequently cited reason for not participating was the (perceived) absence of financial benefit; phrases associated with volunteering included: “…better things to do…wasting time…what is the return…no pay…” This emerges as a strong barrier to any non-paid engagement. Other reasons given were the lack of interest, time, or awareness of opportunities. A number of respondents argued that Libya

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56 https://m.facebook.com/AOPWMO/
lacks a culture of volunteering, especially in more remote, rural regions. A lack of trust in others among young people may also hinder civic participation. A Youth Assessor from Sabha observed:

“A lack of trust of people youth don’t know (and of international organizations) hinders joining… so the majority resort to working with groups they already know and refrain from engaging in foreign groups even if their goal is the same.”

An important finding is that youth generally did not seem to understand what civic engagement might entail. They were able to discuss charitable activities and political participation, such as cleaning or painting public areas, debate competitions, and university student councils, but rarely offered examples of other possible forms of community participation. PGDs include no references to engagement with government bodies (including school administrations). Youth cited active youth whom they looked up to, but it was unclear what those youth do. KIIs made occasional references to “advocacy” but with limited details.

With regard to engagement in politics, the assessment found that youth are generally reluctant to engage politically because they feel excluded by older, male decision makers, are apathetic, or believe that speaking out and drawing attention would bring risk. This finding supports other studies that have found that Libyans express low confidence in their political institutions, and disappointment is higher among the youth, whose aspirations after the 2011 revolution were unmet.

Regarding gender, barriers to mixed-gender gatherings hinder engagement along with participation in activities intended to promote engagement; women, especially those living outside Tripoli and Benghazi, are also hindered by gender norms from traveling to activities promoting civic engagement, even if they are single sex. Some female respondents expressed a fear of speaking out more generally. In the 2012 elections, 2.2 percent of female youth voted, compared to about 11 percent of male youth.

A bright spot is the high level of girls’ and young women’s participation in high school and university debate clubs. Female youth now outnumber males and, at the university level, excel in mixed sex teams and against male members during competitions. It is also worth noting the females in the PGDs tended to express gratitude for having the chance to participate.

“Women are not active in political life, despite being in an increasing range of professions. Culture is stronger than positive legislation. Women’s roles have shrunk since the civil war.” (KII with expert)

 Minority PGD participants felt that their citizenship status inhibited engagement:

“"We cannot volunteer in a society that considers us half citizens and does not guarantee us our most basic rights such as work, for example, if we cannot work in the government, how will we participate in voluntary work?... Participating requires a sense of citizenship in society.” (Male Tuareg youth from Sabha)

Preliminary reports from USAID IPs suggest regional differences in how youth respond to engagement activities. For example, in the East community service projects, such as painting or garbage clean-up, were considered unacceptable, and experienced low turnout, while the turnout for similar activities in Sirte was massive.

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60 KII with USAID Libya Transition Initiative III.
Donor-funded programs throughout the country are promoting opportunities for youth to engage with national and local level government institutions and community organizations in conducting small scale community development projects, as well as to develop leadership and other soft skills. UNICEF has introduced citizenship clubs in the school system. However, many such programs are still in the early stages of implementation.

**DRIVERS OF YOUTH VIOLENCE**

*Participant 2: “War is not the place for a young man.”*
*Participant 7: “On the contrary, it is his right place in order to protect and defend the country. I consider it patriotism.”*
*Participant 6: “They [militias] all fight for money and nothing more. Whoever wants patriotism and has the desire to defend his country should join the institution of the military, not the armed groups.”*

(PGD with young women in Gharyan)

Violence is now part of daily life, including in schools, according to some respondents; the head of a youth NGO said, “Everybody has a gun in Libya.”

Libyans in KIs and PGDs conducted for this assessment most frequently cited economic hardship as the main push factor driving youth to violence and illegal behaviors. While militias were most commonly mentioned, several KIs and PGDs highlighted significant criminal activities attracting youth, including passive facilitation of or active participation in trafficking in humans, drugs, fuel, weapons and other contraband. According to multiple respondents, male youth between the ages of 18 and 25 are the most vulnerable to recruitment into militias and illegal activities.

At the same time, the militias clearly exert a powerful pull. Not only do they reportedly provide a monthly income (LYD1 5,000 according to various respondents), but they also bestow power, authority and access to otherwise scarce resources (like cash at banks or fuel) on members and their families. Joining a militia was described as the “only choice” or the “only viable path” for men given unemployment, no access to capital, poor quality education, youth exclusion, and a lack of attractive alternatives. (A limited number of groups were ideologically driven, according to interviews.) As the quote from Participant 7 above suggests, women may support male family members joining militias.

The militias are also, according to respondents, increasingly well established and therefore harder to disband.61 One respondent made the point that the governments have no interest at this time in demobilizing the militias (except to integrate them into their own forces). While the government may aspire to disband militias, both sides are dependent on them in the conflict. Other respondents reported that families often encourage their sons to join militias as a source of protection, income and prestige for the family.

Research tentatively identified some programs for ex-combatants, including the USAID-funded Libya Elections and Governance Support Program (LEGS) implemented by IRI, which has trained youth groups in Libya on peace-building and conducting focus groups with former fighters to lay the groundwork for local government support to wounded warriors.62 Other more current programs appear to be wary of working with this sub-population, however, due to fear of repercussions, concerns over staff safety, and

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potential backlash for working with youth who may have perpetuated violence. USAID IPs may also encounter legal complexities in dealing with this group.

Government programs appear to have lapsed or exist primarily on paper. The Government of National Accord (GNA) government appears to be focusing on reintegrating ex-combatants either through the MOL or into the army (under the Ministry of Interior). Libya has so far been unable to successfully provide alternative livelihoods for youth combatants. In 2014, the Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development (formerly the Warriors Affairs Commission) offered study abroad opportunities, as well as funding for small and medium projects to integrate former revolutionaries into all institutions of the government. The program collapsed but may have unrealistically raised expectations among combatants of what they can and should receive as part of a DDR program.

VOICE AND PARTICIPATION CONCLUSIONS

Interest in volunteering and civic engagement appears to vary widely, but the Youth Assessors themselves, and many of the PGD participants, were highly energized by the assessment. The assessment notes that NDI and IFES are already working with debate clubs, student unions and student councils with USAID support, and the assessment research confirms these as entry points for voice and participation.

Negative views of unpaid activity emerged as a central hurdle to youth engagement, compounded now by economic stresses; other reasons included Libya’s limited tradition of volunteerism, lack of time, lack of awareness of opportunities, wariness of the organizations doing the mobilizing, and the closing of space for youth activism after their participation in the 2011 revolution. The assessment did not determine what might motivate youth to become more active, although charismatic role models (who can be accessed via social media) appear to attract youth. Activities like debate clubs attract girls as well as boys, but assessment findings suggest that activities need to be tailored to locations to be attractive and accessible to youth, both male and female, and from differing ethnic groups and backgrounds.

Activity that appears to be more political is not necessarily seen as related to volunteering or civic engagement, and youth are generally reluctant to engage politically because of the physical risk it currently entails for those who might disagree with authorities or opposing sides. Youth also feel disregarded by older decisionmakers in the political sphere.

Due to the lack of democratic experience in Libya, the learning curve will be high and take time and energy. More information is needed on what might make youth sufficiently interested in social issues and civic participation as well as to acquire leadership skills and use them to motivate other young people. Adults must also be socialized to the value of the youth voice and their participation outside the home and to the value of volunteering more generally. A larger question is the extent to which offering civic engagement activities, in the absence of more profound changes in the enabling environment, is likely to bring meaningful and sustainable change.

Finally, regarding the militias, findings strongly indicate that there is no guarantee that providing employment is sufficient to lure young men away from them, given the prestige and protection (and possibly sense of belonging and agency) they offer. Nonetheless, a more complete package of interventions (including work with communities on reintegration as well as with ex-combatants on assets and

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64 The Commission was established at the end of the civil war as a government-backed body founded to give educational opportunities to individuals who fought in the war, to transition them into civil life.

opportunities) might at some point become more appealing to militia members than their status quo if it appears unsustainable. While we understand the interest in working in this area, more targeted research would need to be done on this population group in order to provide potential programming recommendations.

MENTAL HEALTH

“Rehabilitative health institutions are completely absent. Two young men were shot in front of me and their body parts were scattered in front of me. From the intensity of the scene, I could not eat for a whole week. There were children who enjoyed the scene in front of them as if it was a game and no one prevented them from seeing this, so how is it possible that our mental health condition is good under these conditions?” (Young man in Sabha PGD)

“Fighting, killing and displacement are now a part of every southern citizen’s life in Libya. We need psychological rehabilitation. The situation here has affected us and our mental abilities.” (Young woman in Sabha PGD)

PREVALENCE

According to an expert in the field and a 2017 MHPSS/WHO report, 40% of the population is suffering from depression, psychoses, and other mental issues. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been acute in recent years, especially after some attacks on Tripoli, that contributed to displacing thousands of families to other safer areas and destabilizing entire families. Drug and alcohol abuse were described as prevalent in multiple PGDs and KIIs (addiction to pornography was also mentioned in a few).

The Libya Psychosocial Support Team, a local NGO with support from UNFPA and the Ministry of Social Affairs, opened a hotline in December 2019. The largest group of callers—61 percent—is made of youth between the ages of 19 and 30. Most of the callers were reaching out for information on depression, anxiety, and mental health issues, and places to go to in order to get support and referrals.

USAID IP IFES also reported setting up an online hotline to provide counseling to employees of their governmental partner, the High National Election Commission, following a terrorist attack at their building in May 2018. One-hour counseling consultations were provided for a period of one year following the attack. IFES had to employ an international company because of the lack of qualified psychologists in Libya. However, unreliable internet connectivity hindered the project’s effectiveness, and IFES believes a telephone-based service would have been better.

PERCEPTIONS

At the same time, the stigma generated by mental health issues is very strong, according to the literature reviewed, KIIs and PGDs. As a participant in a PGD put it, if a person admits to mental health issues, “[P]eople call you insane.” PGDs also suggested that “pessimistic” is used as a reference to depression, for example:

“Insecurity affects the future. An insecure person has a pessimistic view of the future and loses all his hopes and aspirations.” (Young woman in Bayda PGD)

According to the mental health expert interviewed, mental health is not perceived as a priority for many officials in Libya today, including the Ministry of Health; although the problem is significant, the Ministry

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does not fully understand the issue or how to address it. As noted below, an effort by the MOE to provide psychosocial support through school counselors was underused because of parents’ refusal to allow their children to use the services, according to a KII. Many respondents (including one think tank) blamed “the internet” and “video games” for youth’s mental health problems. IFES noted that due to the stigma around mental health issues and the need for complete confidentiality, only about a quarter of the Election Commission’s staff availed themselves of these services and even administrative follow-up was not welcomed by the staff.67

CAPACITY

There is a significant lack of professional psychosocial support in Libya.68 According to the expert interviewed by the LYSA team, doctors rarely specialize in psychiatry, because it is not perceived as a necessary branch of medicine in Libya. As a result, there are fewer than two dozen psychiatrists in Libya, and most are in Tripoli and Benghazi. Only seven Libyan doctors have graduated with a specialization in PTSD, and most are abroad. There is one mental health facility in Tripoli, one in Benghazi, and a branch facility in Misrata.

“Most young people suffer from trauma, depression, anxiety and addiction…. and they are forced to face these problems without any help because society does not recognize psychological illness) …But the state is not interested in the psychological rehabilitation of the youth who have fought wars.” (Male youth in Bayda PGD)

Mental health medication is not readily available in Libya or is extremely expensive for normal citizens. Primary health care in Libya is also poor.

IFES reported in a KII the former Minister of Education, Otman Abdul Jalil, had begun to implement a plan to train school counselors and teachers to provide some level of psychosocial support to students in need, although it was marketed more as a social skills building program within the school system. The first round of trainings took place, but there was some pushback from parents who refused to allow their children to use the services, and it is believed that the program was halted in April 2019 after Minister Abdul Jalil’s resignation.

UNFPA has initiated psycho-social support (PSS) activities in collaboration with the Libya Psychosocial Support Team. In addition to the hotline mentioned above, it began supporting PSS for displaced youth in Sirte in January 2020. The International Organization for the Protection of Children and People with Disabilities works in three elementary schools to provide PSS-related activities. Another relevant organization with significant potential to tackle youth mental health issues is Y-PEER Libya,69 which is present across the country. Although their primary focus is on HIV-AIDS prevention and awareness, they currently run COVID-19 awareness campaigns and have the capacity to address youth mental health issues.

Traditional coping mechanisms include support from family, community, tribal elders, imams and friends.

67 WHO defines mental health “as a state of well-being in which the individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully and is able to make a contribution to his or her community”, WHO World Health Report (2007a).
68 Psychosocial support (PSS) is defined as processes and actions that promote the holistic wellbeing and resilience of people in their social world, including support provided by family, friends and communities. INEE, 2018. Guidance Note on Psychosocial Support, Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies.
MENTAL HEALTH CONCLUSIONS

The assessment yielded strong findings related to mental health. Mental health may be an imminent, though hidden, crisis, with shockingly few mental health professionals or programs, and enormous stigma around seeking help.

The assessment concluded that schoolteachers and counselors could be used to encourage discussion of mental well-being to help mainstream and de-stigmatize such discussions, possibly in collaboration with NGOs such as the Libya Psychosocial Support Team and Y-PEER.

WORKING WITH THE YOUTH ASSESSORS

“The discussion was wonderful, and the topic is relevant and close to the reality we live in. The time did not suffice - as the session lasted 3 hours - and the questions were many, but the discussion was great. I got to meet some wonderful people whom I was happy to have the discussion with…. Everyone was happy to be involved. The participants appreciated the discussion topic and its relevance to their lives. Participants mentioned a strong desire to participate in similar activities in the future.” (Debrief of youth assessors who conducted a PGD with young women in Benghazi)

The positive and enthusiastic responses MSI received from the Youth Assessors during and following data collection suggests that these youth are invested in the assessment and interested in remaining engaged in any further steps. The assessment has enabled the Youth Assessors to develop an informal network of like-minded, enthusiastic and engaged youth able to continue discussions and exchange information and experiences with each other on common goals, aspirations and challenges through an established WhatsApp platform. This group now also has skills and experience related to data collection and PGD facilitation that will allow them to more effectively market themselves to potential employers, data collection firms, or other donor-funded projects looking for these unique skills. Ideally, it will also further empower them to remain engaged and take leadership roles in their own communities. It is our hope that this experience will encourage the Youth Assessors to connect with the USAID YouthLead platform and local youth organizations they met through this assessment so they can continue to interact with other youth change agents and be informed of new growth and professional development opportunities.

These youth also provided feedback during regular debriefs with the Regional Coordinators, Navanti and MSI that could help inform future youth-led assessments in conflict-affected countries. Given their relative inexperience with data collection and PYD concepts, a longer period of training with more opportunities for practice sessions, immediate follow-up and refresher training during data collection would have enabled stronger results with the ability to catch any misunderstandings in the application of the tools and facilitation techniques, while a slower pace during data collection would have allowed them to incorporate and apply the feedback on techniques into subsequent rounds of research.

Further, given the large number of topics covered by the questionnaires, it was sometimes difficult for the Youth Assessors to prioritize questions, as instructed, and effectively facilitate discussions to ensure that sufficient time and follow-up was dedicated to key questions that would elicit the needed level of detail, instead of rushing to ensure that all questions were covered. A more focused and limited list of questions would perhaps have resulted in time for more detailed and nuanced responses.

Due to the deteriorating security situation in some regions following the breakdown of ceasefire negotiations, several PGDs were interrupted by the sound of gunfire or rescheduled due to security concerns. These instances, while not imminently threatening, prompted the Youth Assessors to put into practice the security protocols that had been presented during training, and they effectively handled each
situation by rescheduling or relocating PGD participants to a safe location for completion of the discussions without significant risk or threats. Even with these challenges, the Youth Assessors remained calm, motivated and in command when evaluating and handling the situations.

CROSS-CUTTING CONCLUSIONS: YOUTH ASPIRATIONS AND THE CONFLICT

“Most of the ambitions that were originally fundamentals, like a home, work, [having a] car and earning money, have become far-reaching ambitions…The circumstances we live in have forced us to focus our dreams in this narrow framework that does not reflect our true dreams.” (Youth Assessor, Tripoli)

Key institutions intended to serve youth were weak prior to the civil war. As this report has described, Libya’s general education and TVET systems have suffered from multiple flaws that hinder youth from finding rewarding careers. The civil war has further disrupted what services and opportunities there are, closing schools (sometimes permanently), constricting the economy and job growth, limiting travel for education and work (especially among women), bringing changes to traditional patterns of family formation, and causing physical and psychological harm.

When asked about their dreams and goals for the future, almost all the youth in this study expressed quite modest ambitions, along with frustration that even these were difficult to achieve. Given the sample frame, analysis did not seek to quantify responses, but a large majority of young respondents in PGDs said “stability” was their primary goal, including references to financial, social and psychological stability. Of these, however, financial stability stood out among both young women and young men; stability was most often associated with “a steady job,” “a decent income,” “a salary” or “fixed income,” or “a job, home and car,” along with financial “self-sufficiency” and “independence.” PGD participants themselves underlined this conclusion, referring to youth being focused on the “material” and “financial” aspects of life. Similarly, role models were often people who were financially successful (including militia members). This conclusion aligns with assessment findings regarding the increasing, if grudging, openness among youth to more pragmatic educational and career choices as a way to ensure more stability in their lives. By the same token, very few in the PGDs voiced desires to be active participants in development or civic life, particularly if it entailed volunteering without pay.

At the same time, youth expressed a strong desire “to complete their education,” and for self-improvement more generally, across the PGDs. About as many role models were professors and people who had “developed their talents” and were successful business figures. When asked about youth they knew who were successful and why, PGD participants put a remarkable emphasis on education, training and studying as keys to success. While this emphasis on education may be in some measure a product of the over-emphasis in Libya on formal degrees and certificates, it indicates that well-designed efforts to upskill youth will be met with enthusiasm.

The assessment concludes, on the basis of the PGDs and discussions with Youth Assessors in the course of their research, as well as the existing literature and KIIIs, that Libyan youth are tempering their expectations—with a focus on stability and income—due to the on-going conflict and employment uncertainty. However, they still cannot readily determine how to meet these goals because of the gaps between their current assets and resources, and the demands of a productive adulthood. The recommendations below follow from these conclusions.
RECOMMENDATIONS

“To move away from violence, it is necessary to understand the meaning of peaceful coexistence, societal stability and the rejection of hatred, and this can only be achieved by opening a window through which young people see a life in which everyone lives peacefully without discrimination or exclusion of others.” (Government employee, Kufra)

STRATEGY

This section provides both an overall framework for incorporating PYD in USAID/Libya program activities and specific suggestions for potential interventions. More specific recommendations relate to the short- to medium-term and assume on-going conflict. Longer-term suggestions are noted as such. The report also flags areas especially in need of dedicated further research. The emphasis is on cross-cutting integration, building on existing openings, and discrete interventions that may leverage larger impacts.

Because of pre-existing weaknesses in youth services and the impact of the civil war (and now COVID-19), Libyan youth face disruption at virtually every stage in their lives—obtaining an adequate education, finding a job that matches their needs and aspirations, and forming a family, all while remaining emotionally and physically secure. The leap from what limited shelter educational institutions provide to the world of work is especially fraught now in Libya, as militias and illegal activities exert a strong pull. Libyan youth need support to meet their aspirations in ways that are pragmatic, realistic and adaptable to the uncertain times and insecure context. The recommended overarching goal for USAID efforts to support youth in Libya is therefore to build more secure, flexible pathways to productive adulthood for Libyan youth.

Building More Secure Pathways to Productive Adulthood for Libyan Youth

The recommendations below flow from the assessment findings and weave together several themes that are central to advancing PYD in the Libyan context in the short- to medium-term. These themes are
mutually reinforcing and involve the development of skills, values and behaviors that are transferable across multiple domains of young people’s lives, including family, community, education and employment.

Recommendations integrate all four domains of PYD—assets, agency, contribution and enabling environment—but focus on strengthening the institutional environment, with public and private sector collaboration to support building youth assets (skills and competencies) and on agency ((including pro-social attitudes and values). All of the recommendations also assume intergenerational collaboration: that is, youth empowerment requires not only working with youth, but also the development of adult mentors and allies and the evolution of attitudes supportive of PYD across Libyan society, beginning with the foundational value of “youth as assets.”

Recommendations fall into three major categories: learning for employability; engagement in communities; and mental health and well-being.

**Learning for employability.** A full analysis of Libya’s education and workforce development/employment systems was beyond the scope of this assessment. However, from both literature review and fieldwork, the assessment discerned some key themes to promote youth learning that are foundational to successful employment and citizenship. The most critical need is to begin to align TVET curricula with the skills needed by economic growth sectors and with youth interests as a foundation for enabling more youth to find productive employment. Involving diverse youth in TVET redesign will not only empower them to help Libya meet the challenges in its labor market, but also directly address how youth and their parents view TVET and various occupations with an eye to developing more positive associations around work in a wider range of sectors and positions. Recommendations focus on ensuring that youth both within and outside of the formal education system have the opportunities and support needed to develop a broad range of practical and soft skills competencies that will help them to complete their education goals and advance their marketability in the workplace.

**Engagement in communities** involves the cultivation of opportunities for youth to move gradually but steadily beyond “survival” mindsets typical of conflict-affected countries to expand their understanding of what civic participation can mean. These efforts provide opportunities for youth to reflect on their own values and identities within both the Libyan and global contexts and to build trust through the practice of civil discourse, community service, and advocacy for pro-social issues. These efforts put youth aspirations, perspectives and leadership at the center, and use conflict-sensitive approaches to mitigate the threat of politicization or hijacking of youth efforts to feed further conflict.

**Mental health** is foundational for all work in Libya given the far-reaching effects that decades of brutal dictatorship followed by almost ten years of conflict have had on Libyans of all ages. For young people, attention to psychological well-being is particularly critical because the developmental stage of adolescence and young adulthood normally involves emotional intensity and is also one in which mental health disorders tend to emerge. Brain development during adolescence requires pruning of neural pathways, a process that is highly dependent on daily experience and environmental stimulants. Recommendations seek to empower young people to recognize challenging mental states such as depression and anxiety within themselves and others, and to become more comfortable discussing and seeking help to manage them. These recommendations recognize both the prevailing stigma against discussing mental health in the Libyan context, as well as the nascent stage of international development interventions in this area.

Four main **cross-cutting themes** shape the recommendations: the importance of **soft skills**, attention to **vulnerable populations**, **gender equity**, and **conflict sensitivity**.

**Soft skills** allow individuals to actualize and apply other skills and competencies and to work with others to achieve goals. USAID has invested in applied research to identify core soft skills for youth development; these include positive self-concept, higher order thinking, self-regulation, teamwork, empathy, and goal
orientation. USAID analysis\(^70\) has also shown that the soft skills correlated with improved youth workforce success correspond to improvements in other life domains such as sexual and reproductive health and violence prevention. This assessment uncovered a distinct interest in these skills among both youth and adult key informants, but it also revealed significant confusion about what these skills are and how institutions such as schools, families and workplaces can better cultivate and incentivize soft skills development in youth of various ages. As reflected in the above graphic, soft skills lie at the intersection of assets youth need to effectively navigate and succeed in the transition to adulthood. The recommendations therefore integrate soft skills development as a “connecting tissue” to expand and reinforce interventions across sectors.

With regard to vulnerable populations, the strategy put forward here seeks to reduce the vulnerability of youth overall to poor life outcomes due to the conflict, systemic flaws in the education and training systems, and Libya’s weak economy. The assessment urges USAID and IPs to redouble their efforts to enable the inclusion of persons with disabilities in USAID programming and to go beyond accessibility issues to creating a better enabling environment that addresses the ongoing stigma that affects their psychosocial wellbeing and ability to advance in their personal and professional lives. Similarly, the report recommends seeking to better integrate ethnic minorities and IDP youth where feasible. Where integration is not feasible, USAID may want to consider specialized interventions such as accelerated education programs to broaden access to education and training for those without documentation.

**Gender** considerations were systematically examined throughout the assessment and therefore inform most recommendations. Increasing young women’s participation in TVET and in their communities will require significant intentional effort given the strength of traditional views of appropriate gender roles. It will also require attention to the different ways in which women’s and girls’ vulnerabilities differ geographically. Young women are at the same time likely to represent important resources if USAID considers leveraging the general education system, in which they are the majority of staff (though not leadership) to provide counseling for well-being and mental health.

**Conflict-sensitivity** also informs the recommendations; for example, work with women and minorities carries a need to examine perceptions of and impacts on men and majority populations. In addition, programming must ensure that it does not exacerbate conflict drivers.

### Geographic Targeting

Youth in both remote rural areas (particularly in the South) and in urban and coastal areas are vulnerable, although for different reasons. Because the vast majority of young people live in urban areas, USAID must invest there—including urban hubs in the South—in order to effect systemic change. However, to avoid exacerbating inequities in the Libyan context—and potentially unintentionally feeding grievances and possibly conflict and instability—USAID should use a conflict-sensitive lens in its programming. Wherever possible, access of rural youth to services and opportunities provided to urban youth should be considered. Linkages could be in the form of ICT platforms, dialogue, and “twinning” or partnering of institutions for capacity building. Where intentional linkages are not possible (due to political divisions or geographic distances), then targeted interventions should be explored to meet the specific needs of rural youth.

Finally, **PYD integration** in USAID/Libya’s program—beyond youth-oriented projects and activities—will require dedicated resources in the form of training for IPs in PYD, facilitation of peer-to-peer learning

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across IPs, integration of PYD into projects/activities and solicitations/procurements, outreach to youth, and monitoring of PYD efforts.

**LEARNING FOR EMPLOYABILITY**

**OVERVIEW**

Equipping young people with marketable skills that they can readily use in the transition to the workplace, as well as with positive associations and a sense of purpose around work, is of prime importance in Libya. The reform needs of both the general education and TVET systems in Libya are extensive and well documented: these systems need a complete overhaul in terms of what is taught, how and to whom.

Undertaking holistic reform of the general education and TVET systems is feasible (in the sense of complicated rather than complex), high need and high impact. It would make major contributions to PYD across assets, agency and the enabling environment. Potential partners include the MOE, MOL and NBTVE; ILO, UNESCO, Expertise France, British Council, GIZ and other international donors. A holistic approach would also be high cost and require high levels of coordination.

The assessment does not recommend that USAID engage directly in job creation for youth in the short term. In the absence of major improvements in the general education and TVET systems, and overall strengthening of the private sector, employment promotion efforts are likely to falter. Nor do assessment recommendations prioritize entrepreneurship support. While entrepreneurship is of growing interest to youth, entrepreneurship promotion must be considered in the light of youths’ needs for more secure pathways to adulthood. Further, given the number of donor and government agencies interested in promoting entrepreneurship, USAID should map efforts before devoting resources to this area (see Annex 5 for a preliminary list of donor activities).

This assessment therefore recommends that USAID, in the short- to medium-term, initiate assistance in the category of learning for employability in a limited number of critical, interconnected areas, that draw on Agency expertise, with the central aim of narrowing the gap between education and the job market for youth.

**STRENGTHENING TVET PATHWAYS TO YOUTH-APPROPRIATE OCCUPATIONS**

Identifying and strengthening pathways within the TVET system—with youth input—to high demand occupations that align with youth interests and aspirations is a high impact, feasible opportunity for USAID. For Libya, having a functioning TVET sector that can redirect a large youth population that would otherwise end up in the secondary academic education without being equipped with marketable skills is important for two reasons: improving the quality of the secondary academic education on the one hand and ensuring that Libyan youth are equipped with skills that are relevant to the current economic landscape. Despite the TVET system’s profound needs, the universe of current donors is quite small. At the same time, the Ministries of Education and Labor appear open to donor partnerships.

A critical set of interventions that USAID could support would begin with mapping current and emerging job market needs and their respective training and skills needs, available training, and what could be provided with technical support, additional resources and sufficient incentives. The focus should be on occupations in growing sectors. This mapping will enable the National Board of Technical and

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71 See European Training Foundation, 2020. Vocational Training and Education in Libya, section 4, as well as relevant sections of this assessment.
Vocational Education to develop a targeted strategy for and lead the necessary reforms in coordination with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor. Steps from mapping to reforms include:

- Adapting the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) to the Libyan context, in cooperation with the ILO and the MOL, and adjusting industry standard descriptions for priority occupations, in cooperation with the ILO, the private sector and MOL.
- Identifying the corresponding education pathway for priority occupations, in cooperation with the MOE and UNESCO, and with inputs from other donors with experience in the field, such as the EU (European Training Foundation) and GIZ.
- Updating training curricula to correspond to training requirements for priority sectors, in cooperation with the MOE, and the National Board of NBTVE and UNESCO.
- Ensuring the adoption of a competency-based pedagogical approach in the TVET sector, starting with 40 percent of theory and 60 percent of in-school workshop practice in the first year, moving to 20 percent theory and 80 percent apprenticeship practice in the last year. (Apprenticeships should be developed in coordination with the private sector as described in the next section.)

The assessment recommends a focus on Intermediate Institute reform, along with a focus on growth sectors. Public Intermediate Institutes serve by far the majority of TVET students and are, in theory, the most accessible in terms of cost and location, making them a potentially high impact entry point for working with a wide range of youth. As noted above, the British Council, with EU funding, is working with four of these Institutes. USAID might support the scaling up of these pilot efforts to build the capacity of Intermediate Institutes more broadly and roll out the curricular and pedagogical reforms listed above. Improving TVET institutes is often a challenge, so engaging other donors in a concerted effort to improve the infrastructure, quality of the teaching and relevance of content is key to ensuring positive and lasting effects on youth employment.

USAID can play a central role in integrating PYD into this process not only with government counterparts but also among other relevant donors and private sector representatives. This would entail creating and supporting platforms that ensure that youth themselves engage in reform processes. USAID could facilitate the integration of youth aspirations, ways of working, gender norms and shifts, views on various sectors, and the like. To illustrate, the TVET-SAY activity of USAID/Nicaragua has supported youth involvement in TVET reforms in such areas as selection and prioritization of TVET subjects and TVET branding and media campaigns to reduce stigma and encourage youth and parents to view TVET as a positive step on the path to youth employment. Importantly, TVET-SAY was focused on the marginalized Afro-Caribbean coastal population of Nicaragua where workforce development opportunities for youth had been severely limited. Working with youth to reform TVET can not only increase the quality of education and training but also improve its reputation and in turn attraction for youth and their parents.

ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The assessment found that Libyan Chambers of Commerce are emerging as reliable and credible partners for donors. USAID could initiate work with the private sector—keeping a focus on learning for employability—by working with the Chambers in the following complementary ways:

- Promoting apprenticeship. Apprenticeship is a social institution with a long history, having ensured over centuries the transmission of work skills from one generation to the next. The ILO describes modern apprenticeship as a “unique form of vocational education, combining on-the-job learning and school-based training, for specifically defined competencies and work processes. It [should be] regulated by law and based on a written employment [apprenticeship] contract with a compensatory payment [stipend] and standard social protection scheme. A formal assessment and a recognized certification come at the end of a clearly identified duration.” USAID can
promote these elements by encouraging the adoption of an Apprenticeship Charter among the private sector, in cooperation with trade associations, to ensure optimal conditions for student apprenticeships. Apprenticeship opportunities should be linked to those Intermediate Institutions that are being supported (under the recommendation above) to reform.

- **Linking the private sector to TVET pedagogical (and curricular) reform.** USAID programming could improve both pre- and in-service training of TVET teachers, in cooperation with the private sector and the relevant trade associations, enabling and accelerating the shift from the current theory-based approach to a competency-based approach.

LEVERAGING THE GENERAL EDUCATION SYSTEM

While the assessment does not recommend that USAID embark on major efforts to reform the general education system at this time, the system can be leveraged in multiple ways, through multiple activities and partners, to support learning for employability.

First, as is discussed under Engagement in Communities and Mental Health below, after-school and extracurricular programs such as debate clubs and student council activities can broaden the range of skills that youth develop—including soft skills, entrepreneurship and leadership—that are relevant to employability and workplace transition.

Second, school counseling units can play a vital role in helping youth with career exploration, an important support for youth entering an uncertain, shifting job market. This is particularly important for youth with disabilities in identifying and addressing potential barriers, both physical and cultural, in some career paths that may require adaptations or specialized approaches to enable effective work performance, change cultural norms, and expand opportunities. Career exploration should be introduced in the last two years of schooling before completing the national basic education examination (Shahadah), in cooperation with the MOE, to encourage more widespread consideration of TVET education pathways. Activities like these that are tied to the general education system can also be an effective way to “back into” education reform, as they can improve how teachers teach and open schools to greater transparency and partnership with the community.

As discussed above, out-of-school youth fall basically under three categories: those who dropped out of school for lack of interest and capacity, those whose schools have been damaged through the conflict and have possibly been displaced as a result of that (and who are at risk of dropping out completely if too much time passes before they are able to join school again), and those who were never able to join school formally, for lack of official documentation. In all these cases, accelerated education programs (AEPs) should be considered, though with slightly different characteristics. For the first group, the program should follow strict non-formal educational approaches in order to capture youths’ interest again. Programs for the second group should enable youth to catch up and return to formal education as soon as possible. Programs for the third group should follow the entire cycle at an accelerated pace so that they can graduate rapidly and join other learning cycles, while in parallel every effort should be made for them to obtain legal status in Libya. Assessment research did not yield clear entry points regarding accelerated education, so pursuit of this recommendation would require further research on potential governmental and non-governmental partners and critical locations for piloting.

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72 AEPs are accelerated learning programs that provide a condensed curriculum that enable youth who have missed out on months or years of formal schooling due to a conflict or crisis to catch up on their education and eventually reintegrate into formal school. INEE, 2018. Guidance Note on Psychosocial Support; NORC at the University of Chicago (for USAID), 2016. Accelerated Education Programs in Crisis and Conflict: Building Evidence and Learning.
ENGAGEMENT IN COMMUNITIES

OVERVIEW

USAID can have positive impacts in conflict-affected regions by supporting peaceful opportunities for youth to contribute to their communities and national policy dialogue and reform that are tailored to the socio-political context of the country and nature of the conflict. Notable examples include USAID/Kenya’s “Yes Youth Can,” which empowered nearly 1,000,000 Kenyan youth to create their own youth associations (bunges) and to register to vote,\(^73\) and the USAID/Eastern Caribbean Community, Family and Youth Resilience activity, under which youth across ten Caribbean countries formed a regional network to promote evidence-based approaches to youth crime and violence prevention that have been formally adopted regionally by CARICOM.

The assessment recommends that USAID consider developing a dedicated youth civic engagement activity, as well as working to integrate youth into existing activities that seek to build citizen participation and work with municipalities. Widespread negative views of volunteering and civic engagement call for major efforts to “rebrand” such activities, and USAID will need to take an intentional youth-led approach to determining what will motivate youth to engage. Several principles are therefore critical to the design/adaptation of such programs, if they are to ensure interest and buy-in among Libyan youth:

- **Youth must own and lead their own strategy** even if that process takes time.
  
  o It will be important to assess what kinds of youth networks and modalities for youth civic engagement already exist in Libya, no matter how informal, and listen to youth on their opinions about what modalities and platforms they would like to create or expand, and around what issues. USAID and IPs should be sensitive to the calculus that youth may make in weighing engagement in the conflict context.

  o Youth will need leadership training, mentoring and support as they implement their activities, and they will falter at times—which should be viewed as a critical part of the learning process. Short-term, one-off interventions should be avoided.

  o Working with smaller organizations in Libya must build in outreach and mentoring from before even the “solicitation” stage, so that groups are aware that funds are available (and trust that the process is fair), understand the donor grant making process, can clarify their own needs, capacities and vision, and shape a feasible, impactful activity.

- **Youth are not a monolith**: even within a youth-led effort, many young people will be at risk of marginalization including young women, youth with disabilities, youth in rural regions, darker-skinned youth, etc. It is important to be sensitive to the needs for inclusion of all youth and to be wary of elite capture of youth engagement efforts. The activity should engage in intentional experimentation to reach TVET youth, out-of-school youth, non-university youth, rural youth, youth with disabilities, and other marginalized youth.

- **Adults (including adult-led community-based organizations [CBOs] and government entities) will also require orientation** to and mentoring on what youth-led development means and approaches for supporting youth without smothering their enthusiasm and motivation.

STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY AND MUNICIPAL PATHWAYS TO ENGAGEMENT

Bright spots and new initiatives for engaging with youth and youth-oriented NGOs exist at the municipal and community levels. These provide opportunities both to use field-tested models and to experiment with new approaches in order to determine what works, then refine, build upon and scale up in other municipalities across Libya, with an emphasis on supporting youth to develop and lead their own efforts.

Some potential activities to consider and expand upon include:

- **Support the development of locally appropriate platforms for youth** that enable them to identify and prioritize their needs, how those needs might be addressed through engagement, and how they can lead initiatives to address needs throughout the process. The success of USAID-funded efforts to engage youth in community clean-up and development projects in some areas, but lower uptake in others, underlines the importance of working with youth from the outset to determine and prioritize activities in their communities. In turn, USAID programming should respond to differences in perceptions, attitudes and receptivity to various kinds of community activities in different parts of the country by developing tailored strategies and incentives.

  - This fundamental element of any youth engagement activity might start with community youth mapping, facilitated initially by trusted, nationally present organizations like the Scouts/Guides and Red Crescent, understanding that the ultimate objective is to identify, foster and hand off efforts to locally based youth groups where appropriate. Such a mapping effort would enable youth to identify local youth-led or youth-oriented associations, explore how they are viewed, and determine their capacity and interests. These in turn might provide the seeds of platforms for further work. Going further, many programs have successfully used youth mappers to collect and analyze data on community needs and resources more generally and to work with local governments and leaders to determine which needs to act on and how.

  - USAID may also wish to support further research on the Sabha experience with youth groups, exploring learning from that, and perhaps supporting in-person exchanges or other linkages with other locations.

- **Work with local youth organizations and other civil society organizations** to develop and provide on-going opportunities for youth engagement and learning and, more generally, to help keep civic space open in Libya.

  - Youth organizations could identify youth skills and training needs related to engagement and conduct training on issues of leadership, advocacy, awareness raising and civic participation, as well as to implement engagement activities.

  - Also work with civil society to rebrand “volunteering” as pathways for youth to become integral in identifying, planning and solving community challenges and needs (this also applies to work with municipalities and adults described below).

  - Where youth have identified critical issues that they would like to address, support targeted technical and mentoring support to enable success.

  - Youth groups will need to develop specialized approaches to include such vulnerable groups as youth with disabilities and out-of-school youth in engagement efforts. Not all work can leverage the school system if it is to be inclusive; community-based organizations may be better able to reach out-of-school youth.
USAID should continue and expand work with groups working with and led by youth with disabilities, with attention to enabling these groups to become more sustainable.

- **Work with adults at the municipal/community level** to respect and welcome youth voices. For example, USAID support can facilitate the creation of Municipal Youth Advisory Councils that enable youth to participate at a meaningful level in municipal council planning discussions, inform policy and budgeting decisions, and make recommendations for activities and projects that reflect youth priorities and perspectives for their community. Youth can work with municipalities to monitor the quality and user perceptions of public service delivery to support improved governance as well as youth engagement. Such activities give youth opportunities to demonstrate their ability to engage constructively with municipal leaders and other adults, while increasing youth voice in municipal policy and decision-making. Municipalities may also encourage youth participation through prizes, awards and public recognition for their work.

Opportunities at the municipal level will vary depending on municipal leaders’ openness and officials’ capacity. It is critical that engagement programming provide generally positive experiences for youth and their interlocutors to sustain enthusiasm and avoid cynicism. For this reason, USAID should take a staged approach to identifying municipalities for such programming, accompanied by intentional learning. Careful monitoring and mentoring will help ensure positive interactions and mitigate the potential for negative experiences that might perpetuate false perceptions or discourage future youth engagement efforts.

- **Ensure that USAID/Libya IPs actively engage youth** in community consultation processes for identifying and prioritizing community development activities where possible to supplement and reinforce other youth programming encouraging engagement. This can occur through targeted focus group discussions with youth, representation on Community Consultation and Oversight Committees, and opportunities to monitor or engage in activities during implementation of local service delivery or community improvement projects, while promoting a positive image of youth making a difference in their communities.

**LEVERAGING THE GENERAL EDUCATION SYSTEM**

The assessment recommends continuing support for such interventions as debate clubs and student councils/unions and their networks to reinforce reach into the general education system. USAID’s LEGS program, implemented by IFES, works closely with the MOE on civic education in ways that introduce needed soft skills in such areas as engaging with governing bodies, volunteerism, leadership and critical thinking. Preliminary work in conducting TOT for teachers introduces interactive teaching methodologies that will also help promote student engagement and critical thinking. LEGS also illustrates the scalability of school-based efforts, as curriculum development, teacher up-skilling and work with student bodies can be expanded across primary, secondary and university levels. While the assessment does not recommend that USAID attempt to directly address wholesale educational reform, activities like LEGS have the potential—by working with teachers and school administrators—to improve how teachers teach and open schools to greater partnership with the community.

**MENTAL HEALTH AND WELL-BEING**

**OVERVIEW**

Ultimately, the Libyan health care system and policy-makers, along with parents and other stakeholders, need to be made more aware of the prevalence of entrenched trauma symptoms in a large segment of
the population, and particularly among youth, and of the likely long-term consequences of such traumas if they are not treated, including for the Libyan economy. Awareness of conflict-related psychosocial stress and how to help youth manage it needs to be integrated into youth activities of all kinds in Libya in culturally appropriate ways, with an emphasis on doing no harm. Evidence-based approaches to building the well-being of youth need not be termed “mental health” or “psychological counseling” which are strongly stigmatized in the Libyan context.

KIIs suggested that the MOE is currently overburdened, so program design in this area will need to identify and engage additional partners, such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs and Women, universities, community-based health clinics, and civil society organizations.

If Libyan faculties cannot provide the needed training, given their own lack of PSS professionals, it may be possible to engage local organizations, such as the Libya Psychosocial Support Team, or organizations in the MENA region, such as the University of Jordan’s public health program. UNFPA and UNICEF have also initiated PSS activities that might be leveraged.

**INTEGRATING MENTAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS ACTIVITIES**

USAID should consider incorporating “trauma informed care” (TIC) into all projects that work with youth, so that activities can begin to heal psychosocial wounds left by Libya’s conflict and that services do not re-traumatize beneficiaries or staff. TIC encompasses a variety of research-based approaches to working with youth exposed to traumatic conditions or events resulting in reductions in behavioral problems and PTSD stress. Four key elements underlie this approach: 1) realizing the widespread impact of trauma and understanding potential paths for recovery; 2) recognizing the signs and symptoms of trauma; 3) fully integrating knowledge about trauma into policies, procedures, and practices; and 4) seeking to actively resist re-traumatization. Implementing this recommendation would entail providing training to adults working with youth in these four areas.

**LEVERAGING THE GENERAL EDUCATION SYSTEM**

Safe schools and non-formal learning spaces are some of the most beneficial environments for children and youth during a period of uncertainty. In addition, since education settings bring children and their peers, parents, families, and communities together, they can help create a supportive environment that promotes improved psychosocial wellbeing.

The general education system provides two important entry points, both of which have received support from the Ministry of Education in the recent past.

**ENHANCING THE ROLES AND SKILLS OF SCHOOL COUNSELORS**

An initial targeted step in USAID programming would be to provide training to school counselors under the auspices of the MOE and promote and normalize the use of these professionals. Potential partners in addition to the MOE are the Ministry of Health, World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and

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74 The University of Jordan convened a symposium of governmental, educational, medical and civil society representatives to discuss a community-based model for improving the quality and performance of work in the mental health sector: “Regional to Global Transition of Refugee Mental Health Towards Resilience,” July 2-3, 2019 (Amman, Jordan).

75 ChildTrends, “Five Ways that Trauma-Informed Care Supports Children’s Development, accessed 4/3/20. Other resources are available from the University of Buffalo, Center for Social Research, and the International Trauma Center.

76 A key resource is the International Network for Education in Emergency’s “Guidance Note on Psycho-Social Support” (2018), which discusses such key issues as creation of safe spaces, social-emotional learning, support to teachers, and engagement of parents and community, [https://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/page-images/INEE_Guidance_Note_on_Psychosocial_Support_ENG.pdf](https://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/page-images/INEE_Guidance_Note_on_Psychosocial_Support_ENG.pdf)
universities. This activity appears to be feasible and relatively low cost, although impact will be over the medium- to long-term and will require careful monitoring and attention to do no harm concerns. School counselors can provide a wide range of services that integrate mental health support without labeling it as such:

- Training for counselors might adapt and begin with imparting a framework of trauma-informed care. Four key assumptions underlie this approach: 1) realizing the widespread impact of trauma and understanding potential paths for recovery; 2) recognizing the signs and symptoms of trauma; 3) fully integrating knowledge about trauma into policies, procedures, and practices; and 4) seeking to actively resist re-traumatization. In other words, counselors should work with teachers to help schools ensure that group-based activities encourage trust and a sense of security.

- If this approach proves feasible, additional training on proactive counseling might be developed. At this point, USAID would need to explore with the MOE and other partners how best to present services to encourage their use. While mental health problems are stigmatized, parents still generally trust schools, suggesting that more can be done to frame counseling as a joint parent-school effort to support youth to prosper.

- Because of the absence of PSS services in Libya, initial efforts with school-based counseling should move carefully with regard to referrals. Nonetheless, some children and youth may display behaviors suggestive of deeper psychological issues requiring referral to specialized mental health services when available, or to traditional support services when appropriate. The role of counselors here will be to help education personnel spot signs of deeper psychological needs and identify culturally appropriate responses in a professional and confidential manner.

CONTINUING TO SUPPORT AFTER-SCHOOL AND EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

School-based activities can intersect with and reinforce activities recommended under engagement as well:

- Innovative and effective approaches such as play activities can be incorporated into after-school and extracurricular activities for young people; as discussed in other sections, debate clubs and student councils provide important opportunities for youth to become positively engaged. A manual on PSS recently published with USAID support suggests engaging communities (not only as users, clients or beneficiaries, but to varying extents as agents of their own individual and collective well-being) to undertake healing activities. These would involve socio-relational and cultural activities (helping to maintain a sense of identity), creative and art-based activities (such as music, theatre and drama, storytelling, poetry and creative writing, dance, painting, sculpting, photography and video-making), as well as sport and play activities (as they are a part of learned interactions and behaviors, and easy to reproduce in most settings). The work of “Right to Play,” which uses sports and engaging activities to protect, educate and empower young people affected by conflict, provide additional models.

- Providing opportunities for older youth to volunteer in schools, while leveraging youth platforms developed under the engagement cluster of recommendations, would help expand play activities for younger children and reduce burdens on teachers and counselors, while supplementing engagement options for older youth. Young people might serve as informal teacher’s assistants, tutors and mentors during and after school; Youth Ambassadors could welcome new students and orient them to available services and extra-curricular activities; students might also create peer-to-peer support groups for those dealing with common concerns and needing a safe space for support.

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77 ChildTrends, “Five Ways that Trauma-Informed Care Supports Children’s Development, accessed 4/3/20. Other resources are available from the University of Buffalo, Center for Social Research, and the International Trauma Center.
to share their feelings (under the supervision of a school counselor or teacher). The added advantage of such volunteer opportunities is that they provide youth with well-managed, safe activities that promote positive self-identity, psychosocial well-being, a sense of belonging and teamwork. It is important to ensure that child-protection policies and procedures, with related training and supervision, are in place prior to initiating such efforts.

• One additional entry point for increasing awareness of and access to psychosocial support as part of the formal education system is through the universities, particularly through relevant degree-related externships and fellowships (psychology, social work, counseling, nursing and related fields) with placement in secondary schools and primary health care centers. These kinds of experiential learning opportunities could promote mental health support services related to coping, psychological resilience, case management, and the identification of youth evidencing at-risk behaviors indicative of traumatic stress, drug and alcohol use disorders or physical abuse. They could also serve as referral and follow-up mechanisms for cases in schools requiring immediate attention. By introducing university-aged students as points of contact to secondary school students or out of school youth in the community to discuss mental health concerns as youth-aged “peers,” it may help to break through some of the cultural stigma, as well as promote the awareness of and interest in pursuing this field as a career, thus increasing the availability of trained counselors and psychologists in the long-term in Libya.

####
## ANNEX 1: YOUTH ASSESSORS

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## ANNEX 2: PEER GROUP DISCUSSIONS

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## ANNEX 3: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

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<th>Location</th>
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<th>Youth Assessor / MSI Remote</th>
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<th>Title</th>
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<td>Afrin</td>
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<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director and Founder</td>
<td>Salit NGO Group</td>
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<td>YA</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Tameen Organization for Libyan Antiquities and History</td>
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<td>YA</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Acting Mayor of Bayda Municipality</td>
<td>Bayda Municipality</td>
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<td>Benghazi</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>Creative Associates</td>
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<td>Director</td>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Activities Section, Ghadames High Institute for Technical Sciences/ Head of Ghadames Society for Development and Charity / Head of the Ghadames National Youth Support Association</td>
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<td>YA</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Expert in youth issues</td>
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<td>Gharyan</td>
<td>3/6/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Popular Youth leader and positive youth role model – representing youth with special needs</td>
<td>Represents multiple youth initiatives in Libya, including the Libyan Wildlife Sanctuary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>3/5/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Lecturer/Assistant Professor</td>
<td>Tripoli University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>3/9/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Director of Training Unit</td>
<td>GNA Ministry of Education in Tripoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>3/12/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>IFES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>3/12/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director, Private Sector Company</td>
<td>Diwan Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3/6/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>Expertise France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3/5/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>ABA ROLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3/3/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>IBTCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3/6/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>DAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3/20/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3/19/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>Tunis</td>
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<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>NDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>4/2/2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>PEPOL Project officer</td>
<td>UNDP Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3/30/2020</td>
<td>MSI Remote</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Youth Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>UNFPA Libya</td>
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</table>
### ANNEX 4: YOUTH-RELATED ORGANIZATIONS MENTIONED BY RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Amal Foundation</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al Mobader</td>
<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alartiqa Organization</td>
<td>Yafren</td>
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<tr>
<td>All of Us Together Association for People with Disabilities/ All Together Society</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Athar</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bawanis Organization</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darr Labor Voluntary Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do a Favor</td>
<td>Al Gharyifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do for Training and Development</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eghaa/Isghaa Project</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eureka</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fablab</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festoo Foundation</td>
<td>Jadu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fezzan Libya Association</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free Rights Organization</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friends of the Disabled</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghadames Children’s Association</td>
<td>Ghadames</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghadames National Youth Support Association</td>
<td>Ghadames</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghadames Youth Organization</td>
<td>Ghadames</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Shapers Network</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good Kufra</td>
<td>Kufra</td>
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<tr>
<td>H2O</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hexa Connection</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hope Makers</td>
<td>Ghadames</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houn Media</td>
<td>Houn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights, Transparency and Reform</td>
<td>Waden</td>
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<tr>
<td>I Volunteer</td>
<td>Obari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewel of Ghadames Club</td>
<td>Ghadames</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jusoor Center for Studies and Development</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
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<td>Libyan Bloggers Network</td>
<td>National</td>
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<td>Libyan Debate Club</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<td>Libyan Federal Youth Foundation</td>
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<td>Organization Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libyan Organization for Development and Education</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<td>Moomken</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Solidarity</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Youth Forum</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pioneers of Good Association</td>
<td>Ghadames</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qudrati (My Ability)/Qudra Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Read NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Red Crescent</td>
<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabha Debate Club</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
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<td>Salit Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scouts and Guides</td>
<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shaghaf Foundation</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
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<tr>
<td>She Codes</td>
<td>multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take a Step</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamkeen</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
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<td>Tanarween</td>
<td>Ghadames</td>
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<td>Tanmia 360</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
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<td>Tatweer</td>
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<td>Tracks</td>
<td>Zawia</td>
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<td>Wasool</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>You Are the Hope</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y-PEER</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## ANNEX 5: USAID AND DONOR PROGRAMS

### USAID/LIBYA IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Implementer / Partners</th>
<th>Target Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Geographic Reach</th>
<th>Period of Performance</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Project Activities</th>
<th>Youth Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya Elections and Governance Support Program (LEGS)</td>
<td><strong>Implementer:</strong> CEPPS/IFES</td>
<td>Junior High School Youth (grades 7-9, ages 12-14)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>January 2012 – September 2019</td>
<td>$12,600,000</td>
<td>Focus on youth education, civic engagement and aware-raising activities.</td>
<td>Developed course curricula and teaching manuals focused on civics, volunteering, debate, school election processes, gender equality, human rights, international agreements applicable in Libya and Rule of Law/abiding laws.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Libya Elections and Legislative Strengthening Activity (ELSA) | **Implementer:** CEPPS (NDI and IFES) **Partners:** Human Rights, Transparency & Reform Organization; Houn Media; Do A Favor; I Volunteer; Fesstoo Foundation; Alartiqa Organization | University level youth (ages 18-25) and high school level youth (ages 15-18); Youth (ages 22-35 and 18-30) for “Youth Government Advisory Boards” | Primarily in the North and South (do not work in the East) | 2018 - 2023 | $30,000,000 | All programs have a focus on targeting marginalized or under-represented population groups, especially women, youth and disabled. | - Primary program is centered around two debate clubs – one at the university level and the other at the high school level.  
- “Youth Government Advisory Boards” in which youth are trained as “Youth Ministers” in various ministry and government roles to participate in plenary sessions, informal consultations, and inform policy discussions, and make recommendations.  
- “Community Organizing Youth Groups” involves small
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Implementer / Partners</th>
<th>Target Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Geographic Reach</th>
<th>Period of Performance</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Project Activities</th>
<th>Youth Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OTI/Libya Transition Initiative I, II, III</td>
<td><strong>Implementer:</strong> Chemonics</td>
<td>National, with strategic priority in the South (Sabha)</td>
<td>June 2011 – February 2022; LTI III: May 2017 – November 2021</td>
<td>$109,000,000</td>
<td>Primarily focused on working with municipal councils on service delivery</td>
<td>Scale, youth-led and youth-focused community development programs. CVE component activities have a strong youth focus, but otherwise their activities do not have an exclusive focus on youth. Their activities work with different tribes and youth groups on economic needs and income generation, vocational training depending upon the regional dynamics, culture and economic needs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governance and Civil Society (LGCS)/Taqarib</td>
<td><strong>Implementer:</strong> DAI</td>
<td>National; 5-6 municipalities in the South, 8-10 in the East, 15 in the West</td>
<td>July 2019 – July 2023</td>
<td>$36,000,000</td>
<td>Integrated government and civil society development with shared objective outcomes related to tangible improvements to service delivery and enabling Libya's decentralization process</td>
<td>Youth will not be direct beneficiaries for project activities, but more indirect impact through broad-based engagement with the communities, which will include youth voices. <strong>“Champions for Change”</strong> activity that will identify single actors in municipalities who are engaged in active civic life and bring them into the program, provide training, resources as</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Name</td>
<td>Implementer / Partners</td>
<td>Target Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Geographic Reach</td>
<td>Period of Performance</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Project Activities</td>
<td>Youth Activities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Supporting Consensus-Building for the National Dialogue, Constitution and Governing Process in Libya (LCB) | **Implementer:** ABA ROLI | Youth ages 18-25 | National (except in the East) | August 2014 – April 2020 | $11,000,000 | Initial activities included providing legal research and comprehensive responses and options for drafting the new Constitution; also worked with marginalized minorities to conduct 4 focus group discussions and a legal assessment on the laws and rights of indigenous peoples in Libya. | - Began working with youth to serve as volunteer **Youth Community Liaisons** to conduct dialogues with diverse communities on issues relating to the Libyan transition.  
- Created a **Youth Community Liaison Network** comprised of youth ages 18-25 with 24 active members representing a balance of regions/minorities/gender and just completed the last of 3 trainings for these members on “hate speech.” |
| Libya Economic Empowerment (LEE) | **Implementer:** MEDA  
**Partners:** Desire to Learn (D2L) | Youth ages 18-30 | Tripoli, Benghazi and remote communities (Zawiya, Tamenhint, Zintan, Sirte) | 2013 – March 2020 | $4,700,000 | The first two phases of this program were focused exclusively on women’s economic empowerment from 2013 – 2017, when it was expanded to include youth in its third extension. | - Under Phase 3, emphasis on creating **economic growth opportunities, entrepreneurship and business networking for women and youth** in remote regions and communities to create a space for small business start-ups and entrepreneurs.  
- The objectives of the project were: (1) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Implementer / Partners</th>
<th>Target Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Geographic Reach</th>
<th>Period of Performance</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Project Activities</th>
<th>Youth Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Libya Public Financial Management (LPFM)  | **Implementer:** Pragma          |                      | 44 municipalities | October 2019 – October 2023 | $55,000,000 | 1) Public finance  
2) Enabling environment for the private sector  
3) National Electricity Company | The project has no activities directly targeting engagement with youth, although they are an indirect beneficiary through their work on education at the municipal level. |
<p>|                                             | <strong>Partners:</strong> Counterpart International |                      | (15 in the East; 29 in the West) |                        |            |                                                                                      |                                                                                                           |
| M&amp;E Support Program                        | <strong>Implementer:</strong> IBTCI           |                      | Libya and Tunisia | August 2017 – February 2022 | $13,000,000 | M&amp;E support activities for Tunisia and Libya.                                      | Entrepreneurship for women and youth; youth training on computer skills, leadership, business development, ICT, VBS portal, and one youth innovation grant |
|                                            |                                 |                      | (office in Tunis, no office in Libya) |                        |            |                                                                                      |                                                                                                           |
| Libya Elections and Governance Support Program (LEGS) | <strong>Implementer:</strong> CEPPS IRI        |                      |                      | October 2012 – September 2019 | $11,700,000 | Purpose of project is to help Libyan local government entities build capacity and ensure | Works to increase the role of marginalized groups in Libya’s governance and engages youth leaders to |
|                                            |                                 |                      |                      |                        |            |                                                                                      |                                                                                                           |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Implementer / Partners</th>
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<th>Geographic Reach</th>
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<th>Funding</th>
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<th>Youth Activities</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>inclusive engagement with citizens.</td>
<td>advocate for issues in their communities</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Engaged with youth-focused CSOs under the Libyan Youth Network to identify issues and problem-solve in local communities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Trained youth groups in Libya and Tunisia on peacebuilding and creating regional youth networks.</td>
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<td>- Conducted 10 focus groups with former fighters/ex-combatants to lay the groundwork for local government support to wounded warriors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### OTHER DONORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Implementor/Donor</th>
<th>Target Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Geographic Reach</th>
<th>Period of Performance</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Project Activities / Youth Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Implementer: British Council Donor: European Union (EU)</td>
<td>Youth aged 15-26</td>
<td>Four regions/cities – Benghazi, Sabha, Tripoli and Central region; their target is to pilot in total 15-16 intermediate institutes across four regions and establish “Centers of Excellence.”</td>
<td>Initially started in 2012 but had to pause due to conflict; relaunched in September 2019 – February 2022</td>
<td>€6,000,000</td>
<td>This is an EU technical assistance program for Libya and their direct counterpart is the National Board for Technical and Vocational Education (NBTVE) under the Ministry of Education (MOE); they work primarily with intermediate institutes. The program has four components: 1) Leadership and Management of Technical Institutes at the institutional level; 2) ToT teacher training component; 3) Education and business partnership establishment; 4) Career guidance network. There is a subcomponent that focuses on the creation of a policy fora; this is a network for policy dialogue on youth empowerment, youth employment and training. The British Council also works with youth to develop their soft skills through participation in debate clubs and offers opportunities for young people to contribute to their communities. They work with youth in education and support them through projects such as Active Citizens to effect change in their communities by developing their leadership and project management skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Established incubators in 10 universities in Libya: Al</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on capacity building of public institutions, support to entrepreneurship creation, and access to finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Name</td>
<td>Implementor/ Donor</td>
<td>Target Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Geographic Reach</td>
<td>Period of Performance</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Project Activities / Youth Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partners: Central Bank, UNICEF</td>
<td>Margheb, Benghazi, Gharyan, Misrata, Sabha, Sirte, Tobruk, Tripoli, Zawiya and Al Jufra</td>
<td>2019-2021</td>
<td>2017-2020</td>
<td>Promoting youth for peaceful development in Libya: The objective of the project is to improve the political participation of young people using youth multipliers and local administrations to promote social and political participation. Another program initiated by GIZ is on socioeconomic dialogue and aims at enabling pockets of dialogues and discussions across the country to define the socioeconomic model that they would like to have for Libya. A third program is about improving basic health care in Libya, with the objective that vulnerable populations have better access to medical services. Another program of GIZ aims at creating more jobs through better training and private sector promotion. In this context, GIZ provides training and coaching in entrepreneurial activities or in setting up a business; GIZ also supports the development of local networks to promote business.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<p>| GIZ | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Implementor/Donor</th>
<th>Target Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Geographic Reach</th>
<th>Period of Performance</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Project Activities / Youth Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for the Protection of Children and People with Disabilities. (IOPCD)</td>
<td>International Organization for the Protection of Children and People with Disabilities.</td>
<td>Youth, women, children and people with disabilities</td>
<td>They are headquartered in Benghazi with seven branches in Beyda City, Ijdeiba, Sirte, Tripoli, Khoms City and in small villages</td>
<td></td>
<td>They have received funding from the following: Denmark Christian Aid (DenCA); NDI, IOM, the Libyan Government, private companies and Dutch Embassy. It should be noted that their funding cycles are very short and as such their activities or projects last only from a couple of days to several weeks. They are more activities than long-term projects.</td>
<td>Trains youth (young men and young women) through small projects/initiatives. Some examples include, the AMADEUS training program; phone repair training program; PSS for children in elementary school; War Victims to Build Skills workshops; trainings offered to women widows in basic IT skills, office administration, becoming a hairdresser or clothing designer. Priority is to raise awareness about the rights of people with disabilities and protection of children from a rights-based perspective. They also work with vulnerable women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Local Partner: Tracks</td>
<td>Youth aged 18-27</td>
<td>January 2020 – June 2021</td>
<td>The project is $2.5 million USD in total and UNFPA’s portion is $800-900K USD.</td>
<td>“Y-Peer Network” which is a global network that UNFPA established first and continues to support; it was established in 2010; there are around 700 Libyan youth volunteers and they provide peer to peer trainings (trainings take place in Tunis and in Libya). Primarily all are related to health or GBV; they focus on bullying in schools, armed groups violence,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Name</td>
<td>Implementor/Donor</td>
<td>Target Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Geographic Reach</td>
<td>Period of Performance</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Project Activities / Youth Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>partnership with WFP, UNICEF and UNDP</td>
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<td>family planning, drug abuse, smoking in schools. UNFPA partners with Tracks from Zawiya focusing on youth empowerment through four main areas: 1) entrepreneurship, setting up businesses; 2) grants and capacity building program for civil society organizations, providing technical capacity building, trainings and grants; 3) youth led media online; and 4) psycho-social support for young people who were affected by the war, are displaced, or those who have lost family members/loved ones in Sirte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNICEF is trying to offer some of the training that corresponds to the demand from young people and integrates some employability skills into the training. Over the past years, UNICEF offered such training to approximately 1,000 young people, which is still very small in comparison with the demand. Many graduates found jobs immediately after the training. A new initiative from UNICEF, but again at small scale, is developing social enterprises throughout the country, involving some 6 promising young people from 24 municipalities to develop a small business. Some are focusing on recycling trash, air conditioning maintenance, such as developing a database accessible through an app in order to offer air conditioning repair or maintenance in your vicinity.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**DONOR-FUNDED ENTREPRENEURSHIP PROGRAMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Summary Description</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Partners/ Implementers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU4PSL – Support program for the development of the Libyan private sector</td>
<td>2020–2022: The objective of EU4PSL is to improve the business environment in Libya in order to generate economic growth and employment opportunities, especially for young people and women.</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Expertise France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLEIDSE – Promoting entrepreneurship and SME development in Libya</td>
<td>2016–2021: SLEIDSE aims to promote and develop entrepreneurship in Libya. It specifically disseminates a culture of entrepreneurship, assists business support structures, and improves access to financing for entrepreneurs.</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Expertise France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STREAM – Supporting Libya’s innovation ecosystem</td>
<td>2018–2020: STREAM supports the creation of the first integrated incubator, accelerator and Fab Lab in Tripoli to support the development of start-ups. It aims to build the capacities of Libyan start-ups and companies by offering them a space to receive training, and the opportunity to create prototypes, using the equipment of a Fab Lab.</td>
<td>UK Government</td>
<td>Expertise France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namaa Tamweel Microfinance (MFI) – Facilitating access to financing for Libyan microentrepreneurs</td>
<td>2018–2020: MFI aims to provide technical assistance to the new microcredit agency Namaa Tamweel. It is providing funds that will be allocated to small entrepreneurs. The agency has two branches in Benghazi and Tripoli and aims to provide over 15 million Libyan dinars (EUR 9.2m) to small entrepreneurs during its first two years of operation.</td>
<td>UK Government</td>
<td>Expertise France, Assaray Trade and Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Entrepreneurship Initiative – Bootcamps program for young entrepreneurs</td>
<td>2019–2020: This project aims to support young Libyan entrepreneurs working in the social and solidarity economy, by organizing bootcamps (training workshops) throughout the country, with a view to strengthen entrepreneurial spirit and creative thinking of young people and focus on projects with strong societal impact.</td>
<td>UNICEF and EU</td>
<td>Expertise France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In April 2019, UNICEF has been working with young people across Libya on a project called “Let Libya Be!”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Summary Description</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Partners/ Implementers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More jobs through better training and private sector promotion</td>
<td>2018–2022: The project promotes the development of private enterprises by providing training and coaching in entrepreneurial activities or in setting up a business, by focusing on start-ups and small businesses.</td>
<td>German Government</td>
<td>GIZ with Ministry of Labor and Rehabilitation (MOLR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 6: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TVET ACTORS

The table below summarizes the roles of various actors in the TVET sector currently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Key Role</th>
<th>Involvement/Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>Strategic actor (national level)</td>
<td>High level. Ministry of Planning’s Directorate of Economic and Social Development coordinates framework for national planning/funding, links public sector activity to Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research</td>
<td>Manages systems (national level)</td>
<td>High level. Legal responsibilities to manage and administer public TVE through the NBTVE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labor</td>
<td>Manages systems (national level)</td>
<td>High level. Legally responsible for managing and administering Centers for Vocational Training (CVT). The Directorate of Human Resource Development has coordination and funding role for public and private training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Board of Economic Development</td>
<td>Advisory role (national)</td>
<td>Low engagement with TVE by and large.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU) British Council UNDP is also a donor</td>
<td>Donor (international) Implementing Partner Project was relaunched in fall 2019. The National Board for Technical and Vocational Education (NBTVE) under the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Labor are the main partners/beneficiaries. Initiator, funder through cooperation agreements. They also work with other key ministries who have a stake such as the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Local Governance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET UK</td>
<td>Partner (international)</td>
<td>In progress. Providing technical support to key beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO with EU funding</td>
<td>Partner (international)</td>
<td>Launch of Youth Employment in the Mediterranean (YEM) for Libya in November 2018, in cooperation with MOE, MOL, and private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Assurance and VET Providers Approval Centre (QAVETPAC)</td>
<td>Quality assurance and accreditation</td>
<td>To ensure the relevance and quality of TVET provision. Not yet operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Standards and Certification Centre (OSCC)</td>
<td>Assessor/quality assurance (national agency)</td>
<td>Legislation in place, but not yet operational. Under the Ministry of Labor, a strategic and management role intended, to improve links between demands for skills and supply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional offices of Ministry of Labor</td>
<td>Regional administration of private CVT providers</td>
<td>High involvement as intermediate office of the Ministry of Labor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional offices of TVE</td>
<td>Regional administration of intermediate TVE providers</td>
<td>High involvement as intermediate office of ministry/NBTVE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector skills council (tourism sector)</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Recently established. Potential as model for social partnership development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Documentation Centre</td>
<td>Data provision on labor market needs</td>
<td>Low level of activity due to lack of data and capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private enterprises (foreign and national)</td>
<td>Potential co-founder/partner</td>
<td>Low level of engagement with public sector bodies and with TVE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Key Role</td>
<td>Involvement/Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private TVE providers Accreditation Office</td>
<td>Manage administration of private TVE providers</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and private training providers</td>
<td>Local providers of training</td>
<td>Carrying out instructions, implementing decisions on curriculum etc. Private schools may be initiators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEXES PROVIDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Statement of Work

Data collection instruments: PGD Guide, KII Questionnaires

Training materials: Regional Coordinators Training-of-Trainers (TOT) curriculum and materials, Youth Assessor curriculum and materials