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AFFORDABLE PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN CRISIS- AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES LITERATURE REVIEW

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DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to provide the findings of a literature review on the topic of affordable private schools (APS) in crisis- and conflict-affected countries. It is intended to add to the study commissioned by USAID and carried out by Steve Heyneman, Jonathan Stern, and Tom Smith of Vanderbilt University in 2011, which focused on APS in developing countries.¹ The current study builds upon this by specifically investigating APS in crisis/conflict countries. Seven key questions guiding the current study are:

1. What is “affordable” within the context of crisis/conflict countries?
2. What is the level of quality of private schools relative to public schools?
3. What are the unique features of a crisis/conflict country that might impact the affordable private schools (APS) sector?
4. What are the major constraints that APS face in developing countries and are they different for crisis/conflict countries?
5. What role must the host-country government play in APS in crisis/conflict countries?
6. Are there exemplary APS models that provide insight on how best to leverage and capitalize APS in crisis/conflict countries?
7. Are there prerequisites that must be in place within the crisis/conflict countries to ensure sustainable investments in APS?

These questions were developed in partnership with USAID and were designed to examine the possibilities for donors working in the APS sector in these countries. They were also created in order to gather information necessary to develop a set of lessons learned and recommendations for USAID and other donors on how best to capitalize and leverage the private school movement as governments in post-crisis/conflict countries attempt to rebuild their education systems.

These literature review findings are one portion of a three-part study which will also include key informant interviews and specific crisis/conflict country case studies. The findings from the literature review will inform the other two parts of the study. Together, the literature search, interviews of key informants, and the case studies, will lead to a report outlining the lessons learned and recommendations for donors working in APS in crisis/conflict countries.

1. “The Search for Effective EFA Policies: The Role of Private Schools for Low-Income Children”, Steven Heyneman, Jonathan Stern, Thomas Smith, USAID and the Mitchell Group, 2011

FINDINGS BY KEY QUESTIONS

1. **How is 'affordable' defined within the context of a crisis/conflict-affected country?** What is the optimal level of fees that families in developing countries can afford to pay and how does that differ from the ability to pay by families in crisis countries?

The literature suggests that there is no optimal level of fees that families can afford to pay in developing countries and that there is no difference between developing and crisis/conflict countries. Instead, affordability in education is relative and may be best assessed as a function of the income of the families and their socio-economic status, demand, and expected returns (Barakat et al., 2013).

Parents worldwide have the desire to get their children the best education possible, and this includes those in crisis/conflict countries (UN 2012, ADB/UNICEF 2011, Psacharopoulos et al. 1997). Many studies have looked at reasons why low-income parents in these contexts send their children to low-fee private schools or APS and how much they are willing to pay (James, 1993; Oketch et al., 2010). Many of the reasons put forth for why poor parents patronize APS can be framed by the excess demand and differentiated demand framework set forth by James (1993). According to James, poor families would have preferred to send their children to the free public school system but those are often crowded or non-existent due to limited public spending; thus 'excess demand' for private schools in poor neighborhoods is created. In trying to quantify what fees these poor families deem 'affordable', researchers look at the percentage of income taken up by fees, estimate the perceived returns to investing in a private education and assess the availability of subsidies, vouchers and scholarships provided by the state and schools.

Often faced with limited choices in terms of the limited number of and poor quality of public school education, parents in developing countries including those in crisis/conflict environments often choose to spend a large **percentage of their income** on fees to send their children to APS. In India, it is estimated that families spend over ten percent of their household income on fees for low-fee private schools (Karamchandani et al, (2009). Other researchers estimate much higher percentages in places such as Haiti (11 to 13 percent per capita income) where 80 percent of children attend private schools and the burden of school fees on household budget causes families to sell livestock, their principal form of savings or assets (University of Arizona, 1996).² Poor families absorb this burden and pay out of pocket for private school education because they believe it may be the best pathway for their children to avoid poverty (UN 2012, Psacharopoulos et al., 1997).

Altering the socio-economic pathway of their children and **the perceived rates of return** of investing in education were some of the main reasons poor families in Bolivia sent their children to low-fee private schools. The study on poor households in Bolivia found that affordability is a function of a family's socio-economic status, and is dependent on a family's income level and other factors such as the number of children within the household (Psacharopoulos et al., 1997). In addition, the educational level of the head of the household was a strong determinant on how much a family spent on APS (Psacharopoulos et al. 1997). The same study showed that poor families put their children in private schools primarily because the rates of return of moving to the next grade level were very significant compared to the possibility of repetition in a public school. This example iterates that fact that affordability is relative and can be further quantified and defined according to different income quartiles.

Despite their willingness to enroll their children in private schools, many poor families in the lowest income quartiles cannot afford the fees and the additional cost of uniforms, books and PTA levies

2. University of Arizona, BARA - A Baseline Study of Livelihood Security in Northwest Haiti – April 1996.

associated with APS (Johnson, Bowles, 2010). For very poor families in crisis/conflict environments, where the choice of public schools is also lacking, families cannot send their children to APS without scholarship support or subsidies from the state (Barakat et al., 2013). Therefore, affordability for the poorest families may be dependent on the **extent of government spending and involvement** in the private school sector. In crisis/conflict countries such government support may not exist, therefore the likelihood of the very poor missing out on education because of their inability to pay may be increased in such environments.

Although researchers measure affordability in a number of ways - calculating the measure as the percentage of income taken up by APS fees or defining low-fee private schools as those with school fee rates less than 50% of the minimum wage (Heyneman et al., 2011) - the optimal level of fees families are willing to pay is dependent on their perceived returns on such an investment and their desire to educate their children. In very poor environments such as crisis/conflict environments where parents have limited options for educating their children due to a lack of public schools and weakened educational systems, public schools and private schools are perfect substitutes (Oketch et al., 2010). Education can therefore be made more affordable to the poorest families through government provision of vouchers or subsidies. Donors and NGOs can fuel differentiated demand and therefore quality by encouraging the establishment of more APS and a more competitive education marketplace.

KEY RESOURCES ON COST TO ATTEND APS

Barakat, S., Hardman, F., Rohwerder, B., and Rzeszut, K. (2013, April). *Low-cost private schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan: What evidence to support sustainable scale-up?* [Draft report]. London: DFID.

Heyneman, S.P., Stern, J.M.B, and Smith, T.M. (2011, May). *The Search for Effective EFA Policies: The role of private schools for low-income children*. Washington, DC: USAID. Available at <http://www.idpfoundation.org/News/USAIDEFAReportMay2011.pdf>

Psacharopoulos, G., Arieira, C.R., and Mattson, R. (1997). Private education in a poor country: The case of urban Bolivia. *Economics of Education Review*, 16(4), 395-406.

Oketch, M., Mustiya, M., Ngware, M., and Ezeh, A.C. (2010). Why are there proportionately more poor pupils enrolled in non-state schools in urban Kenya in spite of the FPE policy? *International Journal of Educational Development*, 30(1), 23-32.

2. What is an acceptable level of quality that might be expected in APS?

Low-income families in crisis/conflict environments invest in private schools because they are perceived to be of higher quality than public schools (Tooley, 2007; Tooley and Dixon, 2005; Karamchandani et al, 2009; Baird 2009; French and Kingdon, 2010). In enrolling their children in private schools, families expect smaller class sizes, regular teacher attendance and higher achievement scores, alongside other positive outputs, such as higher graduation rates, low repetition rates and higher wages after graduation. Although APS have an enormous range in quality that can be viewed from factual and parental perspectives, it appears that APS can provide an acceptable level of quality in crisis/conflict countries, both to meet parents' expectations and in accordance with some of the most common metrics of quality. This section looks at how quality education is defined and the evidence surrounding the accomplishments of private schools in achieving quality.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF QUALITY EDUCATION

ACCORDING to UNESCO's Global Monitoring Report (2005), quality education can be characterized according to two principles – 1) the success with which the education system identifies and develops the cognition of learners, and 2) the role education plays in promoting values and behavior related to citizenship and the way in which education encourages creative and emotional development. UNICEF breaks these principles down further into five dimensions of education system quality:

1. Learners who are healthy, well-nourished and ready to participate and learn, and supported in learning by their families and communities;
2. Environments that are healthy, safe, protective and gender-sensitive, and provide adequate resources and facilities;
3. Content that is reflected in relevant curricula and materials for the acquisition of basic skills, especially in the areas of literacy, numeracy and skills for life, and knowledge in such areas as gender, health, nutrition, HIV/AIDS prevention and peace;
4. Processes through which trained teachers use child-centered teaching approaches in well-managed classrooms and schools and skillful assessment to facilitate learning and reduce disparities;
5. Outcomes that encompass knowledge, skills and attitudes, and are linked to national goals for education and positive participation in society.

These principles showcase the complex interactions that contribute to a quality education. However, data on these different dimensions may be difficult to come by or standardize across multiple countries. For example, the second dimension of quality, measuring healthy and safe environments with adequate resources, may be hard to achieve in a crisis/conflict environment where resources are depleted and the environment is unstable. Therefore, researchers tend to use proxies typically measured by learning outcomes such as student performance on standard performance tests, repetition and dropout rates to assess quality in education.

MEASURING QUALITY EDUCATION

The perceived notion is that private schools outperform public schools on all of these measures of quality: student achievement, repetition and dropout rates. If education quality is high then children are more likely to do well in placement tests and move up the grade levels, i.e. they are less likely to repeat a grade or drop out if they receive a quality education. Using drop-out and repetition rates as proxies, Patrinos & Psacharopoulos (1996) and Wolff et al. (1994) found that private schools in Bolivia provide a higher quality education, i.e. private schools had lower dropout and repetition rates. Heyneman et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis comparing APS achievement scores to those from public schools and

in most of their case study countries, namely Jamaica, Ghana and Pakistan, APS outperformed public schools on national examinations.

According to some critics, achievement scores provide a rather narrow definition of quality and most often differences in learning outcomes between private and public schools can be explained away when factors such as family background, income and others are controlled for (ASER, 2009; Sarangpani, 2009). Although studies in Chad, Bhutan, Botswana, and Malawi (Bray, 1997) and Bangladesh (Gauri & Vawda, 2004) did not show significant differences in public versus private achievement scores and results were mixed in Kenya (Tooley & Dixon, 2005; Bray, 1997), Chile (McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006) and Colombia (Angrist et al, 2006); researchers argue that poor families attending APS still gain access to other positive elements of a quality education including increased teacher attendance, efficient use of time on task and improved graduation rates (Dreze and Kingdon, 2001). Depending on the context, there may be other quality classroom measures such as the use of English in classroom instruction (Härmä 2009).

PARENTAL MEASURES OF QUALITY

Many parents who send their children to private schools most often do not have access to research data; therefore they base their school choice on other quality proxies such as small class sizes, interactive teaching practices, enforced discipline and positive outputs, such as higher school completion rates and higher wages after graduation (Barakat, et al, 2013; Härmä 2010; Pal, 2009; Alderman et al, 2001; Andrabi et al, 2008; Heyneman et al., 2011; Cfbt, 2011). Studies show that parents often cite teacher behavior as a measure of quality when considering private schools. According to parents, a quality education would include effective teachers who (1) attend class regularly, (2) who are trained to effectively use time on task and (3) who instill discipline in their classrooms (Barakat, et al, 2013; and Save the Children, 2002). Muralidharan & Kremer (2007) found that in India, when comparing private school teachers to those who taught in public schools, the former were absent two to eight percent less than the latter and six to nine percentage points more likely to be engaged in a teaching activity at any point during school hours. In Tanzania, private schools were found to have more professionally behaved teachers and better support from parents and administrators (Mitchell Group, 2010). Additional quality proxies for parents may include the provision of educational infrastructure such as the state of the school building and provision of equipment (Policy Innovations, 2010). Several research studies have shown parental quality proxies do in fact translate into positive learning outcomes (French & Kingdon, 2010; Wadhwa, 2009; Goyal, 2009; Goyal & Pandey, 2009).

Although APS, especially those in crisis/conflict environments, do not fulfill all the quality measures set by international standards and have an enormous range in quality, they seem to provide some of the positive inputs and outputs families have come to expect. Families invest in APS because of their perception of quality, and, in addition, they believe that APS have greater accountability and are more receptive to the needs of the community (Tooley, 2007; Alderman et al., 2003).

In crisis/conflict countries, where parents are faced with limited school choice, APS may be the only option. The literature shows that in the majority of cases, APS do meet the expected quality measures. However, with limited information, many parents are unable to make informed decisions about quality given the extensive range in quality in APS; parents may be spending huge portions of their household income on poor quality education. Building capacity within communities to recognize and demand quality may be the first step in helping parents realize the quality education they are paying for. Galvanizing community efforts to oversee APS that 'mushroom quickly' after crisis/conflict may be another way to establish quality educational standards in the absence of a fully functioning education governing body.

KEY RESOURCES ON APS QUALITY

Heyneman, S.P., Stern, J.M.B, and Smith, T.M. (2011, May). The Search for Effective EFA Policies: The role of private schools for low-income children. Washington, DC: USAID. Available at <http://www.idpfoundation.org/News/USAIDEFAReportMay2011.pdf>

CfBT. (2011). Preliminary study into low fee private schools and education. London: DFID. Available at http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/60912-GyanShalaFinalReport.pdf

3. What are the unique features of a crisis/conflict-affected country that might impact the APS sector? Does the level of severity of the crisis/conflict matter?

Crisis/conflict events have political, economic, health, and environmental consequences, and each of these affects education systems in differing ways. An economic crisis may increase the opportunity cost of sending children to school, whereas an environmental crisis (e.g., earthquakes) or health crisis (e.g., HIV/AIDS epidemic) may mean grievous loss of life (UNESCO, 2011; UNESCO 2002; UNICEF 2004). A political crisis may also lead to the displacement of millions and an extensive destruction of educational institutions (UNESCO, 2011). In crisis/conflict situations where the basic needs such as water, shelter, health and nutrition are not met, education provision is not prioritized by the government and thus not usually a primary investment. This leaves a gap in education provision that can be filled by affordable private schools (APS). Although demand for APS is high in these environments, the instability, severe lack of resources, and limited capacity of the host government can create a number of unique circumstances not always experienced in other more stable environments. These dire circumstances may be compounded by the severity of the crisis or conflict but the literature has very limited information about what impact the severity of the conflict might have on the APS sector.

CRISIS/CONFLICT FEATURES THAT ENABLE APS TO FLOURISH

Since most of the government resources in these environments are targeted to providing basic public services (e.g., water, food, shelter), there are often huge gaps in education provision. While there may be assistance provided by outside donors and non-governmental organizations, the results can be scattered because of the weak government capacity to absorb assistance and provide coordinated educational services. These gaps provide an opportunity for APS to emerge. Communities and families often want the stability of schooling and will work with NGOs, faith based organizations, and others to create education services. In fact, in Sierra Leone, faith-based schools financed by their respective denominations can be found in the areas most severely affected by conflict (Wodon and Ying, 2009). Community schools in Afghanistan also target remote areas affected by conflict (Burde, 2012).

In crisis/conflict environments APS tend to have stronger ties to the local communities. Therefore, they are able to operate in close proximity, often unrecognized, in discrete locations within communities. The close proximity of APS lessens the communities' anxiety in regards to violence directed at schools, and increases demand and attendance, especially where girls are concerned (Barakat, et al, 2013; Rose & Greeley, 2006). Low-fee private schools have the flexibility to target specific populations and effective targeting can result in granting access to over-aged children who missed the opportunity to attend school (Lexow, 2002), and females and other marginalized populations in crisis/conflict countries (Andrabi, 2006).

CRISIS/CONFLICT FEATURES THAT NEGATIVELY IMPACT APS

In crisis/conflict affected environments, education provision can be severely constricted by national and regional violence. (Turrent, 2009). When there is active strife and violence, the government's role in education is constantly negotiated with different actors in different localities so government policies become fragmented (Titeca & de Herdt, 2011). This may give rise to an unstable state where, for instance, education can be radicalized. Faith-based education institutions (FBEIs), which form a majority of APS in some countries may retract in cases where education is politicized and religion is used as a crutch for intimidation and exclusion (van Ommering, 2009). The lack of democratic processes in a country affected by crisis/conflict may also result in the ruling party's resistance to education reform, including resistance to girl's education (Caddell, 2007; Barakat et al., 2013).

Additional constraints on the provision of education include the fact that violence and displacement frequently leave a legacy of a shortage of qualified teachers (Buckland, 2006). Public schools may

experience this shortage too in these contexts, but APS that often target the very poor in rural areas may be at a greater disadvantage because of the lack of qualified teachers in these remote areas. Low-fee private schools that operate in these rural areas therefore tend to hire the low caliber of teachers that are available to them; these are often untrained and unqualified female community members (Andrabi et al., 2006 and 2007).

As a country moves from a period of overt conflict (such as civil war or foreign invasion) towards a degree of unity, normalcy, and stability (USAID/MSI, 2006), it is expected that government capacity to provide education services or provide support or structure to the private school sector will increase. Post-conflict situations do not always transition to peace and post-conflict conditions may last for years. For example in Liberia, the government is still severely hampered in terms of education provision ten years after the end of the civil war. Such weakened systems may be aided post-conflict by financial resources from external donors that may also become more readily available in a more stable post-crisis/conflict country. Despite the severity of the crisis/conflict, APS sprout in the most affected areas to offer access to the poor and most marginalized populations.

KEY RESOURCES FOR EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMING IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

AMEX and Creative Associates International, Inc. (2008). *Education and crisis intervention framework*. Washington, DC: USAID. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadx917.pdf

INEE. (2013). INEE guidance note on conflict sensitive education. New York: Author. Available at http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1150/INEE_GN_on_Conflict_Sensitive_Education%5B1%5D.pdf

UNICEF and Save the Children (2010). *The short guide to rapid joint education needs assessments*. Geneva: Global Education Cluster. Available at http://www.globalpartnership.org/media/library/Global_Ed_Cluster-Education_Needs_Assess_Guide-English.pdf

4. What are the major constraints that APS face in developing countries and are they different for crisis/conflict countries?

Education providers face numerous constraints and challenges in developing countries and these are only worsened in crisis/conflict environments. The unstable nature of a crisis/conflict environment can be a deterrent to education and the establishment of any form of school system (Turrent, 2009). Although both APS and public schools face similar constraints, such as depleted educational facilities and a lack of qualified teachers as a result of these more difficult environments, APS do face some unique challenges - particularly with regard to regulatory and financial barriers. In these environments, host governments can play a major role in either supporting or limiting the expansion and sustainability of APS.

GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT

In developing countries where the demand for APS is high, governments can create a hostile environment to prevent them from starting up or operating effectively. Governments that strongly oppose APS may set up strict regulatory policies, use intimidation and other tactics to prevent the establishment or sustainability of such schools (Heyneman and Stern, 2013). In countries like Nepal and Nigeria where governments see themselves as the sole provider of education, government opposition can come in the form of intimidation and threats (Caddell, 2007; Phillipson et al., 2008). The use of force and intimidation is often heightened in crisis/conflict situations where tensions are high and there are one-party states (Phillipson et al., 2008). Governments may also regard APS as competitors, vying for students, teachers and funding and will therefore put up obstacles to hinder their establishment (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007, Save the Children, 2002).

REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

One of the obstacles to the expansion of APS is regulatory policies and processes instituted by host governments. Although APS operate independently, and without government funding in most cases, APS are required to register and be recognized in most countries. In most crisis/conflict environments, where the government does not have the capacity to establish and enforce policies, APS may exist in a laissez-faire state, with little or no restriction on their activities. However, as Heyneman et al. (2011) found, countries that establish national policies to regulate APS frequently create roadblocks for APS because most of their policies are (1) unnecessarily numerous, (2) unnecessarily restrictive in content, (3) unenforced, and (4) used as an opportunity for graft and corruption. Although one could argue that policies should be instituted to protect students and ensure some level of quality and standardization, excessive regulations often backfire, leading to loss of differentiation and choice between public and private schools; bribery; uneven application of standards; and ultimately the establishment of underground or shadow networks that operate outside the regulatory framework (Rose, 2002; Srivastava, 2008; Mitchell Group, 2011; Barakat et al. 2013).

In Uttar Pradesh, India, for example, 'low-fee private schools' (LFPS) established an informal network in which schools that did not meet the set standards for recognition affiliated and formed coaching center arrangements with recognized schools. Although the network allowed the sharing of regulatory norms among LFPS, the main purpose of these partnerships was to allow students in the unregistered schools to sit for exams, as students registered at recognized schools or as private candidates with recognized schools (Srivastava, 2008). In Nigeria and South Africa, umbrella associations of low budget private schools have come together to challenge government regulations through protests and court actions (Rose, 2005). Another strong and influential network of private schools is the Catholic network in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This faith based organization is able to influence decision-making in the educational arena with the same authority as the government, which is considered just one of the education actors (Titeca & de Herdt, 2011).

FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

Aside from navigating the government's regulatory frameworks, APS are burdened with raising funds to start and operate in these fiscally strapped environments. Major factors such as APS inability to get loans and secure land ownership impede the progress of many APS and threaten their sustainability (Aga Khan, 2007; Tooley, 2009; Heyneman et al, 2011). According to researchers, APS are unable to get funding from local banks because they lack capital and collateral, which often comes in the form of land ownership and are essentially seen as a major fiscal risk. Research shows that external stakeholders are also reluctant to fund APS because they fear the schools have inexperienced management; insufficient financing since funding relies heavily on tuition; use the funding for multiple objectives (religious, street children or orphans, etc.); are dependent on a single leader, usually the founder; and lack standardization across schools (Heyneman et al, 2011). In addition, APS may not be able to afford loans because of high interest rates.

Due to constraints on funding, APS find alternative ways of reducing their operating costs and unfortunately, these come in the form of reduced spending on teachers and educational materials. Teacher salaries are the largest part of operating costs for APS (Andrabi, et al, 2008). With limited capital resources, the only funding for teacher salaries comes from tuition payments. Therefore, in places such as Tanzania and Pakistan where parents seldom pay tuition on time, APS are faced with the challenge of paying teachers (Liang, 1996; Heyneman et al, 2011). In Pakistan, APS are able to keep expenditures low by hiring less educated female teachers, especially in rural areas (Andrabi et al., 2006 and 2007). Hiring less qualified and poorly trained teachers may lead to a lower quality of education and students who are unqualified and unable to take state exams (Barakat et al. 2013)

Although low-fee private schools encounter financial and physical barriers as a result of the environment in developing and crisis/conflict countries, the policies and actions of host governments can have a huge impact on their activities within that context. The governments of these countries can both decide to embrace and foster the growth of these schools and allow them to operate with less burdensome rules and regulations, or face dealing with undercover networks that sprout due to the demand for these schools. Successful governmental and private school sector partnerships have been created and maintained in places like Colombia, Chile, Cameroon and Bhutan to enhance education quality and choice (see section on Models).

KEY RESOURCES ON THE CONSTRAINTS FOR APS

Caddell, M. (2007). Private schools and political conflict in Nepal. In Srivastava, P., and Walford, G. (Eds.), *Private schooling in less economically developed countries: Asian and African Perspectives* (187–207). Didcot, UK: Symposium. Available at <http://oro.open.ac.uk/2892/1/CaddellSympChpt.pdf>

Heyneman, S.P., Stern, J.M.B, and Smith, T.M. (2011, May). *The Search for Effective EFA Policies: The role of private schools for low-income children*. Washington, DC: USAID. Available at <http://www.idpfoundation.org/News/USAID/EFAReportMay2011.pdf>

Kitaev, I. (2004, December). EFA and private education: Some regional experiences and findings. *Economic Affairs*, 24(4), 27-30.


Turrent, V. (2009). *Last in line, last in school*. Cambridge: International Save the Children Alliance. Available at <http://www.unesco.org/education/lastinschool2009.pdf>

5. **What role must the host-country government play in APS?** Historically, what is the relationship between APS and the host government and how does it evolve given the changing country circumstances?

Although some governments are hostile towards APS, other governments see them as allies in achieving their education strategy and choose to engage with specific schools or the entire sector (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007). The literature finds that the government engages APS in differing degrees and through differing roles, at times resulting in public-private partnerships. LaRocque (2011) states that “PPPs involve agreements between the public and non-state sectors on agreed targets, outputs and goals, sometimes through formal contracts with a specified timeframe.” There is wide agreement (Rose, 2006; LaRocque, 2011; and Heyneman & Stern, 2013; among others) that APS should be seen as a complement to public education provision and their contributions to increasing access to the poor should be recognized; therefore they should be engaged at least in the short-run. However, criticisms of public-private partnerships (PPPs) include the need for governmental design, implementation, administrative, monitoring, and regulatory capacities to ensure contracts terms are carried out successfully and to ensure accountability to quality (LaRocque, 2011). The degree of the partnership and the role the government takes on will require different governmental capacities.

DEGREES OF PARTNERSHIP

The government has many options in defining its relationship with APS, from a low partnership level where education provision is fully public to a high partnership level where education is fully private. Verger (2011) and Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guaqueta (2009) offer the following continuum to describe varying levels of engagement in education:



As discussed in previously, governments choosing limited partnerships may be hostile towards APS. However, some governments also see value in APS in furthering its goals and choose stronger partnerships, although this is no indication of the absence of tension. Rose (2006) cautions that more intense forms of engagement, such as in South Africa and Bangladesh, can lead to tension, particularly without trust or an authentic, ongoing dialogue. Partnerships should involve risk-sharing while drawing equally on each partner’s strengths to achieve a collective goal (Akyeampong, 2009). Without proper input from partners, the partnership may not successfully reach its objectives or become unsustainable due to high levels of tension.

GOVERNMENT ROLES IN PARTNERING

Governments that choose to partner with private and NGO providers often take on several roles, although not exclusively: provider, regulator, funder, or facilitator. There are benefits and challenges to each role, but the government’s effectiveness largely depends on its capacity to implement the set policies within these roles. Thus, while policies may be in place, they may not be implemented due to a lack of capacity or will, highlighting the need for government capacity building (Rose, 2006).

Provider

As a provider, the service of education delivery remains under the direct management of the government. Schools are either all public or partially public, depending on the degree the government

chooses to engage in this role. However, being the main provider of education for governments in developing countries is often a challenge as the government tries to provide services with limited revenue and administrative capacity.

Regulator

As a regulator, the government oversees APS inputs and/or outputs through policy and the enforcement of those policies. Although regulations are often times overly burdensome and unnecessarily limit flexibility and innovation (Heyneman & Stern, 2013; Rose, 2006), they are still necessary to ensure that a specified level of quality is provided and can increase access to marginalized groups, such as in Pakistan (Malik, 2010). Acting as a regulator allows the government to control the curriculum and quality of education, such as through teacher requirements, registration requirements, or reporting requirements, but necessitates having the capacity and willingness to enforce laws and punitive measures uniformly across all schools – both public and private. When regulations are unnecessarily numerous, restrictive, unenforced, or used for graft and corruption, the relationship between APS and the government becomes strained (Heyneman et al., 2011). This balance between protecting the quality of education and students, and creating an enabling environment for innovation is difficult to achieve. Therefore, Rose (2006) recommends including the APS sector in education policy dialogues by engaging with umbrella associations and coalitions of non-state providers.

Funder

As a funder, the government provides direct financial support to APS for salaries, tuition, materials and other costs, or to families to send their children to schools. This also includes providing direct subsidies to schools, and scholarships and vouchers to families. When governments engage in this role and shares costs (Bray, 2002), the government is able to expand access to education quickly without having to fund building projects, and may provide access for children previously excluded from or at-risk of leaving the education system. The government created and funded but independently-managed Punjab Education Foundation established an Education Voucher Scheme (EVS), which provided funding to over 150 private schools, was able to provide free education to 30,000 low-income students living in slums in the three years following its pilot (Malik, 2010). Additionally, if funding is tied to quality indicators, the government maintains some control over the quality of education. For example, Bogota's government ensures that a certain level of quality is achieved by setting standards in the contracts with providers, covering test scores, drop-out rates and hours of instructions, giving the municipality to terminate the contract if standards are not met (LaRocque, 2005). Although providing funding directly to schools requires the government to have the capacity to oversee or at least collect accurate data from schools, scholarships or vouchers require the government to maintain accurate records of its targeted marginalized population, which may be unrealistic in developing contexts (Heyneman & Stern, 2013).

Facilitator

As a facilitator, the government becomes actively engaged and involved with APS to support the growth and influence of specific models or the sector as a whole, such as through providing direct expert services, such as curriculum design and teacher training or direct provision of materials and facilities such as textbooks or leasing out public school facilities; inclusion in policy dialogue; and contracting education provision out to private or NGO providers. Facilitation differs from funding in that the government is not simply transferring money; it is transferring skills or knowledge, voice, or agency to provide support to schools. Governments may also actively initiate the creation of non-state schools or support their continuation through tax incentives. For example, in Bhutan, the government works with communities to set up NGO schools to address the shortage of public school seats while Jamaica offers a tax waiver for private schools (Heyneman et al., 2011; Bray, 2002; Kitaev, 2004).

As a strong facilitator, the government may seek out a provider to assist in education provision in a certain area or group, such as contracting out to privately-run concession schools to reach children from low-income families³. When governments recognize the success of APS models in furthering their education strategy, they may facilitate the scale-up of the models or invite the innovating organization to contribute to the public education sector (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007). For example, the Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan (SCSPEB), which had demonstrated success in promoting education for girls, was asked by the provincial government to set up a Parent Teacher School Management Committee Model as well as to collaborate with the government on middle school and early childhood education program delivery to remote areas of the province (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007). This partnership evolved from the trust developed in an education steering committee involving public and private providers (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007).

Such partnerships require developing vision (objectives), intimacy (trust, mutual accountability and communication) and impact (results-oriented, including local issues and indicators) (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007; and Ingram et al., 2006). Barakat et al. (2013) also note that the design of education partnerships between government and private schools should represent access, quality, and efficiency objectives; target program beneficiaries; and begin by assessing the private sector market. Akyeampong (2009) and Aga Khan Foundation (2007) add that successful partnerships require equal treatment of partners and shared risks. Additionally, both parties must be reliable and fulfill its obligations to maintain trust (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007).

CONFLICT CONTEXT

In many crisis/conflict and developing country contexts, the government is often absent from education provision and lacks the capacity to regulate non-state education providers. As the state rebuilds, the government takes on a larger role but may continue to lack the capacity to enforce laws (van Ommering et al., 2009). Titeca & De Herdt (2011) note that in the DRC, the state remains active in education but does not have sole authority: instead of being the provider, the state is relegated to a regulatory and administrative role that is limited by powerful actors such as the Catholic Church. For example, the church instituted a school fee rate among its schools with no input from the government and in disregard of the fee policies the government had in place (Titeca & De Herdt, 2011). Additionally, because governance is fragmented in many conflict and crisis environments, the state has to negotiate and re-negotiate its power with different actors in different localities, leading to non-uniform education policy (Titeca & De Herdt, 2011). In conflict contexts, it seems unlikely that a government with weakened capacity will be able to implement uniform education policy, particularly without the support of entrenched non-state providers.

Governments have multiple opportunities to engage with APS but do not need to be limited to one role or remain in the same role(s) as the country develops. This is particularly true in conflict contexts, where flexibility on the part of the government is expected. Additionally, as the needs of the education sector changes and the capacity of governments strengthen, the degree of partnering or interaction with non-state providers will vary. Two examples of opposite directions taken by post-conflict governments illustrate how the degree of engagement with non-state providers and the role of the government might change over time.

FROM FUNDER, REGULATOR, AND FACILITATOR TO PROVIDER: SOUTH KOREA

3. Concession school is an educational program that consists of a contract between a group of private schools and the public educational system in which private agents provide education for low-income people. An example of this is the concession school launched in 1999 in the city of Bogotá, Colombia.

Post-war South Korea provides an example of an education sector that evolved into largely public provision. This was achieved through a sequential expansion strategy in education that was aligned with the stages of economic development (Lee, 2008). After establishing universal primary education, the Korean government changed its laissez-faire policy towards private schools, and began to regulate the sector as well as actively support it through funding and facilitation. In recognizing the role that private providers can play in addressing demand, the government offered private schools subsidies and tax incentives for post-primary schooling provision (Government of Korea, 2013). Control of education was also centralized by setting the same regulations for public and private schools, including eliminating school-based entrance exams in favor of a local lottery system (Kim, 2001; and Government of Korea, 2013). This eliminated the quality differences between public and private schools, keeping the two types of providers on par. Additionally, the government's commitment to financing education in its budget enabled the increase in public middle schools and public high schools between the 1970s and the 1990s; the number of private schools also declined during this period (Kim, 2001; and Government of Korea, 2013). The equal treatment of public and private providers, including in terms of funding, allowed Korea to equalize the provision, and the budget commitment to education allowed Korea to increase the public school sector.

FROM PROVIDER TO FUNDER AND REGULATOR: COLOMBIA

Colombia illustrates an education sector's transition to largely private provision in a fragile and conflict context. In 1991, Colombia's government began actively supporting private provision of education when it recognized the gap in secondary education enrollment between the rich and poor. In an effort to increase enrollment, the government began implementing the Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria (Program for Coverage Expansion in Secondary Education – PACES) (Bettinger, 2005). Under PACES, the government provided private school vouchers through a lottery system to middle school children entering secondary school. The recipients were children who came from urban families of the two lowest economic strata within the country (Bettinger et al., 2009). However, the application process limited access to the poorest students, and was later replaced with a concession schools model that provided more government support for privately managed schools and the poor population they served (Angrist et al., 2002; and LaRocque, 2011). Payment is based on the number of students enrolled and is less than the amount invested per public school student (LaRocque, 2011). As a regulator, the Ministry of Education reviews teaching standards for private schools and funds evaluations (LaRocque, 2011). Colombia was able to adapt its role from provider to funder and regulator to provide education quality and access to children. Because of Colombia's success in providing quality education, it is often mentioned alongside the Chilean voucher system, one of the most widely cited examples of public-supported private provision (Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; August and Valenzuela 2003; Gallegos 2004; Sapelli 2003; McEwan and Carnoy, 2000).

Although governments can choose to disengage or engage on varying degrees with APS as the country develops, it is clear that the government must continue to be involved in education provision in some form if access, quality and equity are to be attained. Regardless of the role that governments choose to play or the degree of partnering, it is clear that capacity building in data collection and administration, and the strengthening of legal structures and information sharing platforms will allow the government to better oversee, fund, or support APS, as well as provide an environment conducive to partnerships. Additionally, it is important for governments to be flexible and recognize that its roles will evolve over the course of the country's development, and set a thought-out, long-term education strategy that engages APS in dialogue. Both Korea and Colombia highlight the importance of flexibility in the roles that the government must adapt. Donors can provide capacity building support and stimulate APS umbrella dialogue with governments, being cognizant that smaller non-state providers also have a voice. While there is no clear best prescription for the government in how to engage with APS, some qualities

of successful APS models have emerged, which may help governments decide how to include APS in their education strategy as the country emerges from post-conflict contexts.

KEY RESOURCES ON GOVERNMENTS AND APS

Aga Khan Foundation. (2007). *Non-state providers and public-private-community partnerships in education* [Background paper for EFA Global Monitoring Report 2008]. Paris: UNESCO. Available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001555/155538e.pdf>

LaRocque, N., and Lee, S. (2011). *Non-state providers and public-private partnerships in education for the poor*. New York: UNICEF. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/eapro/Final_NSP_lowres.pdf

Rose, P. (2006). Collaborating in education for all? Experiences of government support for non-state provision of basic education in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. *Public Administration and Development*, 26(3), 219-229.

Titeca, K., and de Herdt, T. (2011). Real governance beyond the 'failed state': Negotiating education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African Affairs*, 110(439), 213-231.

6. **Are there exemplary aps models that provide insight on how best to leverage and capitalize APS in crisis/conflict countries?** What are some exemplary APS models that might provide some insight on how best to leverage and capitalize on APS? Are there any differences in religiously based APS versus secular aps?

MODELS OF APS IN CRISIS/ CONFLICT CONTEXTS

Recent studies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Somalia provide useful insight into successful models of affordable private schools that may help to leverage this sector to provide access and quality for low-income and marginalized populations. These models are cross-subsidization, school-in-a-box and chain schools, community-embedded schools, government-partnered schools, and faith-based schools. This section will briefly highlight examples of these models that are promising in terms of delivering a quality education to children in conflict and crises. Although none of the models have been successful in all of its implementation, there is evidence that specific design and implementation of these models have yielded success in specific countries.

Cross-Subsidization

In previous research, Heyneman et al. (2011) identified examples of cross-subsidization, concessionary schools, school-in-a-box, scholarship, and voucher models that were successful in low-fee private school provision in developing contexts. Cross-subsidization refers to the repurposing of tuition from students who can afford to pay to subsidize the cost of attendance for poorer students who cannot afford tuition. This may come in the form of free spaces provided for a certain number of children enrolled. This practice was found in Kenya, India, Ghana, and Nigeria where reduced fee or free seats were offered to children unable to pay full tuition (Tooley & Dixon, 2005; Heyneman et al, 2011). Cross-subsidization demonstrates the willingness of APS to expand access to children from low-income families.

School-in-a-Box and Chain Schools

The school-in-a-box model refers to an education prototype meant to be replicated and implemented on a larger scale with the goal of providing quality access cost effectively. The box model may include materials, curricula as well as teacher training or can refer to a standardization of curricula and approach in affiliated schools. An example of the school-in-a-box model in conflict is UNICEF's Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) kits, which were successful in increasing access through free education provision. Although evaluations of the program lacked robust evidence, Eversmann (n.d.) found that the kits were perceived by schools in Somalia as successful in increasing attendance and the ability for children to transition. Additionally, classes using TEP were popular in Angola and the DRC and the model helped to integrate students into formal schools (Midttun, 2009; and Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008; and Johannessen, 2005). The UNICEF model is able to provide education access at times of emergencies, but is a short-term solution that should be utilized directly in the aftermath of crises and requires successful distribution for rapid response (Kumar et al, 1996).

Additionally, BRAC schools, which have become chain schools because its model is replicated at scale, also exemplify a successful school-in-a-box model. BRAC schools target disadvantaged children and aims to mainstream them into the formal education system (BRAC, n.d.). An example of BRAC's success can be found in northern Uganda, where BRAC's 122 "second-chance" schools for internally displaced children who had dropped out of primary school or never been to school, successfully integrated about 3,000 students into government schools (BRAC Uganda, n.d.). The model centers around a Montessori approach with teacher autonomy, small class size with a variety of ages, less testing and more soft skills development, and short school days (Rosenberg, 2013a). Additionally, it works across multiple sectors and is supported by donors and business income, keeping costs low in its education programming by using local female teachers (Rosenberg, 2013a and BRAC, n.d.).

Community-Embedded Schools

Community-embedded schools are managed by the community or managed with substantial community input. They may be large-scale NGO established schools or small-scale schools that emerged spontaneously from the community to address the demand for education. This model is particularly important in post-conflict situations because they provide education quickly in emergencies and build community cohesion by involving the community (Burde, 2011). They are also more likely than other models to understand the local context well because they actively involve community members in managing provision.

One example of this type of model is the Partnership For Advocating Community-Based Education-Afghanistan (PACE-A) program, which is noted for its success in increasing attendance, access and test scores for children in rural areas where there are no government schools (Burde & Linden, 2013). The model involves training Local School Management Committees (SMC) in management, conflict resolution, and community mobilization, then tasking the Committees with training and recruiting local teachers and monitoring student and teacher attendance (USAID). PACE-A was designed in alignment with the Community-Based Education Policy Guidelines and the Five Year Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Education, and with the goal of eventually transitioning the management of community-based schools to the Ministry of Education (USAID, n.d.; and Care, n.d.). Additionally, Catholic Relief Services, one of the project's implementers, used criteria for establishing schools that took into consideration the local context to increase access and community engagement. The criteria included assessing proximity to government schools (a minimum of three km distance), the availability of teachers (especially women to increase girls' attendance), and the level of community interest (including a willingness to mobilize resources) (Burde, 2011). Andrabi, et al. (2008) also highlights the importance of the availability of local female teachers for the growth of non-religious for-profit schools in rural areas and in increasing primary school enrollment for girls.

Government-Partnered Schools

Government-partnered schools are public-private partnerships where non-state schools are tasked by the government to achieve specific outcomes in education provision, and the government is actively facilitating or funding the scale-up of successful innovations. Partnering with governments can help sustain some successful APS initiatives that lack long-term financing (Akyeampong, 2009). There are a variety of public-private partnerships, from the provision of funding, such as in Indonesia, to actively inviting incorporating innovative models into the national strategy. Widely regarded examples are highlighted below.

Scholarships and Vouchers. Through scholarships and vouchers, the government transfers money to families or schools for the purpose of covering tuition, reducing the burden of education costs for families and increasing access. Successful models include the Education Voucher Scheme in Pakistan (Salman, 2010; Malik, 2010; and Ansari, 2012), and the Quetta Urban Fellowship Program in Pakistan that provided subsidies per girl enrolled (Kim, Alderman, & Orazen, 1999; Naz, 2003).

Learning Circles. An exemplary model of government-partnered schools is the Learning Circles model, which has been actively adopted into Colombia's national education policy for displaced children for scale-up (Fundacion Escuela Nueva, n.d.). Fundacion Escuela Nueva (n.d.), the organization that designed the Learning Circles, works with the national education system so that its Learning Circle centers follow the national academic calendar and grading system, easing the integration of its students into the public school system (Fundacion Escuela Nueva, n.d.). Learning Circles use a self-directed, participatory and collaborative learning approach, including self-guided lessons and student committees that collect data, look after school grounds, and create learning materials (Fundacion Escuela Nueva, n.d.; and Pearson, n.d.).

Concessionary Schools. The concessionary school model contracts management out to private institutions that have demonstrated outcomes that is at minimum average to provide access to those that the government is unable to reach, such as low-income and marginalized students (Villa & Duarte, 2005). Within conflict contexts, Barrera-Osorio (2009) highlighted concessionary schools in Colombia as successful in reducing drop-out rates and producing education attainment, as measured through test scores, on par with the public sector.

Faith-Based Schools

Faith-based schools are education institutions managed by religious organizations and may include a religious education in varying degrees. Although there has been mixed results from evaluations comparing faith-based and secular schools with no clear patterns identified regarding the factors affecting quality, affordable, private faith-based schools may offer opportunities to increase access, particularly in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Faith-based schools are often present during and after conflict and may be the only education option available during these periods (Bekalo, et al, 2003). They have a large market share of the schools in many developing countries, are locally-embedded and have established the community's trust, and have made long-term commitments, such as in Bangladesh (Asadullah, et al, 2009), Haiti (Paul, 2011), Sub-Saharan Africa (Rose, 2002), the DRC (Backiny-Yetna & Wodon, 2009; and Titeca & De Herdt, 2011) and Sierra Leone (Wodon & Ying, 2009). Additionally, because they have established community networks, are committed to reaching the poorest children, and may have the ability to raise funding through external connections, faith-based schools may be better positioned to connect with local communities and provide access to the most marginalized groups through sustained development efforts (Wodon & Ying, 2009; and van Ommering, 2009). Although no exemplary faith-based schooling model was identified in the literature, the benefits that faith-based schools have in engaging the community suggest that there is potential for achieving access and quality through these institutions.

COMMONALITIES ACROSS MODELS

Although there are a variety of models that have the potential to increase access to quality education, certain commonalities emerged that may offer starting points for understanding models that have a greater likelihood of being successful in conflict/crises: long-term financial sustainability, local community input, and flexibility in design.

Financial sustainability is a challenge for APS, but some exemplary models demonstrate that having long-term financial commitment such as through government funding or partnerships, and donors or business income can sustain the operations of the schools. In reality, these options are limited to the few large-scale, well-known successful providers. Although for-profit chain schools have also seen promising results, effective examples of chain school provision in conflict and crises have yet to emerge.

Another commonality found among exemplary models encompasses the involvement of the community in the design, management and implementation of schools. Community input promotes buy-in, incorporates community objectives, and allows problems that hinder access and quality to be addressed during the initial implementation stages. Because faith-based schools are already entrenched in the community, especially in conflict areas, they may offer an opportunity for deeper engagement with the community and more successful education delivery. It is clear that regardless of the means of delivery, APS in conflict contexts are most successful when the community is engaged.

Finally, exemplary models point to the importance of flexibility in addressing the needs of marginalized and excluded children, such as adapting the school calendar to fit the schedule of students, or increasing

a community's proximity to a school. Particularly in unstable circumstances where children require flexibility in learning, schooling should be adapted to the local environmental context.

As the previous section highlights, governments need to be flexible in the degree and manner of engagement with APS. Likewise, the exemplary models identified in this section are not to be implemented exclusively nor are they guaranteed to be successful in all contexts. The goal and context of education provision will help to determine which model should be used. Vouchers and scholarships require sufficient seats in private schools to absorb an increase in enrollment, and private schools ability to accept public finance, which may be delayed (LaRocque, 2011). Vouchers and scholarships may be better at addressing access for disadvantaged groups than contracting provision out, which may be better at addressing access for a specific geographic area, such as rural areas where there are fewer public schools (LaRocque, 2011). Thus, the education strategy can encompass multiple models and the models used may evolve as the education sector develops.

Although the challenges in post-conflict situations are further enhanced, education provision has seen successes, indicating that it is possible to provide quality access even in the most challenging situations. However, there is no clear, best model for APS education delivery in conflict, and no clarity on the best universal inputs or conditions necessary for successful education delivery. Governments can support education delivery by partnering with APS to fund, scale, and encourage design and delivery that ensures that the needs and objectives of the community are prioritized.

KEY RESOURCES FOR EXEMPLARY APS MODELS

Heyneman, S.P., Stern, J.M.B, and Smith, T.M. (2011, May). *The Search for Effective EFA Policies: The role of private schools for low-income children*. Washington, DC: USAID. Available at <http://www.idpfoundation.org/News/USAIDEFAReporMay2011.pdf>

LaRocque, N. (2008). *Public-private partnerships in basic education: An international review*, Berkshire, UK: CfBT Education Services. Retrieved from http://www.azimpremjifoundation.org/pdf/ppp_report.pdf

7. Are there prerequisites that must be in place within crisis/conflict countries to ensure sustainable investments in APS?⁴

The literature examined has shown that APS in crisis/conflict countries can be a source of quality education, “islands of excellence” (Pick et al., 2008; Banos, 2008) that grant access to the poorest and marginalized sectors of the population. Although the demand of APS is high as a result of a weakened public education system, the environmental context and governments can create barriers to halt their growth and expansion. Innovative models, supports through private-public partnerships, and other sources of funding may enable APS to operate in these environments but their sustainability depends on a number of factors. In an in-depth systematic review⁵ of over 40 articles and documents related to low-cost private schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Barakat et al. (2013) found that four factors were essential to the sustainability of APS: 1) the ability of the school to maintain enrollment; 2) the school's location; 3) operating costs (e.g., teacher wages); and 4) whether the school was established in response to the needs of the community.

One of the most important elements to ensure sustainability was for APS to set school fees at a level that was affordable to parents within the community (Alderman, Kim, Orazem, 2003; Liang, 1996; Harma, 2011). Sustaining APS therefore requires an assessment to determine the fee level that is deemed affordable by the community in which the school is established (issue of affordability is discussed in a previous section above).

The second factor, the location of the school, is also directly related to enrollment. In rural areas, for example, the number of school-going children tends to be lower because of the more dispersed rural populations (Lloyd et al., 2005; Rose, 2007). This is coupled with the fact that parents in rural areas, who are often uneducated and very poor, are reluctant to pay for their children's education (Tooley & Dixon, 2005; Lloyd et al., 2005). For these parents, the opportunity cost of education is too high (Akaguri & Akyeampong, 2010). Also, recruiting teachers for these schools is challenging because of the schools' remote rural locations (Andrabi, 2006). Therefore, before establishing APS in a rural area, one must assess the target population and examine if a school is warranted in the community given the school-age population and the community's desire for a school.

It is not surprising that the operating costs of APS, the third factor, will impact their long-term viability. In order to maintain operations and charge low fees, APS keep operating costs low by paying teachers low wages (Andrabi et al. 2006; Alderman, Kim, Orazem, 2003). They are able to offer low wages because they tend to employ female teachers or less qualified and trained teachers who have limited employment opportunities in these rural areas (Andrabi et al., 2006 and 2007). Low-fee private schools can therefore be sustainable if they keep costs low, therefore keeping fees low to help maintain enrollment. One important concern however, is how maintaining this low cost impacts on the quality of education delivered.

The last factor examines the importance of community support for the establishment of APS. Having community support for APS is crucial for them to continue to function, long-term (Liang, 1996; Aga Khan Foundation, 2007; Samoff, Dembélé, Sebatane, 2011). When an APS is established in response to a community need, this community support contributes greatly to its staying power because community

4. Section draws from Barakat, S., Hardman, F., Rohwerder, B., and Rzeszut, K (2013) The evidence for the sustainable scale-up of low-cost private schools in South West Asia. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London.

5. In Barakat et al. (2013) review, a sustainable school is defined “as a school that is able to stay open for at least the length of a school cycle, with decreasing external financial support from outside agencies (such as the government, international aid organizations and NGOs).” Due to lack of literature on the subject in their focus region, South and West Asia, the review expanded this definition to consider a school sustainable if it remained in operation for at least three years.

members will become more invested in the school's success. This is especially true when the school is the result of a community initiative or demand-driven.

When these factors exist, APS are more likely to be sustainable. Successful models and initiatives may also be scaled-up to reach a larger beneficiary pool. Scaling –up or expanding a successful model or intervention also requires community participation. According to the systematic review⁶ conducted by Barakat and al. (2013), community participation by influential groups such as women groups within the community contributed to the successful scale up of LSPS in the studies they examined (Johnson, Bowles ,2010; Samoff, Dembélé, Sebatane, 2011). In addition, review findings showed that support of every kind including infrastructure; governmental support in terms of political support, regulatory and statutory mechanisms, financial backing; and external supports and networks are essential for scale-up of APS models (Alderman, Kim, Orazem, 2003; Tooley, 2009; Samoff, Dembélé, Sebatane (2011).

Evaluating the specific needs of a community was also found to be essential to a successful scale-up. The scale-up needs to take into account the varied needs and context of the environment, especially in dynamic crisis/conflict environments and not try to try to utilize a one-size fits all model. For example scale-up needs to assess the organizational capacity and infrastructure that exists within the environment to support a scale-up.

Capacity building support for APS's and the community are also pre-requisites for scale up. The review found that an APS structure or model was more likely to be scaled up if it had an effective management or charismatic leadership that responded favorably to feedback and evaluations with the use of transparent and accountable mechanisms (Tooley, 2009; Samoff, Dembélé, Sebatane (2011).

Successful scale up requires an acute awareness of the political and social characteristics of the implementation environment and most importantly how those factors influence the delivery of education, preferable with research gathered from a pilot program (Alderman, Kim, Orazem, 2003; Tooley, 2007; Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2011) . In addition, in order to make the scale up sustainable, APS would need to have realistic expectations of potential disruptions to the schools due to political or other crisis situations and not expand beyond its budget or the needs of the community.

KEY RESOURCES ON SUSTAINABLE APS

Barakat, S., Hardman, F., Rohwerder, B., and Rzeszut, K. (2013, April). *Low-cost private schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan: What evidence to support sustainable scale-up?* [Draft report]. London: DFID.

6. In Barakat et al. (2013) review scale-up refers to “expanding education provision to more children, especially those currently out of education, and the offering of a choice of quality education solutions.”

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LITERATURE SEARCH

Even the casual reader of the findings from the above literature search must be impressed with the complexity of the APS sector, especially in post-crisis/conflict environments. Given the complexity, it is difficult to discern a clear path for donors aiming to capitalize on the APS movement and improve education in a post-crisis/conflict country. Moreover, the path for donor assistance in any specific country should be determined by the peculiar conditions in that environment. Having noted that the donor response may be different in each crisis/conflict country, however, there are lessons learned from the literature review that suggest some policy and program options for donors.

Tradeoffs in quality and cost. In most countries, both the best and worst schools are private schools. In many developing and crisis/conflict countries, a very limited number of private schools are excellent institutions offering world-class educational services, while the vast majority of the other private schools offer mediocre to poor educational services, sometimes on par with government schools but frequently offering services that are sub-standard. With few exceptions, one must have to pay for quality, and low-cost, quality private schools are very difficult to achieve in post-crisis/conflict countries.

Rush to return to normalcy. Many see one of the main objectives in the early stages of countries recovering from crisis/conflict is to return to “normal life” as quickly as possible. Often that means getting the school system “up and running” as soon as possible. This may mean ignoring, in the short-run, the problems of a dearth of trained teachers, the lack of teaching and learning materials, and the bombed-out or damaged buildings. The rush to normalcy often discounts the level of effort needed to develop the capacity within the Ministry of Education or within the private schools sector to return to normal operating capacity. In many post-crisis/conflict countries, ten years or more after the cessation of the problem the Ministry of Education and the private school sub-sector are still suffering from a host of technical, managerial, and financial management problems, owing from the lack of capacity within the respective institutions. In countries in the early-stage of recovery attention to capacity building may forestall problems in the medium- to long-term.

Serious managerial and financial problems. Private sector schools and associations of private sector schools in both developing and crisis/conflict countries often have serious but solvable financial and managerial problems. Limited to revenue mostly tuition payments paid bi-annually, all but the very best (and generally solvent) private schools, use primitive accounting financial management and administrative systems. Few private schools have developed business plans and/or received loans from banks and most are operated as sole proprietorships and enlist limited support from the community they serve. Although many private school proprietors are nominally educated, few have training in administrative or school management and often lack a focus on improving the quality of the school. Huge returns and efficiency gains are likely from improving the management and leadership skills of private school proprietors and the umbrella organizations that serve them.

Role of the government critical. Governments at the central and regional levels within developing and crisis/conflict countries range from benign neglect to open hostility toward the private schools sector. Most governments see the private school sector as competing for scarce educational financial and human resources and, given the generally poor conditions of the government-run schools, are loath to allocate or share resources with institutions that are seen to support the upper classes. Efforts to develop partnerships between associations of private sector schools and governments, wherein the government moves toward a regulator/facilitator of private schools, can create conditions for rapid growth of quality education.

POLICY AND PROGRAM OPTIONS

Given these findings and conclusions, there are a myriad of policy and program options open to donors. Obviously the specific responses of donors should be tailored by the peculiar constraints and problems of the host country circumstances. Nevertheless, assuming that donors in a post-crisis/conflict country are faced with a government with meager resources, and an education system with low net enrollment producing poor quality educational services, some of the options that might be considered are:

Situation analysis. If little is known about the private schools sector in the post crisis/conflict country, the donor should consider commissioning an analysis of the constraints and needs of the private schools sector. Particular attention should be paid to the needs of different levels and types of schools, the needs of national and regional private school sector umbrella organizations, the standard management and operating practices of schools and lending institutions, and the relationship between the private schools sector and the government (Ministry of Education).

Analysis of capacity. The donor should carefully examine the capacity of the Ministry of Education as well as the private schools sector to carry out the delivery of education services in the post-crisis/conflict era. Among other things, the donors should examine the ability of the Ministry of Education at central, provincial and district level to develop policy and implement programs. If the analysis suggests that the Ministry is too weak to successfully carry out the implementation of programs, the donor should consider a capacity building program focusing on developing the systems, and management practices needed to operate an educational system. The program should also involve the private sector schools but may wish to focus on the particular problems faced by sole proprietorship schools, such as, how to develop a business plan and successful practices to develop quality education.

Develop joint training programs. Using knowledgeable contractors and NGOs, develop a series of practical training programs that build on each other and lead to a recognizable credential for education system management and administration. Deliver the program in a manner open to both government and private sector administrators.

Map an optimum role for government and the private sector cooperation in the delivery of quality education services. Develop a strategic plan and actionable steps to achieve the desired roles for both parties and get buy-in from all parties. Donors should provide incentives to all parties to reach the desired roles and objectives.

Develop educational leaders and visionaries. Provide opportunities for advanced degrees, observation yours and work/study tours of exemplary programs in other countries.

Resist the temptation to rush into projects that offer bold promises of a return to normalcy. Rebuilding an education system takes time. Often standard operating practices need to be relearned or established and, in most crisis/conflict countries the institutional memory and personnel needed to just return to normal no longer is in place. Donors need to start small and build on success. Rather than spreading the resources superficially across the whole system, donors should focus resources and concentrate on achieving building blocks for the future.